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Introduction
“Wisdom is to know, that you do not know.”
Socrates
Preface
uWhere there are threats o f serious or irreversible damagef lack o f fuU 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost- 
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. ”
Principle 15 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, Rio de Janeiro, 1992._______________________________________________
The words ‘precaution’ and ‘principle’ hold far less meaning than the tool that fuses both 
concepts as the precautionary principle. On the face of it, the precautionary principle can 
be seen as a manifestation of the sentiment that we should behave in a morally- 
responsibly manner, and, with environmental protection at its focus, it encourages 
anticipatory conduct in response to scientifically-plausible hazards. Essentially, it is 
adverse to a wait-and-see strategy in relation to health and environmental risk, and its 
intuitive appeal lies in its widely accepted philosophy that erring on the side of safety is 
socially desirable. Yet, whilst the underlying message of prudence is a seemingly 
obvious and simple approach to the future, it has been subject to fierce debate amongst 
academic circles. For the most part, disputes have centred on the meaning and scope of 
the precautionary principle, aiming to clarify the nature and extent of precautionary 
action and determine the hazards to which the principle might apply. It is interesting, and 
telling, that some two decades after the emergence of the precautionary principle, 
questions relating to its precise intent, interpretation and implication remain unresolved. 
In spite of the fact that the notion of precaution is a universally-intrinsic element of 
human perception of the unknown, the task of translating notions of prudence and caution 
into a workable instrument of law and policy has presented enormous challenges. 
Consequently, there is a rich and extensive literature attempting to determine what 
‘precautionary action’ entails.
This thesis departs from the bulk of precautionary-literature by focusing primarily on the 
threshold of evidence required before the principle is invoked. Whilst it is mindful of the 
indeterminacy of other aspects of the precautionary principle, such as the operation of 
cost-benefit analysis provisos, and the distinction between precaution and prevention, the 
originality of this work lies in its investigation of the point at which we enter into
precautionary territory. It presents the precautionary principle in the light of a distinction 
traditionally made by the formal discourse of science between risk and uncertainty. In 
this respect, the precautionary principle is often perceived as a decision algorithm; 
applying in the face of uncertainty, but not in response to risk. It is frequently cited as a 
component of the risk analysis process, and to that end it is understood as determining 
which measures might be adopted in relation to impending hazards.
It is of central importance that, in practice, the application of the precautionary principle 
is governed by a technical distinction between risk and uncertainty. A critical feature of 
definitions of the precautionary principle, overlooked by existing literature, is their 
failure to qualify their use of the term ‘uncertainty’. Academic commentators have long 
recognised the existence of a taxonomy of uncertainty, differentiating between 
insufficiency, inconclusiveness, contradiction, indeterminacy, ambiguity, and ignorance. 
Yet, in spite of the distinct categories into which incertitude is arranged, the 
precautionary principle is deemed to operate in response to ‘uncertainty’ without 
qualification as to its specific type and degree. As a result, the operation of precaution 
rests on a crude division between risk and uncertainty. It is conceivable that this broad 
distinction is reflective of the inability of scientific risk assessment procedures to 
acknowledge various levels of incertitude. Indeed, the nature of scientific investigation is 
such that it focuses on what is known, rather than what is unknown. This is displayed by 
risk assessment which is essentially a reductionist process through which future hazards 
are expressed in a single risk estimate. It relies on observations of the past as a means of 
predicting the occurrence and scale of future hazards that are expected to transpire in a 
similar manner.
A problem arises, however, when impending hazards bearing little or no resemblance to 
past incidents emerge. As it stands, risk assessment is incapable of acknowledging that 
unrecognised risks are still risks; that uncertain risks are still risks; and that denied risks 
are still risks.1 Lacking evidence of risk in the past means that similar future hazards may
1 Caims Jnr, J. Editorial: ‘Absence of Certainty is Not Synonymous With Absence of Risk’ (1999) 107(2) 
Environmental Health Perspectives 56-58, at page 56.
be, by default, deemed to be safe. The upshot is what is known as a ‘false negative 
error’. Choosing not to act upon a hazard that later proves to be valid is, in effect, anti- 
precautionary, and renders susceptible the environment or human health to harm and 
substantial remediation costs.2 Yet, the inability of risk assessment to envisage hazards 
that are not directly comparable to the past rather limits its role in making educated 
guesses about the future. Scientific discourse has not yet developed the rhetoric with 
which to express levels of incertitude that exist beyond reference to known unknowns. It 
is unable to articulate human ignorance, contradictory evidence, and ambiguity. 
Scientific risk assessment, therefore, limits the application of precaution to hazards that 
present scientifically-plausible threat based on existing evidence of the past.
The inappropriateness of the precautionary principle as a tool for establishing 
responsibility for the impact of environmental decision-making becomes apparent. This 
is not simply because it lacks definitional specificity, but also because the tendency for 
decision-making institutions to frame the future as a known quantity denies the existence 
of incertitude, creating a conceptual conflict with the aspirations of precaution. Despite 
claims that it redresses the limits of scientific inquiry, the operation of the precautionary 
principle is curtailed unless those institutions detach themselves from their deeply 
embedded deterministic and rational roots. In relation to the precautionary principle, 
therefore, the application of scientific risk assessment in identifying and calculating the 
impact of hazards might be described as ‘paralysis by analysis’.
2 False positive errors on the other hand are, although potentially costly, entirely consistent with the notion 
of precaution. See Underwood, A. J. and Chapman, M. G. ‘Power, Precaution, Type II Error and Sampling 
Design in Assessment of Environmental Impacts’ (2003) 296(1) Journal of Experimental Marine Biology 
and Ecology 49-70, at page 59.
Setting the scene
“77ie Law is the killy-loo bird o f the sciences. The killy-loo, o f course, was 
the bird that insisted on flying backwards because it didn’t care where it was 
going but was mightily interested in where it had been”3
A developed legal system inevitably shapes the nature of risks to which society is 
exposed, and determines the type of response to those that materialise. To that end, the 
law, as a means of controlling the production of risk and defining responsibility, is a 
crucial tool for colonising the future. It is critical to our understanding of what 
constitutes an undesirable threat and to setting limits to so-called risky activities. Our 
attitudes to risk very according to what we expect, and the law is fundamental in 
establishing the expected occurrence and impact of impending hazards and in generating 
norms of conduct to minimise damage and attribute liability. Traditionally, in the context 
of environmental protection, the law has adopted either a ‘command and control’ 
approach through public law or techniques based on private rights. The notion of 
command and control envisages a system in which control is centrally held and applied 
using Government regulations that ascertain the limits of risk-inducing activities. It 
empowers appropriate authorities to monitor compliance, and imposes criminal and 
regulatory penalties for non-compliance. A system based on private rights, on the other 
hand, assigns responsibility to those who own the risk-producing facilities through 
property or contract law. It relies on the law of torts to enable an injured person to seek 
compensatory damage or injunctive relief for the impact of a hazard, either by assigning 
liability to the party owning risk-producing facilities, or to a party bound by contractual 
terms that rearrange the terms of responsibility for a risky activity.
It is important to note that no legal system reflects a pure vision of either ‘command and 
control’ or ‘private rights’ techniques in risk aversion. Environmental protection is 
accomplished using a myriad of legal instruments. As a preface to considering the
3 Rodell, F. Woe Unto You, Lawyers! (Fred B. Rothman & Co.; Littleton, Colorado; 2nd edition; 1987) 
chapter 2, at page 20
relationship between the law and the concept of risk, it is useful to consider that the 
implementation of legal tools in environmental protection is governed by technical, 
scientific analyses of risk. For example, regulations imposed in accordance with 
command and control theory might stipulate that chemical emissions must not exceed a 
specific amount, or that concentrations of pesticides used on crops must remain within 
certain limits. These levels are invariably scientifically-determined. By the same token, 
establishing liability under private property or contract law is a matter for the logical 
underpinnings of scientific enterprise. Locating the source of pollutants, for example, or 
proving a causative link between source and receptor, depend on scientific threshold of 
detectability, or the lowest margins of statistical significance. It is essential that, in order 
to attribute responsibility, the law is dependent on scientifically accurate and objective 
claims. The law cannot make normative statements without recourse to scientifically 
certain knowledge. In order to attain legitimacy, legal rules and procedures are 
inescapably reliant on the authority of scientific expertise. The law is justifiable if it is 
supported by rational, objective, and certain information deriving from scientific 
investigation. The acceptance of legal action as legitimate derives from the innate 
authority of scientific order reflecting tenets that are central to the notion of ‘sound 
science’. Environmental protection using law and policy, therefore, lies on the frontiers 
of scientific knowledge.4
However, the test of scientific endeavour, according to Langmuir, is the ‘test of time’.5 
Modernity has manifested in new strains of environmental hazard, generated by a marked 
upsurge in technological enterprise. Traditionally, scientific means of predicting the 
occurrence and magnate of potential hazards were employed using templates of past 
events to calculate the future. Science is, in essence, a study of regularities. Yet, the 
novelty with which hazards in the modem era present themselves means that they are 
incomparable with the past. As such, scientific foresight is incapable of anticipating the 
future in any meaningful sense. Furthermore, given that the test of scientific endeavour is
4 See, for example, McEldowney, J. ‘The Environment, Science, and Law’ (1998) 1 Current Legal Issues 
109-127, at page 109.
5 Langmuir, I. ‘Pathological Science’, Colloquium at The Knolls Research Laboratory, 18 December 1953, 
transcribed and edited by Hall, R. N., as cited in Huber, P. W. ‘Pathological Science in Court’, in Burger, 
E. J. (ed) Risk (University of Michigan Press; Michigan; 1993) 97-118, at page 104
the test of time, the impact of scientific and technological advance cannot be known until 
it materialises. As Langmuir points out that:-
“[ejverybody thought [Pasteur] was a fool -  thought there couldn’t be any
sense to the subject. It took a long time before germs were believed in.”6
Scientific progress in the modem era is exaggerated, resulting in threats to human health 
and the environment whose impact is scientifically uncertain until they have transpired. 
The dependency of legal intervention on scientific evidence, therefore, comes under 
attack. Although the nature of law in the environmental sphere is contingent on scientific 
constructions of risk, science is, in fact, unable to articulate the future with the certitude 
that the law demands. Despite the fact that the formal discourse of science claims to have 
the capacity to know the future through statistical projections, its capacity is seriously 
undermined by the unknown long-term impact of modem hazards, an incomplete 
knowledge of what is known and what is not known, and the improper application of the 
past to a dissimilar future.
A destabilised scientific basis has potentially severe consequences for the application of 
law in the face of environmental threats. The limits of scientific knowledge in predicting 
the future puts in jeopardy the conventionally-constructed legitimacy of law. It exposes 
the law to claims that its intervention in the course of hazards is unjustifiable, thus 
challenging its innate authority and long-standing supremacy in the articulation of the 
future. It is perhaps surprising, therefore, that, given the flaws in scientific analyses of 
the future, the law has continued to found itself on scientific prediction as a means of 
securing formal legitimacy. However, the scientific legitimation of law is not a process 
that depends on the accuracy with which the future can be foreseen. Instead, legitimation 
is the product of the formal discourse of science and its central tenets such as rationality, 
objectivity, and certitude. By relying on the principles of ‘sound science’, the legal 
regulation of risk can maintain its assertions of rational, objective, and certain responses 
to environmental hazards.
The precautionary principle forces a re-evaluation of the traditional relationship between 
law and science. Although the law has staked a claim in the precautionary principle, 
there exist clear tensions between the legal ideals of scientific certitude and the 
precautionary perspective that the future is, in effect, unknown and incalculable. The 
impenetrable nature o f future hazards makes it difficult, if not impossible, to prescribe the 
type and level of prudence required by the precautionary principle. The upshot is that 
definitions and interpretations of precaution vary enormously. The first part of this thesis 
explores the definitional deficit o f the precautionary principle in international, EC and 
domestic spheres of risk regulation. It charts its emergence in law and policy at each of 
these levels, and focuses specifically on judicial interpretations of its application. The 
overriding contention is that a fundamental implication of this definitional deficit is 
inconsistency in the way the relationship between precaution and scientific risk 
assessment is perceived.
The second part of this thesis shows continues with this theme, introducing the 
precautionary principle and scientific assessment in the light of an extensive body of risk 
literature. It illustrates that, as a result of lacking consensus regarding its meaning and 
scope, establishing the point at which the precautionary principle applies is an unresolved 
and contentious issue. Generally, the invocation of the principle is seen as a matter for 
scientific determination. In practice, risk assessment processes are employed as a means 
of ascertaining whether an impending hazard can be described as a ‘risk* or an 
‘uncertainty*. This binary distinction between risk and uncertainty is founded on the 
notion that risks can be calculated using scientific modes of prediction, although 
uncertainty is innately incalculable because there is a ‘data gap’7 limiting our 
understanding of the nature and impact of an expected threat. The risk/uncertainty 
dichotomy can be described as a difference in the certitude with which they can be 
expressed. Whereas, according to risk assessment formulae, risk can be articulated with 
scientific certitude, the notion o f uncertainty is used to depict future events whose
7 a term used by Professor John S. Applegate in his seminar presentation entitled ‘The Chemical Data Gap 
-  Risk, REACH, and Precaution* at the ESRC-fimded ‘Business, Relations, Sustainability and Society’ 
(BRASS) Centre, Cardiff, 19 May 2005
occurrence and scale cannot be conveyed using precise and definite statistics. The 
precautionary principle is intended to apply only in anticipation of scientific w/zcertainty.
Yet, despite a longstanding reliance on scientific risk assessment procedures as the 
principal mechanism through which the future might be comprehended, this thesis 
submits that the cardinal distinction between risk and uncertainty is flawed. The heart of 
the problem is the outright dependence of definitions of risk on scientific process. By 
virtue of its utilisation of scientific methods of enquiry, risk assessment reflects 
assumptions of rationality, objectivity and certitude that are traditionally associated with 
‘sound science’. Given that it claims to be a manifestation of scientific ideals, risk 
assessment procedures are understood as producing rational, objective, and certain 
expressions of the future. The underlying belief is that scientific investigation is an 
abstract and impartial channel through which reality, or ‘the truth’, can be exposed. 
Quantification is considered to be the most rational means of expressing scientific 
insight, and, as a result of the specificity imparted by numerical characterisations of the 
future, scientific prediction is seen as providing an objective account of prospective 
events. Through claims to rationality and objectivity, scientific enterprise is looked upon 
as presenting certain findings -  in the sense that they were generated without recourse to 
individual bias and are only capable of possessing a single meaning.
This thesis illustrates that science is essentially a social process, thus undermining claims 
made by its formal discourse to rationality, objectivity and certitude. It is shown that 
subjectivity is an inevitable component of scientific investigation, and that findings are 
inexorably informed by individual preference and prejudice. Consequently, scientific 
constructions of reality are meaningful only in the context within which they were 
generated. Naturally, given that it is founded on scientific process, risk assessment is 
subject to similar criticism. Despite the fact that risk assessment professes to craft 
objective and certain articulations of future hazards, this thesis demonstrates that risk is, 
in effect, a socially-constructed concept whose existence is governed by subjective 
perception. With particular reference to sociological theories of risk, it is shown that 
scientific risk assessment is described as an inappropriate tool for predicting the unknown
and that risk is an incalculable phenomenon. Both Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens see 
the emergence of uncontrollable and unpredictable risk as marking the onset of 
modernity. Achieving an objectively certain calculation of risk is curtailed by the 
limitations of human foresight. The advent of the post-industrial modem phase has 
accentuated the shortcomings of prediction by giving rise to new dangers bom of 
technological progression. Although conventional models of scientific risk assessment 
tend to use observations of past events to predict threats that are expected to materialise 
in a similar manner, the modem era spawns novel risks that have no footing in the past. 
As a result, the future is an inaccessible entity, and predictions of the unknown are 
meaningless.
Thus, regardless of the fact that scientific risk assessment processes reflect the 
assumption that the future will mirror the past, our knowledge of the future is, quite 
simply, imperfect. At a press briefing in February 2004, Donald Rumsfeld, US Defence 
Secretary, announced that:-
“[r]eports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to 
me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know 
we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know 
there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns
Q
-  the ones we don’t know we don’t know.”
Although his statement has become renowned for its poor articulation of the future, it is 
useful in highlighting the rhetorical difficulties encountered in dealing with events that 
have not yet materialised. Indeed, it can be said that the modem era can be distinguished 
by its fixation with putting the future at the service of the present.9 As Bernstein’s 
extraordinary historical account illustrates, the mastery of risk has been pivotal in 
marking the transition from ‘the past’ to ‘modem times’.10 To that end, the concept of
8 Donald Rumsfeld, US News Briefing, 12 February 2004.
9 Bernstein, P.L. Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story o f Risk (John Wiley & Sons; New York; 1996) at 
page 1
10 ibid.
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risk is caught up in measures of time, and the ability to define what might happen in the 
future using the rhetoric of risk is central to what is commonly referred to as 
contemporary society.
The focus of this thesis is the dialogue with which we engage with the future. It is widely 
accepted that the conventional means of engaging with the unknown is through 
definitions of risk. The overriding argument here is that the rhetoric of risk is exclusive 
in its approach to the future. In its characterisation of future events as risks, it assigns 
numerical values to essentially unknown occurrences. By applying an inherently 
scientific mathematical model to define the future, the rhetoric of risk effectively 
marginalises uncertainty. Despite the fact that the existence and influence of uncertainty 
is universal, the rhetoric of risk is not equipped with devices through which to articulate 
the fact that the unknown cannot be meaningfully quantified or known.
The issue can be reduced to determining the extent to which the past ascertains the future. 
According to scientific modes of risk assessment, numerical expressions of observations 
of past events are crucial in establishing the course of the future. From this perspective, 
the notion of scientific certainty in the past is imperative to the legitimacy of predictions 
of future risk. Thus, scientific certainty and risk are seen as inescapably intertwined 
mechanisms for demarcating the future.
This thesis can be described as interdisciplinary in its approach. It introduces the 
precautionary principle in various contexts: in international, EC, and domestic law and 
policy; against a backdrop of both scientific and economic constructions of risk; in the 
light of the technical distinction between risk and uncertainty; with regard to the 
objective/subjective dichotomy in risk definitions; in relation to theories of modernity; 
and taking into account the claims of the principles underlying social constructivism. 
The basic premise is that the definition of ‘risk’ espoused by scientific domains is 
conceptually inconsistent with the workings of the precautionary principle, and, for as 
long as scientific means of risk assessment continue to dominate predictions of the future, 
the precautionary principle is unworkable as a tool for attributing responsibility for the
latent impacts of decision-making. The inappropriateness of the precautionary principle 
as a component of scientifically-informed analysis is illustrated in a comprehensive study 
of the BSE crisis.
The overriding premise is that the conflict between the precautionary principle and 
scientific risk assessment exists in the way they perceive the future. Whereas, 
traditionally, risk assessment looks to the past to ascertain the future, the precautionary 
principle is forward-looking and anticipatory. Furthermore, although scientific prediction 
is based on what we know, the focus of precaution is what we do not know. Although 
much literature has either overlooked or discounted the discrepancy between scientific 
and precautionary-thinking, the conflict is fundamental to this thesis.
A BSE case study in Part Three provides an ideal forum upon which this theory is tested. 
An examination of the institutional handling of the epidemic illustrates that scientific 
knowledge of the disease was given precedence in predicting its nature and impact, in 
spite of the fact that epidemiological and pathological information about BSE was 
obviously inadequate. Moreover, notwithstanding claims made by the Government that it 
had adopted a precautionary approach to BSE, the legislative response to the disease 
displayed preventive, rather than precautionary, traits. Rather than acknowledging that 
BSE posed a potential, although scientifically uncertain, danger to human health, the 
threat of transmissibility to humans came to be presented as a known risk. Thus, 
legislation adopted in response to the disease was aimed at specific, scientifically- 
determined risks, and can therefore be described as upholding the notion of hazard 
prevention, as opposed to precaution. As a direct result of its overt reliance on scientific 
understandings of BSE, legal measures introduced by the Government were reactive, not 
anticipatory. The underlying argument is that the implementation of legislative 
responses to an impending hazard is necessarily contingent on there being scientific 
certainty in relation to its existence and magnitude. Accordingly, it can be said that the 
law mediates uncertainty through scientific discourse. Science, in turn, mediates 
uncertainty by framing the future as a known quantity.
This creates a conceptual conflict with the aspirations of precaution. Despite claims that 
it redresses the limits of scientific inquiry, the precautionary principle is essentially 
unworkable unless decision-making institutions detach themselves from their deeply 
embedded deterministic and rational roots. The inability of scientific prediction to 
meaningfully calculate the future, together with the practice of utilisation of scientific 
risk assessment to determine the application of the precautionary principle, effectively 
restricts the implication of the precautionary principle. Although it provides an appealing 
ethos of environmental protection, its ability to curb the consequences of the limits of 
human foresight is inhibited by the shortfalls of the scientific process upon which it is 
based. The upshot is that, whilst the precautionary principle might cultivate a broad- 
spectrum philosophy of prudence, its ability to demand caution in the face of uncertainty 
is curtailed by the reliance of both scientific process and legal regulation on certitude.
Why BSE?
The BSE crisis was chosen as a case study for three principal reasons. First, the episode 
has achieved a degree of closure, and thus events lend themselves to a historical study 
confined to a period of approximately ten years. In practical terms, this has inevitably 
made it possible to limit the study to a preset timescale. Secondly, the setting up of the 
BSE Inquiry, chaired by Sir Nicolas Phillips, has resulted in the creation of a substantial 
archive of information examining the factual history of BSE and CJD, documenting the 
responses taken in the context of the state of knowledge at that time. For research 
purposes, therefore, access to the BSE Inquiry website its collection of letters, 
memorandum, minutes of departmental meetings, written witness statements, and 
transcripts of oral hearings has allowed for an empirical study based on a wide range of 
existing material. Thirdly, events during the BSE crisis are unique in that they bring 
together broad themes such as: the relationship between risk analysis and science; the 
affiliation between science and regulation through the law; the interpretation of scientific 
findings through different media; and the role of precaution in scientific risk assessment; 
as well as more specific issues including the role of MAFF in controlling epidemics; the
xiv
impact of pressure from the agricultural export industry on decision-making; and public 
perceptions of food safety.
The BSE study aims to bring together findings reached in preceding chapters -  
principally that the operation of the precautionary principle is thwarted by factors beyond 
mere definitional deficit. Using two theories -  first, the theory of the ‘marginalisation of 
uncertainty’, and second the theory of the ‘bureaucracy of risk’ -  the BSE analysis 
provides a platform upon which the theoretical backdrop to the precautionary principle 
discussed in Chapters Six to Nine can be seen to materialise. In particular, the following 
themes identified in Part Two of the thesis hold particular resonance in relation to events 
leading up to, and following, the identification of BSE in 1986:- (i) the maintenance of 
the conceptual distinction between risk and uncertainty in formal assessments of the 
threat of BSE to human health; (ii) the misapplication of the term ‘risk’ to include 
unparalleled and scientifically-uncertain hazards; (iii) the reliance of MAFF risk 
assessment on scientific means of prediction; and (iv) the scientific practice of basing risk 
assessment on observations of past events, illustrated by an analogy drawn by 
Government scientists between scrapie and BSE.
Methodology
The raison d ’etre of this thesis lies in the following sentiment: “The precautionary 
principle is essentially a workable concept”. The thinking behind this piece of work 
began in October 2001 when I embarked upon an LL.B Environmental Law course at the 
University of Bristol Law Department. It is here that I was introduced to the 
precautionary principle. I chose to write an essay on the ‘justiciability’ of precaution -  a 
term coined by Elizabeth Fisher11 -  which examined the operation of the principle in the
1 *Jaftermath of the High Court decision in Duddridge. Although I was duly critical of the
11 See Fisher, E. ‘Is the Precautionary Principle Justiciable?’ (2001) 13(3) Journal of Environmental Law 
315-334.
12 R v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Duddridge 7 (1995) Journal of Environmental 
Law 224.
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application of Article 174(2) of the EC Treaty in domestic law, my work reflected the 
opinion that the precautionary principle was not only a desirable tool but also necessary 
in response to uncertain hazards. It is from this perspective that I approached my Ph.D 
studies. Initially, the purpose of my thesis was to illustrate the workability of the 
precautionary principle. However, during my first year of exploring existing literature 
and case law, and after thought-provoking discussions with my supervisor, Professor 
Robert Lee, my outlook changed fundamentally. My first impression of works focusing 
on the precautionary principle was that they unnecessarily overstated the impact of its 
lacking definition. Yet, as I became immersed in precautionary-literature, I found that an 
examination of the ‘definitional deficit’ of the precautionary principle was simply 
unavoidable, and inevitably essential to any in-depth study. My attention shifted, 
therefore, to an exploration of the extent and impact of its ambiguity.
A critical point in my studies was the issuing of the Pfizer13 judgment by the European 
Court of First Instance. It was at this stage that questions of definition became 
overshadowed by deep-seated issues such as the relationship between scientific risk 
assessment and precaution, and, more broadly, the union between law and science. It was 
apparent that, despite being a fundamental hindrance to the operation of the precautionary 
principle, the definitional deficit played only a relatively minor role in undermining its 
application compared with the inherent conflict between scientific risk assessment and 
precaution. Stemming from the theory that the formal discourse of science is 
incompatible with the ideals of precaution, the focus of my thesis duly shifted to proving 
that the precautionary principle is essentially w/iworkable if its application is determined 
solely by scientific means. This hypothesis was subsequently tested in a deductive 
manner. An examination of risk literature and a comprehensive case study of the BSE 
episode have been tailored to test the validity of my hypothesis. Whereas analyses of risk 
literature are largely theoretical in their approach, making reference to a wide range of 
academic commentaries, the BSE study draws upon empirical evidence provided by the 
Phillips Inquiry archive to illustrate the emergence of major themes such as the
13 Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council of the European Union. 11 September 2002. 
European Court Reports 2002 page 00000, at paragraphs 143-145.
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marginalisation of uncertainty and the incompatibility between aspirations of science and 
precaution.
Reference to documents made available by the Phillips Inquiry is consistent with the 
following categorisation. All evidence cited can be accessed via the official BSE Inquiry 
website (www.bseinquiry.gov.uk).
Category Abbreviation
Yearbook ‘YB’
Written witness statements ‘ Statement number ... ’ 
Statements numbered 1-638
Transcripts of oral hearings ‘Transcript number ... ’ 
Transcripts numbered 1-139
Initial background documents ‘IBD’
Part One
The definitional deficit of the precautionary principle
1
Chapter One
The precautionary principle: a rationale for its relativity
1.0 Introduction
The precautionary principle is a ubiquitous, but slippery, concept. There is an air of 
‘charming schizophrenia’1 about it. On the one hand, it is celebrated as a 
‘cornerstone ’,2 as ‘the fundamental principle’3 of environmental law and policy, at the 
forefront of the campaign for sustainable development. On the other, it criticized for 
being a notorious bone of contention, infamously vague and without concrete 
definition. Despite rapid escalation in its use and recognition, the precautionary 
principle is commonly regard as “a rather shambolic concept, muddled in policy 
advice and subject to whims of international diplomacy and the unpredictable public 
mood over the true cost of sustainable living.”4 Whilst it is undoubtedly growing in 
significance, it simultaneously generates increasing confusion and scepticism.
By and large, the precautionary principle is seen as a response to problems 
encountered in policy formulation in the face of scientific uncertainty.5 The 
underlying assumption is that “the damaging effects of human activities may become 
irreversible before the scientific community can agree the precise nature or scope of 
their impact; taking precautionary action can help avoid this.”6 It can be described as 
a symptom of modernity. Sociologists such as Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens 
illustrate how characteristics of modem society spawn new models of political discord
1 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, A. ‘The Silence of the Sirens: Environmental Risk and the 
Precautionary Principle’ (1999) 10(2) Law and Critique 175-197, at page 193.
2 Bergkamp, L. ‘Understanding the Precautionary Principle (Part I)’ (2002) 1 Env. Liability 18-30, at 
page 18.
Cameron, J. and Abouchar, J. ‘The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental Principle of Law and 
Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment’ (1991) 14 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev, 1-27, at 
page 2.
4 O’Riordan, T. and Cameron, J. (eds  ^ Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (Cameron May; 
London; 1994) at page 12.
5 Stallworthy, M. Sustainability, Land Use and Environment: A Legal Analysis (Cavendish; London; 
2002) at page 48.
6 Holder, J. ‘Safe Science? The Precautionary Principle in UK Environmental Law’, in Holder, J. 
Impact of EC Environmental Law in the UK (Wiley; Chichester; 1997) at page 123.
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in relation to risk and the unknown.7 The term ‘risk society’ has emerged to describe 
the new notion of a ‘non-industrial’ society. Crucial to its understanding is a marked 
increase in suspicion of the reliability of science stemming from deep-seated social
• Omalaise. The precautionary principle is perceived as having developed to counteract 
a loss of scientific authority. Von Moltke explains that:-
“[s]cience almost never provides clear proof of major environmental 
impacts because the environment is too complex to be comprehensively 
described in strictly scientific terms. For example, despite widespread 
acceptance of the firm hypothesis that greenhouse gases are capable of 
trapping heat exist, science remains almost incapable of answering critical 
questions concerning actual environmental responses to changes in their 
concentration in the atmosphere.”9
Thus, the notion of ‘precaution’ is an instrument for dealing with scientific 
uncertainty. Essentially, it is representative of the need to change human behaviour 
towards the environment that sustains our existence.10 It requires that decision­
makers act in advance of scientific certainty so as to prevent environmental 
degradation.11 Both in its conceptual core, and in its practical implications, the 
precautionary principle calls for the anticipation of harmful effects.12 It reflects the 
proverb that it is ‘better safe than sorry’. As Runciman points out:-
7 See Grove-White, R. ‘Risk Society, Politics and BSE’ in Franklin, J. (ed) The Politics of Risk Society 
(Polity Press; Cambridge; 1998) 50-53; Beck, U. ‘Politics of Risk Society’ in Franklin, J. (1998) 9-22; 
and Giddens, A. ‘Risk Society: The Context of British Politics’ , in Franklin, J. (1998) 23-34.
8 Roberts, S. ‘Future Directions in Green Political Thought -  Welcome to Jurassic Park: Science, 
Marxism and the Domination of Nature in the Lost World’, www.psa.ac.uk/cps/1998/roberts.pdf. 
accessed in June 2003, at page 6.
9 Von Moltke, K. ‘The Relationship between Policy, Science, Technology, Economics and Law’, in 
Freestone, D. and Hey, E. (eds) The Precautionary Principle in International Law: The Challenge of 
Implementation (Kluwer Law International; The Hague; 1996) Chapter 6, at page 98, emphasis added.
10 Cameron, J. and Wade-Grey, W. Addressing Uncertainty: Law, Policy and the Development of the 
Precautionary Principle, Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global Environment 
(CSERGE) Working Paper GEC 1992-43,
http://www.uea.ac.uk/env/cserge/pub/wp/gec/gec 1992 43.htm. accessed June 2003, at page 1.
11 See, for example, Tickner, J. ‘Precautionary Principle’, in 2(4) The Newsletter of the Science and 
Environmental Health Net, (May 1997).
12 Stein, P. L. Are Decision-Makers too Cautious with the Precautionary Principle?, paper delivered at 
the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales Annual Conference, 14-15 Oct 1999, 
http://www.agd.nsw.gov.au/sc/sc.nsFpages/Stein 3 accessed October 2002.
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“of course it is better to be safe than sorry (safe is good, sorry is bad, so 
it’s a bit of a no-brainer). What the precautionary principle states is that if
1 'Ithere is a chance you might be sorry, it is better to be sorry but safe.”
But, whilst its precise definition and implication remain unclear, it can be said that the 
precautionary principle challenges the conviction with which scientific evidence is 
expressed. In the face of scientific uncertainty, no evidence of harm should not 
necessarily be translated as evidence of no harm.14 In other words, the precautionary 
principle is aimed at avoiding situations in which uncertainty becomes a ‘roadblock’15 
to effective environmental protection.
The precautionary principle has become a universally recognized concept in 
environmental protection. An extensive body of literature claims that its roots can be 
traced to environmental and social policy in West Germany during the 1970s (the 
concept of ‘vorsorgeprinzip’),16 before becoming adopted in various international law
1 7provisions and into the law and policy of other domestic jurisdictions. Its
prominence grew during the 1970s and 1980s, and it currently enjoys widespread 
recognition as an intrinsic part of a number of environmental measures. Its political 
status has augmented, and it has become globally accepted on the environmental 
agenda. However, the precautionary principle is neither well defined nor consistent.18 
There lacks a common understanding of its meaning and application. As Adams 
fittingly points out:-
“What becomes clear ... is that the rhetoric of precaution is invoked 
without any explication of how it might be operationalized in practice.
While the terminology has developed from ‘measure’ to ‘approach’ to
13 Runciman, D. ‘The Precautionary Principle’, in 26(7) London Review of Books (April 2004) at page 
3.
14 Fisher. E. ‘Precaution, Precaution Everywhere: Developing a ‘Common Understanding of the 
Precautionary Principle in the European Community’ (2002) 9(1) Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 7, at page 9; Independent Expert Group on Mobile Phones (IEGMP), Report -  
Mobile Phones and Health (HMSO; London; 2000) at paragraph 6.16.
15 Eckley, N. and Selin, H. ‘All Talk, Little Action: Precaution and European Chemicals Regulation’ 
(2004) 11(1) Journal o f European Public Policy 78-105, at page 80.
16 Fisher, E. (2002) at page 10.
17 O’Riordan, T. and Cameron, J. (1994) at page 113.
18 See, for example, O’Riordan, T. and Jordan, A. ‘The Precautionary Principle in Contemporary 
Environmental Politics’ (1995) 4(3) Environmental Values 191-212.
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‘principle’, and while governments and NGOs alike advocate the 
‘principle’, there has been less attention paid to what it means in 
practice.”19
The scale of its universal recognition makes it impossible to achieve uniformity in
application. Inevitably, this results in a wide-ranging spectrum of ideas,
understandings, claims and expectations. The upshot of this is the creation of a 
1
‘multifarious’ principle with abstract meanings that lack in practical and operational 
direction.
Although its generality can be perceived its strength, the ‘definitional deficit’ of the 
precautionary principle creates a major obstacle to its implementation. Some 
commentators have argued that its inherent ambiguity does not affect its operation,22 
although its imprecision is more often presented as a major concern. As Van Den 
Belt and Gremmen note:-
“The formulation [of the precautionary principle] may sound 
unexceptional, but neither is it of much help as an effective basis for 
policy, as long as the meanings of the key-terms ‘serious’, ‘irreversible’, 
‘damage’, and ‘cost-effective’ are not sufficiently specified and it is not 
decided how much scientific certainty (short of full ‘scientific certainty’) 
we need before we may (or should) undertake preventive action.”24
This ambiguity paves the way for the contradictory application of the precautionary 
principle in the same context. According to Runciman, the duality of the 
precautionary principle was captured by a speech by Tony Blair in his Sedgefield
19 Adams, M. D. ‘The Precautionary Principle and the Rhetoric Behind It’ (2002) 5(4) Journal of Risk 
Research 301-316, at page 305.
20 Dratwa, J. ‘Making Decisions and Taking Risks with the Precautionary Principle’ (2001) 
www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/iointsessions/grenoble/papers/ws 12/dratwa.pdf. accessed June 2005, at page 2.
21 Ibid.
22 Fisher, E. (2002) at page 17.
23 Codex Committee on General Principles, IS* Session, Paris, 10-14 April 2000, Document CX/GP 
00/3-Add 6.
24 Van Den Belt, H. and Gremmen, B. ‘Between Precautionary Principle and ‘Sound Science’: 
Distributing the Burdens of Proof (2002) 15(1) Journal o f Agriculture and Environmental Ethics 103- 
122 at page 105.
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constituency justifying the ‘war against terror’ in Iraq.25 On the one hand, Blair 
claimed that ‘this is not a time to err on the side of caution’. Yet, in the same 
speech, he also argued that what mattered was taking precautions against future 
threats, stating that ‘it is monstrously premature to think that the threat has passed. 
The risk remains in the balance here and abroad.’27 Runciman observes that “this, 
then, is not a time to err on the side of caution and not a time to err on the side of 
incaution. Such an argument can be used to justify anything.”28 The precautionary 
principle can be invoked to rationalize both precaution and incaution, thus giving rise 
to the ability to “dress up choice as necessity and necessity as choice”.29 Its innate 
uncertainty allows for the manipulation of its application in order to achieve a desired 
end. Naturally, discretion in relation to the operation of precaution impedes the 
pursuit for a hard and fast definition.
The academic fixation with finding a concrete common understanding, as 
demonstrated by existing literature on the subject, can be criticised for ignoring the 
true purpose and nature of the precautionary principle in its practical context. The 
aspiration of creating a rigid definition is adverse to its basic rationale, aiming to 
mould it into something it was never intended to be. Arguably, this obsession with 
definition is an attempt to create a precautionary rule which will ultimately conflict 
with, and undermine the essence of the precautionary principle.
Yet, whilst it is true that the scope of its operation is, by virtue of its fluidity, 
potentially wide-ranging, the argument here is that the inherent relativism of the 
precautionary principle has a particularly significant practical implication. This 
emerges from a consideration of the relationship between the precautionary principle 
and conventional models of risk assessment. As practice suggests, the application of 
the precautionary principle is determined by the outcome of risk assessment 
procedures that are used to establish whether or not a risk exists. The precautionary 
principle is commonly understood as applying in the face of scientific uncertainty, 
and not risk. Principal 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, which is taken as the working
25 5th March 2004.
26 Runciman, D. (2004) footnote 13.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid. at page 8.
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definition of the precautionary principle, provides that its application is prompted by a 
‘lack of full scientific certainty’.
This brings to light a crucial distinction that features throughout this thesis between 
risk and uncertainty. Risk analysis dictates that a future event is uncertain if neither 
its frequency nor scale can be quantified. Conversely, a future event can be described 
as a risk if both elements are quantifiable. This distinction becomes significant when 
contemplated in the knowledge that conventional models of risk assessment are 
essentially scientific processes, underpinned by tenets emanating from the formal 
discourse of science -  such as objectivity, rationality and certitude -  reflecting the 
notion that the future can be expressed in absolute terms. The application of the 
precautionary principle, then, is dependent on a distinction between risk, which is 
scientifically articulated by way of objective, rational, and certain quantification, and 
uncertainty, which presents a situation in which the future is beyond scientific 
articulation. Unsurprisingly, given the centrality of scientific discourse, a conceptual 
conflict emerges between risk assessment as an objective, rational, and certain process 
and the subjective and the indeterminate operation of the precautionary principle.
The following section illustrates that, as a consequence of its lacking definition, the 
precautionary principle is an instinctively relative and thus subjective concept. It is 
proposed that the rationale for this definitional deficit is four-fold. A tiered model 
illustrates that the failure to provide a universal definition or understanding can be 
explained with reference to ambiguities both in the precautionary principle’s sub­
structure and in the individual components of its definition. The first three tiers 
demonstrate that the definitional deficit stems from the principle’s foundational 
framework. The first tier represents the ethical basis of environmental law and policy, 
and seeks to highlight the impact of moral pluralism on the definition of the 
precautionary principle. Reference to both anthropocentric and ecocentric 
philosophical stances is useful in illustrating that the meaning and operation of 
precautionary-thinking are subject to the philosophical ideals underpinning its 
definition. The second tier considers the very nature of principles per se, highlighting 
that the ‘principle’ status of the precautionary principle thwarts any efforts to arrive at 
a common definition. The third tier recognises the inexorable link between the 
concept of sustainable development and the precautionary principle, and suggests that
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definitional difficulties associated with sustainable development inevitably infiltrate 
definitions of the precautionary principle. The fourth and final tier shifts focus from 
its foundational aspects to the precautionary principle itself, examining its internal 
ambiguity and definitional inconsistency. Contrary to the widespread belief that the 
precautionary principle derives solely from the German concept of ‘ vorsorgeprinzip ’, 
this section argues that in fact the principle developed independently in a number of 
different jurisdictions, resulting in a range of varying interpretations. The diversity 
with which definitions are framed inevitably leads to the argument that the principle is 
context-dependent and subjective. By examining definitions of the precautionary 
principle in international, EC, and domestic law and policy, it becomes apparent that 
conflicting interpretations of precaution make it a highly contentious and litigious 
concept. Chapters Two to Five provide a detailed consideration of the meaning and 
status attributed to the precautionary principle at international, EC and domestic 
levels. The overriding premise is that, whilst the inherent ambiguity of the 
precautionary principle is often seen as a pretext for developing diverse translations so 
as to contend with wide-ranging consequences, its relativity generates a discord with 
the scientific foundations of risk assessment. The impossibility of finding an 
objective vantage point from which to evaluate its application renders it inconsistent 
with the rhetoric of ‘risk’ which derives from scientifically rational, objective, and 
certain assessment.
Following a detailed examination in Chapters Two and Three of the notion of 
precaution in international environmental protection, and after illustrating that the 
precautionary principle is so lacking in normative content that it fails to impose any 
general obligation in international law, this thesis turns its attention to the operation of 
precaution in the EC. Chapter Four traces the evolution of the precautionary principle 
in EC law and policy before analysing patterns injudicial interpretation. In particular, 
it focuses on nine landmark decisions by the CFI and ECJ as a means of tracing the 
development of precautionary-jurisprudence. A distinction is made between the 
judgments of early case law and more recent decisions. Early case law shows that, 
despite its display of a precautionary approach, the Courts were reluctant to make 
reference to the precautionary principle. However, a CFI decision in 2002 (Pfizer) 
marked a shift in the judicial response to the notion of precaution, indicating the onset 
of the new era in precautionary philosophy in the EC. Post -Pfizer cases confirm that
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not only have the Courts become increasingly willing to explicitly cite the 
precautionary principle, but they have also sought to develop the operational 
framework within which the principle rests. A critical aspect of recent judgments is 
their differing interpretation of the level of scientific uncertainty required to trigger 
precautionary action. Whereas the CFI in Pfizer and Alpharma considered that the 
precautionary principle comes into operation in the face of a scientifically-verified 
risk, later cases such as Wadden Sea confirm that the Courts expect the precautionary 
principle to precede the scientific ascertainment of risk. These judgments can be seen 
as evidence of a liberalisation of the threshold of precaution, and, more broadly, 
recognition of the limits of scientific foresight. This brings to light an interesting 
dilemma for the precautionary principle. Part Two of this thesis refers to what might 
be called ‘the paradox of precaution’, which draws attention to the simultaneous 
reliance on, and rejection of, the formal discourse of science by the precautionary 
principle.
For the time being, however, it is enough to draw attention to, and offer explanations 
for, the definitional deficit of the precautionary principle. This first part of the thesis 
illustrates that the precautionary principle is not a single established concept, but a 
name that has come to denote several distinct ideas, each of which claims to be the 
precautionary principle properly understood. It explains that the definition and 
implementation of the precautionary principle ultimately hinges on: (i) the way in 
which environmental ethics are perceived (Chapter One); (ii) the characteristics of 
principles per se (Chapter One); (iii) the interpretation of the concept of sustainable 
development (Chapter One); and (iv) its inconsistent development in international, EC 
and UK spheres (Chapters Two to Five).
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1.1 Explanations for definitional deficit
■ 1.1.1 Environmental ethics
In the words of Hughes and Jewell, “there is no one single moral basis on which 
environmental law rests but rather a number”.30 It is possible to identify a wide range 
of perceptions of what constitute ‘the environment’, each reflecting different moral 
concerns. Alder and Wilkinson classify these moral positions into: traditional 
anthropocentrism; enlightened anthropocentrism; extended anthropocentrism; non- 
anthropocentric individualism; concern for animal welfare; and ecocentrism.31 
Broadly speaking, however, this range of ethical perspectives can be divided into two 
main schools of thought -  anthropocentrism and ecocentrism -  which sit at polar 
opposite ends of the ‘moral scale’.
For the purposes of its definition, it is important to question whether the precautionary 
principle is underpinned by any particular ethical position. Alder and Wilkinson 
suggest that it is devoid of moral inclination, stating that:-
“[t]he precautionary principle does not tell us what we should take 
precautions against and what must be sacrificed in the process. In other 
words the precautionary principle is consistent with any of the ethical 
perspectives.”32
As a result, the precautionary principle may be defined and implemented in a way 
consistent with any ethical perspective. This argument is reflected in an article 
written by Weiss, who claims that there are five definable attitudes towards risk that 
shape the way in which the precautionary principle is understood and applied: (i) 
scientific absolutism; (ii) technological optimism; (iii) environmental centrism; (iv)
O'!
cautious environmentalism; and, (v) environmental absolutism. According to the 
scientific absolutist standpoint, the precautionary principle should only be invoked
30 Hughes, D. et al, Environmental Law (Butterworths; 2002; London) at page 20.
31 See Alder, J. and Wilkinson, D. Environmental Law and Ethics (MacMillan; London; 1999) chapter 
2 .
32 Ibid. at page 150.
33 Weiss, C. ‘Scientific Uncertainty and Science-Based Precaution’ (2003) 3(2) International 
Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 137-166, at page 144.
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when a danger created by a particular action is scientifically proven. The 
environmental absolutist takes the opposite stance, requiring that potentially 
hazardous activities are postponed until it is proven that no harm will ensue.
This has major and inevitable implications for attempts to achieve a single definition 
and application of the precautionary principle, since its interpretation is dependent on 
the object of moral concern in relation to which precautionary approaches are deemed 
appropriate.34 The dichotomy, for example, between ecocentric and anthropocentric 
positions “may seem somewhat esoteric, suitable only for the philosophy class, but it 
is actually of great practical relevance to the protection of the environment.”35 The 
interpretation of the precautionary principle will depend on the motivating ethical 
stance. An anthropocentric interpretation of the precautionary principle will differ 
from an ecocentric one. Thus, as a result of this broad scale of moral positions, 
understandings of the precautionary principle will vary enormously.
D 1.1.2 Anthropocentrism
“People have seen themselves as placed, not just at the relative centre o f  
a particular life, but at the absolute, objective centre o f everything. The 
certainty o f  Man has been pretty steadily conceived, both in the West and 
in many other traditions, not as an illusion o f perspective, imposed on us 
by our starting-point, but as an objective fact, and indeed an essential 
fact, about the whole universe. ”36
Essentially, the anthropocentric ethical position asserts that only humans are valuable 
in themselves. Humans have intrinsic value and moral standing. Conversely, non­
human entities have external value and lack moral standing. In the words of
34 Alder, J. and Wilkinson, D. (1999) at page 150.
35 Gamer, R. Environmental Politics (Prentice Hall; London; 1996) at page 42.
36 Midgley, M. ‘The End of Anthropocentrism?’, in Attfield, R. (ed) Philosophy and the Natural 
Environment (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge; 1994), as cited in Gillespie, A. International 
Environmental Law Policy and Ethics (Oxford University Press; Oxford; 1997) at page 4.
37 Pierce, C. and VanDeVeer, D. (eds) People, Penguins and Plastic Trees (Wadsworth Publishing Co.; 
Belmont; 1995) at page 184.
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Protagoras, “man is the measure of all things.”38 Kant proclaimed that “[m]an ... is 
the ultimate purpose of creation here on Earth.”39 According to Sophocles:-
“[wjonders are many on earth, and the greatest of these is man ... He is 
master of ageless Earth, to his own bending ... He is lord of all things 
living; birds of the air, Beasts of the field, all creatures of sea and land.”40
The anthropocentric paradigm has its roots in early rationalism41 and the separation of 
humanity from Nature, as advocated by philosophers such as Pythagoras and Plato 42 
This understanding developed from two belief systems -  first, the belief that the 
(immortal) soul and the (mortal) body are separate entities, and the idea that the 
mental being is disconnected from the physical being;43 and secondly, the belief that 
abstract reason, rather than empirical observation, is the source of all knowledge.44
On the basis of the assumption that only humans are intrinsically valuable and 
rational, the existence of everything outside human identity is questionable 45 This 
argument draws upon the concept of individualism, utilized by Thomas Hobbes in 
Leviathan, in which it is argued that society comprises of nothing more than self- 
interested atomistic individuals 46 The significance of the individual can be further 
traced in the works of contemporary liberal philosophers -  such as, John Rawls,47 
Ronald Dworkin,48 and Robert Nozick.49
38 Protagoras, as cited in Rodman, J. ‘The Dolphin Papers’ (1874) North American Review 12, at page 
16.
39 Kant, I. Critique o f Judgement (MacMillan; London; 1914), as cited in Gillespie, A. (1997) at page 4
40 Sophocles, translated by Watling, E. F. The Theban Plays (Penguin Books; Harmondsworth; 1947), 
as cited in Gillespie, A. (1997) at page 4.
41 Gillespie, A. (1997) at page 4.
42 Ibid. at page 5.
43 Wheelwright, H. The PreSocratics (The Bobbs-Merrill Co.; Indianapolis; 1960) at page 130; 
Oelschlaeger, M. The Idea o f Wilderness: From Prehistory to the Age o f Ecology (Yale University 
Press, New York 1991) at 57-60; Descartes, R. Discourse on Method; Meditations (Penguin Books 
Ltd.; London; 1968) at section 4, part 19.
44 Cottingham, J. Rationalism (Paladin: London; 1984) at page 18; Hargrove, E. The Foundations of 
Environmental Ethics (Prentice Hall; New Jersey; 1989) at pages 22-3 and 35-7.
45 Descartes, R. Philosophical Writings (Routledge; London; 1985) vol. 1.
46 Hobbes, T. Leviathan (Penguin; Harmondsworth; 1976) at page 83.
47 Rawls, J. A. A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press; Oxford; 1972).
48 Dworkin, R. Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth; London; 1977).
49 Nozick, R. Anarchy, State, Utopia (Oxford University Press; Oxford; 1974).
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The upshot of this ethical position is that humanity is absolved of culpability for the 
exploitation of non-human entities. It assumes authorisation to use and abuse the 
environment as humans see fit.50 The environment is seen merely as a means to an 
end; the end being man.51 The environment is valuable, but only to the extent that it 
serves the purposes of the human race. As Marx notes, “[t]he purely natural material 
in which no human labour is objectivised ... has no value.” From this perspective 
then, environmental protection can only ever be justified on the ground that it 
safeguards that which is ascribed value. The intrinsically invaluable environment 
need not be protected as such.
D 1.1.3 Changing moral positions and attempts to unify environmental 
ethics
Given that the pursuit of self interests does not always coincide with achieving 
environmental protection, anthropocentrism, as an ethical basis for action, does not 
necessarily prevent environmental degradation. In response to this concern, 
ecocentrism emerged as an alternative ethical basis, shifting emphasis from the 
perception of the environment in terms of its benefit to humankind to its perception as 
an entity worthy of protection in itself, irrespective of its attributed human value. 
Drawing upon the moral position advocated in the works of Rousseau,54 ecocentric 
arguments contend that human beings are communal animals “whose true nature can 
be realized only as part of a wider community of mutual support and co-operation.”55 
In recognition of the anthropocentric and ecocentric extremes, the ultimate challenge, 
of course, is to “unify all ethics with regard to the environment under a single
50 Gillespie, A. (1997) at page 9.
51 Kant, I. Metaphysics and Morals (The Bobbs-Menil Co.; London; 1973) as cited in Gillespie, A. 
(1997) at page 13.
52 Marx, K. Capital (Foreign Publishing; Moscow; 1984) vol. 1 at pages 206-7; and vol. 3 at page 745; 
see also, Smith, A. An Enquiry Into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth of Nations (Methuen; 
London; 1904) vol. 1 at pages 32-3.
53 Gillespie, A. (1997) at page 27; see also Panjabi, R. K. L. ‘Idealism and Self-Interest in International 
Law: The Rio Dilemma’ (1992) 23 Californian Western International Law Journal 189, at pages 194- 
6 .
54 Rousseau, J. J. translated by France, P. Reveries o f the Solitary Walker (Penguin Books; London; 
1979); see also Leopold, A. A Sand County Almanac (Oxford University Press; Oxford; 1949) at pages 
vii-ix and 224-5.
55 Alder, J. and Wilkinson, D. (1999) at page 49.
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framework capable of answering all questions”.56 He does, however, concede that 
this is an ‘overly optimistic’ goal. Pluralism in environmental positions is 
unavoidable. The result is a diverse range of differing ethical positions with 
fundamentally incompatible objectives, generating wide-ranging interpretations of the 
precautionary principle, from ‘weak’ constructions of precaution to ‘strong’.
‘Weak’ interpretations, associated with anthropocentrism of the precautionary 
principle, propose that the lack of full scientific uncertainty is no justification for 
preventing an action that might be harmful.58 Whilst it accepts that environmental 
discharges may create some threat which science cannot prove, in effect it only 
recognises those uncertain facts “beyond science’s current eyesight”.59 Such 
interpretations are likely to induce some cost-benefit analysis and a trade-off between 
environmental and commercial interests. ‘Strong’ interpretations, more commonly 
associated with ecocentrism, demand the impossible -  proof of absolute safety before 
a potentially harmful activity is permitted.
This divergence is a sign that one’s position on the ethical scale inevitably influences 
one’s interpretation of the objectives of the precautionary principle, which will in turn 
determine the way in which it is defined and applied. In the light of the fact that 
environmental principles are designed to deal with a lack of moral monism, the 
precautionary principle must be broadly framed so as to accommodate pluralism in 
underlying ethical stances. Breadth of definition, however, creates scope for 
inconsistent interpretations of precaution, thus advancing the argument that the 
precautionary principle lacks in objective existence.
56 Gillespie, A. (1997) at page 135.
57 Ibid.
58 See for example, Principle 15 of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) Rio Declaration 1992.
59 Hunt, J. ‘The Social Construction of Precaution’, in O’Riordan, T. and Cameron. J. (eds) (1994) at 
page 121.
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1.2 Environmental principles
“I  don’t like principles ... I  prefer prejudices.
The definitional deficit of the precautionary principle is undoubtedly a symptom of its 
‘principle’ status. Environmental law is a sphere rich in principles, including, for 
example, the precautionary principle, the principle of sustainable development, the 
polluter pays principle, and the principles of preventive action and rectification at 
source. General concepts and principles have been formulated to accommodate 
divergence in moral positions. In order to encompass differing philosophical stances, 
there needs to be a degree of flexibility in the way principles can be interpreted.61 
This requisite fluidity, however, inevitably generates problems in relation to the 
certainty and precision with which principles are framed.
Principles, according to Dworkin are “the whole set of ... standards other than 
rules.” The distinction between legal rules and principles is a logical one. 
Whereas a rule possesses an ‘all-or-nothing’ characteristic, stipulating specific 
conduct, a principle “states a reason that argues in one direction, but does not 
necessitate a particular decision.”64 Principles, by definition, are not intended to 
specify particular objectives or rules of behaviour. Rather, they are general guides to 
action,65 indicating certain types of response, and it is “unprofitable to examine either 
legal or policy principles for concrete solutions to particular problems.”66 Whilst 
principles might point in favour of a particular result, they do not stipulate a specific
f%7outcome. Fisher notes that “while the concept of ‘principle’ will vary depending on 
its jurisprudential and jurisdictional context, in all cases a principle is not an
60 Wilde, O. An Ideal Husband (Nick Hem Books; London; 1999) Act IV.
61 Bell, S. and McGillivray, D. Environmental Law (Blackstone Press; London; 5th edition; 2000) at 
page 39.
62 Dworkin, R. M,. ‘Is Law a System of Rules?’, in Dworkin, R. M. (ed) The Philosophy o f Law 
(Oxford University Press; Oxford; 1977) at page 43.
63 Ibid. at page 45.
64 Ibid. at page 47.
65 Alder, J. and Wilkinson, D. (1999) at page 149.
66 Ibid. at page 148.
67 Hart, H. L. A. The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press; London; 2004) at page 261, see also, Stone, C. 
D ‘Is There a Precautionary Principle?’ (2001) 31(7) Environmental Law Reporter 10790.
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‘explicitly formulated* rule that is unchanging in its application.” Instead, its 
application is flexible and context-dependent.69 It is contingent first, on the particular 
circumstances of a case, and second, on the relationship between the precautionary
7 nprinciple and other principles of environmental law and policy. By virtue of its 
inherent fluidity, the precautionary principle can be described as a heterogeneous 
concept.71
Some commentators claim that its ambiguous and contextually-dependent nature is 
immaterial to its practical significance. Cameron, for example, argues that the 
precautionary principle “is not intended to be a command and control-type regulatory
77standard and this does not m any way deny its general effect as a general principle.” 
Boyle also claims that its practical viability derives from its ability to “lay down 
parameters which affect the way courts decide cases or the way an international
70
institution exercises discretionary powers” and to “set limits, or provide guidance, or 
determine how conflicts between other rules or principles will be resolved.”74 Yet, 
this argument neglects its deficiency in normative content. As it stands, the definition 
of the principle specifies neither the nature of precautionary action, nor the point at 
which precautionary action is triggered. Whilst its underlying philosophy can provide 
a general guide to anticipatory environmental protection, it can be argued that it lacks 
the exactitude necessary to translate into a regulatory standard.
In an attempt to circumvent the problem of definitional deficit, the precautionary 
principle has been presented as being concerned with the way in which public 
decisions are made, rather than dictating a particular outcome. Fisher 
conceptualizes the principle as one of process, thus reflecting its status as a principle
68 Fisher, E. (2002) at page 16; see also Sunstein, C. Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (Oxford 
University Press; Oxford; 1996) at page 30; and Posner, R. The Problems of Jurisprudence (Harvard 
University Press; Harvard; 1990) at page 44.
69 Habermas, J. Between Facts and Norms (Polity Press; Cambridge; 1996) at page 208.
70 Commission of the European Communities, Communication on the Precautionary Principle (EC 
Commission; Brussels; 2000) at pages 17-19; see also, Tridimas, T. The General Principles of EC Law 
(Oxford University Press; Oxford; 2000) chapter 1.
71 Dratwa, J. (2001) at page 2.
72 Cameron, J. as cited in Alder, J. and Wilkinson, D. (1999) at page 148.
73 Boyle, A. ‘Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law’ (1999) 48 ICLQ 901, at 
page 907.
^  Ibid.
75 Fisher, E. ‘Is the Precautionary Principle Justiciable?’ (2001) 13(3) Journal of Environmental Law 
315-334, at page 319.
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not a rule -  she states that “[i]t is ‘not all or none in nature’ -  it is a ‘matter of 
degree’.”76 There is no rigid approach to applying it. Instead, its application will 
depend on its context, placing innovative, democratic and discretionary decision­
making at the top of its agenda rather than being based on one-dimensional notions of 
legal certainty and the rules of law. This feature, as Fisher puts it, makes the 
precautionary principle a ‘frustrating’ tool of risk management77 because its 
boundaries of operation are undefined. Although the precautionary principle might 
provide a broad guide for decision-making, its generality makes it impossible to 
achieve uniformity in definition or interpretation. Illustrating the tension between 
precautionary process and consistent interpretation requires reference to three aspects 
of the precautionary decision-making process. The difficulty with this interpretation 
of precaution as an administrative process is that it becomes exposed to pluralism 
beyond its stand-alone definition. The representation of precaution as a process 
compounds issues of implementation. As the following three paragraphs suggest, the 
notion of precautionary process calls for a consideration of factors outside the 
boundaries of its definitional framework.
First, as Schomberg points out, the precautionary principle requires a highly flexible 
process which can accommodate a wide range of scenarios.78 This requires that 
problems encountered on a case-by-case basis are subject to deliberation, together 
with ongoing monitoring, and adapting standards accordingly. Deville and Harding 
advocate a decision-making process which compels the decision-maker to focus in 
more detail on the problem and its scientific uncertainties.79 Weale et al highlight the 
relationship between the precautionary principle and the Stand der Technik (state of 
the art) principle in Germany, and argue that the application of precaution is 
contingent not only on the nature of the risk and scientific uncertainties, but also the
on
state of technological advance at the time.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid. at page 320.
78 Schomberg, P. Memorandum to the House of Lords Select Committee on European Communities, 
Second Report: EC Regulation o f Genetic Modification in Agriculture (HL11-H, 1999).
79 Deville, A. and Harding, R. Applying the Precautionary Principle (Federation Press; Sydney; 1997).
80 Weale, A. et al, Environmental Governance in Europe (Oxford University Press; Oxford; 2000) at 
page 157; see also Von Moltke, K. ‘The Vorsorgeprinzip in West German Environmental Policy’, in 
Royal Commission of Environmental Pollution, Best Practicable Environmental Option (HMSO; 
London; 1988) Appendix 3.
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Secondly, it is widely accepted that a democratic approach to precautionary decision­
making is desirable.81 Despite there being no agreement as to how this might be put 
into practice, it is recognised that a participatory process should be a permanent 
feature of precautionary administrative processes.82 The upshot of incorporating a 
broad range of actors in precautionary decision-making is that the concept of 
precaution becomes increasingly susceptible to inconsistent interpretation.
Finally, it is imperative that the process recognises that the precautionary principle 
has an inherent element of proportionality. In this context, Schomberg submits that 
the term proportionality “implies the evaluation of the scope of the measures to be 
taken and when they should be taken.”83 However, the distinction between the 
principle of proportionality and the precautionary principle is not always clear, further 
muddying the water as regards the way in which the precautionary principle is 
understood. Early EC case law demonstrates the failure to distinguish between the 
two, whereby the adoption of proportionality was actually an implicit implementation 
of the precautionary principle.84 Furthermore, the EC Commission Communication 
claims that the notion of precaution entails proportional action.85 The difficulty 
encountered in setting apart the two concepts makes defining the parameters of the 
operation of the precautionary principle an arduous task.
■ 1.3 Sustainable development: an equally elusive concept
It is important to put the precautionary principle into the context of sustainable 
development. The two concepts are inexorably connected, and this is evident in the 
prevention of environmental degradation:-
81 Fisher, E. (2001) at page 320.
82 Ibid.; see also Harding, R. and Fisher, E. (eds) Perspectives on the Precautionary Principle 
(Federation Press; Sydney; 1999) at page 294.
83 Schomberg, P. (1999).
84 See, for example, Case C-157/96, The Queen v. Ministry o f Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 
Commissioners o f Customs & Excise, ex parte National Farmers’ Union (and Others) 5 May 1998, 
European Court Reports 1998 page 1-02211.
85 EC Commission (2000) at page 3.
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‘The idea of sustainable development shares a common genus with 
numerous other emergent principles in the arena of environmental 
protection. For instance, prospectively, in the search for sustainable 
solutions, the incorporation of the notion of integration into the treaty is 
likely to become increasingly significant... The link between sustainable 
development and the precautionary principle appears especially powerful, 
and prior consideration is therefore given to this principle.”86
An understanding of the principle of sustainable development is undeniably crucial in 
the quest to understanding the precautionary principle. Hughes observes the operation 
of a three-fold relationship between environmental principles -  the application of 
specific rules, based on accepted general principles, which in turn reflect ethical
0*7
values. Furthermore, Hughes notes that within this hierarchy, “it must be that 
sustainable development must be the first and greatest principle and that all others 
should serve that end.”88
Sustainable development is “a term that has come to pervade environmental policy
OQ
discussions.” In the words of Stallworthy, it is “a process, not a scientifically 
definable capacity; it describes the journey we must undertake to arrive at the 
destination, which is of course sustainability itself’.90 Despite the fact that its 
meaning and value are hotly contested, it is generally accepted that sustainable 
development is the foundational principle in environmental law.91
It is argued that the notion emerged during the 1960s in the wake of the Second World 
War, and in response to widespread trepidation over increased industrialization and 
environmental damage. Reflecting this concern, the Declaration of the UN 
Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, 1972, formulated the principle 
of sustainable development, stating that:-
86 Stallworthy, M. (2002) at page 47.
87 Hughes, D. et al (2002) at page 15.
88 Ibid. at pages 23-4.
89 Alder, J. and Wilkinson, D. (1999) at page 127.
90 Porritt, J. Playing Safe: Science and the Environment (Thames and Hudson; London; 2000) at pages 
103-104.
91 See for example, Sunkin, M. et al, Sourcebook on Environmental Law (Cavendish; London; 2002) at 
page 46.
2 Elworthy, S. and Holder, J. Environmental Protection (Butterworths; London; 1997) at page 132
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“Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate 
conditions of life, in an environment of quality that permits a life of 
dignity and well being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and 
improve the environment for present and future generations”.
Perhaps the most significant outcome of the Stockholm Conference has been the 
creation of a new discourse of sustainability.94 The concept has become an 
underlying element in the development of environmental law and policy, gaining 
credibility at domestic, European and international levels. Arguably, the imperative 
of sustainable development was established in the 1987 Brundtland Report of the 
World Commission on Environment and Development, which defined the concept 
as:-
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”95
This report was a catalyst for the so-called ‘Earth Summit’ -  including the 1992 UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) and Agenda 21 -  represents 
a significant step towards legal recognition of sustainable development. In the 
aftermath of UNCED, sustainable development has been “defined to death”.96 
Macnaghten and Urry point out that all definitions “share the underlying belief that 
economic and social change is only sustainable and thereby beneficial in the long 
term when it safeguards the natural resources on which all development depends.”97 
However, it becomes clear that, despite the development of a common language of 
sustainable development, it is not commonly understood. Given the inconsistencies
93 Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm) UN Doc 
A/CONF/48/14/REV 1, Principle 1.
94 See, for example, The Nairobi Declaration on the State of Worldwide Environment 
(UNEP/GC. 10/INF.5 of 19 May 1982); and World Charter for Nature UNGA Res. 37/7, 28 Oct 1982, 
reprinted in 23 ILM (1983) 455-60.
95 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford University 
Press; Oxford; 1987)
96 Stallworthy, M. (2002) at page 2.
97 Macnaghten, P. and Urry, J. Contested Natures (Sage; London; 1998) at page 213.
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and variations in localized perceptions of the concept,98 any attempt to reach a 
universal definition of sustainable development is fruitless. It is argued that “the 
nature of the term is that it is uncertain”.99 Cullingworth and Nadin see it as a “broad 
political commitment to the idea of sustainability”100 that has been so exhausted that 
“it has ceased to have any communicable meaning.”101
Components of sustainable development are highly subjective. Central to the 
difference in interpretations of sustainable development are perceptions of what is 
‘fair* to future generations, and what future generations ‘need’. As Bell and 
McGillivray point out, there is considerable debate about what future generations 
need:-
“Even where things have been treasured as ‘necessary’ in the past and 
present, this is no guarantee that future generations will ‘need’ or even 
value them.”102
Consequently, those who more optimistically see human ingenuity as solving 
environmental problems are likely to be more willing to exploit present natural 
resources.103 Conversely, those who attribute superior value to environmental 
resources would be expected to recognise the irreversibility of damage and be 
reluctant to destroy natural resources. The problem is that there will never be a 
consensus on values, even if values did not change temporally.
As a result of the failure to pin-point one meaning, definitions of sustainable 
development vary immensely across a wide spectrum. Distinctions can be made 
between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ interpretations of sustainable development. A ‘strong’ 
interpretation requires that future generations have the same environmental resources
98 Voisey, H. and O’Riordan, T. Sustainable Development in Western Europe: Coming to Terms with 
Agenda 21 (Frank Cass Publishers; London; 1997) at pages 25-40.
99 Stallworthy, M. (2002) at page 2.
100 Cullingworth, B. J. and Nadin, V. Town and Country Planning in the UK (Routledge; London; 
1997) at page 164.
101 Ibid.
102 Bell, S. and McGillivray, D. (2000) at page 45. See also, Bell, S. and McGillivray, D. 
Environmental Law (Oxford University Press; Oxford; 6th edition; 2005) at pages 62-3 where the 
authors observe that was is meant by the ‘needs and aspirations’ (Brundtland Report 1987) of future 
generations is unclear.
fo3 Ibid.
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as we ourselves inherited.104 It places the value of environmental resources above all 
others, drawing attention to the extent to which those resources are irreplaceable.105 
Weak versions call for distributive justice between generations, obliging the present 
generation to pass onto the next an equivalent or better pool of resources.106 Provided 
the overall result is positive, this interpretation permits trade-offs between resources 
and accepts that certain resources may be sacrificed. An intermediate position would 
require us to leave the next generation the same options available to us.107
O’Riordan and Cameron note that this distinction between weak and strong 
sustainability “lies in the degree to which the precautionary principle ... is 
applied.”108 Likewise, the distinction between weak and strong precaution must 
depend on whether a weak or strong approach to sustainable development is 
elected.109 The interpretation of the precautionary principle is confined by the 
parameters of sustainability.
Whilst the notion of precaution is universally acknowledged, its interpretation and 
operation vary greatly.110 It is argued that:-
“[tjhere is neither an agreed yardstick, nor a consensus as to how it should 
be applied.”111 They go on to state that “[i]t is not the fault of the 
precautionary principle that it is in a muddle. The confusion is an 
inescapable part of the modem environmental dilemma.”112
104 See Alder, J. and Wilkinson, D. (1999) at page 129.
105 Bell, S. and McGillivray, D. (2000) at page 44.
106 See Alder, J. and Wilkinson, D. (1999) at pages 129-130.
107 Ibid.
108 O’Riordan, T. and Cameron, J. (1994) at page 19.
109 See Turner, R. K. et al, Environmental Economics: An Elementary Introduction (Harvester 
Wheatsheaf; London; 1994) which, at page 59, diagrammatically represents the relationship between 
precaution and sustainable development, and illustrates that definitions of the precautionary principle 
vary within the limits of the interpretation of sustainable development.
110 O’Riordan, T. and Cameron, J. (1994) at page 21.
111 Ibid.U2 « . .
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To some extent, the same can be said of sustainable development. Despite its 
widespread acceptance:-
“no-one can properly put it into operation, let alone define what a 
sustainable society would look like in terms of political democracy, social 
structure, norms, economic activity, settlement geography, transport, 
agriculture, energy use and international relations.”113
This ambiguity relating to the implementation of sustainable development has major 
implications for attempts to precisely define and apply the precautionary principle -  
since both concepts are necessarily related to one another.114 The Bergen 
Declaration115 explicitly forged the link, stating that “[i]n order to achieve sustainable 
development, policies must be based on the precautionary principle.”116
Given that achieving a common understanding of the application of sustainable 
development has been identified as an arduous task, interpreting precaution is equally 
problematic. Because the underlying aim of sustainable development is construed 
inconsistently, translations of the precautionary principle will also vary. One’s 
understanding of sustainable development will inevitably influence one’s 
understanding and application of precaution. Acknowledgement of the ambiguity of 
the concept of sustainable development provides an explanation for the incoherence 
and diversity of definitions of the precautionary principle.
■ 1.4 (Alleged) German roots
There is an extensive body of literature tracing the evolution of the precautionary 
principle. The overriding contention is that the principle has its roots in German
113 O’Riordan, T. et al, Reinterpreting the Precautionary Principle (Cameron May; London; 2000) at 
page 41.
114 Alder, J. and Wilkinson, D. (1999) at page 149; see also Elworthy, S. and Holder, J. (eds) (1997) at 
page 154.
115 Bergen Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE Region UN Doc A/CONF.151/PC/10 
(1990) 16* May 1990, in Hohmann, H. (ed) Basic Documents o f International Environmental Law Vol. 
1 (Graham & Trotman; London; 1992) at 558-559.
1,6 Ibid.
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117legislation adopted during the mid-1970s, although as the Chapter Four suggests, it 
first emerged in a domestic context in Sweden in 1969. Freestone, for example, 
claims that “[t]he origins of the precautionary principle ... appear to lie in concepts of 
national law, notably the German law Vorsorgeprinzip, which some also regard as the
1 1 O
most important principle of German environmental policy.” O’Riordan and 
Cameron also maintain that the principle emanates from the German concept of 
Vorsorge, which, when translated, literally means ‘beforehand or prior care or worry’, 
implying caution, good household management, and provision for the future.119 
Furthermore, Boehmer-Christiansen states that “[t]he precautionary principle is said 
to have made its way into English during the early 1980s as the translation of the 
German Vorsorgeprinzip.120
The Vorsorgeprinzip is one of five key principles of German environmental policy -  
namely Vorsorge, Verursacherprinzip (polluter pays), Kooperation (consensus), 
Wirtschaftliche Vertretbarkeit (principle of proportionality), and Gemeinlast prinzip
191(common burden principle). The concept of Vorsorge finds its roots in the first 
draft of the new clean air legislation of 1970 -  which states an intention to dem 
Enstehen schadlicher Umwelteinwirkungen vorzubeugen -  to prevent the
1 99development of harmful environmental effects. The subsequent Federal 
Government Umweltprogramm of 1971 expresses the same notion -  long term 
planning for the environment.123 In 1974, Parliament passed clean air legislation 
implementing the term ‘vorsorgeprinzip’ in response to growing concern over the 
irreversible nature of damage to habitats caused by acid rain and photochemical 
smog.124 Quintessentially, the principle required precautionary action in situations of 
potentially serious or irreversible risks to health or the environment before there was 
evidence of possible harm, with regard to the conceivable costs and benefits of action
117 See for example Th. Douma, W. (1996) ‘The Precautionary Principle’ 
http://www.eel.nl/virtue/precprin.htm. accessed April 2000.
118 Freestone, D. ‘The Precautionary Principle’, in Churchill, R. and Freestone, D. International Law 
and Global Climate Change (Graham & Trotman; London; 1991) at page 21.
1,9 See O’Riordan, T. and Cameron, J. (eds) (1994) at page 12; and also Tromans, S. ‘High Talk and 
Low Cunning: Putting Environmental Principles into Legal Practice’ (1995) 2 Journal of Planning Law 
779-796 at page 780.
120 Boehmer-Christiansen, S. ‘The Precautionary Principle in Germany -  Enabling Government, in 
O’Riordan, T. and Cameron, J. (eds) (1994) chapter 2 at page 31.
121 Ibid. at page 33.
122 Wey, K. G. Umweltpolitik in Deutschland (Westdeutscher Verlag; Opladen; 1993) at page 207
123 Boehmer-Christiansen, S. (1994) at page 35.
124 The German Clean Air Act 1974.
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1 7^or inaction. A subsequent report on the Clean Air Act explained that 
‘vorsorgeprinzip’ called for elements such as research and monitoring of potential 
hazards; the proportionality principle, where the costs of the prevention of hazards 
should be proportionate to the likely benefits gained; and the reducing of risks before 
full proof of harm is established, should its impacts be serious or irreversible.126 
Vorsorge was defined as following:-
“The principle of precaution commands that the damages done to the 
natural world (which surrounds us all) should be avoided in advance and 
in accordance with opportunity and possibility. Vorsorge further means 
the early detection of dangers to health and environment by 
comprehensive, synchronized (harmonized) research, in particular about 
cause and effect relationships..., it also means acting when conclusively 
ascertained understanding by science is not yet available. Precaution 
means to develop, in all sectors of the economy, technological processes 
that significantly reduce environmental burdens, especially those brought 
about by the introduction of harmful substances.”
However, although mainstream literature tends to treat the precautionary principle as 
a manifestation of Vorsorgeprinzip, this theory does not satisfactorily account for the 
extensive variation in its definition and interpretation. Another explanation, which 
develops the Vorsorgeprinzip argument, is that the precautionary principle has 
developed independently in different jurisdictions, producing a patchwork of different 
interpretations. There is evidence that the principle is being simultaneously 
developed at the sub-national,128 national,129 EC,130 and international level.131 The
125 European Environment Agency (EEA), Late Lessons from Early Warnings: the Precautionary 
Principle 1896-2000 (EEA; Brussels; 2001) at page 13.
126 Federal Interior Ministry 1984 Dritter Immissionsschutzbericht, Drucksache, Bonn 10/1345, at 53. 
See Boehmer-Christiansen, S. (1994) at page 36; EEA (2001) Ibid. at page 13.
127 Federal Interior Ministry 1984 Dritter Immissionsschutzbericht. Drucksache, Bonn 10/1345 at 53. 
Approximate translation in Boehmer-Christiansen, S. (1994) Ibid. at page 37.
12 Walton, W. ‘The Precautionary Principle in the UK Planning System’ (1995) 7(1) Environmental 
Law and Management 35-40.
129 Th. Douma, W. ‘The Precautionary Principle in the Netherlands’, in O’Riordan, T. et al (2000) at 
page 163, and De Sadeleer, N. ‘The Enforcement of the Precautionary Principle in German, French and 
Belgian Courts’ (2000) 9(2) Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 
144.
130 Commission of the European Communities, Communication on the Precautionary Principle COM 
1(2000) final (EC Commission; Brussels; 2000)
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way it is interpreted and implemented varies considerably, and thus, it is by no means
1 ^7clear how a common understanding or definition should be achieved. Its 
recognition and implementation spans international boundaries -  India133, Canada,134 
Australia,135 and the US have a long history of precautionary philosophy.136 
Consequently, the precautionary principle is enshrined in a large number of legal and 
policy definitions,137 although its role in anticipating hazards remains unclear. Stone 
claims that there is no such thing as ‘the’ precautionary principle because of the 
infinitely-differing versions of the principle, no one version being “elastic enough to 
wrap around all alternative institutional needs.” Furthermore, there have been 
claims that “the search for a ‘common understanding’ is a futile exercise since the 
principle is nonsensical and non-existent”.139
Against this background, this thesis argues that a fundamental impact of this 
definitional deficit is inconsistency in the manner in which the relationship between 
the precautionary principle and risk assessment is construed. This provokes a 
consideration of the interface between notions of risk, science, and precaution, which 
is considered in detail in Part Two. Chapters Two to Five introduce the precautionary 
principle in international, EC and domestic spheres. An underlying question in each 
chapter is the extent to which scientific risk assessment is seen to determine the 
operation of precaution.
131 Fisher, E. (2002) at page 112; Cameron, J. ‘The Precautionary Principle in International Law’ in 
O’Riordan, T. and Cameron, J. (1994) at page 113.
132 See Fisher, E. (2002) Ibid.
133 Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1997) 9(2) Journal of Environmental Law 387; 
and AP Pollution Control Board v. Nayudu [1999] (1) UJ (SC) 426.
134 Ogilvie, K. Applying the Precautionary Principle to Standard Setting or Toxic Substances in 
Canada (Pollution Probe 2001).
135 Harding, R. and Fisher, E. (1999)
136 Raffensberger, C. and Tickner, J. (eds) Protecting Public Health and the Environment: 
Implementing the Precautionary Principle (Island Press; Washington D.C.; 1999).
137 See Vanderzwaag, D. ‘The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Law and Policy: Elusive 
Rhetoric and First Embraces’ (1999) 8 Journal o f Environmental Law and Practice 355.
138 Stone, C. D. (2001).
139 Fisher, E. (2002) at page 15.
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Chapter Two
The precautionary principle in international environmental
protection
2.0 Introduction
As Chapter One suggests, the definition of the precautionary principle is notoriously 
vague and varying. Nowhere is this more evident than in international law. The 
following chapter traces the adoption of precautionary-type thinking in an 
international instrument to the early 1970s, monitoring its development to the height 
of its global recognition as Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration. It shows that its 
universal acceptance has failed to result in its universal interpretation. This chapter 
illustrates the way in which international environmental provisions define the 
precautionary principle in vastly dissimilar ways. In doing so it charts the 
development of Principle 15 throughout the UN Preparatory Committee negotiations, 
and discovers the ‘main players’ responsible for determining its final definition. 
Remarkably, despite the fact that Principle 15 is considered within academic circles to 
represent the definitive interpretation of precaution, the UN in its Terminology 
Bulletin, produced in conjunction with the Rio Declaration, presents a very different 
definition. This is evidence not only of the lacking consensus as to its meaning, but 
also of the emptiness o f definitions of the precautionary principle. Essentially, the 
failure of definitions to prescribe the requirements of precautionary action makes its 
application wholly discretionary. To a large extent, the international courts have 
recognised its lacking normativity, and have, as a result, been reluctant to construe the 
precautionary principle as imposing any legal obligation in customary law.
The aim of this chapter is to provide evidence to support the argument made in 
Chapter One that the precautionary principle is presented as having a number of 
different meanings. It focuses specifically on Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration and 
highlights the distinction between the definitions proposed by the US and the EC prior 
to the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). This 
transatlantic divide has been the subject of extensive debate. However, this thesis
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departs from the bulk of existing literature which compares the ‘strong’ precautionary 
approach endorsed by the EC with the ‘weaker’ approach advocated by the US. 
Although this thesis acknowledges that the strong/weak dichotomy emerges from the 
definitional deficit of precaution, its primary interest is the impact of this definitional 
ambiguity on the interrelationship between risk assessment and the application of the 
precautionary principle. Although this chapter is only a broad consideration of the 
notion of precaution in the international sphere, it forms a basis for Chapter Three 
which draws out the specific theme of the dependence of precaution on scientific risk 
assessment. The overriding argument is that, although the definitional deficit of 
precaution can manifest itself in a number of different ways -  such as, inconsistent 
interpretations of ‘threats’, ‘serious or irreversible’ and ‘damage’ -  one of the most 
fundamental implications of this imprecision is that it creates an indeterminate 
relationship between conventional risk assessment and the precautionary principle. 
This is significant because it renders uncertain the point at which precautionary- 
territory is entered into. The existence of ambiguity in relation to the ‘trigger’ of 
precautionary action raises profound questions about the role of scientific risk 
assessment in the prediction and control of future hazards. These issues are discussed 
in further detail in Part Two of this thesis. For now, however, it is enough to highlight 
that the definitional deficit of precaution forces a deeper consideration of broad 
theoretical concerns that are often overlooked by precautionary literature.
With these issues in mind, this chapter seeks to introduce the precautionary principle 
in the context of the diversity with which it is formulated in international provisions. 
Armed with an insight into its breadth of definition, Chapter Three goes on to give a 
detailed analysis of what I consider to be a fundamental consequence of divergent 
interpretations of precaution: inconsistencies in the way in which the affiliation 
between the precautionary principle and risk assessment is perceived.
2.0 A principle of international origin
Despite the argument that it derives from German jurisdiction, the precautionary 
principle is traditionally described as a principle of international origin, which reflects
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the theory that risks in the modem era are global rather than local.1 From this 
perspective, and given the potentially widespread scale of environmental degradation 
in contemporary society, the precautionary principle has particular resonance on the 
international forum. Unsurprisingly, the contention that environmental hazards 
disregard international boundaries has placed increasing demands on collective 
decision-making and burden-sharing, calling for the establishment of universal 
regulatory standards. The tendency for modem environmental risks to escape 
conventional spatial limitations means not only that their impact extends beyond the 
source, but also that the dispersion of impact makes it increasingly difficult to locate 
responsibility. The result is twofold. First, as O’Riordan and Cameron note, the only 
way in which to safeguard against ‘globalized risk’ is to ensure that all nations agree 
to the same terms of compliance. Second, it has been recognised that the problem of 
locating responsibility is best dealt with by an anticipatory, as opposed to a 
reactionary, response to risk. The combination of both has culminated in the 
emergence of the concept of precaution in international treaties and agreements.
■ 2.1.2 Tracing its emergence
At international level, the precautionary-type mindset can be traced to the 1972 
Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm,4 
which held as its underlying thesis the notion that “we must shape our actions 
throughout the world with a more prudent care for their environmental 
consequences.”5 In particular, Principle 21 of that Declaration lays emphasis on the 
importance of establishing the absence of environmental risk prior to action, 
stipulating that, whilst States have the right to exploit their own resources, they have a 
concurrent obligation “to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do 
not cause damage to the environment of other States.”6 This pre-emptive sentiment
1 Majone, G. ‘What Price Safety? The Precautionary Principle and its Policy Implications’ (2002) 
40(1) JCMS 89-109, at page 89.
2 Beck, U. Risk Society (Polity Press; Cambridge; 1992).
3 O’Riordan, T. and Cameron, J. (eds,) Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (Cameron May; 
London; 1994)) at page 200.
4 UN Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1.
5 UN Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 paragraph 6.
6 UN Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1.
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was reinforced when, in the aftermath of the Stockholm Declaration, a World 
Commission on Environment and Development Experts Group on Environmental 
Law recommended the alteration of its language so as to include the requirement of an
n
‘effects assessment’ before the authorisation of potentially hazardous activities.
A decade later, a precautionary philosophy was adopted by the UN in its World 
Charter for Nature.8 Reflecting the anticipatory ethos of the Stockholm Declaration, 
Principle 11(b) of the Charter stipulates that activities likely to pose a ‘significant 
risk’ to nature shall:-
“be preceded by an exhaustive examination; their proponents shall 
demonstrate that expected benefits outweigh potential damage to nature, 
and where potential adverse effects are not fully understood, the activities 
should not proceed”9
Despite the fact that, by the early 1980s, the notion of anticipatory action was 
prevalent,10 the first international agreements to make reference to the notion of 
precaution were the Declarations of International Conferences on the Protection of the 
North Sea. Whereas the First Declaration following the Conference at Bremen in 
1984 cites the concept of ‘vorsorgemassnahmen’ (translated in the English text as 
‘timely preventive measures’),11 the Second and Third Declarations, of 1987 and 1990 
respectively, expressly cite the concept of precaution.12 The Second Declaration 
explains that application of ‘the principle of precautionary action’ is required when 
“there is reason to assume that certain damage or harmful effects on the living
7 See World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) Experts Group on 
Environmental Law, Environmental Law and Sustainable Development: Legal Principles and 
Recommendations (WCED; 1996) at page 58; see also Daemen, T. J. ‘The EC’s Evolving 
Precautionary Principle -  Comparisons with the United States and Ramifications for Doha Round 
Trade Negotiations’ (2003) European Environmental Law Review 6-19, at page 6.
8 UN Doc A/RES/37/7 1982.
9 emphasis added.
10 See, for example, the Preamble to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 
(1985) UNEP Doc. 19.53/5; and, the Preamble to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer (1987)
11 Preamble to the First Declaration, see Gundling, L. ‘Status in International Law of the Principle of 
Precautionary Action’ (1990) 5 International Journal o f Estuarine and Coastal Law 23-30, at page 24
12 Ministerial Declaration of the Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, 
London 1987; and Ministerial Declaration of the Third International Conference on the Protection of 
the North Sea, The Hague, 1990 (see (1990) 1 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 658, at 
pages 662-73.
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resources of the sea are likely to be caused by such substances, even where there is no 
scientific evidence to prove a causal link between emissions and effects”.13 The 
Preamble to the Third Declaration is rather more specific, defining the scope of its 
application more narrowly as “tak[ing] action to avoid potentially damaging impacts 
of substances that are persistent, toxic and liable to bioaccumulate even where there is 
no scientific evidence to prove a causal link between emissions and effects.”14
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,15 which was opened 
for signature in March 1985 and came into force in September 1988, states in its 
Preamble that it is “[mjindful also of the precautionary principle measures for the 
protection of the ozone layer”. In 1989, the Nordic Council’s Conference on the 
Pollution of the Seas acknowledged the need for “an effective precautionary 
approach”, stating that the precautionary principle is:-
“intended to safeguard the marine ecosystem by, among other things, 
eliminating and preventing pollution emissions where there is reason to 
believe that damage or harmful effects are likely to be caused, even where 
there is inadequate in inconclusive evidence to prove a causal link 
between emissions and effects.”16
Indeed, by 1990, the UN Secretary-General was able to report that the precautionary 
principle “has been endorsed by virtually all recent international forums.”17
It is interesting that a number of international instruments have equated the 
precautionary principle with the concept of prevention. The Bamako Convention,18 a 
prime example, requires that “each party shall strive to adopt and implement the
13 Second Declaration, at paragraph XVI(l).
14 Third Declaration (1990).
15 UNEP Doc. 19.53/5.
16 Final Report of the Nordic Council’s International Conference on the Pollution of the Seas: Final 
Document Agreed on 18 October 1989, 99 app. v. (1990).
17 As cited in a UNEP publication: Relevance and Application of the Principle of Precautionary Action 
to the Caribbean Environment Programme, CEP Technical Report No.21 (1993) at paragraph I. For a 
recent application of precaution in international policy, see 'International Law Association Resolution 
3/2002: New Delhi Declaration Of Principles Of International Law Relating To Sustainable 
Development’ (2002) 2 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 211- 
216, Article 4.
18 Bamako Convention on the Ban of Imports into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement 
and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa 1991.
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preventive, precautionary approach to pollution problems”.19 The Oslo and Paris 
Commission Convention for the Protection of the North-East Atlantic also makes a 
direct comparison, stating that:-
“[t]he Contracting Parties shall apply: (a) the precautionary principle, by 
virtue of which preventive measures are to be taken when there are 
reasonable grounds for concern that substances or energy introduced, 
directly or indirectly, into the marine environment may bring about 
hazards to human health, harm living resources and marine ecosystems, 
damage amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, even 
when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between the 
inputs and the effects”.20
However, as Young notes, the principle of precaution goes beyond the conventional 
objective of merely preventing environmental damage once the risk of such damage is 
known. As such, the precautionary principle requires the taking or prohibition of 
action while there is still uncertainty as to the existence and magnitude of a risk. 
Whereas preventive action is employed in the face of a quantitatively known 
(calculable) risk, precautionary action is associated with quantitatively unknown 
(incalculable) risk, i.e. uncertainty. Prevention and precaution, therefore, are distinct 
types of regulatory response by virtue of a difference in the degree of knowledge 
required before invocation. The tendency for international instruments to treat 
prevention and precaution as being one and the same thing creates deep-seated 
ambiguity as to the point at which a precautionary approach is triggered. The failure 
by international provisions to make a clear distinction results in some doubt as to the 
certainty with which a risk must be known before acting.
This is a significant problem. The precautionary principle itself does not dictate with 
any meaningful degree of specificity the point at which it comes into operation. 
Whilst the blurred precaution/prevention distinction draws attention to the ambiguity
19 Article 4(3)(f), emphasis added.
20 1992 Article 2(2)(a), emphasis added.
21 Young, M. D. For Our Children’s Children: Some Practical Implications for Inter-Generational 
Equity and the Precautionary Principle (Resource Centre Assessment Commission; Canberra; 1993) at 
page 14.
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in relation to requisite levels of scientific certainty, the problem exists even in the 
absence of any explicit connection with prevention. Definitions of precaution 
stipulating that its application is triggered by ‘scientific uncertainty’ prescribe neither 
the extent nor the nature of uncertainty required. Indeed, the level of generality with 
which it is phrased induces problems with implementation. Nollkaemper reminds us 
that principles serve as guidelines as opposed to imposing concrete obligations and 
that they do not require a particular decision. However, there is a fundamental 
problem with the assumption that the elusive nature of precaution is implicit 
authorisation for the exercise of discretion in determining the appropriate extent and 
nature of scientific uncertainty for the implementation of precaution. From an 
operational aspect, ambiguity relating to its point of application generates deep-seated 
questions about the role of scientific risk assessment in determining the appropriate 
implementation of precaution. Subsequent chapters add substance to this argument.
■ 2.1.2 Intrinsic relativity
The intrinsic relativity of precaution is illustrated by Bell and McGillivray, who 
rightly point out that:-
“each convention tends to contain a slightly different formulation of the 
principle, which makes it difficult to identify an interpretation with which 
all states can be said to agree implicitly as a matter of binding 
international law.”
A degree of international consensus in relation to the core philosophy of precaution, 
however, was marked by the signing of five environmental instruments following the 
1991 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. 
These included two legal instruments -  the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change;24 and the Convention on Biological Diversity25 -  and three non-binding
22 Nollkaemper, A. ‘“What You Risk Reveals What You Value” and Other Dilemmas Encountered in 
the Legal Assault on Risk’, in Freestone, D. and Hey, E. (eds) (1996) 75, at page 80.
23 Bell, S. and McGillivray, D. Environmental Law (Blackstone Press; London; 5* edition; 2000) at 
page 48.
24 New York, 9 May 1992 (1992) 31 ILM 849; 161 signatories.
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agreements -  Agenda 21;26 the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development;27 
and the Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, 
Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests. All but the 
latter incorporated the precautionary principle.
2.2 Principle 15: the preparatory process
Arguably, Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration is the most commonly accepted
9 0definition of the precautionary principle. Cameron and Abouchar even go as far as 
claiming that Principle 15 is so prevalent that it has developed into a component of 
customary international law.30 Given its pervasiveness, it is perhaps fitting to 
examine its evolution during the negotiations preceding the finalising of the 
Declaration in 1992. In the two years prior to Rio, the UNCED Preparatory 
Committee (‘Prepcom’), which was divided into three working groups, met four times 
to propose and modify agreements in relation to the environment and development, 
and to provide a forum upon which concrete action plans could be established 
amongst participating States and international organisations. The first substantive 
session was held in Nairobi in August 1990, and was followed by a second and third 
session in Geneva in March and August 1991 respectively, and a fourth in New York 
early in 1992 during which the Prepcom embarked upon the drafting of the 
Declaration.31
A reading of the preparatory documents sheds light on the process leading to the 
formulation of Principle 15. Like other international agreements, the Prepcom
25 Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, (1992) 31 /LA/818; 170 signatories.
26 Rio de Janeiro, 16 June 1992 UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26, Vol.HI (1992).
27 Rio de Janeiro, 14 June 1992 (1992) 31 ILM 874.
28 Rio de Janeiro, 13 June 1992 (1992) 31 ILM 881.
29 See, for example, deFur, P. L. and Kaszuba, M. ‘Implementing the Precautionary Principle’ (2002) 
288 The Science of the Total Environment 155-165, at page 157; and Conko, G. ‘Safety, Risk and the 
Precautionary Principle: Rethinking Precautionary Approaches to the Regulation of Transgenic Plants’ 
(2003) 12 Transgenic Research 639-647, at page 641.
30 Cameron, J. and Abouchar, J. ‘The Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law’, in 
Freestone, D. and Hay, E. (eds) (1996) chapter 3, at page 41; De Sadeleer, N. ‘The Effect of 
Uncertainty on the Threshold Levels to which the Precautionary Principle Appears to be Subject’, in 
Sheridan, M. and Lavrysen, L. (eds) Environmental Law Principles in Practice (Bruylant; Bruxelles; 
2002) chapter 1 at page 21.
31 Kovar, J. D. ‘A Short Guide to the Rio Declaration’ (1993) 4 Colorado Journal of International 
Environmental Law and Policy 119-140, at page 120.
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considered the precautionary principle to be rooted in the preventive paradigm. In 
particular, it traced the emergence of the precautionary principle to the Nairobi 
Declaration of 1982 -  which, although not explicitly citing the precautionary
principle, highlighted the importance of prevention to international environmental 
policy.33 Similarly, the definition of precaution contained in the 1990 Bergen 
Declaration34 was considered to be pivotal in the formulation of Principle 15. 
Paragraph 7 of the first Annex to the Bergen Declaration required that:-
“[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures
■ i r
to prevent environmental degradation.”
As well as taking into account the concept of precaution as it appeared in other 
international instruments, the Prepcom meetings provided a forum upon which 
participating States were invited to submit their own recommendations and 
definitions. A number of proposals of general principles submitted by participating 
states either fail to acknowledge the precautionary principle, or merely pay it lip- 
serve, failing to explain how it is intended to operate in practice. The Australian 
proposal, for example, simply refers to “[t]he precautionary principle and with it the 
promotion of full use of environmental impact statements”.37 Similarly, the proposal 
put forward by Canada acknowledges the principle but fails to give guidance as to its 
operation, stating that “[a]ll individuals, organizations and States shall adopt 
precautionary and preventive approaches”. The Chilean proposal is of slightly more 
practical use, connecting the precautionary principle with risk assessment, but it is not 
clear on their relationship
32 PrepCom A/CONF.151/PC/78, Annex, at paragraph 3. Nairobi Declaration adopted by the UNEP 
Governing Council at its Session of a Special Character, 18 May 1982, UN Doc A/37/25 (1982).
33 Annex II paragraph 9.
34 Bergen Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE Region (1990).
35 Annex I paragraph 7.
36 See proposal submitted by China and Pakistan, Preparatory Committee Fourth Session Agenda Item 
3, 4 March 1992, UN Doc A/CONF.151/PC/WG.III/L.20 Principles on General Rights and 
Obligations.
37 Preparatory Committee for UNCED Working Group III Agenda Item 4 Principles on General Rights 
and Obligations UN Doc A/CONF.151/PC/WG.HI/L.8/Rev.l, 30 Aug 1991) at paragraph 48.
38 Ibid. at paragraph 49.
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“States, international organizations and transnational corporations shall 
have the obligation to take precautionary and preventive measures 
regarding activities that may cause environmental damage. Prior 
assessment of environmental risks and notification of those concerned or 
potentially affected shall be undertaken”
Recognising that the proposed definitions tended to be vague and lacking in practical 
context, the Preparatory Committee introduced other possible elements to the 
precautionary principle. It suggested first, that decisions should be guided by “careful 
evaluation, so as to avoid, wherever practicable, serious or irreversible damage to the 
environment”; and second, that a “prior assessment of the risk-weighted 
consequences” is conducted.40 Neither was adopted in the final UNCED definition.
The ambiguity and conflicting nature of the proposed definitions was reflected in an 
attempt made by the Chairman to summarise the alternative versions submitted. The 
Draft Principles stated that:-
“In order to [protect] [enhance the protection of] the environment, the 
precautionary approach [shall] [should] be widely applied [by States] 
[according to their capabilities]. [Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty [shall] [should] not be 
used as a reason for postponing [cost-effective] measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.]”41
A month later, a second recital of the Draft Principles proposed by the Chairman 
illustrated that the definition of the precautionary principle had gained some 
specificity. It read as follows:-
“In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are
39 Ibid. at paragraph 50.
40 Preparatory Committee for UNCED Fourth Session Working Group III Agenda Item 3 UN Doc 
A/CONF. 151/PC/WG.III/L.24, 5 March 1992.
41 Preparatory Committee UNCED Fourth Session Agenda Item 3 UN Doc 
A/CONF. 151/PC/WG.III/L.33, 31 March 1992, Principles on General Rights and Obligations -  Draft 
Principles Proposed by the Chairman, see Principle 12.
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threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
should not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.42
Rejecting the attempts made by some European countries to endorse a precautionary 
‘principle’,43 UNCED finally adopted precautionary ‘approach’. Whilst some 
commentators consider that the principle/approach distinction is significant44 -  
distinguishing between the definite use of ‘the’ precautionary principle and the 
indefinite use of ‘a’ precautionary approach -  it transpires that the consequence of 
this rhetorical disparity has been largely immaterial. Despite Principle 15 embracing 
‘a precautionary approach’, it has come to represent a universal definition of the 
precautionary principle.
It is also worth noting that there existed a clear conflict between US and EC 
interpretations of precaution in terms of the degree to which it was perceived as being 
mandatory. Whereas the US proposal concluded that “lack of full scientific certainty 
should not be used as a reason in itself for postponing effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation”,45 the EC submitted that “lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental 
degradation”.46 The use of ‘should’ by the US implied that the application of the 
precautionary principle was perceived as involving some discretion, whilst the EC’s 
use of ‘shall’ indicated that its application was perceived as being obligatory. This 
can be read as being evidence of a greater commitment on the part of the EC to the 
concept of precaution, this being subsequently reflected in 1993 during the Uruguay 
Negotiations when the EC campaign to include the precautionary principle in the SPS 
Agreement was opposed by the US.
42 Preparatory Committee UNCED Fourth Session Agenda Item 3 UN Doc 
A/CONF. 15 l/PC/WG.III/L.33/Rev.l, 2 April 1992, Principles on General Rights and Obligations -  
Draft Principles Proposed by the Chairman, see Principle 15.
43 Kovar, J. D. (1993) at page 134.
44 Adams, M. D. ‘The Precautionary Principle and the Rhetoric Behind It’ (2002) 5(4) Journal of Risk 
Research 301-316) at page 305.
45 A/CONF. 151/PC.WG.III/L.21, 4 March 1992, Prepcom for UNCED, 4th Session Working Group III, 
Agenda Item 3, New York, Principle 6.
46 A/CONF. 15 l/PC/WG.m/L.25, 6 March 1992 Prepcom for UNCED, Fourth Session WG.III Agenda 
Item 3, New York, at paragraph 6.
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Other than minor changes made to the sentence order, the final definition adopted by 
the Preparatory Committee on 2nd April 1992 largely reflected the EC proposal.47 
However, it is worth noting that the UNCED Principle 15 notably departs from the 
EC proposal (as well as from Annex I Paragraph 7 of the Bergen Declaration) on two 
counts -  first, by limiting the obligation to take precautionary measures according to 
the ‘capabilities’ of Member States; and second by requiring that precautionary 
measures be ‘cost-effective’. In this sense, Principle 15 introduces context-dependent 
criteria that have the capacity to severely constrain its application. This stipulation 
that the operation of the principle is means-tested and contingent on benefits 
outweighing costs inevitably yields a significantly weaker version of the precaution 
than one without qualification.
In the light of evidence available from Preparatory Committee sessions, it transpires 
that these additional conditions were introduced in a revised proposal submitted by 
China and Pakistan.48 The original draft presented on behalf of the countries of G77 
by China and Pakistan failed to include the precautionary principle in its list of 
Principles on General Rights and Obligations 49 When it resubmitted its proposal 15 
days later, it confined the application of the precautionary principle to situations in 
which preventive action is ‘cost-effective’, and required that its operation be 
dependent on ‘different socio-economic contexts’.
It is important that these additional provisos are read in view of the fact that the G77 
and China rejected the title ‘Earth Charter’, primarily because it placed too much 
emphasis on the needs of the environment as opposed to the needs of social 
development.50 Conversely, representatives from more economically developed 
countries claimed that the Rio Declaration should shift its focus from anthropocentric 
causes to one which integrated environmental concerns. The Preamble to the 
Canadian proposal for an Earth Charter, for example, stipulated that an understanding 
of our common future should be based on “the fundamental inseparability of
47 See A/CONF. 151/PC/WG.IH/L.25, 6 March 1992, Fourth Session, Working Group III Agenda Item 
3, New York, Principles on General Rights and Obligations, Proposal Submitted by Portugal on Behalf 
of the State Members of the European Community, at paragraph 6.
48 UN Doc A/CONF. 15 l/PC/WG.III/L.20/Rev.l, at Principle 12.
49 UN Doc A/CONF. 151/PC/WG.III/L.20.
50 Kovar, J. D. (1993) at page 123.
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humankind from all o f nature”51 Unsurprisingly, this was strongly resisted by the 
G77 and China, who claimed that developed states had failed to take into account the 
plight of developing countries, and were adamant that the prime concern of UNCED 
should be people and not nature. The final version of the Declaration mirrored the 
anthropocentricity of proposals submitted by developing countries, Principle 1 
acknowledging that “[h]uman beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable 
development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with 
nature.”
Interestingly, in spite of the fact that the formulation of Principle 15 indicated a 
degree of consensus in relation to the meaning of a precautionary approach, the UN 
Terminology Bulletin, prepared in conjunction with UNCED 1992, presented a 
different definition, stating that:-
“[when] confronted with serious or irreversible threats to the environment, 
the absence of absolute scientific certainty should not serve as a pretext 
for delaying the adoption of measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.”53
The significance of this vaguely similar, although diverging, definition is profound. It 
provides evidence that, although there is some agreement as to its underlying 
philosophy of prudence, definitions of the precautionary principle are largely empty. 
Despite having both been prepared by UNCED, the Bulletin defined precaution using 
such obviously different language that it suggests that the underlying ethos of 
precaution was deemed to have greater import than its definition. From this 
perspective, the value of precaution lies not in its precise definition, but in its basic 
premise. The meaning of the precautionary principle exists in its concept, not in its
51 Principles on General Rights and Obligations, Preparatory Committee for the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development, Proposal Submitted by Canada, Fourth Session, 
Agenda Item 3, UN Doc. A/CONF. 151/PC/WG.III/L.23 (1992); see also Principle II of Working 
Group on Ethics, Development and the Environment of the U.S. Citizen’s Network on UNCED, The 
Earth Charter (Draft) (1991) defines ‘Global Interdependence’ as “[t]he Earth community, of which 
humankind is a part, functions in interrelated cycles, processes, and systems upon which life depends. 
This reality forms a basis for all social, cultural, scientific, economic, legal, and political 
arrangements.”
52 Kovar, J. D. (1993) at page 124.
53 UNCED, Terminology Bulletin No.344, Vol.l, Environment and Development UN Publication 
ST/CS/SER.F/344 1992.
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specific expression. It might be argued, therefore, that the only way in which to 
define precautionary action is by describing that which has already been carried out -  
making definitions of precaution descriptive, not prescriptive. This lack of 
normativity has significant bearing on the legal status of the precautionary principle.
2.3 A general principle of international law?
Determining whether or not the precautionary principle has become a general 
principle of customary international law has been a central issue to much academic 
debate. Whereas traditionally, most commentators have observed that precaution 
lacked the precision required to elevate status to legally binding general norm, post- 
Rio literature has tended to construe its widespread recognition as a sign of new­
found prominence in the international arena. An examination of the literature 
confirms a marked shift to the acceptance of the precautionary principle as an 
emerging, if not fully-fledged, component of customary law.
However, as the following chapter points out, the argument that the precautionary 
principle has developed into general customary rule is erroneous in that it is based 
solely on the frequency with which the precautionary principle is cited, and is 
ignorant of the fact that the content of the principle is insufficiently normative to be 
described as a general norm. Bodansky, for example, observes that the ambiguity of 
the precautionary principle makes it impossible to adopt as a regulatory standard.54 
Von Moltke explains that the precautionary principles is situated at a ‘meta-level’ and 
thus requires clarification and operationalisation if it is to be considered a universally 
binding norm.55 The position is compellingly summarised by Bimie and Boyle, who 
accurately point out that:-
“[d]espite its attractions, the great variety of interpretations given to the 
precautionary principle, and the novel and far-reaching effects of some 
applications suggest that it is not yet a principle of international law.
54 Bodansky, D. (1991) ‘The Precautionary Principle: Scientific Uncertainty and International 
Environmental Law’, American Society of International Law, Annual Meeting, Washington D.C. 19 
April 1991, (1991) 85 Proceedings of the American Society o f International Law 413-417, at page 417.
55 Von Moltke, K. (1996) at page 101.
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Difficult questions concerning the point at which it becomes applicable to 
any given activity remain unanswered and seriously undermine its 
normative character and practical utility, although support for it does 
indicate a policy of greater prudence on the part of those states willing to 
accept it.”56
Reflecting these concerns, Cameron and Abouchar argue that at the international level 
there are three aspects of definitional ambiguity. First, ambiguity exists in relation to 
the threshold of harm required for application of the principle.57 The Climate Change 
Convention and the Rio Declaration, for example, require a risk of ‘serious of 
irreparable’ damage. The Convention on Biological Diversity, on the other hand, 
demands ‘significant’ harm, whilst the OSPAR Convention insists on there being 
‘reasonable grounds for concern’. Second, the means of achieving a precautionary
c o
environmental protection are uncertain. Whereas the Rio Declaration imposes an 
obligation to employ ‘cost-effective measures’, it fails to make elucidate the type and 
scale of pre-emptive action required. Third, it is unclear whether the precautionary 
principle should enforce the ‘common but differentiated approach’59 contained in the 
Rio Declaration. Principle 15 requires that participating States invoke the 
precautionary principle ‘according to their capabilities’, although other expressions of 
precaution require unqualified application.60
The difficulty of ascertaining its prescriptive content is particularly evident in the 
judicial approach taken in relation to the principle. A selection of international cases, 
discussed below, illustrate how the courts’ refusal to clarify its international status can 
be interpreted as a lacking consensus as to the meaning and application of precaution. 
Whilst the courts have often recognised precaution as an imperative means of 
environmental protection, and on occasion declared that the precautionary principle
56 Bimie, P. W. and Boyle, A. E. International Law and the Environment (John Wiley & Sons; London; 
1992) at page 98.
57 Cameron, J. and Abouchar, J. (1996) at page 44.
58 Ibid. at pages 44-5.
59 Ibid. at page 45.
60 See, for example, Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East 
Atlantic: “preventive measures are to be taken when there are reasonable grounds for concern”; see 
also, Bacon, L. ‘Enforcement Mechanisms in International Wildlife Agreements and the United States: 
Wading Through the Murk’ (1999) 12 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 331, at page 331: “uncertainties about 
the ability of a fish stock to sustain a harvest level must be resolved in favor of the fish.”
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may be considered a customary rule, they have so far been averse to making a 
definitive statement as to its status. It is perhaps unsurprising that, given the 
politically-charged nature of the disputes in which the concept of precaution has been 
called into question, the courts have declined to take a proactive role.
Contrary to the arguments submitted by Bodansky, Von Moltke, Bimie and Boyle, 
and Cameron and Abouchar, some commentators claim that there is evidence to 
suggest that the courts should regard the precautionary principle as having developed 
into a customary norm of international law. Sands, for example, notes that:-
“[t]he legal status of the precautionary principle is evolving. At a 
minimum, however, there is sufficient evidence of state practice to justify 
the conclusion that the principle, as elaborated in the Rio Declaration and 
the Climate Change and Biodiversity Conventions, has now received 
sufficiently broad support to allow a good argument to be made that it 
reflects a principle of customary law.”61
Legal scholars have tended to argue that, despite the fact that there lacks international 
consensus as to its precise definition, it is possible to identify the conceptual core of 
the precautionary principle. The essence of all interpretations of the precautionary 
principle is that regulatory inaction is unjustified when the environmental risks posed 
by such inaction are (i) uncertain and (ii) non-negligible.63 Arguably, this capacity to 
isolate its central tenets makes the precautionary principle “no less vague” than other 
principles of international law.64 In defining the notion of ‘public utility’ in relation 
to expropriation and compensation in international law, Kissam and Leach observe 
that:-
“the fact that a concept lacks precise definition does not necessarily result 
in it becoming completely meaningless or without value. If, for example, 
an expropriation were submitted to an international tribunal for a
61 Sands, P. ‘Principles of International Environmental Law: Volume 1: Frameworks, Standards and 
Implementation’, in Sands, P. et al (eds) Principles of International Environmental Law: Volumes 1-4 
(Manchester University Press; Manchester; 1995) at page 213.
2 See, for example, Cameron, J. and Abouchar, J. (1996) at page 37.
63 Cameron, J. and Wade-Grey, W. (1992) at page 8.
64 Cameron, J. and Abouchar, J. (1996) at page 46.
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determination of the question as to whether the property expropriated was 
taken for reasons of public utility, the tribunal would not be prevented 
from resolving the issue merely because no ideally satisfactory definition 
of ‘public utility’ exists. An exact definition is neither possible nor 
necessary. Municipal tribunals throughout the world daily interpret and 
apply such seemingly amorphous concepts as ‘good faith’, ‘reasonable 
man’, ‘due process’, and the like, although it would be difficult to define 
these phrases with any absolute degree of finality.”65
Although the argument that other decision rules are just are poorly defined is a weak 
defence of the precautionary principle, it is perhaps de minimus verification that this 
lack of precise definition is not indicative of its futility. Regardless of its definitional 
ambiguity, it is possible to discern a broad philosophy of precaution, incorporating 
notions of prudence and pre-emption. Its poorly defined nature enables the concept of 
precaution to adopt an overarching position in environmental protection. However, in 
my opinion, its definitional deficit is at odds with any attempt to depict it as being 
sufficiently normative to become a customary rule.
This duality of the generality and flexibility of precautionary philosophy on the one 
hand, and its lack of prescriptive guidance on the other, is displayed by judicial 
attitudes to precaution. Despite its widespread recognition in the international arena, 
the argument that the precautionary principle is a legally binding norm has found 
somewhat limited judicial support in the international arena.66 The following section 
illustrates that, notwithstanding their tendency to acknowledge precautionary ethos, 
the courts have been uneasy with the responsibility of determining the meaning and 
legal status of the precautionary principle. The upshot of the courts’ failure to make 
any definitive statement is that the precautionary principle continues to lack in 
specificity and normative content, and as a result, has not yet become a legally 
binding mandate. Although Freestone claims that “discussions about whether the 
precautionary principle is a binding principle of international customary law have a
65 Kissam, L. T. and Leach, E. K. ‘Sovereign Expropriation of Property and Abrogation of Concession 
Contracts’ (1959) 28 Fordham Law Review 177-214, at page 190.
66 Bell, S. and McGillivray, D. (2000) at page 48. De Sadeleer makes a similar observation that 
international courts are renowned for their lack of enthusiasm to accept precautionary principle as 
legally binding, De Sadeleer, N. (2002) at page 22.
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(\1distinctly 1990s feel about them”, the debate will remain fierce for as long as there 
lacks common understanding as to when the precautionary principle is applicable, and 
what its application entails.
2.4 Examining the case law
According to Trouwborst, a broadly precautionary approach can be traced to the 
judgment of the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case in 1949, which confirmed a general 
obligation on states to take preventive action where there is significant risk of 
transboundary damage from activities occurring within their borders.69 However, the 
‘precautionary principle’ was first explicitly cited during international judicial
7 nproceedings in the Nuclear Tests Cases of 1973-4, which concerned a dispute over 
the French atmospheric nuclear testing at two atolls in the South Pacific. Australia 
and New Zealand claimed that, pursuant to a general obligation to prevent 
environmental harm, states planning to undertake activities with potentially negative 
environmental impact had to prove that those activities posed no risk. During ICJ 
pleadings, the Australian Advocate-General argued that, given the fact that any 
environmental degradation caused by atmospheric testing would be permanent, it was 
appropriate to adopt a precautionary approach:-
“Mr President, one of our primary legal propositions is that the deposit of 
radioactive fallout from the nuclear test infringes the inviolability of our 
territorial sovereignty. That proposition does not require Australia to 
establish the exact extent of the danger of these radioactive materials of 
which we are the unwilling target ... The processes of fallout deposit and
67 Freestone, D. ‘Caution of Precaution: A Rose By Any Other Name?’ (1999) 10 Yearbook of 
International Environmental Law 25-32, at page 26.
68 Corfu Channel Case -  United Kingdom v. Albania (1949) ICJ Rep. 1, at page 1; aee Trouwborst, A. 
Evolution and Status o f the Precautionary Principle in International Law (Kluwer; The Hague; 2002) 
at page 158.
69 Ibid
70 Australia v. France; New Zealand v. France (Interim Measures) (1973) ICJ Rep. 173; (Jurisdiction, 
Australia) (1974) ICJ Rep. 253; (Jurisdiction, New Zealand) (1974) ICJ Rep. 457.
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the resulting uptake of radioactive material by the Australian people are
71irreversible; the legal injury is irreparable.”
In this particular instance, the ICJ did not make ruling because France announced that 
it would not carry out any further testing. However, twenty years later, France 
embarked upon a new scheme of underground nuclear testing. Unsurprisingly, 
Australia, New Zealand and other Pacific states attempted to reopen the case. In 
August 1995, New Zealand lodged ‘Request for an Examination of the Situation’,72 
claiming that, in accordance with the precautionary principle, France was under an 
obligation to provide evidence before embarking upon nuclear testing that such 
testing would not introduce radioactive material to the environment.
The French government retaliated, claiming that it was under no legal obligation to 
prevent environmental degradation caused by radioactive contamination since the 
international status of the precautionary principle was “tout a fait incertain”74, and
7Sthat, in any event, it had already been complied with.
Unfortunately, the ICJ was prevented from handing down judgment on the 
precautionary principle and other substantial issues,76 and New Zealand’s request was 
dismissed without recourse to a discussion of the merits. The three dissenting judges, 
however, concluded that New Zealand had made a prima facie case, and their
71 per Senator Murphy; ICJ Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents: Nuclear Test Cases, Vol. I, at page 
43.
72 ICJ Order, 22 September 1995, Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with 
Paragraph 63 o f the Court’s Judgment o f 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. 
France) Case; in (1995) ICJ Rep. 288.
73 Ibid. at page 290.
74 6 Yearbook of International Environmental Law (1995) 536, which cites judgment New Zealand v. 
France, pages 71-72 and 75.
75 Ibid.
76 The Court noted that:- “in analysing [the ICJ] Judgment of 1974, it reached the conclusion that that 
Judgment dealt exclusively with atmospheric nuclear tests; that consequently, it is not possible for the 
Court now to take into consideration questions relating to underground nuclear tests; and that the Court 
cannot, therefore, take account of the arguments derived by New Zealand, on the one hand from the 
conditions in which France has conducted underground nuclear tests since 1974, and on the other from 
the development of international law in recent decades - and particularly the conclusion, on 
25 November 1986, of the Noumea Convention - any more than of the arguments derived by France 
from the conduct of the New Zealand Government since 1974.” For full text of Request for an 
Examination of the Situation with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the 
Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) see http://www.icj- 
cii .org/iciwww/icases/inzfr/inzff summaries/inzfr isummarv 19950922.htm. accessed January 2005.
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comments may be used to indicate judicial perception of the status of the 
precautionary principle in international environmental law.
Judge Koroma did not go beyond acknowledging the argument made by New Zealand 
regarding the precautionary principle, merely stating that “there is probably a duty not
• • 7 7to cause gross or serious damage which can reasonably be avoided.” Judge Ad Hoc 
Palmer, on the other hand, suggested that the precautionary principle might be 
described as “a principle of customary international law relating to the 
environment.”78
Although the international courts have suggested that the principle should be treated
7 0as more than merely a guiding concept, they have avoided definitively concluding 
that it has evolved into a customary rule of international law. It is reasonable to 
suggest that this judicial apprehension is reflective of lacking consensus as to the 
precise meaning and application of the precautionary principle. Whilst the courts 
have acknowledged precaution as a broad philosophy of environmental protection, 
they have avoided defining the precautionary principle, arguably because demarcating 
its operation presents too challenging a task beyond the demands of arbitration.
This thesis does not seek to resolve the debate surrounding the legal status of 
precaution, although on the evidence provided, it is my opinion that it has not yet 
developed into an international customary norm -  although it is likely that 
deliberations of this nature will continue. The purpose of this chapter has been to 
introduce the argument that the definitional deficit of the precautionary principle 
manifests in its divergent interpretation and disagreement about its normative content. 
My studies of the precautionary principle began with in-depth consideration of its 
lacking definition, and on discovering its contentious nature, it has become clear that
77 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma on the 1995 Nuclear Tests Cases, ICJ Order, 22 September 
1995, Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s 
Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case; in (1995) ICJ 
Rep. 288, at 363-380, emphasis added.
78 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ad Hoc Palmer, ICJ Order, 22 September 1995, Request for an 
Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment o f 20 
December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case; in (1995) ICJ Rep. 288, 381-421, 
at page 412.
79See, for example, Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project {Hungary v. Slovakia) 25 
September 1997, (1998) 37 ILM 162; Separate (dissenting) Opinion of Judge Weeramantry 
http://www.icj-cii.org/iciwww/idocket/ihs/ihsiudgement/ihs ijudgment 970925 weeraman.htm. 
accessed July 2004 at paragraph A.
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legal judgments provide a key insight into the evolution of its scope and application. 
The most illustrious judgment at the international level -  the WTO Beef Hormones 
Dispute -  is discussed in the following chapter. Although I initially approached this 
case wanting to ascertain the international status of the precautionary principle, my 
interest quickly shifted to defining the relationship between precaution and risk 
assessment. This was because, despite the fact that the Beef Hormones Dispute is 
often cited as the pivotal case in determining the legal status of precaution, both the 
WTO Dispute Resolution Panel and the Appellate Body judgments fail to explicitly 
add substance to the continuing debate. The most interesting aspect of this case, from 
my perspective, is the way in which the role of scientific risk assessment in 
determining the application of precaution was perceived by the Courts. The next 
chapter discusses, in some detail, the relationship between risk assessment and 
precaution from US and EC standpoints -  which build upon the transatlantic divide 
observed in UN Preparatory Committee meetings. In doing so, it introduces more 
abstract topics, such as the definition of the concept of risk and the utility of scientific 
foresight.
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Chapter Three
The Beef Hormones Dispute: an analysis of the role of precaution
3.0 Introduction
The debate over the international status of the precautionary principle climaxed in 
1998 when the WTO Dispute Resolution Body was charged with the task of 
determining whether an EC ban on the import of hormone-treated bovine violated the 
trade harmonisation provisions of the SPS Agreement. Although the Reports of both 
the WTO Dispute Resolution Panel and the Appellate Body carefully avoided the 
question of its international status, they are useful because they highlight the 
irresolvable conflict between differing interpretations of the precautionary principle 
and its reliance on scientific risk assessment. The objective here is to provide a 
description of proceedings together with an analysis of broader themes such as 
judicial interpretations of ‘science’ and ‘risk’, and the extent to which scientific 
assessment informs a precautionary response to uncertainty.
However, before turning to examine the WTO Beef Hormones Dispute in more detail, 
it is worth placing the EC’s stance in its historical context, with particular reference to 
a case brought before the ECJ in 1988, Re Agricultural Hormones. It is important to 
note that the approach taken by the EC at the WTO in 1998 is reflective of the 
conduct of EC institutions in the early and mid 1980s, and for that reason, it is 
necessary to pay due attention to proceedings leading up to the WTO litigation.
3.1 Background
On 31 July 1981, the EC Council of Ministers adopted Directive 81/602 by qualified 
majority on the basis of Article 43 EC Treaty,1 prohibiting ‘certain substances having
1 Now Article 37 EC Treaty
48
a hormonal action and of any substances having thyrostatic action.’ Specific 
substances contained in Article 2 of the Directive were not to be administered to farm 
animals, although Article 4 provided that Member States could authorise the 
administration of certain substances for therapeutic (and similar) purposes. In order 
to ascertain the safety of the use substances under Article 4, Article 5 of the Directive 
required that the Council, acting unanimously on the basis of a proposal from the 
Commission, should decide ‘as soon as possible’ on the administration of five 
anabolic agents for fattening purposes. Those substances were oestradiol 17-p, 
progesterone, testosterone, trenbolone and zeranol. In accordance with Article 8, the 
Commission set up a scientific group to examine their effects. The Scientific Group 
on Anabolic Agents in Animal Production3 was chaired by Professor Lamming (and 
known as the ‘Lamming Group’). It issued an interim report on 22 September 1982.
This Report explained that the use of such growth promoters in farm animals resulted 
in accelerated conversion of foodstuff and protein deposition.4 It also noted that the 
hormones in question already occurred naturally in farm animals, and thus “have to be 
considered as inevitable constituents of food from animal origin.”5 Oestradiol-17p, 
testosterone and progesterone were present naturally in milk in varying quantities 
depending on the physiological condition of the animal,6 and it was agreed that they 
had an inconsequential impact on animal health. The Report observed that:-
“[u]nder appropriate conditions the treatment of animals with exogenous 
natural steroids results in residues in edible tissues which are orders of 
magnitude lower than those that can occur naturally in mature males, 
females and pregnant females. Therefore in practice no quantitative 
differences have been observed between treated and untreated animals 
when the recommended conditions of use were observed. Levels in
2 Directive 81/602, OJ 1981 L222/32, amended by Directive 85/358, extended in 1988 (Directives 
88/146 OJ 1988 L70/16 and 88/299 OJ 1988 L128/36) and consolidated by Directive 96/22 OJ 1996 
L125/3.
3 EU Commission, Report of the Scientific Group on Anabolic Agents in Animal Production (EU 
Commission; Brussels; 1982)
4 Ibid. at paragraph 1.
5 Ibid. at paragraph 3.
6 Ibid.
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treated and untreated calves are if the order of 0.1 |ig testosterone/kg and 
0.03pg natural oestrogens/kg edible tissue.”7
Regarding potential risks created by the human consumption of meat treated with 
exogenous anabolic hormones, the Report found that the quantity of hormones used 
was “toxicologically negligible”.8 Furthermore, it held that, provided the agents were 
properly used, the liver and placenta actually formed tissue barriers to prevent adverse 
toxicological effects of the consumption of anabolic hormones.9
On the basis of this evidence, the Lamming Group was able to conclude that the use 
of oestradiol-170, testosterone and progesterone did not present any harmful effects to 
consumer health when used under appropriate conditions as growth promoters in farm 
animals.10 This opinion was subsequently supported by the EC Scientific Veterinary 
Committee,11 the EC Scientific Committee for Animal Nutrition,12 and the EC 
Scientific Committee for Food.13 However, with regard to the administration of 
trenbolone and zeranol, the Lamming Group concluded that it was necessary to 
conduct further scientific studies before determining their safety.14
In the light of the scientific advice, the Commission published a proposal15 for a 
Council Directive amending Directive 81/602/EEC, calling for the controlled use of 
oestradiol-1713, testosterone, and progesterone for fattening purposes. However, 
following consultations with the Economic and Social Committee16 and the European 
Parliament,17 the proposal was rejected. In essence, both institutions considered that 
the scientific evidence upon which the proposal was based was inadequate.18 This is, 
to say the least, an intriguing position given the scientific position that oestradiol- 17p,
7 Ibid. emphasis added.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid. Conclusions and Recommendations, at paragraph 5.1.
11 Opinion of the Scientific Veterinary Committee, expressed 9 November 1982, paragraph 2.
12 Opinion of the Scientific Committee on Animal Nutrition, expressed 17 November 1982, at 
paragraph 2.
13 Opinion of the Scientific Committee for Food, expressed 4 February 1983, III/197/83-EN, see 
Conclusions and Recommendations.
14 EU Commission (1982) at paragraphs 5.2 and 5.3.
15 COM(84)295 Final.
16 See Economic and Social Committee Opinion [1985] OJ C44/14.
17 See European Parliament Resolution [1985] OJ C288/158.
18 See Economic and Social Committee Opinion [1985] at paragraph 10; European Parliament 
Rsolution [1985] at paragraph 6.
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testosterone, and progesterone, used in a controlled and appropriate manner, posed 
only a negligible risk to animal and human health.19 The Economic and Social 
Committee, in particular, considered that the evidence presented in the Lamming 
Report had failed to establish the safety of the three anabolic agents on the basis of 
“sound experience covering, inter alia, conditions of use”,20 and thus could not be 
relied upon as irrefutable proof that their use would not jeopardise consumer 
protection. Unsurprisingly, in 1987 the Lamming Group was disbanded, and its 
findings were published independently of the EC.21
Prima facie, the rationale underlying the outright rejection by the Economic and 
Social Committee and the European Parliament of the authorised use of those three 
substances is unclear. A closer examination of the Opinions submitted those two 
institutions, however, suggests that the direct protection of animal and consumer 
safety was not the principal focus of their concern. For instance, the Economic and 
Social Committee was eager to point to the fact that “[t]he representatives of 
consumers and workers have for a long time been unequivocally opposed to the use of 
anabolics in livestock fattening.”22 Similarly, the European Parliament highlighted 
that “the resultant uncertainty over the safety of these substances has had an adverse 
effect on consumer confidence”, and added that the overproduction of meat and 
meat products as a consequence of the use of anabolic agents added considerably to 
the costs of the Common Agricultural Policy.24 It is evident, therefore, that both the 
Economic and Social Committee and the European Parliament had far wider terms of 
reference than the Lamming Group. Whereas the Lamming Group adopted a 
narrowly scientific sphere of enquiry, the Economic and Social Committee and the 
European Parliament took into account a markedly broader range of factors, making 
their risk assessment a political rather than purely scientific exercise. It was thus
19 See Report of the Scientific Veterinary Committee, The Scientific Committee for Animal Nutrition 
and the Scientific Committee for Food on the Basis o f the Report of the Scientific Group on Anabolic 
Agents in Animal Production (Directorate-General for Agriculture; Commission of the European 
Communities; Luxembourg; 1984) Document EUR8913.
20 Economic and Social Committee Opinion [1985] at paragraph 10.
21 Bridges, J. W. and Bridges, O. ‘Hormones as Growth Promoters: The Precautionary Principle or a 
Political Risk Assessment?’, in Harremoes, P. (ed) et al, The Precautionary Principle: Late Lessons 
From Early Warnings (Earthscan Publications Ltd; London; 2002) chapter 14, at page 163; see also 
Lamming, G. E. et al ‘Scientific Report on Anabolic Agents in Animal Production’ (1987) 121 The 
Veterinary Record 389-392.
22 Economic and Social Committee Opinion [1985] at paragraph 9.
23 European Parliament Resolution [1985] at paragraph J.
24 Ibid. see Introduction.
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inevitable that their position on the administration of anabolic agents would differ 
from that of the Lamming Group.
The Commission proposal was amended accordingly,25 resulting in the adoption of 
Directive 85/649 on 31 Dec 1985 prohibiting the use of all substances for growth 
promotion purposes, permitting authorised use only for therapeutic purposes. Article 
2 of Directive 85/649 stipulated that States derogating from Article 2 of Directive 
81/602 were only permitted to do so in accordance with Article 4 of Directive 81/602. 
Article 5 of Directive 85/649 required that Member States ensured that no farm 
animals (or meat from such animals) to which certain substances have been 
administered were dispatched to other Member States. Article 6 obliged Member 
States to prohibit the import of farm animals (or meat animals from such animals) to 
which certain substances have been administered.
■ 3.1.1 Re Agricultural Hormones26
The UK, supported by Denmark, made an application to the ECJ for a declaration that 
Directive 85/649 was void, claiming that the Directive should have been based on 
Article 100 EC Treaty27 which required first, a unanimous vote for measures relating 
to the approximation of legislation and second, the consultation of the European 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee. The UK submitted that the 
Council’s reliance on Article 43 was insufficient because the scope of the Directive in 
question extended beyond securing the aims of the common agricultural policy to the 
approximation of legislation in relation to the safeguarding to the interests and health 
of consumers.28
The Council did not deny that part of the Directive dealt with the approximation of 
national laws in respect of the protection of public health, but it argued that this did
25 [1985] OJC313/4.
26 [1988] 2 C.M.L.R 543.
27 Now Article 94
28 Ibid. at 551
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not cause it to fall outside the scope of the common agricultural policy, meaning that 
Article 43 provided a sufficient legal basis.
The Court held that when the Directive was read in the light of Article 39 EC 
Treaty,30 which established the objectives of the common agricultural policy,31 it 
became clear that Article 39 allowed far-reaching regulation of the markets, including 
approximation measures.32 Accordingly, efforts to achieve the objectives of the 
common agricultural policy “cannot disregard requirements relating to the public 
interest such as the protection of consumers or the protection of health” As a result, 
Article 43 was considered to be the appropriate legal basis since the Directive was 
aimed primarily at achieving common agricultural objectives, and common 
agricultural policies were deemed to encompasses harmonisation measures. Thus 
recourse to Article 100 was held to be unnecessary.34
Incidentally, Directive 85/649/EEC was declared void on procedural grounds, for its 
failing to comply with Article 6(1) of the Council’s Rules of Procedure, constituting 
an infringement of an essential procedural requirement within the meaning of Article 
173(1) of the Treaty. However, in order to fully understand the approach taken by the 
EC in 1998 at the WTO, it is important to give some consideration to the arguments 
submitted by the UK and the Council in relation to the Lamming Report, and to the 
judgment passed down by the ECJ.
Essentially, the UK claimed that the Council was under an obligation, pursuant to 
Article 8 of Directive85/649, to consider the Lamming Report, and that, in the light of 
its findings, there was no scientific evidence justifying the ban on the use of 
hormones. To recap, Article 8 stipulated that:-
“[n]ot later than 1 July 1984, the Commission shall submit to the Council
a report on the experience acquired and scientific developments,
29 Ibid. at page 569, paragraph 5.
30 Now Article 33
31 Ibid. at pages 552-3.
32 Ibid. at page 553.
33 Ibid. at page 570, paragraph 12.
34 Ibid. at page at 553.
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accompanied, if necessary, by proposals which take these developments 
into account.”
The UK Government argued that Article 8 required that the Council take into account 
the fact that the Lamming Group had concluded that oestradiol-170, testosterone, and 
progesterone did not present any risk to animal and human safety, and that the 
Directive should reflect these findings. However, the ECJ was of the opinion that that 
the scientific report was intended for the Commission, and that the Commission, not 
the Council, was under a duty to consider it when drafting proposal for the contested 
Directive.35 Furthermore, given that the Lamming Report dealt only with three of the 
five hormones in question, it did not unequivocally support the UK’s claim that 
consumer health was not endangered.
The most significant aspect of the judgment, however, lies in the breadth of the 
Court’s attitude to issues of consumer safety. Perhaps the most telling statement 
made by the Court was that “there was really no reason to examine the health 
problem in particular”.37 Notably, the approach taken by the Court extended beyond 
a narrowly scientific consideration of potential risks to health -  evident in its 
conclusion that it was ‘certain’ that the Lamming Report “did not have to be 
considered in depth”.38 Instead of restricting its focus solely to matters of health, the 
Court extended its analysis to include the notion of public interest which was deemed 
to encompass more than consumer health.39 The words of Advocate General Lenz are 
useful in rationalising this approach. For example, Lenz recognised that:-
“the predominant concern of the Commission, and thereafter of the 
Council as well, was not so much the safeguarding of the health of 
consumers (a problem which the Scientific Group considered above all) 
but to take into account the interests o f consumers in general.”40
35 Ibid. at page 558.
36 Ibid. at page 567.
37 Ibid. at page 558, emphasis added.
38 Ibid. at page 567.
39 Ibid. at page 543
40 Ibid. at page 558, emphasis added.
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On closer examination of the judgment, it transpires that ‘the interests of consumers in 
general’ are more directly associated with economic integration than with maintaining 
consumer health protection. This is evident in the Court’s assertion that the contested 
Directive was primarily “a measure of economic policy in the agricultural sphere”,41 
and one which was necessary for the proper functioning of the Common Market.42 
Lenz interpreted this as evidence that the main concern was establishing equal 
conditions of livestock fattening and upholding the objectives of unimpeded intra- 
Community trade free from distortions of competition 43 It is worth pointing out that 
this issue was raised in a Resolution of the European Parliament,44 which recognised 
that the ban on hormones used for fattening purposes would inevitably affect trade 
with third-country suppliers of meat products. In considering whether third countries 
were likely to be aggrieved, Lenz questioned “whether this is really a genuine danger 
or just an unsubstantiated fear”.45 Without doubt, the approach adopted by the 
Council and the ECJ in this case, and subsequently by the EC at the WTO in 1998, 
suggests that it perceived the threat as a genuine danger.
The proceedings of Re Agricultural Hormones can be regarded as setting the scene for 
the EC/US WTO Dispute. The interpretation of risk assessment as an analysis of 
factors beyond scientific risk quantification, encompassing more general consumer 
interests such as the objectives of the single market and the maintenance of consumer 
confidence, shifts the focus of risk assessment from science to politics. It is upon this 
political basis that the EC rekindled the hormone debate in 1998 when it was required 
to defend a measure prohibiting the administration of anabolic agents before the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body. In doing so, the EC appeared to construe the concept of 
risk assessment in a broad manner, reflecting the response of the Court in Re 
Agricultural Hormones. Although the EC only made explicit reference to the 
scientific nature of its assessment, it is implicit that the adoption of a Directive in 
1998 was motivated by factors other than scientific findings.
41 Ibid. at 555.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid. at page 557.
44 [1985] OJ C288/158.
45 Re Agricultural Hormones [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 543, at page 568.
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3.2 WTO Beef Hormones Dispute46
In March 1988, proposals for the prohibition of anabolic agents were re-introduced by 
the Commission and adopted by the Council in Directive 88/146. In September that 
year, and in an attempt to avoid accusations of lacking scientific evidence in support 
of the measure, the European Parliament established the Committee of Enquiry into 
the Problem of Quality in the Meat Sector. The Committee reported (in the ‘Pimenta 
Report’) that the ban of hormonal substances for purposes other than therapeutic 
should be maintained.
Under the 1979 Tokyo Round of General Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade,47 the US sought to establish a ‘technical experts group’ in effort to illustrate 
that the EC ban could not be scientifically justified. The EC blocked the request,48 
and on 27 December 1988 the US retaliated by announcing the imposition of a 
prohibitive one hundred per cent tariff on a number of EC exports to the US, 
including canned tomatoes, fruit juices, instant coffee, and low alcohol drinks, to take 
effect from 1 January 1989 49 On 26 January 1996, the US requested consultations 
with the EC regarding its prohibition,50 and on 2 February 1997 requests were made
ri
by Australia and New Zealand, followed by Canada on 8 February, to join the 
consultation. The requests were accepted by the EC on 19 March 1997.54 Joint 
consultations took place on 27 March, but the parties failed to reach an agreement. A
46 EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Panel Reports: Case 
WT/DS26/R/USA, 18 August 1997; Case WT/DS48/R/CAN, 18 August 1997; Appellate Body Report: 
WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R, 16 January 1998.
47 Following from this, a ‘Standards Code’ was adopted. This has since been replaced by the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) arising out of the Uruguay Round Agreements, to 
which all WTO Members are party.
48 Winham, G. R. ‘International Regime Conflict in Trade and Environment: the Biosafety Protocol and 
the WTO’ (2003) 2(2) World Trade Review 131-155, at page 136.
49 duties amounting to US$93 million per annum, although duties were withdrawn in 1996 for being 
incompatible with WTO provisions. See Bridges, J. W. and Bridges, O. (2002) at page 167.
50 See WT/DS26/1. The request made by the US was brought pursuant to Article 4 of the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU); Article 11 of the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement); Article 14 of 
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement); Article 19 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture; and Article XXII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT).
51 WT/DS26/3.
52 WT/DS26/2.
53 WT/DS26/4.
54 WT/DS26/5.
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month later, the US called for the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to set up a panel to 
resolve the issue.55
■ 3.2.1 WTO Framework and the SPS Agreement
The World Trade Organisation was established by the Final Act of the Uruguay 
Round of Negotiations,56 which was adopted in Marrakesh on 15 April 1994, and 
came into effect on 1 January 1995. The WTO Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), an important constituent of
cn
the makeup of the WTO, combines the non-discriminatory sentiments and concern 
for food safety58 of the GATT 1947, and built upon food safety standards developed 
by the Codex Alimentarius Commission.59 Essentially, the SPS Agreement prohibits 
the implementation of unjustified sanitary and phytosanitary measures for the purpose 
of trade protection. Although its underlying objective is the harmonisation of 
international standards of trade, it also aims simultaneously to preserve the right of 
parties to the agreement to establish the level of health protection it considers 
appropriate, except when SPS measures adopted present an unnecessary barrier to 
international trade. Accordingly, Members are obliged to ensure that measures are 
“not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between Members ... or a disguised restriction on international 
trade”.60 Although Members have the right to take sanitary or phytosanitary measures 
‘necessary’ for the protection of human, animal or plant life,61 they can be applied 
‘only to the extent necessary’ to achieve those objectives. Measures adopted for 
sanitary of phytosanitary purposes must be based on sufficient scientific evidence, 
except where scientific knowledge is inadequate -  in which case Members are
55 WT/DS26/6; pursuant to Article 11 of the SPS Agreement; Article 14 of the TBT Agreement; Article 
19 of the Agreement on Agriculture; Article XXIII:2 of the GATT; and Article 6 of the DSU.
56 See the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
57 in particular GATT Article I (Most Favoured Nation Treatment) and Article HI (National Treatment)
58 GATT Article XX(b), which states that “nothing in this Agreement shall ... prevent the adoption ... 
of measures ... necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.”.
59 A subsidiary body of FAO and the WHO.
60 SPS Agreement Article 2.3.
61 Ibid. Article 2(1).
62 Ibid. Article 2(2).
63 Ibid.
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required to adopt provisional measures on the basis of ‘available pertinent 
information’.64
In the course of the Uruguay Round negotiations, which ended in 1993, the EC sought 
to explicitly incorporate the precautionary principle in SPS Agreement, but yielded to 
US pressure to require scientific risk assessment in the face of uncertain hazards.65 
Consequently, the SPS Agreement relies on scientific standards of proof, and makes 
explicit reference to concepts of scientific certainty and scientific justification.
■ 3.2.2 Proceedings
The WTO Panel held that the EC ban violated three provisions of the SPS Agreement. 
First, it found that the EC prohibition was inconsistent with the obligation pursuant to 
Article 5.5 to ensure that SPS measures are non-discriminatory, which requires the 
avoidance of arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the level of protection resulting 
in discrimination or disguised restrictions on international trade. Second, given that 
the EC ban did not adopt the Codex Alimentarius Standards that deemed the use of 
anabolic hormones to be safe, it did not satisfy the harmonization requirement of 
Article 3. Third, the Panel found that not only had EC failed to conduct a scientific 
risk assessment in a satisfactory manner, but had also failed to demonstrate that its 
prohibition was ‘based on’ an appropriate risk assessment, which constituted an 
infringement of Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. In relation to this last point, the 
Panel Report suggests that its decision could be partly attributed to the fact that the 
preamble to the contested EC Directive did not explicitly refer to scientific 
evidence.68 To base its decision on the absence of scientific substantiation in the 
Directive preamble is questionable. Macmillan rightly points out that “[t]his is the 
sort of ruling that should make one glad that an Appellate Body exists.”69
64 Ibid. Article 5(7).
65 Winham, G. R. (2003) at pages 134-135.
66 SPS Agreement Article 2(2).
67 Ibid. Article 3(3); Article 12(3).
68 Panel Report, at paragraph 8.122
69 Macmillan, F. WTO and the Environment (Sweet & Maxwell; London; 2001) at page 150.
58
The EC appealed the Panel’s decision, and the Appellate Body rejected two of the 
three grounds upon which it was based. First, the Appellate Body rejected the 
argument that the EC prohibition infringed Article 5.5 argument, concluding that the 
contested measure could not be held to be discriminatory because the rationale was 
not trade-related. Secondly, the Appellate Body rejected the argument that the EC 
prohibition was inconsistent with Article 3, concluding that the Article 3 requirement 
that measures be based on international standards did not mean that SPS measures had 
to conform to those particular Codex standards.
However, although the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s third argument that the ban 
infringed Article 5.1, it took a slightly different view. It concluded that, although a 
Member implementing an SPS measure was under no procedural obligation to carry 
out a risk assessment, it was required to rely upon a risk assessment irrespective of by 
whom it was conducted.70 It is on this basis that the Court concluded that the EC
• • 71prohibition was invalid.
Arguably, this was a surprisingly narrow verdict. In its ruling, the Appellate Body 
made an attempt to broaden the meaning of conventionally-scientific risk assessment. 
First, it extended the scope of risk assessment, beyond that espoused by the Panel, 
allowing non-scientific factors to be taken into account. It concluded that the risk to 
be evaluated in risk assessment under Article 5.1 was:-
“not only risk ascertainable in a science laboratory operating under strictly 
controlled conditions, but also risk in human societies as they actually 
exist, in other words, the actual potential for adverse effects on human
77health in the real world where people live and work and die.”
Second, the Appellate Body held that Article 5.1 did not require that an SPS measure 
accord with the consensus of scientific community, stating that the purpose of risk 
assessment was not to reach a ‘monolithic conclusion’ that coincided with the
70 Appellate Body Report, at paragraphs 189-191.
71 Ibid. at paragraph 208.
72 Ibid. at paragraph 187.
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majority opinion.73 A divergence, according to the Appellate Body, indicated a 
roughly equal balance of scientific opinion.74
Yet, in spite of seemingly liberal approach, the Appellate Body concluded that there 
was no rational relationship between EC ban and the risk assessment required under 
Article 5.1 -  primarily because the risk assessment relied upon was too vague, failing 
to give a sufficiently detailed account of specific risk posed. The Appellate Body 
identified the risk as being “the carcinogenic or genotoxic potential of the residues of 
those hormones found in meat derived from cattle to which the hormones had been 
administered for growth promotion purposes.”75 However, scientific studies cited by 
the EC lacked the requisite specificity, analysing the carcinogenic potential of 
exogenous hormones in general, as opposed to hormones directed at promoting 
animal growth.
As well as violating Article 5.1, it was also held that the imprecision with which the 
EC risk assessment was conducted breached paragraph 4 of Annex A to the SPS 
Agreement which required “the evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on 
human or animal health arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins 
or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs.” Adopting a narrow 
interpretation of the word ‘base’, the Appellate Body held that the EC measure was 
not based on risk assessment as defined by paragraph 4, Annex A.
With regard to the precautionary principle, the EC claimed that Articles 5.1 and 5.2 
should be read in accordance to the precautionary principle. Both the Panel and the 
Appellate Body were agnostic to the question of whether the precautionary principle 
existed, and avoided clarifying its status, if any, in international environmental law. 
The Appellate Body noted that:-
“[t]he status of the precautionary principle in international law continues 
to be the subject of debate amongst academics, law practitioners, 
regulators and judges. The precautionary principle is regarded by some as
73 Ibid. at paragraph 194.
14 Ibid.
75 Ibid. at paragraph 200.
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having crystallized into a general principle of customary international 
environmental law. Whether it has been widely accepted by Members as 
a principle of general or customary international law appears less than 
clear. We consider, however, that it is unnecessary, and probably 
imprudent, for the Appellate Body in this appeal to take a position on this 
important, but abstract, question. We note that the Panel itself did not 
make any definitive finding with regard to the status of the precautionary 
principle in international law and that the precautionary principle, at least 
outside the field of international environmental law, still awaits
7 f\authoritative formulation.”
It is interesting that the Appellate Body considered that it was ‘unnecessary’ and 
‘imprudent’ to make a definitive statement as to its international status, particularly in 
the light of the preamble to the Agreement Establishing the WTO which requires the 
“optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable 
development”. Given that sustainable development is deemed to be a central tenet of 
the WTO, and that the precautionary principle is frequently considered by other 
international agreements to be an essential element of sustainable development, the 
Appellate Body’s silence is surprising.
Instead of determining its status, the Appellate Body opted to outline four principles 
governing the relationship between the SPS Agreement and the precautionary 
principle.77 First, the implementation of the precautionary principle does not justify 
measures otherwise inconsistent with the Agreement. Secondly, Appellate Body 
claimed that the precautionary principle is already reflected in Article 5.7, which 
operated where relevant scientific evidence was insufficient. In such circumstances, a 
Member is permitted to adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of 
‘available pertinent information’, whilst continually seeking to obtain the additional 
information necessary for a more objective risk assessment and to review the 
measures accordingly within a reasonable period of time. According to the Appellate 
Body, there was no need to assume that Article 5.7 exhausted the relevance of the
76 Ibid. at paragraph 123.
77 Ibid. at paragraph 124.
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precautionary principle because it was also reflected in Article 3.3 and the sixth 
paragraph of the preamble, enabling Members to establish their own levels of sanitary 
protection, even if they were more cautious than those implied by existing 
international standards.
Thirdly, in determining whether ‘sufficient scientific evidence’ required by Article 2.2 
existed, a panel was obliged to bear in mind that “responsible, representative 
governments commonly act from perspectives of prudence and precaution where risks 
of irreversible, e.g. life-threatening, damage to human health are concerned.”79
Finally, the Appellate Body held that the precautionary principle did not displace the 
principles of treaty interpretation. From this perspective, the precautionary principle 
could not exonerate the EC from its failure to comply with Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the 
SPS Agreement. 80
Overall, the Appellate Body can be described as having given “short shrift to the
Oj
precautionary principle”. Although it did take steps towards clarifying the 
relationship between precaution and the SPS Agreement, portraying the precautionary 
principle as a scientific tool of risk assessment, its finding that it would be 
‘imprudent’ to determine its legal status has maintained the elusiveness of precaution. 
In this instance, the WTO renounced the opportunity of making an authoritative 
statement on the standing of the precautionary principle in customary international 
law. This judicial timidity suggests that the problem of defining precaution is more 
profound than a simple elucidation of terms. Ambiguity is present in its conceptual 
core.
Ultimately, the Appellate Body held that the EC ban on the import of beef from any 
source containing artificially administered growth hormones violated the SPS 
Agreement. Interestingly, the EC measure was found to breach the Agreement 
despite the fact that it was not shown to restrict international trade -  the point being
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Winham, G. R. (2003) at page 140.
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that the EC prohibition was not ‘based on’ risk assessment,82 and that the scientific 
evidence presented neither focused on nor addressed the particular kind of risk at 
stake.
■ 3.3.3 Case analysis
Although it has received little academic criticism,83 the Appellate Body ruling is 
problematic for three reasons. First, given that there is compelling evidence that 
oestradiol-17p poses a risk to human health,84 it is unfortunate that the EC’s initial 
precautionary prohibition was so heavily criticised. Although hindsight is 
undoubtedly beneficial, it is arguable that Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement permitted 
the adoption of the prohibition. Article 3.3 states that:-
“Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures 
which result in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than 
would be achieved by measures based on the relevant international 
standards, guidelines or recommendations, if there is a scientific 
justification, or as a consequence of the level o f sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection a Member determines to be appropriate in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of paragraphs 1 through 8 of Article 5. 
Notwithstanding the above, all measures which result in a level of sanitary 
or phytosanitary protection different from that which would be achieved 
by measures based on international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations shall not be inconsistent with any other provision of this 
Agreement.”
82 SPS Agreement Article 5.1; See Appellate Body Report at paragraph 193.
83 Quick, R. and Bluthner, A. ‘Has the Appellate Body Erred? An Appraisal and Criticism of the 
Ruling in the WTO Hormones Case’ (1999) 2 Journal of International Economic Law 603-639, at page 
636; Winham, G. R. (2003) at page 140.
84 In the aftermath of the WTO Beef Hormones Dispute, the EC Scientific Committee on Veterinary 
Measures Relating to Public Health (SCVPH) conducted an additional risk assessment, and concluded 
that oestradiol 17P must be considered a complete carcinogen. The Committee was unable to provide a 
definitive opinion on five other hormones in question. This formed the basis of Council Directive 
2003/74/EC which amended Directive 96/22/EC. Directive 2003/74 prohibited the use of oestradiol- 
17p in farm animals, and provisionally banned the other five hormones until further scientific evidence 
became available.
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Paragraph 5 of Annex A defines the ‘appropriate’ level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection as “[t]he level of protection deemed appropriate by the Member 
establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to protect human, animal or plant life 
or health within its territory.” On the basis of Article 3.3 and Annex A, paragraph 5, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the EC should have been entitled to determine levels 
of environmental protection beyond those stipulated by the SPS Agreement. 
Following the WTO ruling, and in response to the Appellate Body’s concern about its 
failure to produce a sufficiently comprehensive and detailed risk assessment, the 
European Commission launched a series of 17 specific scientific studies to determine 
whether the threat posed by the contested hormones was indeed genuine. Late in
1998, an independent body -  the Scientific Committee of Veterinary Measures 
Relating to Public Health (SCVPH) -  was established to conduct an assessment of the 
risk to human health arising from the administration of six hormones (oestradiol-17p, 
testosterone, progesterone, trenbolone, zeranol, and MGA) for growth promotion 
purposes. Of the nine specialists making up the SCVPH, four scientists were from the 
US. The working group met several times, before delivering its opinion on 30 April
1999. It concluded that possible endocrine, developmental, immunological, 
neurobiological, immunotoxic, genotoxic, and carcinogenic risks to consumers had 
been identified with differing levels of conclusive evidence for each of the six 
hormones. In particular, the Committee found that, although it was impossible to 
quantify the risk with any degree of certainty, there was a substantial body of 
evidence suggesting that oestradiol-17p was tumour-initiating and tumour-promoting. 
With regards to the other five anabolic agents, the Committee considered that no safe 
threshold levels could be established, yet despite being unable to quantify the risk 
associated with their administration, it was possible to estimate the risk in qualitative 
terms. Although in April 2000 the SCVPH re-examined the risk in the light of new 
scientific information, it did not revise its 1999 opinion. Arguably, against the 
backdrop of Article 3.3, the EC should have been permitted to undertake a separate 
scientific investigation into the growth promoting agents, and adopt a higher level of 
consumer protection on the basis of evidence found.
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Secondly, the Appellate Body concluded that the studies relied upon by the EC lacked
O f
the requisite level of precision and detail. The level of specificity required in a risk 
assessment was set out in paragraph 4 of Annex A to the SPS Agreement, which 
defined risk assessment as “the evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on 
human or animal health arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins 
or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs”. The Appellate Body 
considered that this provision was sufficient proof that the EC was compelled to rely 
on specific and comprehensive scientific evidence. For this reason, scientific studies 
relating to carcinogenicity of anabolic agents in general were deemed to violate the
O f
paragraph 4 proviso. Yet, paragraph 4 is silent as to whether there had to be an 
exact correlation between the way in which those agents were used during scientific 
experiment and the uses proposed in the contested regulation. It can be argued that 
the specificity requirement had no textual footing in the SPS Agreement. Even the 
Panel concluded that several of the EC scientific studies relating to the carcinogenic 
potential of entire categories of hormones met the minimum requirements of a risk 
assessment.87 As Wirth rightly points out, the specificity requirement in paragraph 4 
is not ‘blindingly obvious’.88
The finding that the EC failed to satisfy paragraph 4 obligations is unsound. It 
appears that the Appellate Body’s conclusion was based on the fact that, if not all, of 
the scientific studies referred to by the EC concluded that the use of the five hormones
OQ
in question for growth promotion purposes was safe. The EC prohibition was held 
to have violated the Article 5.1 requirement that an SPS measure be ‘based on’ risk 
assessment because it did not conform to the outcomes of the scientific studies cited.90 
Conformity requires that the contested measure reflected the findings of scientific risk 
assessments. On the basis of the Appellate Body’s interpretation of ‘based on’ as 
meaning ‘conforming to’, it can be argued that the extent to which scientific evidence 
is upheld by an SPS measures is pivotal to its legitimacy under the WTO regime.
85 Appellate Body Report at paragraph 200.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid. at paragraph 196.
88 Wirth, D. A. ‘The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round & NAFTA Trade Disciplines’ (1994) 27 
Cornell International Law Journal 817, at page 857.
89 US Panel Report at paragraph 8.124; Canada Panel Report at paragraph 8.127; Appellate Body 
Report at paragraph 206.
90 Appellate Body Report at paragraph 192.
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Yet, this narrowly scientific approach is manifestly inconsistent with the way in 
which the Appellate Body subsequently extended the definition of ‘risk’ so as to 
encompass non-scientific factors. Accordingly, risk assessment under Article 5.1 
should not be confined to an evaluation of the risk ascertainable in a science 
laboratory operating under strictly controlled conditions.91 Furthermore, the 
Appellate Body held that the Panel had erred in its finding that all risk was necessarily 
quantifiable, and that the term ‘risk’ could also be used to denote unquantifiable 
threats, definable only by qualitative means. The interpretation of risk as qualitative 
measurement is perhaps the only evidence in the entire judgment that the Appellate 
Body was prepared to accept subjective risk perception as an appropriate factor in the 
setting of trade barriers. Indeed, the judgment can be described as displaying a 
polarization between perceived and objective measurements of risk. Whilst the 
Appellate Body recognised that risk assessment could take into consideration non- 
scientific, unquantifiable factors,93 it was also of the opinion that the EC measure 
ought to reflect the outcome of the scientific risk assessment that the use of the 
hormones at issue was safe. Whereas the Appellate Body seemingly permitted a 
liberal approach to risk assessment, it was simultaneously intolerant of the 
endorsement of anything other than mainstream scientific evidence.
This leads to the third inconsistency of the ruling. Despite acknowledging the 
divergent opinions presented by different scientists as an acceptable basis for risk 
assessment,94 and given that the Article 5.1 stipulation that an SPS measure must be 
‘based on’ risk assessment was interpreted as requiring the measure to reflect 
scientific findings, it is surprising that the Appellate Body rejected evidence submitted 
by one scientist as having a rational relationship with the contested measure. Dr 
Lucier, an expert advising the EC and the Dispute Resolution Panel, claimed that the 
consumption of meat treated with exogenous oestrogens posed a threat to human 
health, stating that:-
“[f]or every million women alive in the United States, Canada, Europe 
today, about a 110,000 of those women will get breast cancer. This is
91 Ibid. at paragraph 187.
92 Ibid. at paragraph 186.
93 Macmillan, F. (2001) at page 150, section 6.15.
94 Appellate Body Report at paragraph 194.
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obviously a tremendous public health issue. Of those 110,000 women 
who get breast cancer, maybe several thousand of them are related to the 
total intake of exogenous oestrogens from every source, including eggs, 
meat, phyto-oestrogens, fungal oestrogens, the whole body burden of 
exogenous oestrogens. And by my estimates one of those 110,000 would 
come from eating meat containing oestrogens as a growth promoter, if 
used as prescribed.”95
Mindful of the fact that the other scientific studies cited by the EC were criticised for 
failing to address, the specific risk posed by the five hormones in dispute, it is at least 
arguable that Dr Lucier’s assessment of the potential risks was sufficiently specific for 
the purposes of paragraph 4. Given that oestradiol-17p is an exogenous oestrogenic 
derivative, it is unclear precisely why the Appellate Body concluded that the evidence 
lacked sufficient detail.
The Appellate Body avoided ascertaining whether Dr Lucier’s submission satisfied 
the specificity requirement of paragraph 4. Instead, it argued that the evidence 
provided by Dr Lucier produced results “not reasonably sufficient to overturn the 
contrary conclusions reached in the scientific studies referred to by the European 
Communities”.96 It appears that, on concluding that the results of Dr Lucier’s study 
were “not reasonably sufficient”, the Appellate Body was making reference to the 
magnitude of the risk, and not the specificity of the study.
The Appellate Body’s dismissal of Dr Lucier’s submission conflicts with the way in 
which it had previously interpreted the notion of risk assessment as incorporating the 
opinion of scientists taking divergent views, and not necessarily embodying the view 
of the majority of the scientific community.97 The acknowledgment by the Appellate
QQ
Body that divergent views were welcomed suggests that the EC position was 
incontestable. Arguably, Dr Lucier’s evidence reasonably supported99 the EC import
95 US and Canada Panel Reports, Annex, paragraph 819; Appellate Body Report, at paragraph 198, 
note 181.
96 Appellate Body Report, at paragraph 198.
97 Ibid, at paragraph 194.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid. at paragraph 193.
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ban, giving rise to a ‘rational relationship’ between the risk assessment and contested
100measure.
On the basis of these inconsistencies, it can be concluded that there was little to 
warrant the narrow approach eventually adopted by the Appellate Body. It is 
conceivable that, had it upheld its liberal interpretation of the process of risk 
assessment, and had it given due attention to the observable specificity of Dr Lucier’s 
evidence, the Appellate Body would have found that there existed a sufficient 
relationship between the EC measure and its underlying risk assessment. Instead, the 
WTO resorted to a strictly scientific approach, which is reflected in its attitude 
towards the definition of risk. Notwithstanding its ostensible attempt to extend the 
boundaries of its definition to include qualitatively measurable risk, the Appellate 
Body only examined the risk in respect of its physical implications, and not in the 
context of the consumer perception of that risk.
3.3 WTO and the precautionary principle
On reading the Reports of both the Panel and the Appellate Body, it becomes apparent 
that a clear-cut distinction was made between the precautionary principle as it is 
embodied in Article 5.7, and the precautionary principle as a customary rule of 
international environmental law. The tension between Article 5.7 and the notion of 
precaution as a customary rule was undoubtedly a central theme of the rulings. This
distinction is crucial in demonstrating that both the definition and application of the
precautionary principle is inherently context-dependent. Instead of invoking Article 
5.7, the EC claimed that its import ban was justified by the precautionary principle as 
a customary rule of international law -  because the narrowly-scientific confines of 
Article 5.7 did not support the broader rationale underlying the contested Directive.
In determining the implementation of the precautionary principle, the EC took into 
account factors beyond the margins of Article 5.7. Indeed, in the light of the approach
100 Ibid. at paragraph 189.
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adopted by EC institutions in Re Agricultural Hormones it is reasonable to suggest 
that the Community’s reliance on the precautionary principle at the WTO hearing was 
reflective of its attempts to maintain consumer confidence in the safety of meat. This 
is a particularly credible argument in view of the fact that the majority of scientific 
studies presented by the EC concluded that the use of the hormones at issue posed a 
statistically negligible threat to human health. In accordance with the scientific 
constraints of Article 5.7, much of the evidence available to the EC at the time 
indicated that any human health risk associated with the use of anabolic agents was 
insignificant, and, on the basis this information, precautionary action was 
scientifically unjustifiable. Yet, the remit of the EC’s interpretation of ‘uncertainty’ 
was far broader than its counterpart in Article 5.7. Whereas the application of 
precaution through Article 5.7 was based on the fact that, according to scientific 
consensus, it could be said with a degree of scientific certainty that the use of 
hormones posed no, or very little, risk, the EC adopted a more liberal notion of 
‘precaution’, taking into account uncertainty stemming from extra-scientific sources. 
From this perspective, it can be said that the EC’s stance mirrored the opinion of 
Advocate General Lenz in Re Agricultural Hormones that the invocation of the 
precautionary principle rested on the protection of public interests in general, which 
required an examination of factors outside the scope of scientific assessment, and not 
confined to the protection of consumer health, which was solely a matter for scientific 
determination.
The disparity between Article 5.7 and the precautionary principle as a ‘customary 
rule’ can be seen as a product of differences not only in the operational significance 
attributed to scientific evidence, but also in the regimes from which they derive. 
Whilst Article 5.7 is a component of a trade liberalisation regime, the principle of 
precaution as relied upon by the EC developed from a scheme of environmental and 
human health protection. Thus, the concept of precaution pursuant to Article 5.7 and 
precaution as an element of customary international law are irreconcilable for as long 
as they continue to have different priorities. The natural conclusion to draw is that, 
despite talk of ‘the’ precautionary principle, its definition and interpretation ultimately 
depends on the context within which it is being applied.
101 [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 543.
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Although the Appellate Body did not explicitly admit that this was the case, its ruling 
can be interpreted as an implicit rejection of the argument that a separate 
precautionary principle created an obligation in customary international law. Not 
only does this reflect the lacking international consensus as to its definition and 
content, but it is also a sign of the Appellate Body’s scepticism of the feasibility of 
forms of the precautionary principle developing from beyond the boundaries of the 
trade liberalisation regime. Interestingly, in a subsequent report published by the 
Council for Responsible Nutrition (CRN), it was observed that a precautionary 
principle model other than that espoused by Article 5.7 is “not needed and is 
potentially harmful, because it would be redundant and falsely imply that there is no 
precaution in risk management without it”,102 going on to note that “a separate 
precautionary principle would be an open invitation to erect unjustified technical 
barriers to trade”.103 Reflecting the underlying attitude of the Appellate Body in WTO 
Beef Hormones, the CRN considered that the precautionary principle, as a customary 
rule of international law, provided an opportunity for arbitrary decision-making, 
interpreting it as merely a justificatory tool to frame otherwise unrelated decisions in 
terms of environmental protection.
This leads to an important conclusion. Whereas previous academic commentaries 
have tended to point to the significance of the Beef Hormones Dispute as existing in 
the willingness of the Appellate Body to acknowledge the concept of precaution in the 
framework of Article 5.7,104 they overlook the more subtle reasoning that the ruling 
represents an implicit rejection of the usefulness of precautionary principle as an 
undefined and ambiguous rule of customary rule of international law.
102 Codex Alimentarius, Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Foods Derived From Biotechnology, 
Consideration of the Elaboration of Standards, Guidelines or Other Principles for Foods Derived from 
Biotechnology (February 2000) Document CX/FBT 00/4, Part I, at page 27.
103 Ibid.
104 Macmillan, F. (2001) at pages 154-155.
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3.4 Post-Beef Hormones
■ 3.4.1 Japan -  Measures Affecting Agricultural Products105
The precautionary principle became the focus of attention for the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body again in 1999 following a complaint made by the United States in 
respect of the requirement imposed by Japan to test and confirm the efficacy of the 
quarantine treatment for varieties of particular agricultural products (‘the varietal 
testing requirement’).106
Japan had previously prohibited importation of eight agricultural products -  apples, 
cherries, peaches (including nectarines), walnuts, apricots, pears, plums and quince -  
from the United States on the basis that they were potential hosts to a species of pest, 
the codling moth, presenting a potential risk to the yield of Japanese agriculture.107 
The import prohibition could only be lifted if the exporting country was able to 
demonstrate the exercise of an alternative quarantine procedure that achieved the 
required level of protection. The efficacy of the alternative quarantine procedure 
could be tested against two guidelines set out by the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries. The first set out a number of testing requirements which had 
to be satisfied before the import prohibition could be lifted.108 The second outlined 
the procedure of approving varieties of a particular product, called ‘the varietal testing 
requirement’.
The United States claimed that the varietal testing requirement was inconsistent with 
the obligations under the SPS Agreement. The Panel Report, which was delivered on 
27 October 1998, found that Japan had acted inconsistently with Articles 2.2, 5.6 and 
7 of the SPS Agreement.109 Accordingly, the process of varietal testing in respect of 
the import of apples, cherries, nectarines and walnuts violated Article 2.2 which
105 Report of the Appellate Body AB-1998-9, WT/DS76/AB/R, 22 February 1999.
106 Japan -  Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, AB— 1998-9, WT/DS76/AB/R, at paragraph 1.
107 Prohibition made on the basis of the Plant Protection Law, Law No. 151, enacted on 4 May 1950; 
and the Plant Protection Law Enforcement Regulation, Ordinance No. 73 of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, enacted on 30 June 1950.
10 the Experimental Guideline for Lifting Import Ban -  Fumigation, see Japan -  Measures Affecting 
Agricultural Products, at paragraph 2.
109 Japan -  Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, at paragraph 3.
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imposed an obligation on Members not to maintain SPS measures without scientific 
evidence of a risk to the environment.110 The varietal testing requirement was also 
incompatible with Article 5.6 which compelled Members to ensure that measures 
were not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve Japan’s appropriate level of 
phytosanitary protection, taking into account its technical and economic feasibility. 
And, given that Japan did not publish the varietal testing requirement in respect of any 
of the agricultural products in question, the requirement was inconsistent with 
paragraph 1 of Annex B, and as a result, breached Article 7.
Pursuant to Article 16, paragraph 4, of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement o f Disputes, Japan appealed against the legal issues arising 
in Panel Report, filing its submission on 4 December 1998.111 In relation to Article 
2.2, Japan claimed that the Panel Report failed to give due regard to the precautionary 
principle112 -  submitting that the varietal testing requirement needed to be understood 
in the context of a precautionary ethos, particularly given that the precautionary 
principle was reflected in both the Codex Alimentarius113 and the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Guidelines for Pest Risk Analysis.114 Japan claimed 
that the Panel had erred in its decision that there was no ‘actual causal link’ between 
the contested measure and scientific evidence, and in doing so, had denied the 
operation of the precautionary principle.115 It argued that the varietal testing 
requirement was ‘an information requirement’116 -  which was justifiable even where 
there is only “some available information suggesting some risk.”117
I I O
Conversely, the US argued that there was no “objective and rational relationship” 
between the varietal testing requirement and the scientific evidence required by 
Article 2.2 SPS, and that the precautionary principle should not be used as a ground 
for justifying an SPS measure which was otherwise inconsistent with SPS
110 Article 2.2 -  applies except as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5.
111 WT/DS76/5.
112 Japan -  Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, at paragraph 10.
113 Codex Alimentarius, General Principles for the Use of Food Additives (1995) Document CX/GP 
00/3-Add 6, Vol. A l.
114 International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures Part I -  Import Regulations, Guidelines for Pest 
Risk Analysis, Food and Agriculture Organisation Secretariat 1996.
115 Japan -  Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, at paragraph 9.
116 Ibid. at paragraph 8
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid. at paragraph 20
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obligations.119 Furthermore, the US asserted that there was only a theoretical risk and 
that Japan was not permitted to justify its measure without ascertainable scientific 
evidence of potential harm.120
The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding that there must be a rational and 
objective relationship between the SPS measure and scientific evidence of a potential 
risk.121 Moreover, it noted that if the ‘rational and objective relationship’ requirement 
were to be discarded, Article 5.7 would be rendered impotent, given that its operation
1 O')is limited to cases “where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient.” With regard 
to this interpretation, the Appellate Body concluded that the varietal testing measure 
had been maintained without sufficient scientific evidence. Evidence that there 
may have been varietal differences which were likely to affect the efficacy of 
quarantine treatment was merely speculative,124 and the threat of the entry of the 
codling moth into agricultural systems was seen as only ‘a possibility’.125
Reflecting the findings in the WTO Beef Hormones Case, the Appellate Body held 
that the precautionary principle was already upheld by Articles 3.3 and 5.7 of the SPS
1 OAAgreement. In particular, regard was given to Article 5.7, which, as a
manifestation of the concept of precaution, stipulates that a four-stage test must be
111satisfied before invocation. First, a Member may provisionally adopt a 
precautionary SPS measure is imposed in respect of a situation where ‘relevant 
scientific information is insufficient’.128 Second, a measure must be adopted on the
• 11Q • •basis of ‘available pertinent information’. Third, the adoption of a provisional 
measure is prohibited unless the Member seeks to obtain additional information
119 Ibid. at paragraph 21
120 Ibid. at paragraph 22
121 Ibid. at 84; see also Panel Report paragraphs 8.29 and 8.42.
122 note that the Appellate Body found that although the contested measure was considered to be a 
provisional measure according to the first sentence of Article 5.7 SPS, Japan had not fulfilled the 
requirements contained in the second sentence of Article 5.7 SPS Agreement -  see Japan -  Measures 
Affecting Agricultural Products, at paragraph 143(b).
123 Appellate Body Report Japan -  Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, at paragraph 85.
124Ibid. at paragraph 21.
125 Ibid. at paragraph 42.
126 Ibid. at paragraph 81.
127 Ibid. at paragraph 89
128 Article 5.7 SPS, first sentence.
129 Ibid.
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i innecessary for a more objective assessment of risk. Finally, subsequent to adoption,
the Member is obliged to review the measure accordingly within a reasonable period 
of time.131
Despite recognising the existence of the precautionary principle within the Article 5.7 
framework, the Appellate Body reiterated that it had not been written into the SPS 
Agreement as a ground for justifying SPS measures that are otherwise inconsistent 
with the obligations of Members set out in other provisions of that Agreement.132 
Reflecting the finding in the Beef Hormones Dispute, an implicit aspect of the ruling 
was that there was no overarching duty arising independently of obligations under the 
SPS Agreement to apply the precautionary principle. In curtailing the application of 
the precautionary principle to the confines of Article 5.7, the Appellate Body 
effectively denied that the application of the precautionary principle as a broader legal 
mandate that would threaten to supersede existing SPS provisions.133 Although it 
remained silent as to the international status of the principle, the Court’s explicit 
restriction of precaution to Article 5.7 can be construed as an outright rejection of the 
precautionary principle derived from alternative regimes.
Even in the aftermath of the WTO Beef Hormones Dispute, the Appellate Body 
continued to be ill at ease with the concept of precaution as a general customary rule 
of international law, presumably as a result of a deep-seated concern not only for its 
lack of precise definition and application, but also for its potentially devastating 
implications on the aims and objectives of the trade harmonisation regime. Had it felt 
that the precautionary principle had a sufficiently normative character, then it is 
conceivable that the Appellate Body would have been drawn into some discussion of 
its international legal status as a customary rule. However, mindful of the notorious 
ambiguity surrounding its definition and the implications of its application, it is likely 
that the Appellate Body considered it futile to make a universal declaration on a 
principle so lacking in universal content.134
130 Article 5.7 SPS, second sentence.
131 Ibid.
132 Japan -  Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, at paragraphs 81 and 124.
133 Ibid. at paragraph 21
134 See Bimie, P. W. and Boyle, A. E. (eds) (1992) at page 98.
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Three principal observations can be made in relation to the approach taken by the 
WTO Panel and Appellate Body in both the Beef Hormones and the Japanese 
Agricultural Measures rulings. First, both rulings suggest that the Panel and 
Appellate Body were hostile to the level of generality at which the precautionary 
principle was pitched by the EC and Japan, respectively. Second, and more 
specifically, the rulings indicate that the reconciliation of precaution and trade 
harmonisation is only possible within the narrowly-prescribed confines of Article 5.7. 
Third, the approach taken by both the Panel and Appellate Body was unquestionably 
science-based, implying that the notion of precaution was subordinate to the more 
pressing need to base measures on a thorough scientific assessment. The overriding 
theory, however, is that a definite disparity exists in the scope of application between 
precautionary principle in relation to specific provisional measures under the SPS 
Agreement and the precautionary principle as a general norm of international law. 
Defining the scope of its operation depends on whether it is being interpreted either 
narrowly within the margins of Article 5.7, or in a broader manner as a customary 
rule. Hence, both the meaning and application of the precautionary principle vary 
according to the context within which they exist. It can thus be described as an 
intrinsically relative instrument.
The apprehensiveness demonstrated at the WTO was replicated by the International 
Court of Justice in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases,135 which, although endorsing 
precautionary approach, remained guarded about the possibility of the precautionary 
principle imposing legal obligation as a result of its acceptance at a general customary 
level. Arguably, however, the opinions expressed by Judge Treves, Judge Laing and 
Judge Ad Hoc Shearer go beyond the WTO Dispute Resolution Bodies in that they are 
somewhat more amenable to the possibility of the principle having attained customary 
status.
135 International Tribunal for the Law of the Seas Order in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (Requests
for Provisional Measures) {New Zealand v Japan', Australia v Japan), 27 August 1999.
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3.4.2 The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases136
A joint claim was brought by Australia and New Zealand against Japan’s 
experimental fishing programme. All three States were associates of the Commission
on the Conservation of Bluefin Tuna.137 Japanese catches of Southern Bluefin Tuna
1 ^ 8exceeded the allocated quota under Commission framework.
Australia and New Zealand instigated an arbitration procedure pursuant to Annex VII 
of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and filed a request for 
provisional measures to prevent the continuation of Japanese fishing programme with 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. In their Statements of Claim, 
Australia and New Zealand alleged that Japan was in breach of its obligations under 
Articles 64 and 116-119 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea by “failing in 
its obligations under UNCLOS in respect of the conservation and management of 
SBT [Southern Bluefin Tuna], having regard to the requirements of the precautionary 
principle”,139 and requested that Japan “immediately cease unilateral experimental 
fishing for SBT [and] that parties act consistently with the precautionary principle in 
fishing for SBT pending a final settlement of the dispute.”140
Japan claimed that there was no evidence to suggest that the experimental fishing 
programme posed a risk to the Southern Bluefin Tuna stock, and argued that the 
programme was in fact a necessary course of action in order to assess the potential of 
the stock to recover in numbers.141 Furthermore, it claimed that “it was doubtful that 
the precautionary principle had attained the status of a rule of customary international 
law.”142
The Tribunal Order prescribed provisional measures to prevent serious harm to the 
marine environment,143 displaying definite precautionary traits. It expounded a
137 Commission established under the 1993 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna
138 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases at paragraph 71.
139 Statements of Claim of Australia and New Zealand, 15 July 1999, paragraph 69(l)(e).
140 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases at paragraphs 31 and 32.
141 Ibid. at paragraphs 33, 42, 47 and 73.
142 Arbitral Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case, 4 August 2000 
at paragraph 34.
143 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases at paragraphs 40-67.
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classic three-stage precautionary model recognising: (i) that the severely depleted 
stock was evidence of the Japanese fishing practice posed a risk to Southern Bluefin 
Tuna; (ii) that the conflicting scientific evidence presented could be construed as 
scientific uncertainty; and (iii) and that, in the face of scientific uncertainty, it was 
necessary to act with prudence and caution.144 Exhibiting a greater willingness than 
previously done so by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to endorse the notion of 
precaution, the Tribunal accepted the notion of precaution as a pivotal component of 
international environmental protection. In particular, Judge Treves described a 
precautionary approach as being a ‘necessary’ course of action, particularly given the 
urgency of the situation,145 and added that the reluctance of the Tribunal to take a 
position as to whether the precautionary approach was a binding principle of 
customary law was understandable.146 Yet, notwithstanding the Tribunal’s 
discernible commitment to endorsement of a precautionary response to potential 
hazards, it was simultaneously ambivalent as to its legal status in international 
environmental protection. Judge Laing, for example, concluded that, although it was 
evident that the Tribunal had adopted a precautionary approach,147 it was not possible, 
on the basis of the arguments presented, to determine whether the precautionary 
principle was a customary norm of international law.148 In his opinion, he explained 
that:-
“[i]t might be noted that treaties and formal instruments use different 
language of obligation; the notion is stated variously (as a principle, 
approach, concept, measure, action); no authoritative judicial decision 
unequivocally supports the notion; doctrine is indecisive; and domestic 
juridical materials uncertain or evolving.”149
Likewise, Judge Ad Hoc Shearer asserted that is was unnecessary to enter into a 
debate in respect of the legal status of the precautionary principle, and that the
144 Ibid. at paragraphs 77 and 80, emphasis added; See also Fabra, A. ‘The LOSC and the 
Implementation of the Precautionary Principle’ (1999) 10 YB of Int’l Env L 15-24, at page 16.
145 Separate Opinion of Judge Treves, paragraph 8.
146 Ibid. at paragraph 9.
147 Separate Opinion of Judge Laing, paragraphs 21,12 and 19.
148 Ibid. at paragraph 16.
149 Ibid. see footnote 5.
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measures ordered by the Tribunal were “rightly based upon considerations deriving 
from a precautionary approach.”150
Despite the fact that Treves, Laing and Ad Hoc Shearer were of the opinion that it was
neither possible nor desirable to make a ruling on the international legal status of the
precautionary principle, Trouwborst nevertheless considered that, from a
precautionary point of view, the Southern Bluefin Tuna case is “the most meaningful
one so far”.151 Yet, notwithstanding the conviction with which the judges cited the
concept of precaution, the principle’s legal implications remained elusive. According
to Freestone, this explicit acceptance of the precautionary principle at international
1level is a sign that it as attained the status of a general rule of law. Similarly, Hey
interprets the frequency with which precaution has been cited in international practice
1as evidence that it has crystallised into a binding customary rule. Cameron insists 
that the impact of the precautionary principle extends beyond policy guidance, having 
legal effect as a general norm of international law.154 Likewise, Sands claims that 
there is sufficient evidence of state practice to assume that the principle reflects a 
broadly accepted basis for international environmental protection, adding that its 
status as a customary rule is secured even though its content and application being 
may be open to interpretation.155
However, academic commentaries claiming that the precautionary principle has 
evolved into a general and binding principle are mistaken in basing this assumption 
solely on the frequency of its invocation. Whilst the regularity of its occurrence is 
indicative of its notoriety, it does not necessarily point to its acceptance as a universal 
principle of international law. The problem is one of striking a balance between 
generality and specificity. By virtue of their nature, customary rules of international 
law are characteristically general in nature so as to achieve widespread application. 
The flipside is that excessive generality undermines the precautionary principle’s
150 Separate Opinion of Judge Ad Hoc Shearer.
151 Trouwborst, A. (2002) at page 173.
152 Freestone, D. (1991) at pages 36-7.
153 Hey, E. ‘The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Policy and Law: Institutionalizing Caution’ 
(1992) 4 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 303, at page 303.
154 Cameron, J. (1994) at pages 266 and 279.
155 Sands, P. ‘The Greening of International Law: Emerging Principles and Rules’ (1994) 1 Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies, partly reprinted in D’Amato, A. and Engel, K. (eds) International 
Environmental Law Anthology (Cincinnati; Ohio; 1996) 21-22, and 28-29, at page 22.
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normative disposition and thwarts any attempt to identify and articulate its core 
elements. Thus, a degree of specificity is required in order to determine its definition 
and application.
It is commonly accepted that a principle develops into a customary rule if it displays 
two elements.156 First, it must be a given practice of states. Second, it must be
1 S7accepted as being mandatory. In its Report of the Sixty-Ninth Conference held in 
London, 2000, the International Law Association explained that general rules are 
created and sustained by the “constant and uniform practice of States and other 
subjects of international law”,158 and give rise to “a legitimate expectation of similar 
conduct in the future.”159 Logically, in order to satisfy these conditions, the 
precautionary principle must be practically viable and its operation sufficiently clear. 
Imprecision, to the extent that its core elements are largely unrecognisable, precludes 
uniformity of application in the sense that the huge variety of interpretations given to 
the precautionary principle conflict with efforts to generalise.160 As Brown Weiss 
notes, “there is no agreement on the content of the principle, or even as to whether an 
actual principle has emerged or only an approach to address a problem.”161 It is for 
this reason that, regardless of the frequency of its recognition, the legal bearing of the 
precautionary principle is prevented from extending to a customary law -  a 
conclusion motivated by its lack of definitive interpretation -  reflected by the fact 
that, at present, a state’s failure to uphold the precautionary principle is not deemed to 
be an internationally wrongful act triggering state responsibility.162 Furthermore, as a 
result of its disputed application and scope in the international sphere, it becomes
156 See, for example, Hohmann, H. Precautionary Legal Duties and Principles of Modem International 
Environmental Law (Dordrecht; 1994) at 172-173, identifying characteristics that mark the evolution of 
a customary rule.
157 International Law Association ‘Final Report of the Committee on Formation of Customary 
(General) International Law & Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General 
Customary International Law’, in International Law Association Report of the Sixty-Ninth Conference, 
held in London 25-29* July 2000 (London; 2000) 712-790, at page 718; see also Brownlie, I. 
Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press; Oxford; 1998) at pages 4-9.
158 paragraph l(i) International Law Association (2000) at page 719.
159 Ibid.
160 Bosselmann, K. ‘Power, Plants and power Plants: New Zealand’s Implementation of the Climate 
Change Convention’ (1995) 12 European Public Law Journal 423-439, at pages 431-432.
161 Brown Weiss, E. ‘International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a 
New World Order’ (1993) 81 Georgetown Law Journal 690, as cited in Jurgielewicz, L.M. Global 
Environmental Change and International Law (Lanham; 1996) page 90, footnote 318.
162 Tinker, C. ‘Responsibility for Biological Diversity Conservation Under International Law’ (1995) 
28 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 777-821 at page 796.
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impossible to attach any meaningful explanation without reference to context. The 
precautionary principle, by virtue of its elusive character, is inherently dependent on 
its operational framework, and for that reason, subjectivity predominates its 
utilisation. Indeed, the judicial reluctance to furnish the precautionary principle with 
any functional substance is indicative of the reality that stand-alone definitions are 
void.
The WTO Panel is expected to deliver its judgment in relation to another trans- 
Atlantic dispute by the end of January 2006.163 In 2003, the US, Canada, and 
Argentina challenged the EC over its de facto moratorium on the approval of 
genetically modified (GM) crops.164 A number of other nations have also registered 
their interest as third parties affected by the outcome.165 In a formal request for WTO 
Panel adjudication, the complaining Member States claimed that three measures were 
inconsistent with specific provisions of the SPS Agreement, GATT 1994, the 
Agreement on Agriculture, and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.166 
These are:-
1. the EC moratorium on the approval of products of agricultural 
biotechnology which suspended consideration of applications for, or 
granting or, approval of biotech products under the EC approval system;
2. the blockage under EC existing legislation of all applications for placing 
further biotech products on the market; and
3. the maintenance by EC Member States of national marketing and import 
bans on biotech products even though those products have already been 
approved by the EC for import and marketing in the EC.
163 In relation to the European Communities Measure Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products. See complaints lodged before the WTO Dispute Resolution Panel by the United States (DS 
291/17), Canada 292/17) and Argentina (293/17). Despite early indications that a preliminary ruling 
may be passed down before the end of 2005, the Panel has delayed its ruling until January 2006.
164 European Communities -  Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing o f Biotech Products 
WT/DS 291,292 and 293.
165 Australia, Brazil, Chile, China, Chinese Taipei, Columbia, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Thailand, and Uruguay.
166 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, WT/DS291/23 (8 August 2003).
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Without going into the finer details of the arguments presented by the parties, it is
• 1 f\7worth drawing attention to the amicus curiae brief submitted on 30 April 2004 -
the value of which lies in its explicit recognition that the strict scientific interpretation 
of the SPS Agreement is inconsistent with the argument that risks “are defined, and 
hence can be meaningfully interpreted and evaluated, only within particular political
1 Aftand cultural contexts.” The brief supports the claim that risk assessment is neither 
a single methodology, nor a ‘science’.169 Instead, and contrary to the US position, the 
brief asserts that the notions of ‘risk’ and ‘risk assessment’ must be 
reconceptualised170 in order to account for the fact that they both vary with context.171 
It observes that, although risk assessment has often been presented as an objective, 
science-based, value-free analytical exercise,172 both science and policy would be
1 71better served by acknowledging the scientific limits of risk assessment. This is an 
interesting position, particularly in the light of the overwhelming consensus within 
regulatory circles is that science is a universally-valid expert analytical process. As 
this thesis shows, however, scientific knowledge is neither uniform nor complete -  
especially so in relation to environmental protection and food safety issues, given 
their ‘special cultural status in human society’.174
The following chapter focuses on the relationship between the concept of ‘risk’ and 
the precautionary principle in EC regulation. It points to the tendency within EC 
institutions to regard precaution as a component of risk assessment, and in addition to
167 The groups can be broadly divided:- the first group comprises of a number of expert academics 
(Professors Brian Wynne, Robin Grove-White, Shelia Jasanoff, Lawrence Busch, and Mr David 
Winickoff); the second group is made up of GeneWatch UK, Foundation for International 
Environmental Law and Development (FIELD, UK), Five Year Freeze (UK), Royal Society for the 
Protection of Birds (RSPB, UK), The Center for Food Safety (USA), Council of Canadians, Polaris 
Institute (Canada), Grupo de Relexion Rural Argentina, Center for Human Rights and the Environment 
(CEDHA, Argentina), Gene Campaign (India), Forum for Biotechnology and Food Security (India), 
Fondacion Sociedades Sustentables (Chile), and Greenpeace International.
168 Busch, L. et al, Amicus Curiae Brief Submitted to the Dispute Settlement Panel of the World Trade 
Organisation in the Case o f ‘EC: Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products’, 30 April 2004, at page 15. Full text of amicus available at
http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fss/ieppp/WTQamicus. accessed August 2005.
169 Ibid. at page 5.
110 Ibid.
171 Ibid. at page 6.
172 See, for example, World Health Organisation, Application of Risk Analysis to Food Standards 
Issues, Report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation, Geneva, Marchl 1995, at page 6.
173 Busch, L. et al (2004) at page 12. See also Silbergeld, E. K. ‘Risk Assessment and Risk 
Management: An Uneasy Divorce’, in Mayo, D. G. and Hollander, R. D. (eds) Acceptable Evidence: 
Science and Values in Risk Management, 99-114, at page 99.
174 Ibid. at page 18. See also, Echols, M. A. Food Safety and the WTO: The Interplay of Culture, 
Science, and Technology (Kluwer Law International; The Hague; 2001) at pages 148-155.
81
this association, to view risk in isolation. This connection between the operation of 
the precautionary principle and scientific risk analysis finds itself at the heart of 
hazard regulation in the EC, and this is particularly evident in relation to the structure 
of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). There is some evidence, however, 
that the recent judicial treatment of precaution is departing from its traditional reliance 
on quantitative definitions of risk to an evaluation based on qualitative information. 
Chapter Four introduces the interface between precaution and science-based risk 
assessment, before turning to examine trends in case law that suggest a liberalisation 
of the meaning of ‘risk* so as to include perceptions of impending hazards that are 
shaped by normative priorities, culture, and experience. Chapter Five continues with 
this theme, presenting the precautionary principle in UK law and policy. It illustrates 
that, because it is neither feasible (nor desirable) to demarcate risk assessment as a 
purely technical phase, definitions of ‘risk’, and as a result the application of 
precaution, vary according to context.
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Chapter Four
The precautionary principle in EC environmental protection
4.0 Introduction
The notion of precaution has long featured in the regulatory philosophy of the EC.
Precautionary measures were being taken for some time before the ‘precautionary
principle’ was explicitly incorporated into the Treaty of Rome by the Maastricht
Treaty in 1992.1 Its historical relationship with the EC derives from its early
development in the environmental protection regimes of Member States. The first
legal use of the notion of precaution can be traced to the Swedish Environmental
Protection Act of 1969, which reversed the burden of proof in respect of
• • *)environmentally hazardous activities, and required industry to demonstrate safety of 
products to regulators before their use. In West Germany, environmental precaution 
emerged as a consequence of the Social Democrat election victory in 1969 which 
established a government eager to enforce its environmental credentials.4 The 
subsequent 1974 Clean Air Act employed the term ‘vorsorge’, which has since been 
deemed by many academics to mark the emergence of the precautionary principle in 
environmental protection. Following its initial stages of development in domestic 
law, precautionary thinking became the focus of supranational regulation. Following 
intense German lobbying during North Sea deliberations, the EC adopted the 
precautionary principle as a standard environmental policy.5
Notably, early anticipatory provisions tended to refer to a precautionary ‘measure’ 
rather than ‘principle’.6 For example, a Council Decision concerning the release of
1 For full text see (1992) 31 ILM 247.
2 Miljoskyddslagen 29 May 1969 Stockholm, Swedish Government.
3 Lofstedt, R. ‘The Swing of the Regulatory Pendulum in Europe: From Precautionary Principle to 
(Regulatory) Impact Analysis’ (2004) 28(3) Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 237-260, at page 243.
4 Weidner, H. “TJmweltpolitik: Auf altem Weg zu einer intemationalen Spitzenstellung’, in Suss, W. 
(ed) Die Bundesrepublik in den achtziger Jahren. Innen Politik, Kultur, Aussenpolitik. (Frankfurt; 
Opladen; 1991) as cited in Lofstedt, R. (2004) at page 244.
5 Lofstedt, R. (2004) at page 244. See also Commission of the European Communities, First 
Environmental Action Programme 1973-1976 OJ 1973 Cl 12.
6 See for example, Directive 80/876 EEC on the approximation of the laws of Member States relating 
to straight ammonium nitrate fertilizers of high nitrogen content, OJ L250 23/09/1980, page 0007- 
0011, Article 9(3).
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chlorofluorocarbons into the environment, delivered in March 1980, stated that “a 
significant reduction should, as a precautionary measure, be achieved in the next few 
years in the use of chlorofluorocarbons giving rise to emissions”.7 Similarly,
o
Directive 80/1095, which was designed to ensure that the Community remained free 
from classical swine fever, provides that, in the event of swine fever spreading 
alarmingly in Community territory, Members States may “take the precautionary 
measures they deem appropriate, including the reintroduction of organized preventive 
vaccination.”9 In 1982, a Communication from the Commission concerning the 
marketing and use of plant protection products considered that “a number of 
precautionary measures ... should be taken”10 so as to prevent the materialization of 
any risks to human health or the environment posed by the use of 
trichlorophenoxyacetic acid as a herbicide. The distinction between a precautionary 
measure and the precautionary principle, however, is largely rhetorical, without 
practical implication.11
As ‘precautionary spotting’ illustrates, the principle is deeply embedded in EC 
environmental protection. Whilst some consider the referencing of examples of 
precaution as strengthening the case for its legitimacy,13 others regard that the citing 
of infinitely divergent definitions demonstrates the fact that the precautionary 
principle is ‘mere mush’.14 For the purposes of illustrating the extent to which the
7 Council Decision 80/372 26 March 1980 concerning chlorofluorocarbons in the environment, OJ 
L090 03/04/1980 page 0045-0045, Preamble, emphasis added.
8 OJ L325 ol/12/1980 page 0001-0004.
9 Article 6(3) Directive 80/1095 EEC, emphasis added.
10 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council: 
Concerning the Marketing and Use o f Plant Protection Products, COM(82)332 final, OJ C l70 
08/07/1982, page 0006, at paragraph III.3.
11 See, for example, The International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 
Guidelines for Applying the Precautionary Principle to Biodiversity Conservation and Natural 
Resource Management, October 2005, which treats the ‘precautionary principle’ and ‘precautionary 
approaches’ as the same concept. See also Haigh, N. ‘The Introduction of the Precautionary Principle 
into the UK’, in O’Riordan, T. and Cameron, J. (eds) Interpreting the Precautionary Principle 
(Earthscan Publications Ltd; London; 1994) at page 238.
12 Fisher. E. ‘Precaution, Precaution Everywhere: Developing a ‘Common Understanding of the 
Precautionary Principle in the European Community’ (2002) 9(1) Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparagraphtive Law 7, at Section C.
13 Harding, R. and Fisher, E. (eds) Perspectives on the Precautionary Principle (Federation Press; 
Sydney; 1999) see Appendix .
14 Fisher, E. (2002) at page 14; see also Morris, J. ‘Defining the Precautionary Principle’, in Morris, J. 
(ed) Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle, at page 1; McKinney, W. J. and Hammer Hill, 
H. ‘Of Sustainability and Precaution: The Logical, Epistemological and Moral Problems of the 
Precautionary Principle and Their Implications for Sustainable Development’ (2000) 5(1) Ethics and 
Environment 77.
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principle infiltrates environmental protection, a degree of ‘precaution spotting’ is 
unavoidable. The following examples are lifted not only in an attempt to 
demonstrate the frequency with which the precautionary principle is referred to, but 
also in an effort to impart a sense of the significance bestowed upon it in this context. 
It is shown that the precautionary principle is looked upon as central tenet in the EC 
legal order.
4.1 The significance of the precautionary principle in the EC
Support for the precautionary principle is institution-wide. It is clear that the EC
institutions advocate the precautionary principle as an integral part of its
environmental strategies -  most notably in the fields of climate change,15 ozone
protection16 and food safety.17 The 1997 Commission Communication on Consumer
1 8Health and Food Safety, for example, pledges that “the Commission will be guided 
in its risk analysis by the precautionary principle, in cases where the scientific basis is 
insufficient or some uncertainty exists”.19 The European Parliament, in its Resolution 
on the 1997 Green Paper on General Principles of Food Law, stressed that “policy in 
this area must be founded on a scientifically-based risk analysis supplemented, where
15 See, for example, Council Resolution on a Community programme of policy and action in relation to 
the environment and sustainable development - A European Community programme of policy and 
action in relation to the environment and sustainable development, OJ C 138, 17 May 1993, pages 1-4.
16 See, for example, Article 1 of Directive 2000/69/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 16 November 2000 relating to limit values for benzene and carbon monoxide in ambient air; Article 
13 of Directive 2001/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2001 on 
national emission ceilings for certain atmospheric pollutants.
17 See, for example:-
• Paragraph 6 of Commission Decision 2000/325 authorising Member States to take measures 
provisionally against the introduction into, and the spread within the Community of Pepino 
mosaic virus as regards tomato plants, intended for planting, other than seeds (notified under 
document number;
• Paragraph 110 of Commission Decision 1999/835 on the national provisions notified by the 
Kingdom of Denmark concerning the limitation to the placing on the market and use of 
creosote;
• Article 4 of Directive 1999/50/EC amending Directive 91/321/EEC on infant formulae and 
follow-on formulae; and
• Article 4 of Directive 1999/39/EC amending Directive 96/5/EC on processed cereal-based 
foods and baby foods for infants and young children.
18 COM(97)183 final.
19 Ibid. 30 April 1997, at page 20.
20 European Community Parliament, Resolution on the Commission Green Paper on General Principles 
of Food Law in the EU COM(97)176 final, OJ C l04/61 10 March 1998.
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necessary, by appropriate risk management based on the precautionary principle”21 In 
1999, the Council adopted a Resolution urging the Commission “to be in the future 
even more determined to be guided by the precautionary principle in preparing 
proposals for legislation and in its other consumer-related activities and develop as a 
priority clear and effective guidelines for the application of this principle”.22
This commitment is evident throughout Community policy.23 For example, EC 
Environmental Action Programmes (EAPs), which formulate strategic policy to 
reflect the fundamental elements of environmental thinking,24 have long recognised a 
pre-emptive approach to environmental risk.25 Although Gervais notes that EAPs 
have not always reflected the notion of anticipatory conduct, she observes that their
21 Ibid. at paragraph 22.
22 Resolution 1999/C 206/01, at paragraph 11(3). Other examples of the application of precaution in EC 
policy include:-
• Paragraphs 2(u) and 7 of Regulation 854/2004 laying down specific rules for the organisation 
of official controls on products of animal origin intended for human consumption;
• Paragraph 5 of Council Decision 2002/628 concerning the conclusion, on behalf of the EC, of 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety;
• Paragraph 17 of Regulation 852/2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs;
• Paragraph 14 of Directive 2004/37 on the protection of workers from the risks related to
exposure to carcinogens or mutagens at work;
• Paragraph 22 of Regulation 1946/2003 on transboundary movement of genetically modified 
organisms;
• Paragraph 3 of Regulation 1830/2003 concerning the traceability and labelling of genetically 
modified organisms and the traceability of food and feed products produced from genetically 
modified organisms and amending Directive 2001/18/EC;
• Paragraph 2(1) of Council Regulation 2371/2002 on the conservation and sustainable 
exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy;
• Chapter 11(b) of the European Parliament Recommendation concerning the implementation of 
Integrated Coastal Zone Management in Europe;
• Paragraph 1 of Directive 2001/42 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and 
programmes on the environment; and
• Article 4(1) of Directive 2001/18 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically 
modified organisms.
23 Resolution on Endocrine-Disrupting Chemicals, OJ C341 09/11/1998, page 0037; Resolution on the 
Transatlantic Economic Partnership and EU/US Trade Disputes, Especially Hormones, Bananas and 
Hushkits, OJ C279 01/10/1999, page 0215; CEC White Paper on Food Safety COM (1999) 719 final; 
Common Position No.51/2000 of November 2000 adopted by the Council in relation to the adopting of 
a Directive on national emission ceilings for certain atmospheric pollutants, OJ C375 28/12/2000, 
pages 0001-0011; Commision of the European Communities, Application of the Precautionary 
Principle and Multi-annual Arrangements for Setting TACs, COM(2000)803 final; European 
Governance -  A White Paper COM(2001) 428 final, OJ C287 12/10/2001; Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee: 
Strategy for Dioxins, Furans and Polychlorinated Biphenyls COM(2001)593 final, OJ C322 
17/11/2001 pages 0002-0018.
24 Hey, C. and Taschner, K. (eds) ‘A Critical Evaluation of Available European Legislation on Industry 
and the Environment’ (Dec 1998) European Environmental Bureau Industry Handbook, at section 2.
25 See Commission of the European Communities, First Environmental Action Programme 1973-1976 
OJ 1973 Cl 12.
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emphasis has gradually shifted from pollution control to pollution prevention and 
precaution?6 Whereas the First Action Programme in 1972 focused on a remedial 
approach to waste disposal, the Sixth Action Programme27 of 2001 asserted that 
“[w]here there is uncertainty about the risks but the effects or impacts are suspected to 
be potentially serious, a precautionary approach will be adopted”, before concluding 
that the precautionary principle “underpin[s] much of our current environmental 
legislation.”29
4.2 Article 174(2)
Explicit reference to the precautionary principle is made in Article 174 of the EC 
Treaty. Paragraph 2 of that Article states that EC environmental policy
“shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of 
situations in the various regions of the Community. It shall be based on 
the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action 
should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be
O A
rectified at source and that the polluter should pay.”
There is no doubt that the precautionary principle is imperative in the EC -  and this is 
particularly evident when Article 174 is read in the light of Article 6, which provides 
that “environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of all other Community policy and activities, in particular with a view
i
to promoting sustainable development”.
Despite the centrality of precaution in the EC legal order, the Treaty avoids defining 
it, which might suggest that there is some tacit understanding of its meaning and
26 Gervais, C. An Overview of European Waste and Resource Management Policy, Sustainable 
Economy Programme (Forum for the Future; London; May 2002) at section 3.1.
27 Commission of the European Communities, Sixth Environmental Action Programme 2001-2010, OJ 
2002 L242.
28 Ibid. at page 40.
29 Ibid. at page 65.
30 emphasis added.
31 emphasis added.
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application. This is not the case. Academic inquiry has, for the large part, proceeded 
on the assumption that a fixed ‘bright line’ definition can be accomplished. 
However, as Stone rightly points out, it is impossible to define ‘the’ precautionary 
principle because there is no one version of the principle “elastic enough to wrap
y y
around all alternative institutional needs”. Underlying Stone’s argument is the 
notion that the precautionary principle is too fluid a concept to be fixed by a single 
definition. Its intrinsic relativity is inconsistent with the drive to give it cast-iron 
meaning. The silence of Article 174(2), therefore, provides evidence that a universal 
definition is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.
This fluidity was exemplified by the WTO Beef Hormones Dispute, in which the 
scope and definition of the precautionary principle was discemibly dependent on the 
context in which it operated. In that case, the term ‘precautionary principle’ was used 
in two very different senses. On the one hand, the WTO Panel and Appellate Body 
claimed that the precautionary principle was upheld by Article 5.7 SPS Agreement, 
which had a narrow focus on scientific interpretations of risk. On the other, the EC 
submitted that it was entitled to rely on the precautionary principle as a general rule of 
customary international law, whose application was relied on a broader understanding 
of risk and its social dimensions.
It is unsurprising that, in the aftermath of the Beef Hormones Dispute, the EC set 
about clarifying its position on the precautionary principle. The WTO ruling clearly 
gave the EC the impetus to establish a common interpretation of precaution and 
respond to the criticism that the EC’s interpretation was impractical. The need for an 
official stance became more obvious still when concerns as to its meaning were raised 
by the Economic and Social Committee. The Committee noted that:-
“there are as yet few legal bases for the precautionary principle and that 
case law is still in its infancy. Explicit and implicit allusion to his 
principle does not provide a solid base, and the Economic and Social
32 see Fisher, E. (2002) at page 15; Sandin, P. et al ‘Five Charges Against the Precautionary Principle’ 
(2002) 5(4) Journal of Risk Research 287-299 at page 289; Gray, J. S. and Bewers, M. ‘Towards a 
Scientific Definition of the Precautionary Principle’ (1996) Marine Pollution Bulletin 32, 768-771, at 
page 768.
3 Stone, C. D ‘Is There a Precautionary Principle?’ (2001) 31(7) Environmental Law Reporter 10790.
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Committee would ask the Commission to submit a concrete, viable case
” 34soon.
In October 1999, a Commission official speaking at an inter-service working session 
in Brussels in October 1999 acknowledged the pressure on the EC to adopt a united 
front, admitting that “[w]e should consolidate the precautionary principle on human 
health and internal affairs”.35 Reacting to concerns over its definitional deficit, the 
Commission produced a Communication on the Precautionary Principle in February 
2000.36 At the outset, it states that it aims “to inform all interested parties, in 
particular the European Parliament, the Council and Member States of the manner in 
which the Commission applies or intends to apply the precautionary principle when 
faced with taking decisions relating to the containment of risk.”37 In addition, it seeks 
to develop a ‘common understanding’ of risk assessment, management and 
communication, and prevent the misuse of the precautionary principle in a 
protectionist manner. Should action based on the precautionary principle be deemed 
necessary, it ought to be proportionate, non-discriminatory, consistent with previous 
action, based on a cost-benefit analysis, and subject to future review.38
Unquestionably, the Communication provides a useful tool for decision-making, and 
contributes to the ongoing debate on the issue. Yet, the Communication is “still thin 
on precise definition”,39 and fails to clarify thresholds that determine the point at 
which the precautionary principle is to be employed. It provides only very general 
guidelines, arguably so as to maintain the broad discretion of Community institutions 
in decision-making. Even the Economic and Social Committee, in its analysis of the 
Communication, concluded that the EC still needed to reach a consensus for the
34 European Economic and Social Committee, ‘Own-Initiative Opinion on Use of the Precautionary 
Principle’ (2000) at page 5.
35 as cited in Dratwa, J. ‘Taking Risks with the Precautionary Principle: Food (and the Environment) 
for Thought at the European Commission’ (2002) 4 Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 197- 
213, at page 198.
36 Commission of the European Communities, Communication on the Precautionary Principle COM 
1(2000) final (EC Commission; Brussels; 2000).
37 Ibid at page 8.
38 Ibid. at page 3.
39 Lee, R. “(Pre)Cautionary Tales: Risk, Regulation and the Precautionary Principle”, in Bos wall, J. and 
Lee, R. (eds) Economics, Ethics and the Environment -  Papers from the UKELA Cardiff Conference, 
June 2001 (Cavendish; London; 2001) at page 93.
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meaning and application of the principle.40 The Environment Commissioner claimed 
that “there is a definition.. .in the Communication.”41 When asked what the definition 
was, she answered “it depends on the case it is being applied to”.42
To some extent, the Council Resolution passed in December 2000 modifies the 
operation of the precautionary principle as it was set out in the Commission’s 
Communication.43 First, whilst the Communication emphasizes the importance of 
risk assessment to be science-based,44 the Resolution recognises that, if scientific 
knowledge is insufficient or a risk urgent, a comprehensive risk analysis might not 
always be feasible.45 Second, whereas the Communication makes a distinction 
between scientific risk assessment and political risk management,46 the Resolution 
attempts to ‘socialize’ the scientific process of assessment, introducing the idea of 
greater public participation in the identification and perception of risk.47
Although subtle, these differences are significant in that they demonstrate that the 
Communication is most definitely not the ‘final word’48 on the matter, and that even 
during the period between the publication of the Communication in February and the 
passing of the Resolution in December, the boundaries of the understanding of the 
precautionary principle had moved. Some commentators claim that its fluctuating 
interpretation has repercussions on its perceived legal status. Given its variability, the 
identification of common traits must necessarily occur at such a high level of 
generality that its status is limited to guiding environmental policy, without imposing 
any legal obligation.49 Hession and Macrory, for example, stress that determining the 
implications and legal status of the precautionary principle is largely contingent on 
subsequent legislative processes that seek to operationalise a framework of risk
40 European Economic and Social Committee (2000) at page 9.
41 As cited in Bergkamp, L. ‘Understanding the Precautionary Principle: Part I’ (2002) Env. Liability 
18, at page 18.
42 As cited in Stone, C. D. (2001) at page 10790.
43 Vogel, D. The New Politics o f Risk Regulation in Europe (Centre for Analysis of Risk and 
Regulation, London School of Economics; London; 2001) at page 16. For European Council 
Resolution, see Presidency Conclusions, Nice European Council Meeting 7, 8 and 9 December 2000, 
http://europa.eu.int/coimcil/off/conclu/dec2000/dec2000 en.htm. accessed June 2003.
44 Commission of the European Communities (2000) at section 5.1.
45 Council Resolution, at paragraph 8.
46 Commission of the European Communities (2000) at section 6.1.
47 Resolution at paragraph. 20.
48 Commission of the European Communities (2000), at section 2.
49 See Kramer, L. EC Environmental Law (Sweet and Maxwell; London; 2000) at page 10.
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assessment and precaution.50 From this perspective, the precautionary principle under 
Article 174(2) is at most “an expression of political will”.51
Other commentators overlook its lacking precision, focusing on its conceptual 
underpinnings as opposed to the manner in which it is articulated, and claiming that 
the principle pursuant to Article 174(2) is legally binding.52 Nonetheless, the extent 
to which the precautionary principle can derive legal status in EC law still remains 
unclear. Invariably, determining its status is problematic since a principle, unlike a 
rule, “states a reason that argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a particular 
direction”. By virtue of its nature, it is inherently difficult to demarcate. That said, 
the Commission’s Communication was optimistic about its development into a 
binding norm of EC environmental policy. Claiming that it would be wrong to 
conclude that the absence of any precise definition inevitably lead to legal 
uncertainty, the Communication made it clear that the ambiguity of the precautionary 
principle would gradually evolve into specificity through the judicial process:-
“Like other general notions contained in the legislation, such as 
subsidiarity or proportionality, it is for the decision maker and ultimately 
the courts to flesh out the principle. In other words, the scope of the 
precautionary principle also depends on trends in case law, which to some 
degree are influenced by prevailing social and political values. However, 
it would be wrong to conclude that the absence of a definition has to lead 
to legal uncertainty.”54
Given this statement, it is interesting to see how the European Courts have dealt with 
the precautionary principle. A handful of cases have touched upon it, although the 
Courts have tackled neither its definition nor substance, having only outlined its
50 Hession, M. and Macrory, R. ‘Maastricht and the Environmental Policy of the Community: Legal 
Issues of a New Environment Policy’, in O’Keeffe, D. and Twomey, P. (eds) Legal Issues of the 
Maastricht Treaty (Chancery; London; 1994) at pages 151-67.
51 Stallworthy, M. (2002) at page 51.
52 Douma, W. Th. ‘The Precautionary Principle in the European Union’ (2000) 9(2) RECIEL 132-143 
at page 141.
53 Dworkin, R. Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth; London; 1977) at page 24.
54 Commission of the European Communities (2000) at page 9, emphasis added.
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jurisprudential background.55 The following section introduces four early cases to 
illustrate the conservative approach taken by the judiciary:-
i. Association pour la Protection des Animaux Sauvages;
ii. The Queen v. MAFF ex parte National Farmers ’ Union
iii. UK v. Commission
iv. Bergaderm v. Commission
This section goes on to highlight four more recent judgments as a means of 
emphasising a shift in the judicial interpretation of precaution:-
v. Pfizer v. Council,;
vi. Alpharma v. Council;
vii. Monsanto Agricoltura Italia; and
viii. The Wadden Sea Case.
While this distinction between early case law and more recent judgments aids an 
understanding of the development of precaution in the EC, it also reflects two very 
different approaches adopted by the European Courts.
4.3 Examining the case law
■ i. Association pour la Protection des Animaux Sauvages 56
In 1992, the Administrative Court of Nantes made an Article 177 EC Treaty57 
reference to the ECJ requesting clarification on the interpretation of Article 7(4) of
CO
Directive 79/409/EEC on the conservation of wild birds. Various associations for 
the protection of the environment had sought, before the national court, to annul the
55 Dratwa, J. (2001) at page 4.
56 Case C-435/92, Association pour la Protection des Animaux Sauvages and Others v Prefet de 
Maine-et-Loire and Prefet de Loire-Atlantique, 19 January 1994, ECR [1994] page 1-00067.
57 Now Article 234.
58 OJ 1979 L103, page 1.
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decision of the Prefects of Maine-et-Loire and of Loire-Atlantique to fix their closing 
dates for the hunting of migratory birds and waterfowl. The Prefects had staggered 
their closing dates according to migratory activity with the objective of allowing a 
certain percentage of the species to escape the protection granted by Article 7(4) of 
the Directive. The national court asked ECJ to determine whether the staggering of 
closing dates was compatible with the species protection afforded by the Directive.59
Despite the fact that the ECJ did not cite the precautionary principle in its judgment, it 
unequivocally demonstrated precautionary approach. It held that the decision to 
stagger hunting closing dates was incompatible with Article 7(4) -  a provision 
explicitly stating that dates must be fixed in a manner that guarantees the complete 
protection of migratory and wildfowl species. By varying the dates so as to ensure 
that certain number escaped protection, the Prefects of Maine-et-Loire and of Loire- 
Atlantique were in breach Article 7(4). The Court noted that, given that the 
environmental impact of the staggering of hunting dates was scientifically uncertain, 
it would be held to be incompatible with the Directive objective of species protection 
unless the Member States concerned could “adduce evidence, based on scientific and 
technical data relevant to each individual case”60 that this method would not impede 
the complete protection of species. In effect, the ruling shifted the burden of proving 
that the practice posed no risk to the migratory birds and wildfowl before its 
authorisation.
■ ii. The Queen v. MAFF ex parte National Farmers’ Union61
The National Farmers’ Union, along with nine other parties involved in the raising for 
sale, feeding, iairage, transport and export of livestock, bovine semen, embryos and 
other beef-related products (hereafter collectively referred to as ‘NFU’) brought an 
action contesting various acts adopted under Article 1 of Commission Decision 
96/239/EC. The Decision was implemented by the Commission subsequent to the
59 Ibid. at paragraph 4.
60 Ibid. at paragraph 22.
61 Case C-157/96, The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Commissioners of 
Customs & Excise, ex parte National Farmers' Union, and Others, 5 May 1998 ECR [1998] page I- 
02211.
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release of two statements by the Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee 
(‘SEAC’), an independent body that advised the UK Government in respect of the
possible link between bovine spongiform encephalopathy (‘BSE’) and Creutzfeldt-
£*\
Jakob disease (‘CJD’). The Decision, based on Council Directives 90/425 and 
89/662, was an emergency measure against BSE imposing a temporary ban on the 
export of bovine animals, meat and other derived products from the UK to other 
Member States and third countries. During proceedings in the Queen’s Bench 
Division of the High Court, reference for a preliminary ruling was made under Article 
177 EC Treaty63 questioning the validity of Article 1 of the Decision. The applicant’s 
claims were dismissed by the CFI, and the ECJ subsequently delivered its judgment 
on 5 May 1998.
The NFU made three claims: that the Commission lacked the power to adopt the 
Decision; that the Commission misused the power to adopt that Decision; that the 
Decision infringed the principle of proportionality.64
The NFU submitted that the Directives 90/425 and 89/662 did not provide an 
adequate legal basis for the Decision, and that, as a result, the Commission lacked the 
power to adopt the Decision. The NFU noted that even if the Commission did not 
totally lack competency, it did lack competency to prevent the export of certain 
bovine products because there was no material risk of BSE transmission associated 
with bovine semen, embryos, live calves under 6 months, fresh meat from animals 
under two and a half years, tallow and gelatin.65
However, two SEAC statements sought to reclassify BSE -  stating that it was no 
longer affecting only cattle, but should also be considered a hazard to human health.66 
SEAC claimed that there was new information suggesting that the link between BSE 
and CJD had ceased to be merely a theoretical hypothesis and had developed into a 
real possibility.67 According to ‘the most likely explanation’, cases of CJD were
62 as amended by Council Directive 92/118/EEC of 17 December 1992.
63 Now Article 234.
64 Association pour la Protection des Animaux Sauvages and Others v Prefet de Maine-et-Loire and 
Prefet de Loire-Atlantique, at paragraph. 11.
65 Ibid. at paragraph 16.
66 Ibid. at paragraph 23.
67 Ibid. at paragraph 31.
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linked to contact with the BSE disease -  and this required a significant modification 
of the perception of risk posed to human health.
The Court recognized that the Commission enjoyed wide discretionary powers,69 and 
held that the publication of new scientific information, establishing a likely, albeit 
uncertain, connection between BSE and CJD, should be treated seriously. The Court 
concluded that the Commission did not exceed the bounds of its discretion in seeking 
to contain the disease within the territory of the United Kingdom by banning the
70export from that territory, and that it was sufficiently competent to act in the way it 
did.
However, the NFU argued further that even if the Commission were competent to 
adopt the Decision, it had nevertheless misused its powers -  with the main purpose of 
achieving an end other than that stated.71 The NFU submitted that the fifth recital in 
the preamble to the Decision was worded in a way that suggested that its real purpose 
was to allay consumer concern, and not to protect public health. Nonetheless, the 
Court held that, if read as a whole, it was evident from the text of the Decision that the 
Commission was prompted to invoke the provision by concerns of transmission of 
BSE to humans,72 and thus there was no misuse of powers.
The NFU’s final contention was that the Decision was a disproportionate measure73 
given the existence of both Community and UK measures that had already been 
adopted. The Commission contended that the Decision was justified in the light of 
the uncertainties as to the potential risks to human health. The Court was of the same 
opinion, and stated that:-
“[wjhere there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks to 
human health, the institutions may take protective measures without
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid. at paragraph 39.
70 Ibid. at paragraph 41.
71 see in particular, Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v Council, 12 November 1996 ECR [1996] page I- 
5755, paragraph 69.
72 Association pour la Protection des Animaux Sauvages and Others v Prefet de Maine-et-Loire and 
Prefet de Loire-Atlantique, at paragraph 45.
73 Ibid. at paragraph 47
having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks become fully
, , 7 4apparent.
Young points out that, even though this statement holds little weight, it indicates that
n c
the Court was judicially reviewing the application of the precautionary principle. 
Although the Court did not explicitly cite the principle, it was upheld by deference to 
the “legislative prerogative”76 of the Community institutions.
■ iii. UK v. Commission77
Also in relation to the emergency measures against BSE, the UK brought an action 
under Article 173 EC Treaty78 for the suspension and ultimately the annulment of 
Commission Decision 96/239. The UK submitted nine pleas in total to support its 
application -  but for the purposes of this chapter it is sufficient only to highlight the 
following claims: failure by the Commission to observe the limits placed on the 
powers conferred on it by Directives 90/425 and 89/662; misuse of powers; and 
breach of the principle of proportionality.
In accord with the NFU case, the ECJ held that the Commission’s powers conferred 
by Directives 90/425 and 89/662 were drafted in wide terms, thus allowing the 
Commission to adopt the necessary safeguard measures.79 The text of the Directives 
confirms that in the event of disease or any grounds likely to create a serious hazard to 
animals or humans, the prohibition of movement of animals and by-products from a 
specified territory is an appropriate measure. The Court noted that the Commission 
enjoyed a broad discretion as to the nature and extent of the measures it employs, and 
having regard to the uncertainty as to the risks to public health, the pleas alleging 
lacking competence and misuse of powers were rejected.
74 Ibid. at paragraph 62
75 Young, G. ‘Some Thoughts on the Precautionary Principle’ (2000) 1(5) Perspectives on European 
Business Law 16-19, at page 17.
76 Ibid.
77 Case C-180/96, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Commission of the 
European Communities, 5 May 1998, ECR [1998] page 1-02265.
78 Now Article 230.
79 Ibid. at paragraph 54.
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Echoing the approach taken in the NFU case, the Court also concluded that, in the 
face of scientific uncertainty, the Decision was a proportionate measure, since:-
“uncertainty concerning the manner in which BSE is transmitted, 
particularly as regards its transmissibility through the mother, coupled 
with the lack of a system for tagging animals and controlling their 
movements, has meant that there can be no scientific certainty that the 
mother of a calf is completely free from BSE or, even if she is, that the 
calf is completely unaffected by the disease.”80
Thus, in the light of the incertitude as to the existence of risk, it was held that the 
emergency measure -  which embodied the philosophy of precaution -  was am 
appropriate response to the identified threat.
■ iv. Bergaderm v. Commission81
A similar line of reasoning was further demonstrated in the judgment of the CFI in  
Bergaderm v Commission o f the European Communities. Article 4 of Council 
Directive 76/768/EEC concerning the approximation of the laws of Member States in  
relation to cosmetic products, as amended by Council Directive 93/35/EEC, required 
Member States to prohibit the marketing, contrary to the conditions set out, o f  
cosmetic products containing any of the substances listed.82
Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques Bergaderm produced Bergasol, a sun oil which 
contained 5-methoxypsoralen (‘5-MOP’) -  a derivative of bergamot essence, 
suspected as potentially having carcinogenic effect.83 Following the release of a  
number of conflicting scientific studies, the Commission sought the opinion of the 
Scientific Committee on Cosmetology so as to determine whether the use of the
80 Ibid. paragraph 102.
81 Case T-199/96, Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques Bergaderm SA and Jean-Jacques Goupil v  
Commission of the European Communities, 16 July 1998, ECR [1998] page 11-02805.
82 Annex II, and Annex III Part I to Directive 76/768/EEC.
83 Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques Bergaderm SA and Jean-Jacques Goupil v Commission of the 
European Communities, at paragraph 10.
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ingredient in sun oil was potentially carcinogenic. The Committee concluded that the 
level of 5-MOP in sun oil should be no greater than 1 mg/kg.84 Commission Directive 
95/34/EEC was subsequently invoked requiring all Member States to take necessary 
action to ensure that neither manufacturers nor importers could place sun creams 
containing more than 1 mg/kg of psoralens on the market. Bergaderm, in breach of 
this requirement, was formally put into liquidation, and subsequently lodged an action 
at the CFI on 16 July 1998 calling for the Commission to pay costs and damages.
Amid other submissions, Bergaderm claimed that the Commission manifestly erred in
or
its risk assessment and breached the principle of proportionality. In essence, the 
applicant argued that the Directive was adopted in the absence of any scientific 
evidence to prove that it was a necessary measure in order to protect the public health, 
and that the Directive was an inappropriate tool as a means of achieving its purported 
objective, namely the protection of public health.
Unsurprisingly, the Court held that since cases involving public health issues were 
delicate and controversial86, the Commission must have a sufficiently wide discretion 
to take precautionary measures without having to wait until the reality and gravity of 
those risks materializes. Furthermore, the Court noted that there was no evidence to 
suggest that the Commission had misinterpreted the scientific reports concerning the 
potential risks involved in the use of bergamot essence in sun oil, and the Commission 
was right to refer the matter to the Scientific Committee and comply with its findings. 
Thus, it was held that the Commission neither made a manifest error of assessment 
nor adopted a disproportionate measure in the circumstances.
The language adopted in these four cases is strikingly similar, and they clearly 
demonstrate the Courts’ limited and cautious approach to the precautionary principle 
in the early stages of its development. Ironically, even five years after the 
precautionary principle was introduced in Article 174, the term ‘precautionary 
principle’ does not feature anywhere in the text of the judgments -  suggesting that the
84 Ibid. at paragraph 19.
85 Ibid. at paragraph 40.
86 Ibid. at paragraph 55.
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Courts were uneasy with its jurisprudence and uncertain of its meaning.87 Instead, the 
Court implicitly upholds a precautionary approach behind the guise of arguments of 
legislative competence of the Community institutions and the doctrine of 
proportionality. The Court of First Instance in 2002 recognised that:-
“Prior to the enshrinement in case law of the precautionary principle, on 
the basis of the Treaty provisions, that principle was implicitly implied in
o o
the review of proportionality.”
The Treaty’s failure to define the precautionary principle leaves the Court with a 
burden of legislative proportions which it is unwilling to shoulder. As a result, the 
Courts have utilized the more familiar tools of judicial review to scrutinize decisions 
for a manifest error or a disregard for a risk of serious or irreparable damage to public 
health or the environment.89 This is illustrative of schizophrenic application of 
precaution. Early case law demonstrates that the precautionary principle was 
upheld,90 but masked behind more familiar legal jargon. The Court, without any 
practical direction, erred on the side of caution and handled the precautionary 
principle in a way more compatible with existing EC jurisprudence. This approach 
was understandable given the lack of legal clarity as to the meaning of the principle. 
Whilst the Court acknowledged the utility of anticipatory responses to uncertainty, it 
felt uneasy about taking the precautionary principle beyond its abstract existence and 
offering practical direction as to its operation.
Douma claims that it is clear from the case law that the precautionary principle can 
“influence or even determine the outcome of cases”91 and thus “it is preferable to 
describe a principle that is codified in the EC Treaty as a legally binding norm.”92
87 See for example Atik, J. ‘Science and International Regulatory Convergence’ (1996-97) 17 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 736, at pages 748-9.
88 Case T-132/00, Artegodan v Commission of the European Communities, 26 November 2002 ECR 
[2002] page 11-04945, paragraph 185. Court refers to Case C-l 80/96 United Kingdom v Commission of 
the European Communities paragraphs 73-78; Order of the President of the Court of First Instance in 
Case T-76/96 National Farmers’ Union and Others v Commission of the European Communities 
[1996] ECR 11-815, paragraphs 82-93, in particular paragraph 89.
89 Young, G. (2000) at page 19; see also Douma, W. Th. (2000) at page 137.
90 This was confirmed by the CFI in 2002 in Case T-70/99, Alpharma Inc. v Council of the European 
Union, 11 September 2002, ECR [2002] page 00000, at paragraph 152.
91 Douma, W. Th. (2000) at 141.
92 Ibid.
99
However, it is difficult to conclude from these cases that the precautionary principle 
was legally binding in its own right since it was never explicitly referred to, and 
influenced the outcome of the cases only insofar as the existing jurisprudential 
framework allowed. Nevertheless, more recent judgments suggest an elevation of the 
status of the precautionary principle. The following section introduces four cases 
which illustrate increasing judicial confidence in the interpretation and application of 
Article 174(2).
4.4 A different approach 
■ v. Pfizer93
Additives to animal foodstuffs such as vitamins, trace elements, binders, 
preservatives, coccidiostats and antibiotics are controlled by Directive 70/524/EC 
which was last substantially amended by Directive 96/51/EC. Only additives on an 
authorized list can be used in animal feeds subject to certain conditions of use. Under 
the legal provisions, a Member State is able to prohibit the use of an additive if it is 
thought to create a risk to animal or human health or the environment.
In the light of advice from a national scientific body, Denmark banned the use of 
virginiamycin, belonging to the streptogramin class of antibiotics, in animal 
foodstuffs. The Commission subsequently sought scientific advice from the Scientific 
Committee for Animal Nutrition (‘SCAN’), and on 17 December 1998, relying on the 
Commission’s guidance, the Council adopted Regulation 2821/98 banning the use of 
four antibiotics -  virginiamycin, bacitracin zinc, spiramycin, and tylosin phosphate -  
as additives in animal foodstuff because of concerns of the development of animal 
resistance to antibiotic and transmission of resistance to humans through 
consumption.
The contested Regulation was adopted by the Council on the basis of Article 11(3) of 
Directive 70/524 - enabling the Commission to instigate an Article 24 procedure to
93 Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council of the European Union, 11 September 2002, ECR 
[2002] page 00.
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alter the lists of authorized antibiotics in response to concerns raised by a Member 
State in respect of the protection of human or animal health, or the environment. 
Relying upon Article 3a(e) of the Directive,94 the Council withdrew authorization for 
the use of 4 antibiotics as additives in foodstuffs, claiming that, in relation to 
virginiamycin in particular, its decision was justified because there was a risk that the 
effectiveness of certain human medicines could be jeopardized.95
Pfizer Animal Health SA (‘Pfizer’), the only producer of virginiamycin when the 
regulation was adopted, lodged an application at the CFI challenging the legality of 
the provision.96 Pfizer argued that there were eight grounds for annulment - 
inevitably making this case exceedingly complex -  although its principal claims were 
that the Community institutions erred firstly, in their assessment and management of 
the possible risks to human health posed by the use of virginiamycin in animal
Q7foodstuffs, and secondly, in their application of the precautionary principle.
Both parties agreed that Directive 70/524 permitted Community institutions to adopt a 
measure on the basis of the precautionary principle, although they disagreed on the 
interpretation of precaution, and the relationship between precaution and scientific 
risk assessment.98
Pfizer and the Council accepted that the measure prohibiting the use of virginiamycin 
could not legitimately be based on a ‘zero risk’ test -  since it is impossible to prove 
conclusively that a particular substance creates zero risk to human health, either now 
or in the future.99 However, Pfizer argued that the Community institutions were 
prohibited from invoking precautionary measures unless and until they had
94 See Recital 5 of Regulation (EC) No. 2821/98.
95 Ibid. at Recital 21 .
96 Note, an interim application to market the product pending appeal was rejected.
97 Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council o f the European Union , at paragraph 108.
98 Ibid. at paragraph 113.
99 Ibid. at paragraph 130: A zero risk test, according to the Court, would “quickly lead to the paralysis 
of technological development and innovation.” This point was reiterated in case C-6/99, Association 
Greenpeace France v Ministere de I'Agriculture et de la Peche [2000] ECR page 1-1651, in which the 
Court (at paragraph 72) claimed that the precautionary principle:-
“does not require an activity to be prohibited or subjected to draconian restrictions 
whenever it cannot be scientifically proved that there is absolutely no risk attaching to it, 
since it is common knowledge that lawyers have always described proving a negative as 
probatio diabolica and not without reason.”
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undertaken a full scientific assessment of the potential risks, and had shown that any 
such risks are probable.100 Although it acknowledged that virginiamycin may create a 
‘hazard to human health’, Pfizer submitted that this is an unsatisfactory ground upon 
which to base the Regulation. Instead, Pfizer required that a higher threshold of proof 
be imposed, stating that:-
“[i]t would be proven with the first dead man. It would be proven with 
the first infection, or with the first proof of colonization, or the first proof 
of transfer in a human.”101
The Court held that Pfizer’s interpretation of the precautionary principle was 
incorrect:-
“it must be bome in mind that, when the precautionary principle is 
applied, the fact that there is scientific uncertainty and that it is impossible 
to carry out a full risk assessment in the time available does not prevent 
the competent public authority from taking preventive protective measures 
if such measures appear essential, regard being had to the level of risk to 
human health which the public authority has decided is the critical
109threshold above which it is necessary to take preventive measures.”
Overall, the Court found in favour of the Council, concluding that it neither made 
manifest errors of risk assessment and management nor breached the precautionary 
principle. In its lengthy judgment, the Court endeavoured to shed light on the role 
played by the precautionary principle in the risk assessment processes. The Court 
held that the application of the precautionary principle was permitted in situations 
where there existed a risk to human health, even if the risk could not be fully 
demonstrated.103 It also decided that precaution could not be based on a purely
100 Ibid. at paragraphs 129-130.
101 Ibid. at paragraph 379, emphasis added.
102 Ibid. at paragraph 382.
103 Paragraph 144.
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hypothetical approach to risk.104 There had to be tangible scientific evidence of the 
magnitude and likely occurrence of the threat.105
In its approach to precaution and risk assessment, the CFI placed scientific enquiry at 
the heart of precautionary decision-making, stating that:-
“Scientific advice is of the utmost importance at all stages of the drawing 
up and implementation of new legislation and for the execution and 
management of existing legislation. The duty imposed on the Community 
institutions by the first subparagraph of Article 129(1) of the Treaty to 
ensure a high level of human health protection means that they must 
ensure that their decisions are taken in the light of the best scientific 
information available and that they are based on the most recent results of 
international research.”106
Furthermore, although it noted that a full scientific assessment of potential hazards 
might not always be possible, the Court held that the application of precaution must 
be adequately supported by scientific data107 This affiliation between precaution and 
risk assessment was maintained by the CFI in Alpharma.
■ vi. Alpharma108
In conjunction with the Pfizer case, an application was made by Alpharma in relation 
to the withdrawal of bacitracin zinc as an additive to animal foodstuffs pursuant to 
Council Regulation 2821/98. Recital 22 to the contested regulation states that:-
“selected resistances from the use of bacitracin zinc as a feed additive 
inevitably increase the reservoir of resistance to bacitracin zinc”, and that 
“these resistances could be transferred from animals to humans and reduce
106 Ibid. at paragraph 5.
107 Ibid. at paragraph 144.
108 Case T-70/99, Alpharma Inc. v Council of the European Union, 11 September 2002, ECR [2002] 
page 00000.
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the effectiveness of bacitracin zinc used as a human medicinal 
product.”109
Alpharma claimed that the Court should annul the Regulation, either in its entirety or 
in so far as it concerns bacitracin zinc, and order the Council to pay costs.
The arguments of Alpharma were largely comparable with those submitted in Pfizer. 
Alpharma submitted four pleas: i) breach of essential procedural requirements; ii) 
manifest errors of assessment, which included errors in the risk assessment, and in the 
application of the precautionary principle; iii) infringement of fundamental principles 
of Community law, namely, the principles of proportionality and protection of 
legitimate expectations; and iv) breach of the obligation to state reasons.110
It was clear from recital 29 to the contested regulation that the Council relied on the 
precautionary principle to justify its adoption.111 Alpharma accepted that the 
precautionary principle enabled Community institutions to quickly adopt pre-emptive 
measures in the face of an emergency, but argued that the principle could not be used 
as an excuse for failing to carry out a sufficiently thorough risk assessment.112 
Alpharma maintained that the Community institutions made a manifest error of 
assessment in concluding that they had sufficient cogent and reliable scientific 
evidence to suggest a link between the use of bacitracin zinc and animal and human 
resistance. Contrary to the course of action in Pfizer, the Community institutions in 
this case authorized the withdrawal of bacitracin zinc without first obtaining a 
scientific opinion from SCAN regarding the associated risks.113 Despite this, the 
Court found that Alpharma had failed to demonstrate that the Community institutions 
had erred in their risk assessment, and although scientific knowledge at the time was 
incomplete, it was clear that the Council could reasonably conclude that there existed 
serious human health concerns.114
109 Ibid. at paragraph 271.
110 Ibid. at paragraph 99.
111 Ibid. paragraph 134. Recital 29 states that “the prohibition on the use of the antibiotics bacitracin 
zinc, spiramycin, virginiamycin and tylosin phosphate ought to be perceived as an interim protective 
measure taken as a precaution”.
112 Ibid. at paragraph 148.
113 Ibid. at paragraph 203.
114 Ibid. at paragraph 313.
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A considerable part of the Alpharma judgment was devoted to outlining the role of the 
precautionary principle in processes of risk assessment.115 In line with the Pfizer 
decision, the Court noted that the precautionary principle was intended only to apply 
in situations in which it had been proven by scientific means that a risk was more than 
merely hypothetical.116
Although it has been acknowledged that the precautionary principle has not yet been 
fully defined in EC case law,117 Pfizer and Alpharma chart the further development of 
precautionary jurisprudence and provide the precautionary principle with both form 
and substance. Both cases insinuate an elevation of the status of the precautionary 
principle beyond a pure policy tool to a legally binding norm that is open to challenge, 
and we see the manifestation of more concrete principles upon which the Courts 
might base that contention.
In contrast with the four early cases, and in response to the Commission’s instruction 
to the Courts to flesh out its definition, Pfizer and Alpharma illustrate increasing 
recognition of the precautionary principle in its operational context, and if nothing 
else, provide a stepping stone to further understanding of its utilisation within the EC. 
It has been interesting to see whether the Courts have continued to take a proactive 
role in interpreting precaution. The following two cases illustrate the way in which, 
in the aftermath of Pfizer and Alpharma, the ECJ has been increasingly willing to 
develop a practical framework in which precaution can operate.
■ vii. Monsanto Agricoltura Italia118
By virtue of Regulation 258/97, foods produced from genetically modified organisms, 
but which no longer contain them, may be placed on the market without prior 
authorization, provided a national food assessment body has certified that the novel 
food is substantially equivalent to the traditional non-GM food already being
115 Ibid. at paragraph 152-184.
116 Ibid. at paragraph 159.
117 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Alber, Monsanto Agricoltura Italia SpA and Others v Presidenza 
del Consiglio dei Ministri and Others [2003] ECR page 1-08105, at paragraph 135.
118 Case C-236/01, Monsanto Agricoltura Italia SpA and Others v Presidenza del Consiglio dei 
Ministri and Others, 9 September 2003 [2003] ECR page 1-08105.
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marketed. According to the provisions contained in the Regulation, the person 
responsible for the placing on the market is under an obligation to notify the 
Commission.119 In 1997 and 1998, after the approved food authority had certified 
substantial equivalence, Monsanto Europe SA and two other firms used the simplified 
procedure to notify that foods made from genetically modified maize were being 
placed on the market.120
Between November 1998 and April 1999, the Italian Health Ministry wrote to the 
Commission requesting reports of toxicological and allergenicity assessments 
conducted in relation to GM maize produced by Monsanto.121 Instead of replying 
directly to the letters, the Commission, in accordance with its practice, forwarded the 
information to Monsanto and the two other firms for them to make that information 
immediately available to the Member States. The Italian Republic claimed that the 
absence of detailed information, and in particular, the renewed interest by the 
Scientific Committee for Food, provided adequate grounds for the precautionary 
suspension of the marketing and use of transgenic products. On 4 August 2000, 
pursuant to Article 12 of Regulation, the Italian Republic adopted a Decree122 
prohibiting the marketing pf foods made from genetically modified maize which were 
authorized using the ‘simplified procedure’. Monsanto (and others) challenged the 
Decree. During proceedings, the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale de Lazio 
referred to the ECJ questions in relation to (i) the admissibility of the simplified 
procedure in the light of evidence that the foods contained residues of transgenic 
protein; (ii) the compatibility of procedure with Articles 153 and 174 EC Treaty; and 
(iii) the degree to which the simplified procedure took account of the precautionary 
principle. For the purposes of this section, the third question warrants further 
examination.
119 Article 5, Regulation 258/97.
120 Simplified procedure set out in Article 5: 'In the case of the foods or food ingredients referred to in 
Article 3(4), the applicant shall notify the Commission of the placing on the market when he does so. 
Such notification shall be accompanied by the relevant details provided for in Article 3(4). The 
Commission shall forward to Member States a copy of that notification within 60 days and, at the 
request of a Member State, a copy of the said relevant details. The Commission shall publish each year 
a summary of those notifications in the "C" series of the Official Journal of the European 
Communities.”
121 Case C-236/01, Monsanto Agricoltura Italia SpA and Others v Presidenza del Consiglio dei 
Ministri and Others, [2003] ECR 00, at paragraph 25.
122 The Prime Ministerial Decree of 4 August 2000, which suspended the marketing and use of 
products derived from transgenic maize of the lines Bt-11, MON 810 and MON 809.
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In his Opinion, Advocate General Alber offered an explanation of the precautionary 
principle, suggesting that even a theoretical risk might justify precautionary action. 
Accordingly, conclusive evidence of the reality of the risk was “not required”,123 and 
precautionary action was deemed appropriate even where the cause for concern was 
“based on preliminary scientific findings.”124 Precautionary action was deemed to be 
justifiable when “no concrete threat to those resources has yet been demonstrated but 
initial scientific findings indicate a possible risk.”125
The Advocate General considered that the simplified procedure adequately accounted 
for the protection of health and the precautionary principle.126 The ECJ adopted a 
similar stance, concluding that Regulation 258/97 already contained provisions 
upholding the notion of precaution.127 In particular, the Court explained that the 
safeguard clause contained in Article 12 “must be understood as giving specific 
expression to the precautionary principle”128 Article 12 required that Member States 
wanting to temporarily restrict or suspend the trade in, and use of, a particular food, or 
food ingredient, provide details that it posed a danger to human health or the 
environment, and immediately inform other Member States and the Commission.129 
The Commission is obliged to present a draft of those grounds to the Standing
i in  • •Committee for Foodstuffs, which, following detailed examination, will deliver its 
opinion on the draft within a time limit specified by the Committee Chairman.131 The 
Commission shall adopt the measure if it is in accordance with Committee opinion.132 
However, if the measure is not in accordance with Committee opinion, or the 
Committee gives no opinion, the Commission is obliged to submit a proposal relating 
to measure to the Council.133 The Council shall act by qualified majority,134 and, if it
123 Monsanto Agricoltura Italia SpA and Others v Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri and Others, 
Opinion of the Advocate General, at paragraph 137.
Ibid.
125 Ibid. at paragraph 108, emphasis added.
126 Ibid at paragraph 202 .
127 Monsanto Agricoltura Italia SpA and Others v Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri and Others, 
ECJ Judgment, at paragraph 112.
128 Ibid. at paragraph 110.
129 Regulation No. 258/97, Article 12(1).
130 Ibid. Article 12(2).
131 Ibid, Article 13(3).
132 Ibid, Article 13(4)(a).
133 Ibid, Article 13(4)(b).
134 Ibid, Article 13(4)(b).
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fails to do so within three months of referral, the proposed protective measure shall be 
adopted by the Commission.135
According to the ECJ, the procedural requirements set out in Article 12 had enshrined 
the spirit of the precautionary principle, and thus the claim by the Italian Republic that 
the simplified procedure conflicted with the precautionary principle was erroneous. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court adopted what is described as a ‘deferential’ 
approach -  that is, it referred to the EC Regulation and concluded that the 
precautionary principle had already been upheld.
This deference to Community provisions emerges from the broad discretion given to 
policy-makers.137 During proceedings for an Article 234 reference for preliminary 
ruling, Advocate General Mischo noted that:-
“Since that principle is to be applied in situations of great uncertainty, we 
cannot expect the courts to impose their own convictions, the possible 
basis of which is difficult to discern, moreover, in the realm of scientific 
problems.
It is obviously not a question of removing the application of the 
precautionary principle from the sphere of judicial review, but merely of 
recognising that the courts can, in this field, only exercise minimal review 
since the political authorities must be granted a broad discretion.”138
135 Ibid.
136 Similarly, the ECJ in Case C-6/99, Greenpeace v Ministere de I’Agrulture et de la Peche [2000] 
ECR page 1-01655, held (at paragraph 44) that observance of the precautionary principle was already 
reflected in the obligations created by Article 11 of Directive 90/220 on the deliberate release into the 
environment of genetically modified organisms. Article 11 imposed a duty on the manufacturer or 
importer to the Community to, before a GMO was placed on the market as or in a product, submit a 
notification to the competent authority of the Member State where the product is to be placed on the 
market, outlining an assessment of potential risks to human health or to the environment.
137 This discretion is subject to the requirement that the protection of pubic health and of the 
environment takes precedence over economic interests, and the principles of proportionality and non­
discrimination: see case T-132/00, Artegodan v Commission of the European Communities [2002] ECR 
page 11-04945, at paragraph 186.
Case C-241/01, National Farmers’ Union v. Secretariat general du gouvemement [2002] ECR page 
1-09079, at paragraphs 74 and 75. For further discussion of this deference to the legislative prerogative 
to Community institutions, see Young, G. (2000) at page 17.
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One practical implication of this discretion is the resultant ambiguity relating to the 
degree of scientific certainty required before precautionary responses are instigated. 
From this perspective, the question of when the precautionary principle applies 
becomes just as important as what the precautionary principle entails. Determining its 
point of application depends on its relationship with scientific risk assessment. As the 
following section illustrates, judicial interpretations of the precautionary principle 
signal a shift in the way in which this relationship has been perceived.
4.5 An emerging pattern?
There are cases to suggest that a precautionary measure cannot properly be based on a
1 7 0‘purely hypothetical approach to risk’. An explicit connection is made between 
precaution and risk assessment,140 and the precautionary principle is perceived as 
applying after a thorough scientific investigation of the likely magnitude and 
occurrence of an expected threat.141 Its operation depends on there being tangible 
scientific evidence of the existence of a risk. The application of the precautionary 
principle cannot be founded “on a mere conjecture which has not been scientifically 
verified.”142 A scientifically-certain risk is necessary before precautionary responses 
are triggered. More recent cases, however, have suggested that the application of the 
precautionary principle can precede the ascertainment of a scientifically-certain
139 See Case E3/00, EFT A Surveillance Authority v Kingdom of Norway [2001] paragraphs 36-38.
140 See, for example, Case C-41/02, Commission v. Kingdom of the Netherlands, in which the Court 
states (at paragraph 53) that:-
“[a] proper application of the precautionary principle requires, in the first place, the 
identification of the potentially negative consequences for health of the proposed 
addition of nutrients, and, secondly, a comprehensive assessment of the risk for health 
based on the most reliable scientific data available and the most recent results of 
international research.”
See also, Ffizer Animal Health SA v Council of the European Union, in which the CFI states (at 
paragraph 5) that a scientific risk assessment is required before any anticipatory action is taken; and the 
Opinion of Mr Advocate General Mischo, Case C-192/01, Commission v. Denmark [2003] ECR page 
1-09693, at paragraph 114.
141 Case C-192/01, Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Denmark, Opinion of 
Advocate General Mischo,23 September 2003, ECR [2003] page 1-09693, at paragraph 102.
142 Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council of the European Union, at paragraphs 143 and 145.
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threat.143 From this perspective, the principle is seen as coming into effect before the 
existence and gravity of risk can be established using risk assessment processes.144
■ viii. The Wadden Sea Case145
One of the most recent declarations by the European Courts that the precautionary 
principle might operate before the impact of a risk has been verified came about 
during a ruling by the ECJ on a preliminary reference made by the Raad van State. In 
the Wadden Sea case, the ECJ was asked to determine when an ‘appropriate 
assessment’ under Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive146 should be conducted.147 
An appropriate assessment was construed as a manifestation of precaution. It was not 
clear under if, before conducting an appropriate assessment, it was necessary to 
ascertain that a significant effect had already ensued, or whether it was sufficient 
merely to establish that it was not unlikely that a significant effect might materialise.
In its clarification of the issue, the ECJ appealed to the precautionary principle, 
describing it as ‘one of the foundations of the high level of protection pursued by 
Community policy’.148 Drawing on the implications of the principle, the ECJ 
concluded that an appropriate assessment was to be conducted if the risk of significant
143 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Denmark, at paragraph 101; Bergaderm 
SA v Commission of the European Communities, at paragraph 66.
144 Case C-24/00 Commission of the European Communities v France, 5 February 2004, ECR [2004] 
page 00, at paragraph 56.
45 Case C-127/02, Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee and Nederlandse Vereniging 
tot Bescherming van Vogels v Staatssecretaris van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, 7 Septmber 
2004, ECR [2004] page 00.
146 Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and 
flora, OJ 1992 L206, page 7.
147 Article 6(3) reads as follows:-
“Any plan or project not directly connected with or necessary to the management of the 
site but likely to have a significant effect thereon, either individually or in combination 
with other plans or projects, shall be subject to appropriate assessment of its implications 
for the site in view of the site's conservation objectives. In the light of the conclusions of 
the assessment of the implications for the site and subject to the provisions of paragraph 
4, the competent national authorities shall agree to the plan or project only after having 
ascertained that it will not adversely affect the integrity of the site concerned and, if 
appropriate, after having obtained the opinion of the general public.”
148 Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee and Nederlandse Vereniging tot Bescherming 
van Vogels v Staatssecretaris van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, 7 Septmber 2004, ECR [2004] 
page 00, at paragraph 44.
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effect ‘ cannot be excluded on the basis o f objective information \ 149 The Court went 
on to explain that this meant that an assessment should be carried out where there is 
‘doubt as to the absence of significant effects’.150 In the light of this interpretation, 
Article 6(3) should not be interpreted as requiring that an assessment is performed if a 
plan or project is considered to definitely have significant effect on a site.151 An 
appropriate assessment is required when there is a ‘mere probability’ of a significant 
effect.152
It is interesting to note the way in which the ECJ handled the precautionary principle 
in this case. Although, on the whole, little reference was made to the principle, it is 
certainly clear that when the Court did endeavour to explain its relationship with 
Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, it adopted a markedly different approach to past 
judicial treatment of precaution. In order to illustrate the profundity of its new tactic, 
it is useful to consider it in the context of previous judgments. Only after doing so 
will it become evident that the European Courts are gradually liberalising the 
threshold of precaution -  meaning that they are becoming increasingly willing to 
extend its scope of application, broadening the meaning of ‘uncertainty’ in relation to 
which the precautionary principle operates. The rationale for this shift has not been 
made explicit. However, it is reasonable to suggest that the Courts, in view of public 
confidence crises over concerns such as Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, 
salmonella, hormone-treated meat, genetically modified organisms, the Sars virus, 
and bird flu, are making a more fervent statement recognising that science cannot 
always predict the occurrence and magnitude of future hazards. Instead of requiring, 
before the application of precaution, the scientific verification of future events, the 
Courts are demonstrating a willingness to require the application of precaution before 
a risk is scientifically established.
The ECJ in the Wadden Sea case construed the precautionary principle as applying
1where there was doubt as to the absence of environmental degradation, and where 
uncertainty of a hazardous impact ‘could not be excluded’ on the basis of objective
149 Ibid.
1501bid.
151 Ibid. at paragraph 41.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
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information.154 Later on in the judgment, the Court noted that the precautionary 
principle would only not apply if the competent authority had ‘made certain ’ that the 
plan or project would not adversely affect the integrity of the site concerned.155 Given 
the impossibility of predicting with certainty that a plan or project would not impair 
the environment, the precautionary principle became, in effect, perpetually applicable. 
Whereas the CFI in Pfizer limited its application to scientifically verified risk, the 
Court in Wadden Sea effectively extended the operation of the precautionary principle 
all future uncertainty, irrespective of scientific testimony. The ECJ replicated the 
Wadden Sea approach towards the end of 2004 when it commented that the 
precautionary principle is applicable in circumstances:-
“[wjhere it proves to be impossible to determine with certainty the 
existence or extent of the alleged risk because of the insufficiency, 
inconclusiveness or imprecision of the results of studies conducted, but 
the likelihood of real harm to public health persists should the risk 
materialise, the precautionary principle justifies the adoption of restrictive 
measures.”156
This stance is significant. Not only does it illustrate the Courts’ increasing readiness 
to allude to the precautionary principle, but it also signals a new ethos in which they 
are willing to push the boundaries of its application. Instead of relying on scientific 
corroboration of the possibility of a risk, the Courts are implicitly beginning to 
recognise the prevalence of future uncertainty and the inability of science to 
comprehend that which has not yet materialized.
Underlying this change in judicial perception of the future is a conceptual shift from a 
discourse based on the notion of quantifiable risk to a discourse focusing on 
numerically indeterminate uncertainty.157 It represents an attempt, at least, to free 
environmental decision-making from the shackles of scientific knowledge, and to
154 Case C-41/02, Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of the Netherlands, 2 
December 2004, ECR [2004] page 00, at paragraph 44.
155 Ibid. at paragraph 59, emphasis added.
156 Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of the Netherlands, at paragraph.54.
157 This conceptual distinction between risk and uncertainty is based on the seminal work of Frank 
Knight. See Knight, F.H. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (Houghton Mifflin Company; Boston; 1921)
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concede to the fallibility of scientific prophecies of unknown consequences.158 
However, the ability of precautionary measures in the face of uncertainty to provide a 
more suitable ‘cognisance of the future’159 than scientific prediction depends entirely 
on the willingness of decision-making institutions, first, to detach themselves from 
their deeply embedded positivist, rational, scientific traits; and second, to recognise 
that responsibility for decision-making about future hazards is more easily attributed 
if those decisions are made on moral, rather than scientific, grounds. Only after a 
complete shift in the institutional mindset has occurred is the precautionary principle 
likely to have substantive implication. Pending any transformation, however, and 
despite the latest judicial propensity to disengage the application of precaution from 
scientific assessment, the point at which the precautionary principle is applicable 
remains a tentative issue.
Determining the relationship between the precautionary principle and scientific means 
of prediction lies at the heart of any inquiry into the meaning and implication of 
precaution. As Part Two of this thesis illustrates, the ideological underpinnings of 
scientific risk assessment raise fundamental questions about the ability of the 
precautionary principle to secure responsibility for the latent impact of environmental 
hazards. The following section focuses on the affiliation between science and 
precaution, as it is perceived in the EC framework of human health protection. It 
shows that, on a procedural level, the precautionary principle is seen as championing 
scientific expertise.
4.6 The precautionary principle in the EC -  a scientific tool
Despite being conceptually rooted in an increasing distrust of the ability of scientific 
expertise to predict the occurrence and magnitude of risks to human health and the 
environment, the precautionary principle in the EC regulatory administration is
158 See D. Parr ‘Knowing About Ignorance’, in T. Gilland et al, Debating Matters: Science: Can We 
Trust the Experts? (Hodder & Stoughton; London; 2002) Essay 4, at page 55.
159 B. Adam ‘Re-Vision: The Centrality of Time for an Ecological Social Science Perspective’, in S. 
Lash, B. Szersynski, and B. Wynne (eds). Risk, Environment and Modernity -  Towards a New Ecology 
(Sage Publications; London; 1996) chapter 3.
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definitely scientifically-based.160 The underlying assumption is that modernity and 
its associated technological advances pose threats of which we are unaware, and in 
order to avoid future harm we need to regulate more stringently. Thus, the tendency 
of EC institutions to treat the precautionary principle as a scientific tool indicates 
recognition of the need to improve and intensify risk assessment and support decision 
making with scientific fact. In an age of growing pressure to hold decision-makers to 
account, marked by a rise in the judicial review of regulatory decisions at EC level, 
the ‘hard facts’ of science are increasingly being relied upon to transfer responsibility 
for otherwise uncorroborated conduct. The consequence is the emergence in the EC 
legal order of a paradoxical pattern. Whilst the precautionary principle is perceived as 
a challenge to the value of scientific information in insuring against future harm, the 
legitimacy of anticipatory decision-making is measured against yardstick of scientific 
fact. In the EC, at least, this conflict has been resolved by the portrayal of precaution 
as a scientific instrument.
In 1997, the Green Paper on General Principles o f Food Law in the EU  noted that, in 
order to ensure a high level of protection of health and the environment, measures 
should be based on a risk assessment “taking into account all relevant risk factors, 
including technological aspects, the best available scientific evidence and the 
availability of inspection sampling and testing methods.”161 This scientific emphasis 
was echoed by the Commission’s Communication on the Precautionary Principle in 
2000, which stated that scientific data relevant to the risks must always be evaluated
1 A')before the application of the precautionary principle.
To some extent, this drive to ensure that scientific knowledge is given a pivotal role in 
decision-making has been stimulated by a marked increase in public distrust of 
scientific authority. This issue was central to the White Paper on Food Safety,163 
published in 1999, which recognised that:-
160 Vogel, D. (2001) at page 17.
161 COM(97) 176, 30 April 1997.
162 Commission of the European Communities, Communication on the Precautionary Principle, at page 
13, emphasis added.
163 COM( 1999)719 final.
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“[f]ood safety needs to be organized in a more co-ordinated and integrated 
way ... The European Union needs to re-establish public confidence in its 
food supply, its food science, its food law and its food controls.”164
It is interesting that, in an attempt to restore consumer confidence in scientific
expertise, the Commission should call for a more scientific response to food safety 
concerns rather than exposing scientific domain to public scrutiny and participation. 
This can, perhaps, be explained using the words of Luhmann -  that “[s]cience can 
escape the risk of loss of authority ... only by inducing it itself.”165
The deliberate effort to give regulatory decision-making a more rigorous scientific 
basis is evident in the founding of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). 
Having been provisionally set up in Brussels in 2002, the EFSA was legally 
established by Regulation No.178/2002.166 The Regulation stated that the EFSA 
would facilitate the centralisation of risk assessment so as to avoid the fragmentation
of the internal market,167 and provide a “strong scientific base” for regulatory
1 •  • •decision-making. Its principal objective was referred to in the Preamble as
ensuring that “consumers, other stake-holders and trading partners have confidence in
the decision-making process, its scientific basis and the structures and independence
of the institutions protecting health and other interests.”169 Essentially its role was to
provide an independent scientific point of reference in risk assessment, and in so
doing, assist in ensuring the smooth functioning of the internal market.170
However, the establishment of the EFSA -  as an attempt to counteract diminishing 
consumer confidence -  is based on an unsound assumption. It ignores the fact that 
declining faith in scientific enterprise is not so much to do with the accuracy of 
scientific evidence, but rather is a response to the nature of the process through which 
that evidence is obtained. The formal separation, which the EFSA achieves, between 
science and ‘everything other than science’ denies that science is, in fact, a social
164 Ibid. paragraphs 6-7; see also chapter 4: ‘Towards Establishing a European Food Authority’.
165 Luhmann, N. Risk: A Sociological Theory (Gruyter; 1991) at page 215.
166 Regulation No.178/2002 of 28 January 2002, OJ L31 1 February 2002.
167 Ibid. at Preamble, paragraph 34.
168 Ibid. at Article 1(1).
169 Ibid. at Preamble, paragraph (9).
170 Ibid. at Preamble, paragraph 34.
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process. By presenting itself as an independent scientific risk assessor, the EFSA is, 
in effect, making an explicit statement that scientific process is a self-governing and 
objective sphere. Yet, as a number of theorists have argued, consumer distrust in 
scientific expertise is likely to remain for long as it operates without broader
171contextual analysis and stakeholder participation.
A further consequence of the shift in emphasis to scientific knowledge subsists in 
relation to the conceptual underpinnings of the precautionary principle. In laying 
particular emphasis on scientific evidence in risk assessment, the precautionary 
principle is transformed from being a decision-making tool in its own right, to an 
integral component of scientific process. However, as Adams fittingly points out, the 
linking of the precautionary principle back to risk and scientific evidence in many 
ways:-
“undermines the very reasons why international agreements call for action 
to be based on precaution in the first instance, namely that scientific 
uncertainty surrounding many environmental problems emphasizes that
• * 177risk cannot always be quantified and evidence isn’t always available.”
Ultimately, the EFSA model, in its portrayal of scientific assessment as an objective 
and authoritative process, promotes the notion that risk assessment prescribes specific 
precautionary responses to the future. Both the explicit reliance of risk assessment on 
exclusively-scientific evidence and the contention that science operates as an
171 There is a large body of literature relating to public participation in decision-making relating to risk. 
The broad argument is that increased participation improves dialogues, builds trust, and enhances 
transparency. For detailed discussion, see Walker, G. el al ‘Risk Communication, Public Participation 
and die Seveso II Directive’ (1999) 65 Journal of Hazardous Materials 179-190; Irwin, A. ‘Regulatory 
Science -  Towards a Sociological Framework’ (1997) 29(1) Futures 17-31, at page 28; and Irwin, A. 
‘Constructing the Scientific Citizen: Science and Democracy in the Biosciences’ (2001) 10 Public 
Understanding of Science 1-18, particularly page 15, which advocates greater public dialogue and 
engagement in regulatory decision making; Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Setting 
Environmental Standards, 21st Report (HMSO; London; 1998) at page 102:-
“Those directly affected by an environmental matter should always have the accepted 
right to make their views known before a decision is taken about it. Giving them that 
opportunity is also likely to improve the quality of decisions; drawing on a wider pool of 
knowledge and understanding (lay as well as professional) can give warning of obstacles 
that, unless removed or avoided, would impede effective implementation of a particular 
decision”.
172 Adams, M.D. (2002) at page 307.
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autonomous sphere give rise to an understanding not only that legitimate predictions 
of hazardous events must be scientifically formulated, but also that there can only be 
one ‘proper’ application of the precautionary principle, predetermined on the basis of 
scientific foresight. And, although the EFSA risk assessment is still in its initial 
stages of development, it is indicative of the institutional treatment of the relationship 
between the notion of precaution and scientific discourses. Furthermore, it denotes 
the propensity to regard the precautionary principle as a cast-iron concept. This 
idealistic practice, however, is inconsistent with the argument that the precautionary 
principle is contextually-framed. As it is illustrated in Chapters Six to Nine, the 
socially-constructed backdrop to the implementation of the precautionary principle is 
critical to its interpretation.
i
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Chapter Five 
The Precautionary Principle in the UK
5.0 Introduction
In the words of O’Riordan:-
“A decade ago, precaution was a dirty word. It was treated with great 
suspicion by the UK government, because it was regarded as a cost- 
raising, time-delaying and benefits-reducing measure.”1
Although the precautionary principle has since come to be accepted as part of the 
domestic environmental agenda, the development of precaution in the UK has been 
far less momentous than in international and EC spheres. There are certainly fewer 
examples of its use in policy documents, and the judiciary have been less inclined to 
perceive it as a free-standing principle.2 There are arguments that, in the light of 
evidence that precaution is “too rarefied for the English judicial palate”, it should be 
interpreted as a procedural, rather than substantive, requirement. Elizabeth Fisher has 
written extensively in this area, arguing that the definitional implications of the 
precautionary principle can be overcome by construing it in terms of procedural 
fairness.4 This provides an excellent explanation for the more passive approach of 
English Courts, and suggests that the languid evolution of the precautionary principle 
in the UK can be seen as consequence of the common law tradition. In Germany, for 
example, the notion of precaution has long been interpreted as a central tenet of 
administrative law, securing consistency, predictability, transparency, and 
accountabilityJn decision-making.5 By contrast, and as a result of the common law
1 O’Riordan, Foreword, in Harremoes. P. et al (eds) The Precautionary Principle in the 20* Century -  
Late Lessons from Early Warnings (Earthscan Publications Ltd; London; 2002) at page xi.
2 See, for example, the judgment of Richards J. in R. v Leicestershire County Council ex parte 
Blackfordby and Boothorpe Action Group Ltd. [2001] Environmental Law Reports 2, at paragraph 65.
3 Beloff, M. ‘Judicial Review: 2001 -  A Prophetic Odyssey’ (1995) 58 MLR 143 at page 153.
4 Arguably, Fisher’s seminal piece in this area is: Fisher, E. ‘Is the Precautionary Principle Justiciable?’ 
(2001) 13(3) Journal o f Environmental Law 315-334.
See, for example, Boschert, K. and Gill, B. ‘National Report: Germany. Precaution for Choice and 
Alternative’ (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitat; Miinchen; 2004) at page 6. See also De Sadeleer, N. 
‘The Enforcement of the Precautionary Principle by German, French and Belgian Courts’ (2000) 9(2)
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roots of English law, courts have been unwilling to accept that the precautionary 
principle presents a ground for judicial review.6
This first section of this chapter gives a brief overview of the emergence of the 
precautionary principle in UK policy. The second section introduces case law that 
cites the notion of precaution, and illustrates that there has been little judicial progress 
since the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Duddridge.7 The final section draws 
conclusions about the interpretation of precaution as a rigid principle. In doing so, it 
refers to the relationship between precaution and scientific risk assessment. The 
argument is that the use of risk assessment to determine the operation of the 
precautionary principle necessarily places scientific inquiry at the heart of regulatory 
decision-making. On a broad level, the connection between law and science is 
evident in the philosophy of common law. However, Fisher observes an 
inconsistency between the polycentricity of scientific problems intrinsic to risk 
assessment and the linearity of legal arbitration.8 This provokes a tension between, on 
the one hand, a conceptual connection between common law and science, and, on the 
other hand, the judicial incompetence in dealing with highly complex and specialised 
scientific questions.
In my opinion, developments in the scope and application of the precautionary 
principle in the UK have been insignificant -  relative to its evolution in international 
and EC law and policy. The failure by O’Riordan and Cameron to include a detailed 
analysis of precaution in the UK in their 2001 Reinterpreting the Precautionary 
Principle is indicative of its static existence on the domestic scene.9 This is certainly
RECIEL 144-151. De Sadeleer observes (at page 146) that, in Germany, judges have tended to use the 
notion of precaution in order to have firm control over administrative decisions. He cites a number of 
administrative cases in which the precautionary principle is interpreted as a procedural matter rather 
than a rigid principle of substantive impact (see pages 145-147).
6 Fisher extends her inquiry to Anglo-Commonwealth jurisdictions, where, she argues, the 
precautionary principle has been recognised as a ground of review. See Fisher, E. (2001) at pages 316 
and 324-327.
7 R v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Duddridge 7 (1995) Journal of Environmental 
Law 224.
8 Fisher, E. (2001) at page 317.
9 Despite the fact that O’Riordan and Cameron’s Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (Earthscan 
Publications Ltd; London; 1994) included a chapter detailing the development of the principle in UK 
law, the 2001 reworking of the title omitted any such examination (O’Riordan, T. et al (eds) 
Reinterpreting the Precautionary Principle (Cameron May; London; 2001).
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reflected by the word length of this chapter. For the sake of completeness, however, I 
felt that a consideration of precaution in the domestic context was necessary.
5.1 Historical analysis
There is no doubt that the Government is committed to the precautionary principle in 
its policy documents.10 The following statement, made by the Earl of Caithness in the 
House of Lords, is the earliest evidence that the Government endorsed the 
precautionary principle as an integral component of environmental protection:-
“Environmental policy must evolve on the basis of sound science, 
informed debate, foresight and a proper balance between development and 
conservation. We accept the precautionary principle.”11
The UK had already accepted the precautionary approach two months earlier when it 
became a signatory to the Declaration of the Second Conference on the North Sea in 
November 1987. It is interesting to note the shift in the terminology used -  from the 
word ‘approach’ to the word ‘principle’. Haigh recognises that this may or may not
1 *7have been a deliberate move, but it is interesting to highlight that the terms 
precautionary approach, precautionary action and precautionary policy appear in 
subsequent official documents, although the term ‘precautionary principle’ did not 
appear again until the White Paper This Common Inheritance: Britain’s 
Environmental Strategy in 1990,13 which stated that:-
10 See, for example, DEFRA (Wilkinson, P. et al) Identification of Information Needed to Decide with 
Confidence on the Long Term Management of Options for Long Lived Radioactive Waste (HMSO; 
London; October 2002) at page 125, section 4.4.1; DEFRA, The GM Dialogue: Government Response, 
9 March 2004 (HMSO; London; 2004) at pages 14-15, paragraphs 5.2 and 5.3; DEFRA, Achieving a 
Better Quality of Life: Review of Progress Towards Sustainable Development -  Government Annual 
Report 2003, March 2004) (HMSO; London; 2004) at page 18, paragraphs 2.13-2.15; DEFRA, 
Evidence and Innovation: DEFRA’s needs from the Sciences Over the Next 10 Years (HMSO; London; 
2004) at page 17, at paragraph 5.7.
11 per Lord Caithness, The Minister of State for the Environment, Hansard 1988 H.L. Col. 1311.
12 Haigh, N. ‘The Introduction of the Precautionary Principle into the UK’, in O’Riordan, T. and 
Cameron, J. (eds) Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (Earthscan Publications Ltd; London; 1994) 
at page 238.
13 DEFRA, Cm 1200 (1990)
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“[wjhere there are significant risks of damage to the environment, the Government 
will be prepared to take precautionary action to limit the use of potentially dangerous 
materials or the spread of potentially dangerous pollutants, even where scientific 
knowledge is not conclusive, if the balance of likely costs and benefits justifies it ... 
The precautionary principle applies particularly where there are good grounds for 
judging either that action taken promptly at comparatively low cost may avoid more 
costly damage later, or that irreversible effects may follow if action is delayed.”14
The White Paper is has been described as “one of the most authoritative 
interpretations provided by the British Government on the subject.”15 Yet, although it 
demonstrates a firm policy commitment to the notion of the precaution, it lacks in 
practical content.16 The Department of the Environment’s guidance, issued five years 
later, was arguably of greater practical significance, confirming the close relationship
I  *7
between risk assessment and the application of precaution. These guidelines were
subsequently revised, providing an over-arching framework for the operation of
1 8precaution in relation to risk assessment. The opening chapter described the 
precautionary principle and risk assessment as complementary processes, noting that 
“[i]n reality, risk assessment is often employed where issues are not clear and can be 
used to identify effects considered serious enough to warrant precautionary action.”19
The Government’s Strategy for Sustainable Development20 endorsed this commitment 
to the precautionary principle meant that it was no longer acceptable to claim that “we 
can’t be sure that serious damage will happen, so we’ll do nothing to prevent it”.21 
The Strategy also went on to note that precautionary action must be based on an 
‘objective assessment’22 of costs, benefit, and the degree of scientific certainty. The
14 paragraph 1.18.
15 Haigh, N. (1994) at page 238.
16 Bell, S. and McGillivray, D. Environmental Law (Blackstone Press; London; 5th edition; 2000) at 
page 51.
17 Department of the Environment, A Guide to Risk Assessment and Risk Management for 
Environmental Protection (HMSO; London; 1995).
18 DEFRA, Environmental Protection: Guidelines for Environmental Risk Assessment and 
Management (HMSO; London; 2000).
19 DEFRA, Guidelines for Environmental Risk Assessment and Management (HMSO; London; 2000) 
at paragraph 1.5.
20 DETR, A Better Quality of Life: A Strategy for Sustainable Development in the United Kingdom 
(HMSO; London; 1999).
21 Ibid. at paragraph 4.2.
22 Ibid.
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precautionary principle was subsequently interpreted as having a central role in the 
reduction of radioactive waste.23 A consultation document explained that 
precautionary responses were suitable when:-
“there are reasonable grounds for concern that substances or energy 
introduced, directly or indirectly, into the marine environment may create 
hazards to human health, harm living resources and marine ecosystems, 
damage amenities or interfere with legitimate use of the sea, even when 
there is no conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between the inputs 
and effects.”24
The most compelling evidence of the Government’s support of precaution came in its 
response to the Phillips Inquiry, in which it observed that a key lesson from the BSE 
epidemic was the need for a more consistent approach to the precautionary 
principle.26 As my case-study set out in the later stages of this thesis illustrates, the 
BSE crisis provided a classic forum upon which the operation of precaution in the 
face of scientific uncertainty could be tested. Yet, despite claims that the 
precautionary principle was employed in the legislative scheme adopted in response 
to concerns that BSE might transmit to humans, evidence suggests that legal 
provisions reflected the notion of risk prevention rather than precaution. Chapters 
Ten to Twelve present a detailed examination of events following the initial 
identification of BSE in November 1986. It is shown that the workability of the 
precautionary principle was dependent not only on a consensual understanding of its 
meaning and scope, but also on broader questions of the role of risk assessment in 
determining its application. For now, however, it is enough to recognise that the 
Phillips Inquiry is evidence that precautionary philosophy is perceived as a critical 
component of the pre-emption of uncertain hazards.
In its 2002 report, The Precautionary Principle: Policy and Application, the 
Interdepartmental Liaison Group on Risk Assessment (ILGRA) highlighted that,
23 DEFRA, UK Strategy for Radioactive Discharges 2001-2020, Consultation Document (HMSO; 
London; June 2000).
24 Ibid. at chapter 2, section 1, page 12.
25 DEFRA, Response to the Report on the BSE Inquiry, Cm 5263 (HMSO; London; 2001); see also The 
Inquiry into BSE and Variant CJD in the United Kingdom (HMSO; London; 2000).
26 DEFRA (2001) at paragraph 5.3.
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although it was widely accepted that the precautionary principle should be applied in 
the management of hazardous activities, there was still considerable debate as to what 
the principle meant in UK policy. It concluded that “[t]here is an obvious need for 
consistency between Departments.”27 In the same year, the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs pledged that all its policies would reflect a 
precautionary approach in line with the Nice European Council Resolution on the 
Precautionary Principle28 and the guidance issued by ILGRA.29
The emergence of new ‘strategic commissions’ relating to specific health concerns 
has also resulted in the promotion of precautionary policy appraisals. The 
Independent Expert Group on Mobile Phones, set up in 1999 to assess possible health 
risks from mobile phones, base stations and transmitters, reported that the 
precautionary principle should be adopted until more detailed and scientifically robust 
information on health effects was made available.30 Support for the precautionary 
principle has also been demonstrated by the Advisory Committee on Pesticides,31 and 
the Committee on Safety of Medicines. This approach to health risks has recently
27 ILGRA (HMSO; London; 2002) at page 4.
28 DEFRA, Foundations for our Future -  DEFRA’s Sustainable Development Strategy (HMSO; 
London; June 2002).
29 Ibid. at page 7, section 2.9.
30 IEGMP, Mobile Phones and Health (‘The Stewart Report’) (IEGMP; Oxon; 2000) 
http://www.iegmp.org.uk/report/index.htm. accessed June 2004, at section 6.40.
31 DEFRA and HSE, Advisory Committee on Pesticides, A Guide to Pesticide Regulation in the UK 
and the Role of the Advisory Committee on Pesticides, ACP 19 (311/2005) (HMSO; London; 2005) at 
page 16. The Report adopted a more ambivalent approach to precaution, stating that:-
“[w]hen reviewing existing approvals the ACP does not make explicit decisions that it 
will or will not apply the precautionary principle. Rather it aims to give due weight to all 
uncertainties in the risk assessment, whether they relate to risks from continuing or 
withdrawing approval.”
I would like to express sincere thanks to Professor David Coggon, Chairman of the Advisory 
Committee on Pesticides, for his valuable comments.
32 In 2003, the Committee on Safety of Medicines (CSM) advised that Metrodin High Purity should no 
longer be used in the UK. Metrodin High Purity is most commonly used to stimulate the ovary in 
women undergoing invitrofertlilisation (IVF), or in women who have a hormonal deficiency leading to 
a failure to ovulate. See Department of Health Press Release issued on 10 February 2003. Professor 
Alasdair Breckenridge, Chairman of the CSM stated that:-
"CSM has advised the withdrawal of Metrodin HP purely as a precautionary measure.
The Committee carefully considered this issue and advised that even a theoretical risk 
such as that associated with Metrodin HP was unacceptable given that there are 
alternative treatments. It is stressed that there have been no reported cases of the 
transmission of CJD via urine or products derived from urine."
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been endorsed by the Government in its response33 to a report issued by the House of 
Commons Science and Technology Committee in March 2005 on Human 
Reproductive Technologies and the Law.34 The Department of Health accepted that 
the notion of precaution had a definite role in assessing threats to health, insisting that 
the precautionary principle applied to threats which “may not be susceptible to 
demonstration and evidence in advance.”
Despite the fact that the precautionary principle as set out in Article 174 EC Treaty 
does not have direct effect in domestic law,36 anticipatory responses to risk are 
enshrined in a number of UK legal regimes. It follows that the precautionary 
principle has effect in the UK only to the extent that the Government implements it in 
its own policy and legislation, or EC institutions adopts a provision embodying 
precaution that legally binds Member States. Maurice Kay J., for example, claims 
that the Waste Management Licensing Regulations 1994 are, in effect, a ‘restatement’ 
of the precautionary principle.38 Similarly, precaution has been upheld in planning
33 Department of Health, Government Response to the Report of the House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee: Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law, August 2005 (HMSO; 
London; 2005).
34 Cm 6641, August 2005. The Report responds to the House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee Report on ‘Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law’, Fifth Report of Session 2004- 
05, HC 7-1, March 2005.
35 Department of Health (2005) at paragraph 6. It went on to note that “the application of a 
precautionary approach requires that consideration of harms to society or to patients must include the 
consideration of potential harms to future offspring.”
36 See, for example, R. v. Derbyshire County Council, ex parte Murray [2001] Environmental Law 
Reports 26, at paragraph 17.
37 See, for example, General Product Safety Regulations 2005, which transpose Council Directive 
2001/95/EC on general product safety. Section 10(5) (which reflects Article 8(2)(f) of the Directive) 
requires that “[a]n enforcement authority shall in enforcing these Regulations act in a manner 
proportionate to the seriousness of the risk and shall take due account of the precautionary principle.” 
Similarly, the Notification of New Substances (Amendment) Regulations 2002, which amends the 
Notification of New Substance Regulations 1993 and implements paragraphs 7 and 8 of Article 1 of 
Directive 2001/59/EC, enshrines the precautionary principle. Section 3(b) provides that:-
“[i]f emissions can be anticipated to occur, rigorous exposure control must be achieved 
by appropriate techniques, noting the need to adopt the precautionary principle in that 
physicochemical, toxicological or ecotoxicological properties which had not been tested 
shall be assumed as being hazardous.”
38 R. v. Derbyshire County Council, ex parte Murray [2001] Environmental Law Reports 26, at 
paragraph 17. See section 15(4)(ii), for example, which states that “all technical precautions will be 
taken to ensure that no substance in list I can reach other aquatic systems or harm other ecosystems”. 
A precautionary approach is also evident in the Water Resources Act 1991, for example, under which 
the Secretary of State has power to issue regulations that take precautions against water pollution 
(section 92). See Bell, S. and McGillivray, D. Environmental Law (Oxford University Press; 6* 
edition; Oxford; 2005) at page 76.
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• 39policy as a means of operationalising the concept of sustainable development. 
However, it is often perceived as being at odds with a general presumption in favour 
of development traditionally associated with English planning law.40 The following 
extract, taken from the Examination in Public report on the Cambridgeshire Structure 
Plan, illustrates this tension:-
“It is hard to see how it [the precautionary principle] can be reconciled 
with the advice in PPG1 that there is a presumption in favour of 
development proposals which are in accordance with the development 
plan. We can foresee a number of difficulties in its application, and the 
role of planning authorities in relation to other agencies on whose advice 
they will presumably have to rely in whole or in part in determining 
planning applications and in preparing local plans. We consider that it is 
premature to include the precautionary principle as a policy now.”41
Despite academic support for the application of precaution in UK planning,42 there 
has been relatively little debate as to the manner in which it might operate in this 
context.43 The principle does not feature strongly in Planning Policy Guidance (PPG) 
Notes -  other than in PPG23 Planning and Pollution Control44 which endorses a 
precautionary approach to the prevention of pollution. Indeed, planning law and 
policy presents an interesting conceptual dilemma for the notion of precaution, 
requiring a trade-off between the potential benefits of development and costs of 
environmental degradation. Unsurprisingly, the precautionary principle does not
39 See, for example, Planning Policy Guidance (PPG) Note 25: Development and Flood Risk, at 
paragraphs 9-14; and PPG Note 20: Coastal Planning, at paragraph 2.16.
40 This general presumption was modified in 1991 by the Planning and Compensation Act which 
created a presumption in favour of development in accordance with the terms of the Development Plan. 
Furthermore, the presumption must be read in the light of more recent steps taken by the Government 
to encourage sustainable development, and its efforts to introduce a presumption against inappropriate 
development in Green Belts, for example (PPG Note 2: Green Belts).
41 Cambridgeshire County Council, Cambridgeshire Replacement Structure Plan: Examination in 
Public, Report of the Panel (Cambridgeshire County Council; Cambridge; 1995)) at 83.
42 Blowers, A. (ed) Planning for a Sustainable Environment (Earthscan; London; 1993) at page 134; 
Healey, P. and Shaw, T. ‘Changing Meanings of ‘Environment’ in the British Planning System’ (1994) 
Transactions of the Institution o f British Geographers, NS19, pages 425-438.
43 Counsell, D. ‘Prudent Pessimism or Sitting on the Fence: Has the Precautionary Principle a Role in 
UK Development Plans?’ (2002) 17(1) Planning Practice & Research 5-16, at page 8.
44 Note that PPG 23 has been replaced by Planning Policy Statement (PPS) 23: Planning and Pollution 
Control. Paragraph 6 of PPS 23 also endorses the precautionary principle.
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always sit well with those with development interests,45 and it is perhaps for this 
reason that it has had a rather more ancillary role on the planning agenda than in 
international and EC environmental law. In a questionnaire recording stakeholder 
responses to the Bedfordshire County Council Structure Plan,46 for example, a 
developer considered that:-
“[t]he precautionary principle has no place in planning. Development 
deemed to be needed must be planned for in the most sustainable way, this 
is the raison d ’etre of the development plans system. It is not acceptable 
to sit on the fence saying ‘I’m not sure about this’.”47
Nonetheless, the English Courts have helped to ensure that the precautionary principle 
is firmly-established in the rhetoric of planning guidelines. In response to an 
application for the judicial review of a local authority decision to grant planning 
permission for the construction of a housing site in an area at high risk of tidal 
flooding, the High Court upheld the principle pursuant to paragraph 8 of PPG 25, 
requiring risk-aversion in the face of hazards that were not ‘susceptible to certainty of 
prediction’.48 Furthermore, the Court of Appeal, in its consideration of the operation 
of precaution under PPG 8, endorsed the application of precaution before 
‘scientifically robust’ information became available.49
45 Counsell, D. (2002) at page 9.
46 Bedfordshire County Council, Bedfordshire Structure Plan 2011: Deposit Draft (Bedfordshire 
County Council; Bedford; 1995).
47 as cited in Counsell, D. (2002) at page 9.
48 The Queen on the Application of Thomas Bates & Son Limited v. Secretary of State for Transport, 
Local Government and The Regions, Maldon Borough Council [2005] JPL 343, at paragraph 21. See 
also, R (On the Application of Thomas Bates & Sons Ltd.) v. Secretary of State for Transport, Local 
Government and The Regions [2005] 2 Property Planning and Compensation Reports 11. Harrison J. 
upheld the notion of precaution, interpreting the guidance in PPG 25 relating to the issue of flood risk 
as a requirement that planning authorities apply the precautionary principle through a risk-based search 
sequence to avoid such risk where possible and to manage it where that is not possible (at paragraph 
23).
49 T-Mobile Ltd, Hutchinson 3G UK Ltd, Orange Personal Communications Services Ltd v. The First 
Secretary of State, Harrogate Borough Council [2004] EWCA Civ 1763, at paragraph 11.
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5.2 Case law
Both Fisher50 and Whitehouse51 agree that the ‘true test’ of the precautionary principle 
lies in the willingness of the courts to apply it in judicial review proceedings. In 
contrast with international and EC levels, there has been little case law in the UK 
relating to the precautionary principle since the leading case of Duddridge. Here, 
the Court of Appeal upheld the Secretary of State’s decision to set a high threshold of 
evidence of scientific risk before precautionary action would be triggered. The 
applicants submitted that the mere possibility of significant harm, no matter how 
scientifically uncertain, could bring the precautionary principle under Article 13 Or EC 
Treaty53 into operation. In his judgment, Smith J. noted that there was a clear 
distinction between the applicants’ contention that the precautionary principle applied 
where there was a possibility o f increased risk of injury and the Government’s White 
Paper formulation that it operated in the face significant risks o f damage.54.
Having concluded that “[tjhere is, at present, no comprehensive and authoritative 
definition of the precautionary principles”,55 Smith J. claimed that she was left with 
no choice but to conclude that the Secretary of State was under no legal obligation to 
implement it. Interpretations of the precautionary principle as “a statement of 
commonsense”56 lacked the sufficient precision to create compel a decision-maker to
cn
take specific action. Smith J. adopted a deferential approach illustrated by EC
50 Fisher, E. ‘Is the Precautionary Principle Justiciable?’ (2001) 13(3) Jnl of Environmental Law 315- 
334, at page 321.
51 Whitehouse, J. ‘The Legal Profession: Translating Principles into Practice, in Sustainability: 
Principles to Practice, Proceedings’ (1994) Fenner Conference on the Environment (Department of the 
Environment, Sport and Territories; Canberra; 1996) at page 59.
52 R v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Duddridge 1 (1995) JEL 224. Lee notes that 
ex parte Duddridge “represents the most detailed review of the application of the precautionary 
principle in the English courts”, Lee, R. G. ‘(Pre)cautionary Tales: Risk, Regulation and the 
Precautionary Principle’ in Lee, R. G. and Boswall, J. (eds) Economics, Ethics and the Environment 
(Cavendish; London; 2002) at page 94.
53 Now Article 174(2).
54 Cm 1200 (1990) at paragraph 1.15.
55 R v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Duddridge, at page 226.
56 Ibid. at page 281; for the interpretation of precaution as a principle of commonsense, see Leatch v. 
National Parks and Wildlife (1993) 81 LGERA 270.
57 R v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte Duddridge at page 234.
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Courts, concluding that the Secretary of State had already adopted a precautionary 
approach.58
Fisher claims that this deferential approach is evidence of the perceived lack of 
competence on behalf of the courts to deal with matters requiring a level of expert 
knowledge.59 She claims that the application of the precautionary principle “requires 
the application of expert knowledge to a science/policy problem that is highly 
polycentric.”60 On a conceptual level, the polycentricity of scientific evidence is 
presented as being incompatible with the more linear structure of legal arbitration. 
The underlying argument is that there is an inherent tension between the spheres of 
law and science. Fisher’s basic premise is that, as a result of the nature of legal 
review, the law is an unsuitable vehicle through which science might be translated. 
As a result, either the courts do not consider the precautionary principle, or when they 
do, they usually defer to the anticipatory approach of the decision-maker.61
This problem of non-justiciability, however, is reflects the assumption that the 
application of the precautionary principle is primarily reliant on scientific prediction. 
The argument that the precautionary principle requires a consideration of complex 
scientific information is indicative of the operational relationship between precaution 
and risk assessment processes. More generally, this connection between law and 
science reflects the legitimating function of scientific knowledge.62 This theme is 
further developed in Chapter Twelve.
58 Ibid. at page 226, emphasis added. See Fisher, E. (2001) at page 324. A deferential approach has 
also been illustrated in R v. Chief Constable of Sussex ex parte International Trader’s Ferry Ltd [1999] 
2 AC 418, see page 430, in which Lord Slynn of Hadley remarked that:-
“[t]he courts have long made it clear that, though they will readily review the way in 
which decisions are reached, they will respect the margin of appreciation or discretion 
which a [decision-maker] has.”
59 Fisher, E. (2001) at page 321.
60 Ibid. at page 322.
61 Ibid. at page 327. See also, Stein, P. (2000) at page 2.
62 For a detailed discussion, see McEldowney, J. ‘The Environment, Science, and Law’ (1998) 1 
Current Legal Issues 109-127, particularly at pages 109-112.
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Yet, in contrast with, on one level, using scientific risk assessment to determine the 
operation of precaution,63 and on another level, the affiliation between common law 
and science; Fisher submits that the ability of courts to review the application of the 
precautionary principle is curtailed by judicial incompetence in relation to scientific 
problems. This creates a discord between the simultaneous dependence of precaution 
on scientific inquiry and the inability of judges to evaluate technical issues. Similar 
tensions are identified in later chapters of this thesis -  particularly those dealing with 
the link made by social theorists between risk and modernity. In addition, the BSE 
case-study in Chapters Ten to Twelve illustrates interrelationships between science, 
precaution and risk regulation.
5.3 Precautionary process
Underlying the observation that there is a conflict between the review of scientific 
information and judicial competence is the notion that the precautionary principle is 
often perceived by the courts as a rigid decision algorithm.64 Fisher suggests that the 
problems of definitional imprecision and reliance on scientific expertise are overcome 
when the precautionary principle is interpreted in terms of procedural fairness.65 This 
draws attention to an important dichotomy between the precautionary principle as a 
fixed principle of substantive impact, and the precautionary principle as a matter of 
process. By policing the process through which precautionary decisions are 
administered, the courts are able to avoid being drawn into a debate as to the precise 
meaning of ‘the’ precautionary principle and the precision of scientific assessment, 
instead adjudicating the merits of the way in which decision-making is conducted.
63 DEFRA, The GM Dialogue: Government Response (HMSO; London; 2004) at paragraph 5.6: “A 
risk-based approach to the regulation of GMOs is entirely consistent with the precautionary principle.” 
See also, GM Science Review Panel, GM Science Review: An Open Review of the Science Relevant 
to GM Crops and Food Based on Interests and Concerns of the Public, First Report, July 2003, at 
paragraph 3.2, which presents precaution as an inherently scientific response to uncertain, ambiguous, 
or disputed information.
64 Fisher, E. (2001) at page 320.
65 Fisher, E. (2001) at page 328; see Bridgetown Greenbushes Friends of the Forest Inc v. Executive 
Director of the Department of Conservation and Land Management (1997) WAR 102 at page 118; 
Mohr v. Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority [1998] A AT A 805 at paragraph 124; Conservation 
Council of South Australia v. Tuna Owners Association (No.2) [1999] SA ERDC 86 at paragraph 24.
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It is interesting to consider the ability of domestic courts to review precautionary 
process. Galligan notes that UK jurisprudence on procedural fairness has been 
‘threadbare’, indicating that developing the competence of UK courts is likely to be 
problematic.66 Moreover, it has been observed that if the courts do endorse the 
precautionary principle as a process rather than a rigid rule, there is evidence to 
suggest that they might still inappropriately conceptualise ‘procedural fairness’ as a 
matter of ‘fact finding’.67 Consequently, it has been strongly argued that, should the 
development of the precautionary principle in this procedural context occur, it “should
/TO
be within the administrative and legislative spheres of government.” However, 
Galligan points out that the concept of procedural fairness in the UK lacks any 
systematic and coordinated approach to its implementation, meaning that, in any 
particular case, the elements of procedural fairness are not always fulfilled.69 He 
notes that:-
“[wjhether particular groups or interests are consulted can be a matter of 
chance, and the informality of the system may lead to consultation being 
selective and partial. The result often is that instead of being open and 
public, rules are made behind closed doors and in secret. Since 
administrators do not have to explain or justify the rules they make, we 
cannot always be sure that the range of opinions and the various interests
7 0are properly taken into account.”
That said, it is arguable that the operation of the precautionary principle is beginning 
to display procedural attributes that mark a new approach to precautionary thinking. 
In recent years, and without prompting from domestic courts, the Government’s 
precautionary policy has developed into a more robust interpretation of the principle 
in relation to the protection of human health and the environment. This has transpired 
in response to' concerns about the regulation of genetically modified (GM) organisms. 
A statement made by the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
66 Galligan, D. J. Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures (Clarendon 
Press; Oxford; 1996) at page 487.
67 Chayes, A. ‘The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation’ (1996) 89 Harvard LR 1281, at page 
1297; Dixon v. Australian Fisheries Management Authority [2000] AATA 442.
68 Fisher, E. (2001) at page 333.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
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verified that the Government’s approach to GM crops would be firmly based on the 
precautionary principle.71 It is interesting that the notion of precaution in this context 
is very much associated with the process of regulatory decision-making, such as 
public participation and transparency. Although policy documents have long made a 
connection between precaution and stakeholder participation, this relationship is often 
simply a rhetorical commitment rather than a procedural reality. In relation to the 
regulation of GM organisms, however, the relationship between the precautionary 
principle, and transparent and inclusive decision-making has been implemented in 
practice. The public GM debate,72 launched in June 2003, and overseen by an
7^independent steering board chaired by Professor Malcolm Grant, has been pivotal m 
the application of precaution through a participatory approach to risk characterisation. 
The Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission observed that scientific 
research agendas are beginning to encompass broader social dimensions.74 Levidow 
and Carr have also recognised that “eventually the scientists learned how to ask 
questions which would concern consumers”.75 By extending the question of risk 
perception beyond narrowly-scientific assessment, the precautionary principle can be 
seen to apply in relation to a broader number of threats.
The relationship between precaution and the manner in which risk is constructed is 
central to this thesis. The following chapters in Part Two offer a theoretical
71 Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, statement on genetic modification, at 
paragraph 5. See also, DEFRA, The GM Dialogue: Government Response (HMSO; London; 2004) at 
paragraph 5.4. See also, DEFRA, Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment, Annual 
Report 8, October 2001 (HMSO; London; 2002) at paragraph 2.4.
72 Called ‘GM Nation?’. For further information, see www.gmnation.org.uk
73 Chair of the Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission. The steering board 
published its report on 24 September 2003, GM Nation? Findings of the Public Debate, concluding (at 
paragraph 51) that:-
“Supporting the concept of precaution, although less often explicitly cited, is the memory 
of previous unforeseen disasters. The most common is BSE, followed by foot-and- 
mouth, tobacco, Chernobyl (and nuclear power generally), DDT, SARS, and many local 
and individual examples, including the grey squirrel, hedgehogs in Scottish islands and 
the spread of Japanese knotweed in Wales. They are all used, especially BSE, to suggest 
that government and scientists cannot be relied on when they say that some new 
phenomenon is safe, and that government cannot necessarily be trusted to act in the 
interests of the general public rather than producers.”
74 DEFRA, Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission, What Shapes the Research 
Agenda in Agricultural Biotechnology? (HMSO; London; 2005), at page 2.
75 Levidow, L. and Carr, S., UK: Precautionary Commercialization? (2000) 3(3) Journal of Risk 
Research 261-270. The authors quote (at page 265) the former chairman of the Advisory Committee 
on Novel Foods and Processes.
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explanation for the relationship between constructions of risk and scientific 
knowledge. As case law has demonstrated, an affiliation between science and risk 
assessment is central to understandings of precaution. The WTO Appellate Body, for 
example, has maintained that definitions of risk are to be ‘based on’ risk assessment 
procedures -  and, despite claiming that the scope of risk assessment should extend 
beyond scientifically-informed interpretations of risk, the Court rejected findings that 
did not uphold the tenets of scientific discourse.76 The relationship between science 
and risk assessment is also evident -  although perhaps less so than in the international 
sphere -  in the EC. The CFI in Pfizer, for instance, made an explicit link between risk 
assessment and scientific findings, claiming that constructions of risk had to be
77scientifically-verified. And, although more recent case law in the EC is perhaps 
indicative of a move away from the traditional reliance of risk assessment on
70
exclusively-scientific perceptions of the future, the science-nsk nexus continues to 
dominate hazard decision-making.79
This chapter has presented precaution and risk assessment from a distinctly UK 
perspective. Despite the fact that the evolution of the precautionary principle in 
domestic law and policy has been far less contentious than its development in 
international and EC spheres, broad questions about the relationship between 
precaution and scientific risk assessment have still emerged. Fisher has led the debate 
in this area, identifying a tension between the complexity of scientific inquiry and the 
linear nature of legal arbitration. She concludes that this problem of judicial 
incompetence can be overcome if precaution is construed as a procedural obligation 
as opposed to a decision-making algorithm requiring courts to judge the merits of 
scientific evidence. This chapter has suggested that the application of the 
precautionary principle in relation to GM organisms might be interpreted as an
76 EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) WTO Appellate Body Report: 
WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R, 16 January 1998, at paragraphs 192-198.
77 Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council of the European Union. 11 September 2002. 
European Court Reports 2002 page 00000, at paragraphs 143-145.
78 See Case C-41/02, Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of the Netherlands at 
paragraph 54.
9 See, for example, guidance issued by the EC Commission in its Green Paper on The General 
Principles of Food Law in the EU, COM(97) 176, 30 April 1997.
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indication of its association with procedural fairness -  specifically through increased 
stakeholder participation and transparency in policy-making.80
The dependency of risk assessment on scientific method in prediction is best 
understood with reference to the theoretical backdrop to precaution. The following 
chapter begins by marking the distinction between calculable risk and incalculable 
uncertainty. It shows that, in accordance with conventional models of scientific 
assessment, risk is seen as a quantifiable entity; whereas uncertainty is perceived to be 
unquantifiable. This calculable/incalculable dichotomy is crucial because the 
precautionary principle is deemed to operate in the face of incalculable uncertainty, 
but not calculable risk. The chapter presents the concept of risk in the light of its 
long-established connection to scientific quantification. By virtue of its scientific 
underpinnings, risk calculations are portrayed as objective, rational, and certain units. 
This has major implications for the application of precaution -  not least because it 
introduces a conceptual conflict between the propensity for scientific assessment to 
frame the future in certain terms and the typically-precautionary interpretation that 
impending hazards can be scientifically uncertain. The following part of this thesis 
explores broader issues of science, risk and precaution using economic theory, 
scientific discourse and social science insights as a conduit. A BSE case-study in the 
last part of this thesis is illustrative of these themes, and provides evidence to suggest 
that there is an inherent conflict between the regulation of risk and the aspirations of 
precaution.
80 A Memorandum submitted by GeneWatch UK has noted that “[t]his was a novel and welcome step 
that brought the possibility of a new form of public participation in decision making.” See House of 
Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, Conduct of the GM Debate, Eighteenth 
Report of Session 2002-03, HC 1220, 20 November 2003 (HMSO; London; 2003) at page 26, 
paragraph 4.
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Part Two
The precautionary principle and its relationship with ‘risk’
and ‘scientific certainty’
"Society’s growing commitment to the precautionary principle is essentially a 
response to a growing tension between two aspects of science: its growing 
innovative powers [are] increasingly outrunning its capacity to anticipate the
consequences.”81
81 Harramoes, P. et al, ‘Twelve Late Lessons’ in Harramoes, P. et al, The Precautionary Principle in 
the 2Qfh Century: Late Lessons from Early Warnings at page 209.
Chapter Six
Theoretical backdrop to the precautionary principle
6.0 Introduction
As Part One of this thesis has illustrated, the relationship between risk assessment, 
and thus scientific interpretations of ‘risk’, and the precautionary principle is a 
contentious issue that remains unresolved. Judgments passed by international and 
European courts have tended to lend support for the argument that the application of 
the precautionary principle is to be determined by scientific risk assessment that 
assigns definite quantities to impending hazards. The WTO Appellate Body, for 
example, has maintained that the implementation of precaution under the SPS 
Agreement must follow a strict and narrowly-scientific calculation of the magnitude 
and scale of threats to human health. This approach has subsequently been mirrored 
by the CFI which held that the precaution principle can only apply if a potential 
hazard has been scientifically verified. On this basis, the affiliation of precaution to 
the scientific measurements of future threats is clear. Furthermore, they serve as 
evidence that the operation of precaution is reliant on an absolute distinction between 
‘risk* and ‘uncertainty’.
More recent judicial endeavours in the European context have raised questions about 
the dependence of precaution on the outcome of risk assessment procedures. Whilst 
they are not explicit in their criticism, they do serve to highlight that the practice of 
using risk assessment as the sole means of ascertaining the application of a 
precautionary response is an unsatisfactory approach to future hazards. The problem 
with relying on scientific risk models is not only that their assessment of the future is 
based on observations of a past which might bear little or no relation to potential 
occurrences, but also that their predictions are interpreted normatively. Numerical 
expressions of risk are interpreted as prescribing the appropriate course of action in 
response to an impending hazard. An outcome of a 2% risk of flooding, for example, 
is routinely translated as a very low risk to which a precautionary response is
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considered to be unsuitable.1 The problem here of course is that a figure of 2% is 
incapable of conveying the context within which the risk assessment was conducted 
which might include incomplete, indeterminate, or disputed knowledge about the 
hazard in question. Wynne has pioneered thinking in this field, and has 
demonstrated on numerous occasions the failure of scientific assessment to develop a 
rhetoric to express inadequate knowledge of the future. His work illustrates that the 
utility of risk quantification is limited by factors that do not lend themselves to 
numerical articulation. This has been pivotal in exposing linear definitions of risk to 
the charge that abstract quantification is rarely emulated in practice, although its 
impact on the operation of the precautionary principle remains largely unexplored.
Part Two of this thesis develops this argument that statistical predictions deriving 
from risk assessment processes might represent more than a simple calculation of the 
likely magnitude and frequency of an event. It provides a theoretical backdrop to the 
precautionary principle in an attempt to better understand the practical implications of 
using scientific risk assessment to determine its application. It begins by emphasising 
the relationship between the precautionary principle and risk assessment, before 
putting forward the argument that the results of risk assessment are normatively- 
interpreted. This normative interpretation is fuelled by claims that, given that 
scientific observation is essentially an objective exercise, risk estimates convey a 
single outcome in response to which a specific course of action is required.
1 The focus here is ‘false negative errors’ or Type II errors. For a detailed discussion of Type II errors 
and the operation of precaution, see Underwood, A. J. and Chapman, M. G. ‘Power, Precaution, Type 
II Error and Sampling Design in Assessment of Environmental Impacts’ (2003) 296(1) Journal of 
Experimental Marine Biology and Ecology 49-70, at page 59.
2 Domingo Jimenez Beltran argues that misplaced ‘certainty’ about the absence of harm has played a 
key role in delaying precautionary responses to hazards, stating that:-
“there is clearly nothing scientific about the pretence of knowledge. Such ‘certainty’ 
does little to reduce ignorance, which requires more scientific research and long-term 
monitoring in order to identify the unintended inpacts of human activities.”
Stirling also notes that:-
“The curious thing is, that these and other sources of intractable uncertainty and 
ignorance are routinely treated in the regulatory appraisal of technology by using the 
probabilistic techniques of risk assessment.”
See Stirling, A. ESRC Global Environmental Change Programme on Science and Precaution in the 
Management of Technological Risk, Final Report, May 1999, Section 5, at 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/gec/gecko/r9e-prc-.htm accessed June 2004. See also Harremoes, P. et 
al, The Precautionary Principle in the 2(fh Century: Late Lessons from Early Warnings (Earthscan; 
London; 2002) Preface, at page xiv.
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This thesis goes on to illustrate that there is a fundamental problem with this 
absolutist application of risk assessment -  which is further demonstrated in Part Three 
using a case-study of the BSE epidemic. The first is that the practice of taking risk 
quantities at face value is flawed because it overlooks the fact that risk is a product of 
social construction. From this perspective, risk calculations can be described as 
embodiments of not only magnitude and frequency, but also of factors such as the 
distribution of risk and benefits, voluntarism and consent, degree of familiarity, 
visibility, and control.3
Directly relating to the notion of subjective construction is that risk estimates -  in 
their conventional mathematical format -  are incapable of communicating 
deficiencies in knowledge, such as inconsistency, indeterminacy, and disputed 
accuracy. In the same way that the numerical assessment of risk should be construed 
as a medium through which subjectivity can manifest, it should also be borne in mind 
that risk statistics are also unable to communicate the fact that their manufacture was 
based on imperfect knowledge. If it is accepted that the quantification of risk is 
inherently- but unrealistically- dependent on there being a complete and objective 
knowledge base, then it is feasible to argue that a precautionary response might be 
appropriate in the face of risk that is presented as being certain and known.
Constructivist theories, propounded by authors such as Douglas and Wildavsky, have 
been useful in presenting an interpretation of risk to counter the argument that risk is 
an objectively quantifiable entity. They serve to highlight that perceptions of future 
hazards are essentially the product of individual bias and contextual factors that 
mould our assessment of the unknown. From this sociologically-driven perspective, 
the concept of risk can be described as a subjective construction whose existence is 
incapable of independent measurement. In this respect, numerical expressions of risk
3 See the works of authors, such as Slovic, P. ‘Beyond Numbers: A Broader Perspective on Risk 
Perception and Risk Communication’, in Mayo, D. G. and Hollander, R. (eds) Acceptable Evidence: 
Science and Values in Risk Management (Oxford University Press; Oxford; 1991); Wynne, B. 
‘Uncertainty and Environmental Learning: Reconceiving Science and Policy in the Preventive 
Paradigm’ (1992) 2 Global Environmental Change 111-127; Wynne, B. ‘Creating Public Alienation: 
Expert Cultures of Risk and Ethics of GMOs’ (2001) 10 Science as Culture 303-305; and Renn, O. 
‘Three Decades of Risk Research: Accomplishments and New Challenges’ (1998) 1 Journal of Risk 
Research 44-71.
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are a manifestation of more than objective assessments of impending hazards, and 
thus should not be taken as conclusive and factual accounts of the future.
The danger with a solely-constructivist approach to risk, however, is that suggests that 
risk assessment in the traditional sense is always a redundant procedure. This position 
is neither accurate, nor useful in the absence of any alternative process of 
measurement. Beck’s thesis proposes a model that strikes a balance between 
objectivist and constructivist stances. He argues that there is a clear distinction 
between industrial and post-industrial society based on the extent to which risk 
assessment is able to function. Accordingly, industrial society presents hazards 
whose occurrence and impact can be accurately predicted using risk assessment, 
whereas post-industrial risk society produces threats that defy scientific 
quantification. It is in his risk society thesis that he draws on the argument that 
although risk has been accurately measured in the past, its post-industrial 
characteristics provide evidence that it is a social relationship rather than simply a 
physical danger.
Building on Beck’s account of the distinction between industrial society, in which 
insurance-based calculations establish causal relations and liability, and contemporary 
risk societies, in which hazards defy models of regulatory and attribution, the 
precautionary principle can be seen as a response to the threats posed by new and 
uncontrollable hazards. Essentially, the underlying philosophy of the precautionary 
principle is that, given that “[n]ot everything is a matter of economics”,4 anticipatory 
action is desirable in the face of unquantifiable threats. From this perspective, 
scientific measurement and precaution are often presented as alternative approaches to 
risk.
However, in spite of the fact that his thesis is founded on the notion that scientific 
projection in the assessment of risk in post-industrial society is limited, Beck rejects 
the utility of anticipatory responses to potential hazards. He argues that, because of 
our inability to know the impact and occurrence of future hazards, anticipatory
4 Ewald, F. “The Return of Descartes’ Malicious Demon: An Outline of a Philosophy of Precaution”, in 
Baker, T, and Simon, J. (eds) Embracing Risk: The Changing Culture of Insurance and Responsibility 
(University of Chicago Press; Chicago; 2002) 273-301, at page 285.
138
conduct, and with that precaution, are rendered impotent. This leads to what I call the 
‘paradox of precaution’. Beck’s criticism of anticipatory action is in direct conflict 
with the principal reason for the emergence of precautionary conduct -  that is, as a 
response to the limitations of scientific quantification as a means of defining the 
future.
Whereas industrial society is characterised by a ‘paradigm of responsibility’ based on 
principles of fault, liability and insurance, risk society presents hazards whose origin 
cannot be traced, and whose occurrence and magnitude are neither measurable nor 
assessable -  thus making it impossible to attach responsibility. Neither doubt nor 
uncertainty provide a rational basis upon which to establish responsibility.5 The 
argument is that:-
“one can hardly see how, under current law of responsibility, one could 
attribute to anyone an injury of unclear origin, except by employing new 
systems of causal analysis, vague logic, and other systems of probably 
causality, or by introducing a new law of proof, or by fixing 
responsibilities of principle to necessarily arbitrary foundations.”6
From this perspective, the precautionary principle might be seen as an attempt to 
reformulate the concept of responsibility by demanding that decision-makers have 
regard for potential, but unknown, consequences of their conduct. The notion of 
precaution is presented in the light of Hans Jonas’ theory of the imperative of 
responsibility. On the basis of Jonas’ thesis, the ability of the precautionary principle 
to establish responsibility is subject to the extent to which its construction of potential 
hazards is explicit in its recognition of the limits of scientific inquiry. Yet, despite the 
fact that decision-makers regularly cite the precautionary principle as a motive for 
anticipatory conduct in the face of the unknown, and its application is interpreted as a 
rebuttal of scientific measurement, the operation of precaution is still dependent on 
the scientific assessment of potential hazards.
5 Ewald, F. (2002) at page 276.
6 Ibid. at page 287.
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Although the affiliation between the precautionary principle and risk assessment, and 
the ‘science versus precaution’ debate, are often presented as merely a rhetorical 
inconsistency of little practical significance, they have, in my opinion, three 
fundamental implications. First, the application of precaution is limited to hazards 
that are considered by scientific measurement to be uncertain. The notion of 
uncertainty in risk assessment procedures, however, is rather more restricted than 
broader, socially-informed interpretations. Whereas scientific assessment is based on 
a deeply-rooted presumption that the distinction between risk and uncertainty can be 
strictly maintained through quantification, in reality, the boundary between risk and 
uncertainty is far less clear.
The second implication, which is essentially a restatement of the first, is that a 
precautionary response might be suitable despite risk assessment calculations that a 
hazard presents a statistically-certain risk. A finding that a threat to human health or 
the environment can be expressed with numerical precision should not automatically 
rule out the operation of precaution. This is because a specific risk quantity cannot 
convey knowledge deficiencies to which a precautionary response might be 
appropriate.
The third implication is that, as a result of its narrow reliance on scientific risk 
assessment, the precautionary principle, in practice, displays traits that are more 
closely associated with the notion of risk prevention than precaution. This 
consequence is made evident in Part Three of this thesis which illustrates that, despite 
claims of its precautionary-nature, legislation adopted as a means of controlling the 
threat of BSE was aimed at a specific and scientifically-determined risk. A detailed 
case-study of the BSE crisis reveals that the dependence of precautionary conduct on 
the outcome of risk assessment is reflective of the intricate relationships between 
institutional and scientific constructions of risk, and the legitimating function of 
scientific certainty in the regulation of hazards.
To begin with, Chapter Six introduces the theoretical backdrop to the precautionary 
principle. It focuses on the traditional distinction made between risk and uncertainty, 
and illustrates that despite being presented as specific quantities, risk estimates are not 
necessarily based on objective and complete information about the future. The aim of
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this chapter is to demonstrate that the normative interpretation of risk calculations 
overlooks the fact that risk is essentially a socially-constructed phenomenon. 
Normative interpretations of risk work on the assumption that quantified forecasts 
reflect objective accounts of the future. As Chapter Seven illustrates, this position is 
problematic because precise expressions of risk can represent subjective and uncertain 
perceptions. Chapters Eight and Nine develop the argument that risk is more than a 
problem of measurement, introducing risk in the context of the theory of modernity. 
The overriding argument is that the process of determining the application of the 
precautionary principle should involve a consideration of factors beyond those 
conveyed by quantification.
6.1 Risk assessment and the precautionary principle
The dependence of the precautionary principle on scientific risk assessment has long 
been recognised. As preceding chapters have illustrated, judicial interpretations of 
precaution provide evidence that the operation of precaution is based on there being a 
clear distinction between ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ which is established using scientific 
risk assessment. The centrality of scientific assessment in determining the operation 
of precaution is widely acknowledged. In a speech made to the American Branch of 
the International Law Association, for example, the EU Minister for Agriculture, 
Fisheries, Food Safety and Consumer Affairs declared that “[t]he implementation of 
an approach based on the precautionary principle should start with a scientific 
evaluation.”7
The question is, what are the implications of the heavy dependence of precaution on 
the outcome of risk assessment procedures? In order to provide a thorough answer to 
this, it is necessary to consider the nature of risk assessment, and more broadly, the 
characteristics of scientific inquiry. It is by virtue of the objectivity and rationality of
7 A speech delivered by Tony Van Der Haegen, in the ‘EU View of Precautionary Principle in Food 
Safety’, New York Oct 23-25 2003, http://www.eurunion.org/News/speeches/2003/031023tvdh.htm. 
accessed May 2004. See also Weiss, C. ‘Scientific Uncertainty and Science-Based Precaution’ (2003) 
3 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 137-166, at page 159; and at 
page 161 where the author argues that “a scientific outlook should support precaution, and precaution 
should be based on science. ‘Science-based precaution’ should be shorthand for proper risk 
management.”
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risk estimates that the outcome of risk assessment can be normatively interpreted. 
The risk assessment process is deemed to maintain a clear distinction between risk 
and uncertainty, and it is perceived to produce authoritative and legitimate forecasts 
of the future. This innate authority is bom of the underlying theory that the formal 
scientific discourse assures objective and rational expressions of the past, the present, 
and the future. The following account explores the historical analyses of the 
argument that the concept of risk upholds the scientific ideal of objectivity. It 
illustrates the way in which risk calculation has come to be associated with 
impartiality and precision, and it makes reference to the core assumption that 
scientific inquiry operates on the basis that there is a clear distinction between facts 
and values.
6.2 Risk: what’s in a name?
“That which we call a rose, By any other name would smell as sweet.,f8
In the words of Rosa, “[r]isk has a very long past, but very short history”.9 
Notwithstanding the fact that the concept of risk has only come to dominate the social 
debate in the modem era,10 the concept of risk is certainly not new.11 This is 
particularly evident in relation to environmental risk. It has always existed. As noted 
by Jaeger et al>
“Far from a transient annoyance, risk is constitutive of the human 
condition, as it has been from the beginning of human existence. While 
we worry about the risk of a nuclear disaster, our ancestors worried about 
the risk of being devoured by other species. We worry about the risk of
8 Shakespeare, W. Romeo and Juliet, Act Two; Scene Two.
9 Rosa, E. A. ‘Metatheoretical Foundations for Post-Normal Risk’ (1998) 1(1) Journal of Risk 
Research 15-44, at page 15.
10 Beck, U. Ecological Politics in an Age o f Risk (Polity Press; Cambridge; 1995) at page 2; see also 
Rosa, E. A. and Wong, S. K. ‘Weaving the Social Fabric of Risk Perceptions: The Cultural Context’, 
paper presented at the Annual Meeting o f the American Sociological Association (Pittsburgh; PA; 
1992).
11 Knight, F. H. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (Houghton Mifflin Company; Boston; 1921) at page 199.
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global warming, while they worried about the risk of finding shelter to
1 9protect themselves from the Arctic cold.”
1 ^It is generally accepted that the origin of the word ‘risk’ is unknown, although a 
number of authors claim to have traced it. Bonp, for example, contends that the word 
risk has Arabic roots.14 Johnson and Covello, on the other hand, argue that it is a 
derivative of Greek and Latin expressions.15
Whichever stance is correct, it is thought that the use of risk-related jargon first 
appeared in Europe during the fourteenth century in a collection of Italian 
documents.16 Ewald notes that the Italian word risque, and later risco, were used in 
relation to maritime activities,17 roughly translating to ‘that which rips’ from which
1 ftthe words ‘reef and ‘rock’ are derived. On a similar note, Johnson and Covello 
associate ‘risk’ with the Vulgar Latin resecum, meaning ‘danger’, ‘rock’ or ‘risk at 
sea’, and the Greek rhiza, meaning ‘c liff.19 Giddens, on the other hand, argues that 
the word risk seems to have entered the English language via Spanish or Portuguese 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. He does, however, agree that the term was 
first used “by Western explorers as they set off on their voyages across the world.”
Given its historical credentials, it is interesting to observe a relatively new obsession 
with the concept of environmental risk. Despite the age-old awareness of risk, it has 
only recently been thrust to the forefront of the environmental agenda as the most 
perturbing plight of modem society. Without doubt, contemporary culture is 
bedevilled by fear for ontological security and the unknown. Risk is embedded in the 
social fabric of the post-industrial age. It is an intrinsic part of modernity. Perhaps
12 Jaeger, C. C. et al, Risk, Uncertainty, and Rational Action (Earthscan; London; 2001) at page 14, 
section 1.1.1.
13 Strydom, P. Risk, Environment and Society: Ongoing Debates, Current Issues and Future Prospects 
(Open University Press; Maidenhead; 2002).
14 Bonp, W. (1991) at page 263.
15 Johnson, B. B. and Covello, V. T. The Social and Cultural Construction of Risk (Reidel; Dordrecht; 
1987) at page i.
16 Bonp, W. (1991) at page 263.
17 Ewald, F. ‘Insurance and Risks’ in Burchell, G. et al (eds) The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality (Harvester Wheatsheaf; London; 1991) at pages 198-9.
18 Strydom, P. (2002) at page 75.
19 Johnson, B. B. and Covello, V. T. (1987) at page i.
20 Giddens, A. ‘Risk’, Reith Lecture Series, 1999, Hong Kong 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/events/reith 99/week2/week2.htm. accessed October 2003.
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most significantly, it has become part of everyday life. News of chemical spills, food 
contamination, global climate change, genetic modification, the transmission of 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy to humans, the resurgence foot and mouth 
disease, toxic Scottish salmon, the identification of bird flu, and the measles, mumps 
and rubella (MMR) vaccination dispute have become unavoidable -  unsurprisingly, 
provoking growing paranoia over our vulnerability.
For most theorists, this new fixation is seen as being the result of a social transition to
*y i
a new order. The onset of the new social order is associated with the demise of the
industrial phase and the evolution of a new modernity, the spirit of which is marked 
by a preoccupation with risk. Underlying the elevation of the status of the risk 
discourse is the argument that the modem condition challenges the expectation of 
continuing progress, shifting attention to the darker sides of modernization.22 
Growing realisation that scientific and technological progress can be as problematic 
as it is beneficial has drawn attention to the capacity of the modem condition to create 
as many risks as it dispels. Heightened awareness of the detrimental effects of 
industrial advancement firmly establishes the centrality of risk to contemporary 
society. The emergence of the precautionary principle has undoubtedly coincided 
with the onset of the new risk order. An account of the precautionary principle 
without reference to the risk discourse is therefore incomplete.
6.3 Risk -  positivist hubris and rationality
Despite the fact that ‘risk’ has become a fully-fledged discipline, there is still 
remarkably little consensus as to its definition. At one end of the spectrum, there is an 
intentional avoidance of getting caught up in the definitional debate,23 whilst at the 
other, risk is considered a definable entity in an objective, observable sense, and is 
expressed as a compound of the probability of an event multiplied by the severity of
21 Jaeger, C. C. et al (2001) at page 15.
22 Beck, U. (1995) at page 2.
23 Douglas, M. and Wildavsky, A. B. Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and 
Environmental Dangers (University of California Press; Berkeley; 1982).
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its consequences.24 Luhmann claims that it is “generally agreed that not too much 
attention needs to be paid to questions of definition, for definitions serve only to 
delimit, not adequately to describe (let alone explain) the object under
' y c
investigation.” That said, it is useful to gain an understanding of the circumstances 
to which the term ‘risk’ is applied, if only to appreciate the conceptual distinction 
between risk and uncertainty.
The lacking consensus is probably best explained as a product of differences in 
underlying theoretical context. The natural sciences tend to claim that all 
eventualities can be expressed using numbers. Early economic and insurance 
theories, for example, portray risk in as a rational and exact measure. The social 
sciences, on the other hand, maintain that there is no definition of risk that could meet 
the requirements of natural science. Psychological and cultural theory stances assert 
that, in reality, people do not calculate risk with the rationality and certitude 
demanded by conventional decision theory.
Interestingly, despite the attack made by the social sciences on the quantification of 
risk, the process of risk assessment continues to express risk as the outcome of 
objective and rational measurement. Wynne observes that “[t]he deterministic 
commitment can ... be seen to reflect the instrumentalist epistemology of modem
Of tscientific culture overall”. He goes on to note that authoritative representations of 
scientific knowledge deletes complexity in decision-making, which “effectively
• • 97denies lack of predictive control, and thus also responsibility for it.”
In the face of an increasingly uncertain future, the calculation of risk is perceived as 
providing a secure basis for decision-making. The attaching of fixed numerical 
values to future events is seen as a move to extend control over the unknown and 
counteract the problem of human vulnerability. The ability to quantify and control
24 Kates, R. W. and Kasperson, J. X. ‘Comparative Risk Analysis of Technological Hazards (A 
Review)’ (1983) 50 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 7027-7038.
25 Luhmann, N. (1993) at page 7.
26 Wynne, B. ‘Reflexing Complexity: Post-genomic Knowledge and Reductionist Returns in Public 
Science’ (2005) 22(5) Theory, Culture & Society 67-94, at page 77.
27 Ibid. at page 70.
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uncertainty creates an impression of security, and this approach continues to dominate 
the scientific analysis of impending hazards.28
■ 6.3.1 The economics of risk
Arguably, modem day notions of risk are founded in economic theory, emerging in 
relation to banking and insurance as a calculation of the probable consequences of 
investment decisions for borrowers, lenders, and insurers. Instrumental in its 
statistical treatment was mathematician Frank Knight, whose economic theory sought 
to explain entrepreneurial profit by modelling the absorption of uncertainty. In 
dealing with measures of incertitude, Knight argued that, according to probability 
theory, uncertainty and risk are distinct categories.31 Accordingly,
“[t]he practical difference between the two categories, risk and 
uncertainty, is that in the former the distribution of the outcome in a group 
of instances is known (either through calculation a priori or from statistics 
of past experience), while in the case of uncertainty, this is not true, the 
reason being in general that it is impossible to form a group of instances 
because the situation dealt with is in a high degree unique.”32
The basic premise is that risk is quantifiable, whereas uncertainty is w/iquantifiable.33 
This ability to calculate risk leads Bernstein to conclude that risk is, in effect, not an 
uncertainty at all.34 Since quantification expresses risk with exactitude, it can be 
described as being certain. The presumption that risk can be reduced to a single 
numerical value with certainty conceptualises risk as an objective expression. It
28 Luhmann, N. (1993) at page 13.
29 Giddens, A. (1999).
30 Knight, F. H.(1921).
31 See Knight, F. H. (1921); see also Keynes, J. A Treatise on Probability (Macmillan; London; 1921); 
Keykhah, M. ‘The Shape of Uncertainty: Implications for Decision Making’ (2002) Oxford Geography 
Working Paper Series WPG 02-03 at page 3.
32 Knight, F. H. (1921) at page 233.
33 See, for example, Willett, A. H. ‘The Economic Theory of Risk and Insurance’ (2002) Columbia 
University Studies in Political Science, Vol. XTV, No. 2; Hawley, F. B. ‘Enterprise and Profit’ (1900) 
Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol XV 75-105, at page 88; and Hawley, F. B. ‘The Risk Theory of 
Profit’ (1893) Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol VII459-479, at page 468.
34 Bernstein, P. L. Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk (John Wiley & Sons; New York; 
1996); Pritchard, P. Environmental Risk Management (Earthscan; London; 2000) at page 72.
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assumes a mirror relationship between calculation and reality. As such, quantification 
is a means of conveying scientific truth.
On the ground that the risk calculus predicts the future with objective certainty, the 
concept of risk finds itself at the heart of insurance theory. Risk is, accordingly, “a 
neologism of insurance.”35 Say’s Dictionary of Political Economy claims that “the 
whole theory of insurance rests on the fundamental notion of risk.” Classic 
insurance theory forms the backdrop against which the ‘govemmentality’ approach to 
risk has developed. The relationship between the concept of risk and government was 
established by Foucault,37 and developed by the likes of Ewald,38 Castel,39 and 
Dean.40 From this perspective, risk is seen as a function of governmental rationality,41 
constructed through knowledge, practices and techniques, and enabling the 
government to regulate, control, and shape human behaviour.42 Accordingly, a shift 
from traditional society to insurance society is marked by constructing the concept of 
risk in a quantifiable format.43 Risk, according to Dean, is:-
“a way ... of ordering reality, of rendering it into a calculable form. It is a 
way of representing events so they might be made governable in particular 
ways, with particular techniques, and for particular goals. It is a 
component of diverse forms of calculative rationality for governing the 
conduct of individuals, collectives and populations. It is thus not possible 
to speak of incalculable risks.. .”44
Risk, therefore, is a behavioural science. In order to be able to create the sense of 
security so fundamental to the notion of the provident state, risk is deemed to be a
35 Ewald, F. (1991) at page 198.
36 Say, L. NouveairDictionnaire d ’Economie Politique, as cited in Burchell, G. et al (1991) at page 
199.
37 Burchell, G. et al (1991).
38 Ewald, F. (1991).
39 Castel, R. ‘From Dangerousness to Risk’ in Burchell, G. et al (1991) pages 281-298.
40 Dean, M. Govemmentality: Power and Rule in Modem Society (Sage; London; 1999).
41 Ibid. at page 176.
42 Lupton, D. (ed) Risk and Sociocultural Theory: New Direction and Perspectives (Cambridge 
University Press; Cambridge; 1999) at page 4.
43 Ewald, F. L ’Etat Providence (Bernard Grasset; Paris; 1986) at page 16; Giddens, A. ‘Risk and 
Responsibility’ (1999) 62 Modem Law Review 1, at page 9.
44 Dean, M. ‘Risk, Calculable and Incalculable’, in Lupton, D. (1999) chapter 6. at page 131.
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calculable entity.45 The risk calculus reconstructs reality into an intelligible format 
allowing government intervention. Beck explains that “[r]isk calculations and private 
and state insurance policies are social answers to the challenge of the insecurities 
created by modernity in every area of life.”46 In order to deal with uncertainty, 
society requires an effective system for making uncertainty less threatening. 
Calculability is a response to the threat posed by risk to ontological security.
■ 6.3.2 Risk and rationality
Underpinning the notion of quantifiable risk is the concept of rationality47 
Rationality signifies the provision of a commonly accepted method for dealing with 
uncertainty. This role, in contemporary Western societies at least, is performed by the 
scientific community. Although uncertainty presents an obstacle to collective 
decision making, science provides a socially-accepted system through which such 
obstacles can be overcome. To some extent, the relationship between scientific 
calculation and rationality can be observed in Weber’s traditional sociological 
theory48 -  which was, arguably, based on the Kantian notion that “mathematics 
presents the most splendid example of the successful extension of pure reason, 
without the help of experience.”49 Weber’s account of modem capitalism unites 
science and calculability with ideas of rationality and objectivity.50 Quantitative 
reckoning was, accordingly, the defining feature of rational commerce, and thus 
calculability was given central significance in the theory of modem capitalism. 
Accordingly, calculability generates a state of rationality: -
“From a purely technical point of view, money is the most ‘perfect’ means 
of economic calculation. That is, it is formally the most rational means of
45 Ewald, F. (1991) at page 201.
46 Beck, U. (1995) at page 107.
47 Jaeger, C. C. et al (2001) at page 20.
48 Weber, M. ‘Science as a Vocation’, in Gerth, H. H. and Wright Mills, C. (eds) From Max Weber: 
Essays in Sociology (Routledge; London; 1958) pages 77-128, at pages 139 and 155; Weber, M. 
‘“Objectivity” in Social Science and Social Policy’ in Shils, E. A. and Finch, H. A. (eds) The 
Methdology of Social Sciences: Max Weber (The Free Press; New York; 1969) pages 50-112; Weber, 
M. Economy and Society (University of California Press; Berkeley; 1978) part One, chapter two.
49 Kant, I. (translated by Smith, N. K.) Critique of Pure Reason (Macmillan; London; 1933) at page 
576.
50 Weber, M. (1978), with particular reference to sections 1-14, 22, 25, 30, 31 and 41.
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orienting economic activity. Calculability in terms of money is thus the 
specific means of rational economic provision.”51
Quantitative calculation is equated with rationality because it is an exact and 
unambiguous means of expression. For Weber, the term ‘rational’ indicates 
evaluative neutrality. Following on from this, a distinction is made between the 
subjective and objective condition. Weber considers rationality to be an embodiment
c-y
of objectified quantitative calculation that excludes subjective elements of 
perception. Whereas objectivity is synonymous with realism, subjectivity is 
associated with ideas and beliefs that exist only in the mind.
6.4 Risk: social construction or social reality?
“The scientific man has above all things to strive at self-elimination in his 
judgments, to provide an argument which is as true for each individual 
mind as fo r his own. ”54
The extricable link made between the concepts of calculability, rationality and 
objectivity uncovers a broader argument, also evident in Weber’s theory of modem 
capitalism -  that empirical science is both rational and objective. The scientific claim 
to legitimacy derives from the suppression of subjectivity in favour of exactitude and 
impartiality. Quantification is the primary means by which science is able to screen 
out individual biases and prejudices, thereby achieving objectivity. According to 
Porter, strict quantification is the most credible way of rendering nature and society 
objective.55
51 Ibid. at page 86.
52 Brubaker, R. The Limits of Rationality: An Essay on the Social and Moral Thought of Max Weber 
(Routledge; London; 1984) at page 11.
53 Ibid.
54 Porter, T. M. Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton 
University Press; Princeton, New Jersey; 1996) at page 75.
55 Ibid. at page 74
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The ideal of objectivity is conflated with the notions of impersonality and truth. In 
other words, objective quantification allows us to know things as they really are,56 
without reference to divergent individual perceptions of the truth. In this sense, 
objectivity is the hallmark of certainty. A decision made on the basis of quantitative 
calculation reduces reality into a simple numerical expression, making it seemingly 
fair and value-free. The concept of scientific objectivity provides an answer to the 
social demand for impartiality and certitude. As Porter puts it, quantification “is a 
way of making decisions without seeming to decide ... [lending] authority to officials 
who have very little of their own.”57
Essentially, a claim to scientific objectivity assumes the use of non-arbitrary and non- 
subjective method. It is rooted in positivist or realist theories of scientific knowledge 
which contend that objectivity is necessarily derived from the logical relationship 
between hypotheses and the extent to which they are directly observed. Thus, 
scientific observation provides the foundation for claims to scientific objectivity.58 
Implicit in the notion of the scientific observation, or scientific empiricism, is the idea 
that, since objective observation is possible, an objective expression of observation 
can also be attained. Objectivity, therefore, extends to scientific measurement, 
manifesting itself in the quantification of observed results.59 Objective quantification 
leaves no room for conflicting interpretations, and can thus be described as promoting 
scientific certainty.
Claims of the objectivity and certainty of scientific knowledge find their roots in the 
works of Galileo60 and Bacon.61 The Galilean argument is primarily a metaphysical 
one, claiming that the facts of nature are explicable in terms of underlying structures, 
processes and laws. This underlying order can only be expressed in quantifiable 
units. Values, as opposed to facts, are not generated by the underlying order but
56 On the meanings of objectivity, see Daston, L. and Galison, P. ‘Image of Objectivity’ (1992) 40 
Representations 81-128; and Daston, L. ‘Objectivity and the Escape from Perspective’ (1992) 22 
Social Studies of Science 597-618.
57 Porter, T. M. (1996) at page 8.
58 Brown, H. I. Observation and Objectivity (Oxford University Press; Oxford; 1987) at page 190.
59 Rowe, W. D. An Anatomy of Risk (John Wiley & Sons; New York; 1977) at pages 38-39.
60 Galilei, G. The Assayer (1623), excerpts in Drake, S. Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo 
(Doubleday; New Jersey; 1957).
61 Bacon, F. (Anderson, F. H. (ed)) The New Organon and Related Writings (Columbia University 
Press; New York; 1960).
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rather are the product of man assigning worth to objects as a result of experience, 
practice or influence of social organisation.62 The underlying order is a realm of pure 
fact without any connection to value.63 Since the aim of science is to represent the 
underlying order of the world, science is necessarily devoid of man’s evaluative 
judgements -  thus firmly establishing the notion of scientific neutrality.
The Baconian argument, on the other hand, is predominantly epistemological and 
methodological. Accordingly, the world is only what can be observed. This approach 
places scientific methodology at its heart:-
“Only what is observed ... and certified by replication and agreement -  
independently of our desires, value perspectives, cultural and institutional 
norms and presuppositions, expedient alliances and their interests -  can 
properly serve as evidence for scientific posits and for choosing among 
scientific theories.”64
Thus, science is based on empirical evidence “but surely no value judgments.”65 
Statements of fact do not involve statements of value.66 Accordingly, science is an 
impartial entity, and scientific judgments are made on proper rational and objective 
grounds rather than individual whims and subjectivities. Consequently, science is 
seen as a self-sufficient, autonomous body with its own internal dynamic.67 Any 
interference from external values and interests only contaminate scientific processes 
and threaten its neutrality, impartiality and objectivity. In order to preserve this 
autonomy, non-scientific values and interests are denied any role in scientific practice. 
According to Lacey, this notion that science is value free “has long played a key role 
in the self-understanding and the public image of modem science.”68 Claims that 
science is dependent on individual or organisational contexts are rejected on the basis
62 Lacey, H. Is Science Value Free? Values and Scientific Understanding (Routledge; London; 1999) 
at page 3.
63 MacIntyre, A. After Virtue (University of Notre Dam Press; Notre Dame; 1981) at pages 80-1
64 Lacey, H. (1999) at page 4.
65 Hempel, C. G. ‘Science and Human Values’, in Hempel, C. G. Aspects of Scientific Explanation 
(The Free Press; New York; 1965) at page 91.
66A concept otherwise known as the ‘Humean schema’ -  see Hume, D. A Treatise of Human Nature 
(1740) (Nidditch, P. N. (ed)) (Clarendon Press; Oxford; 1978).
67 Lacey, H. (1999) at page 9.
68 Ibid. at page 1.
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that it challenges the legitimacy traditionally enjoyed by the natural sciences. In order 
to maintain its authority, science is deemed to operate in a vacuum from external 
influences. Early last century, for example, Poincare wrote:-
“Ethics and science have their own domains, which touch but do not 
interpenetrate. The one shows us to what goal we should aspire, the other, 
given the goal, teaches us how to attain it. So they never conflict since 
they never meet. There can be no more immoral science than there can be 
scientific morals.”69
On a similar note, Luhmann comments that:-
“[t]he intervention of personal qualities and circumstances are treated as 
disturbing noises and, like other ‘accidents’, eliminated if they do not lead
7 0to valuable discoveries of truths or falsities.”
Science is thus de-anthropologized.71 It is removed from its context and operates in 
an abstract sphere. It operates on the basis that there are truths ‘out there’ waiting to 
be discovered, which, once discovered, will form a certain and permanent part of 
knowledge.72 The scientific value of such knowledge is dependent on whether is can 
be supported by empirical fact.73 On a purely philosophical level then, the scientific 
position can be described as subscribing to a realist or objectivist ontology, 
advocating the claim that “a world exists independent of percipient human 
observers”.74 It is on this basis that scientific risk assessment operates.
Heightened awareness of the problems of decision-making in relation to the unknown 
future has resulted in increased demand for a framework of decision analysis. In 
response to this a model of decision-making known as risk assessment has developed. 
Despite the fact that risk assessment has evolved with time, it continues to display a
69 Poincare, H. The Value of Science (Dover; New York; 1958) at page 12.
70 Luhmann, N. Ecological Communication (Polity Press; Cambridge; 1989) at page 77.
71 Ibid. at page 78.
72 Weinberg, S. ‘The Revolution that Didn’t Happen’ (1998) 45(15) New York Review of Books 48-52.
73 Lakatos, I. ‘The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, in Worrall, J. and Currie, G. 
(eds) Philosophical Papers Vol.l (Cambridge University Press 1978) at page 1.
74 Rosa, E. A. (1998) at page 18.
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fundamental trait of early models -  making an explicit claim to rationality in that it 
seeks to reduce risk to numeric expression. The quantitative and reductive nature of 
risk assessment demonstrates close ties with economic and utility theory which rely 
on “a cardinal numerical scale”75 of magnitude and likelihood.76 Risk is, accordingly, 
a problem of measurement.77 These deeply embedded features are considered rational 
scientific practice, allowing risk assessment to produce objective results on the basis 
of positivism and logical empiricism.78
7 0For Rosa, objective science is the ‘bedrock* of risk assessment. Objective risk 
assessment, in the scientific sense, is concerned primarily with the prediction of future 
events from numerical data yielded from past events, and is based on the common 
belief that ‘anything can be proved with statistics’.80 A report published by the 
Medical Research Council Institute for Environment and Health categorises
• •  R1probabilistic assessment into either classical frequentist or Bayesian. They differ 
not only in their underlying philosophy, but also in the way in which statistical 
evidence is incorporated into assessment.82
In the classical view, the probability of a future event is defined by the frequency with 
which the event will occur, based upon a series of repeated observations. 
Conventionally, if an inadequate historical database of observation exists, 
mathematicians and economists turn to the Bayesian approach, which expresses 
probability in terms of the relative likelihood of different outcomes, based on the best
75 Stirling, A. ‘Risk, Uncertainty and Precaution: Some Instrumental Implications from the Social 
Science’, in Berkhout F. et al (eds) Negotiating Environmental Change: Perspectives in Environmental 
Social Science (Edward Elgar; Cheltenham; 2003) pages 33-76, at page 38.
76 See Starr, C. ‘Social Benefit Versus Technological Risk: What is Our Society Willing to Pay for 
Safety?’ (1969) 165 Science 1232-1238.
77 See, for example, Kates, R. W. and Kasperson, J. X. (1983) at page 7029:- “A hazard, in our 
parlance, is a threat to people and to what they value ... and risk is a measurement of hazard”.
8 Lowrance, W. W. Of Acceptable Risk: Science and the Determination of Safety (Kaufmann; Los 
Altos, California; 1976); Rowe, W. D. (1977); Starr, C. (1969).
79 Rosa, E. A. (1998) at page 18; see also EU Committee (1999) at page 35.
80 Hattis, D. and Smith, J. ‘What’s Wrong with Risk Assessment?’, in Humber, J. M. and Almeder, R. 
F. (eds) Quantitative Risk Assessment (Humana Press; New Jersey; 1987) pages 55-105, at page 81; see 
also Lee, T. R. ‘Perception of Risk -  The Public’s Perception of Risk and the Question of Irrationality’, 
in The Royal Society Report: The Assessment and Perception of Risk, (The Royal Society; London; 
1981) pages 5-16, at page 6.
81 Price, G. M. and Shuker, L. K. (eds) ‘Probabilistic Approaches to Food Risk Assessment’, Report of 
a Workshop Held on 8-9 June 1998 (MRC Institute for Environment and Health; University of 
Leicester; 2000) at page 6.
82 Ibid.
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available information and the prevailing expert opinion. According to the Bayesian 
model, probability is considered a ‘degree of belief,84 and, unlike the ffequentist 
approach, places emphasis on judgement as well as available evidence. Bayesian 
reasoning “is a quantitative means of assessing uncertainty in the light of incomplete 
evidence”,85 and is based on the principle that probability can be quantified by taking 
into account statistical information in the light of what is currently known.
Probability, therefore, is only relative to the knowledge at the time of prediction. 
Keynes notes that “our estimate of the probability of an event varies not absolutely 
with the circumstances which actually affect its occurrence but with our knowledge of
o r
those circumstances.” Knowledge of an event is dependent on one’s conception of 
that event, rather than on the event itself. As a result, the future is not susceptible to
Q -7
direct objective measurement. Yet, in spite the fact that probabilistic assessment is 
informed by subjective risk perception, it is commonly presented as a strictly 
scientific process whose predictions can be interpreted as objective, certain, and 
normative calculations.
6.5 Risk assessment: the centrality of scientific quantification
Dealing with risks to human health and safety and to the environment is a complex 
and ever-evolving discipline. As decisions in modem society have become more
oo
intricate, more formal decision making tools have developed, and there has been 
widespread recognition that handling risk issues should follow a structured approach 
known as the ‘risk cycle’. Essentially, the risk cycle describes a three-stage model of
83 Jaynes, E. T. ‘Bayesian Methods: General Background’, in Justice, J. H. Maximum Entropy and 
Bayesian Methods in Applied Statistics (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge; 1996) pages 1-25; 
Wallsten, T. ‘Measuring Vague Uncertainties and Understanding Their Use in Decision Making’, in 
Von Winterfeldt, D. and Edwards, W. Decision Analysis and Behavioural Research (Cambridge 
University Press; Cambridge; 1986).
84 Price, G. M. and Shuker, L. K. (2000) at page 6.
85 Ibid. at page 21.
86 As cited in Keykhah, M. ‘The Shape of Uncertainty: Implications for Decision Making’ (Economic 
Geography Research Group; University of Oxford; Oxford; 2002) Working Papers, WPG 02-03, at 
page 6.
7 Hattis, D. and Smith J. A. ‘What’s Wrong With Quantitative Risk Assessment?’, in Humber, J. M. 
and Almeder, R.F. (eds) Quantitative Risk Assessment (Humana Press; New Jersey; 1987) 57, at page 
65.
88 See Covello, V. T. and Merkhofer, M.W. Risk Assessment Methods — Approaches for Assessing 
Health and Environmental Risks (Plenum Press; New York; 1993).
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risk assessment, risk management, and risk communication, and is intended to make a 
critical contribution to the recognition of potentially hazardous situations as early as 
possible.89 Although a number of different risk cycle models have been developed in 
the past, all tend to display three principal characteristics -  first, science is given a 
pivotal role in risk assessment; secondly, there is an operative separation of risk 
assessment from risk management; and finally, risk communication occurs throughout 
the whole process.90
According to the European Commission, the term risk assessment is used to describe 
the evaluation, identification, measurement and prioritisation of risks.91 The risk 
management stage operates in response to results generated by risk assessment, and 
involves the weighing up of different policy options, and, if necessary, the 
implementation of appropriate control measures.92 Risk communication is ongoing 
throughout the risk cycle, and is an interactive process of exchanging information and 
opinions between actual or potential stakeholders.
Although each component of the risk cycle are important in ascertaining the manner 
in which the future is perceived and controlled, this part focuses specifically on the 
process of risk assessment because of its fundamental role in distinguishing between 
risk and uncertainty. Risk assessment has grown to become a recognised discipline in 
itself. From a historical perspective, it has been traced back to the ancient 
Babylonians.94 Nevertheless, it is more widely accepted that the conventional process 
of risk assessment emerged in the mid-twentieth century. Although risk is a much 
older concept, risk assessment is associated with the ‘professionalization’ of risk,95 
marking a transition from the lay discourse of risk to an expert-driven discourse. 
Simultaneously, this shift elevates quantitative approaches to the measurement of risk,
89 EU Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium, Position Paper on a 
Comprehensive Risk Analysis Process (EU Committee; Brussels; 1999) at page 19.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid. at page 18.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Mehta, M. D. ‘The Social Construction of Science, Risk and Expertise’ (March 2002) Canadian 
Chemical News 28-30, at page 29; see also, Plough, A. and Krimsky, S. ‘The Emergence of Risk 
Communication Studies: Social and Political Context’ (1987) 12(3/4) Science, Technology, & Human: 
Special Issue on the Technical and Ethical Aspects of Risk Communication 4-10, at page 5; and 
Covello, V. T. and Mumpower, J. ‘Risk Analysis and Risk Management: A Historical Perspective’ 
(1985) 5(2) Risk Analysis 103-120.
95 Plough, A. and Krimsky, S. (1987) at page 5.
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and, despite an attack on its legitimacy by sociological theory, this form of risk 
assessment remains the principal means by which risk is defined and understood. 
And, as risks increasingly emanate from techno-scientific activities, so risk 
assessment becomes more firmly fixed in the realm of scientific knowledge.
By and large, it is agreed that the birth of quantitative risk assessment was induced by 
the emergence of post-war decision analysis. There is, however, lacking consensus 
with regard to the period during which risk assessment came to the forefront of 
decision-making in the face of uncertainty. Some trace its appearance to the mid- 
1940s,96 others to the late 1940s,97 even as late as the early 1950s.98 Whichever is 
most accurate, the collective opinion points to risk assessment as a response to post­
war insecurity, the influence of military strategy, and the realisation of nuclear 
capabilities.
In their article, The Emergence o f Risk Communication Studies, Plough and Krimsky 
claim that contemporary risk assessment is derived from a variety of quantitative 
approaches introduced in the late 1940s to aid economic and military decision­
making.99 Despite the fact that they trace the beginnings of transition to the expert- 
centred field to as far back as the eighteenth century, scientifically-based quantitative
i onrisk assessment is deemed to have arisen following World War II. In the two 
decades ensuing, a crude mathematical model gradually infiltrated the social sciences, 
and by the 1960s, a fully-developed decision-making methodology, based on the 
concept of rational choice, had come to command the risk arena.
Strydom is rather more specific about the origins of quantitative risk assessment. 
Accordingly, early models emerged as the by-products of the development of the 
nuclear industry and debate about its safety. The first risk study was conducted in the 
United States in 1957 by the Brookhaven National Laboratory, known as the 
Brookhaven or Wash-740 Report, commissioned by the US Atomic Energy 
Commission. Essentially, the report set out to determine the likelihood that fission
96 Burton, I. et al, The Environment as a Hazard (Oxford University Press; New York; 1978).
97 Plough, A. and Krimsky, S. (1987) at page 5.
98 Strydom, P. (2002) at page 13.
99 Plough, A. and Krimsky, S. (1987) at page 5.
100 Ibid.
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products might be released from a nuclear plant,101 the levels of exposure or 
contamination which cause injury to people or damage to property,102 and the number 
of deaths or types of injury, or costs in damaged property that could ensue in the event 
of radiation exposure.103
Interestingly, it begins by placing the risk assessment in the context of heightened risk 
awareness in the post-war era:-
“It might be supposed, because the essential fuel in a nuclear power 
reactor is the same as that in atomic bombs, that gross malfunctioning in 
power reactors could possibly lead to a devastating explosion similar to 
those produced by A-bombs. Such is not the case.”104
From the outset, it is evident that the principal intention of the study is to restore 
public confidence in the nuclear industry.105 Given that public perception is deemed 
paramount, it is perhaps surprising that the report is written wholly from a scientific 
perspective, without recourse to lay opinion.106 This early example scientific 
domination in the risk debate continues to form the basis of contemporary risk 
analyses.
The alliance between nuclear risk assessment and quantification was later drawn upon
1 (i7and confirmed by British physicist Farmer. In his paper entitled Reactor Safety and 
Siting: A Proposed Risk Criterion, Farmer proposed that a model of safety analysis 
based on probability theory be employed to assess the risks associated with the 
construction of a nuclear reactor plant. Demonstrating uttermost allegiance to its
101 Atomic Energy Commission, Theoretical Possibilities and Consequences of Major Accidents in 
Large Nuclear Power Plants: A Study of Possible Consequences if Certain Assumed Accidents, 
Theoretically Possible but Highly Improbable, Were to Occur in Large Nuclear Power Plants, WASH- 
740 (U.S. Atomic Energy Commission; Washington D.C.; March 1957) at page 1.
102 Ibid.
m Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid. Foreword given by Chairman of the Atomic Energy Congress of the United States, at pages 
vii-ix.
106 the Study Group was comprised entirely of scientists and engineers, see list of participators on page 
viii.
107 Farmer, F. R. ‘Reactor Safety and Siting: A Proposed Risk Criterion’ (1967) 8(6) Nuclear Safety 
539-548.
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scientific roots, the model relies heavily on the measurement of risk.108 Farmer states 
that “[t]he logical way of dealing with this situation is to seek to assess the whole 
spectrum of risks in a quantity-related manner”.109 It is critical to note that an explicit 
link is made between the quantification of risk and the avoidance of excessive 
complexity in decision-making.110 The reduction of risk to a one-dimensional 
quantity facilitates the simple analysis and comparison of risk.
Similarly, the underlying concept of Rowe’s Anatomy o f Risk111 is that risk
119assessment is based solely upon quantification. Accordingly, risk is a component 
of magnitude and probability,113 and there are three stages to the risk measurement 
process. Drawing the first from Kates’ Risk Assessment o f Environmental Hazards,114 
and the latter two from the works of Otway,115 Rowe explains that the risk assessment 
process comprises of risk identification, risk estimation, and risk evaluation. Risk 
identification is a preliminary diagnostic stage, involving the observation and 
recognition of a new risk. The risk estimation stage is marked by the quantification of 
the likelihood of an identified risk and the severity of its consequences. Finally, risk 
evaluation is a process by which acceptable levels of risk to individuals or to society 
are developed.
Despite the fact that the European Commission claims that the development of 
quantitative approaches owes much to European scientists, statisticians and 
philosophers,116 it also maintains that most, if not all models of risk assessment are
108 Ibid. at page 540.
109 Ibid. at page 539, emphasis added.
110 Ibid. at page 547.
111 Rowe, W. D. (1977).
1,2 Ibid. at page 3.
113 Ibid. at page 24.
114 Kates, R. W. ‘Risk Assessment of Environmental Hazards’, Scientific Committee on Problems of the 
Environment (SCOPE) Report No. 8 (International Council of Scientific Unions; Paris; 1976).
115 See Otway, H. J. ‘Risk Estimation and Evaluation’ in Proceedings of the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis Planning Conference on Energy Systems, IIASA-PC-3, (International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis; Austria; 1973); and Otway, H. J. ‘Risk Assessment and Social 
Choices’, in IIASA Research Memorandum RM-75-2 (International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis; Austria; February 1975) at page 5.
116 EU Committee (1999) at page 36. See for example, the works of Laplace, P. S. A Philosophical 
Essay on Probabilities (Dover; New York; 1951) which established the basis of probability theory. 
See also Ramsey, F. P. Truth and Probability -  The Foundation of Mathematics and Other Logical 
Essays (K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.; London; 1931); and Di Finetti, B. ‘La Prevision, Ses Lois 
Logiques, Ses Sources Objectives’ (1937) 7 Ann. Inst. Henri Poincare 1-68 which created a framework 
for decision making in the face of uncertainty.
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based on a report published by the US National Academy of Science National 
Research Council (‘the NRC’ hereafter).117 The report, Risk Assessment in the
1 1 o
Federal Government: Managing the Process (also known as the Red Book) , 
considers the problem of chemical carcinogenicity, and establishes a four-stage model 
of risk assessment, including hazard identification, hazard characterisation, exposure 
assessment, and risk characterisation.119 Although the framework was initially 
intended to deal with human health assessment, it was later adopted for environmental 
risk assessment. Arguably, the Red Book has provided the template for subsequent 
risk assessment models. Scientific assessment has since become an ‘entrenched 
methodology’,120 and it is universally accepted as the dominant method of risk 
analysis. Underpinning models of scientific risk assessment are notions of 
objectification and an empiricist culture, and the assumption that everyone sees the 
same thing in the same way.
In particular, the NRC was asked to determine whether there should be a single, 
centralised risk assessment process in federal government. It was suggested that such 
an arrangement would reduce the influence of policy-makers, thus minimising the 
possibility of risk assessment being manipulated so as to satisfy predetermined policy. 
Perhaps most notably, the report highlighted the profound schizophrenia upon which 
the risk cycle is based by emphasising the importance of a conceptual distinction 
between risk assessment and risk management. This intellectual boundary separates 
the scientific foundations of risk assessment, and the political footing of risk
191 • •management. As such, science and politics are distinct processes. Whereas risk 
assessment is concerned with the production of scientifically-certain constructions of 
risk, risk management is associated with the social authorisation of risk. The 
dichotomy serves to emphasise that the risk assessment stage is crucial so as to obtain 
the requisite scientific basis for regulatory decision-making.122 As is demonstrated
117 EU Committee (1999) at page 37.
118 National Research Council (NRC) Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the 
Process (National Academy Press; Washington D.C.; 1983).
119 Ibid. at page 84.
120 Jaeger, C. C. et al (2001) at page 89.
121 JasanofF, S. Serviceable Truths: The Legitimation of Uncertainty under American Law, Cardiff 
Social Science Seminar Series 2003-4, 13* November 2003.
122 Rodricks, J. V. ‘Historical Perspective of Risk Assessment and Review of Steps in the Process’, in 
Food Safety Policy, Science, and Risk Assessment: Strengthening the Connection: Workshop
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below, the dichotomy not only has significant repercussions on the application of the 
precautionary principle, but is also impossible to maintain. At present however, it is 
necessary only to draw attention to the ostensible scientific and apolitical nature of 
risk assessment.
Proceedings (Institute of Medicine, Food and Nutrition Board; Washington D.C.; 2001) 25-27 at page 
26.
160
Chapter Seven 
The societal dimensions of risk prediction
7.0 Introduction
This chapter builds on the finding in the previous chapter that risk assessment reflects 
the normative assumption of control, providing an account of the coexistence of 
complexity with reductionist simplicities evident in applied science. Whereas, in 
Chapter Five, it is shown that reductionist epistemic commitments pervade 
mainstream ‘sound science’ and scientific risk assessment, this chapter points to the 
limits of predictability, or ‘intellectualised control’.1 It does this on the basis of the 
traditional distinction made between ‘science’ and ‘society’, and the resultant 
institutionalised separation of narrowly scientific concerns from broader contextual 
issues. Despite the fact that reductionism and notions of ‘linear thinking’ have been 
long-standing idioms of science and risk assessment, this chapter illustrates that in 
reality the concept of risk and ethical questions do converge. In the words of Wynne:-
“The anointed ‘sound science’ for such regulatory public science is 
invariably risk assessment, which, as many analysts have recognised, is 
always represented as if it is open scientific knowledge, but is always 
framed in various contextual and reductionist ways.”4
This chapter offers an alternative approach to the prevalent epistemic understanding 
of risk that it has objective, rather than constructed, meanings. It turns to sociological 
analyses of risk that demonstrate a more reflexive and culturally extensive approach 
to the subject. Theorists such as Douglas, Wildavsky, Slovic, Tversky and Kahneman 
claim that we cannot know the risks we face.5 Risk is not a reality; it is only
1 Wynne, B. ‘Reflexing Complexity: Post-genomic Knowledge and Reductionist Returns in Public 
Science’ (2005) 22(5) Theory, Culture & Society 67-94, at page 69.
2 See Rayner, S. and Cantor, R. ‘How Fair is Safe Enough? The Cultural Approach to Social 
Technology Choice’ (1998) 7(1) Risk Analysis 3-9.
3 Wynne, B. ‘Reflexing Complexity: Post-genomic Knowledge and Reductionist Returns in Public 
Science’ (2005) 22(5) Theory, Culture & Society 67-94, at page 70.
4 Ibid. at page 83.
5 Douglas, M. and Wildavsky, A. B. (1982).
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perceived. And, given that its existence is contingent on perception, a number of 
societal factors affect its construction. Irwin suggests that this social constructivism 
captures a ‘richer and more diverse’6 sense of reality than the hegemony of strictly 
scientific interpretations of risk.
The conflict between the tendency for scientific risk assessment to conceptualise risk 
as an objective measurement and the constructivist view of risk as subjective and 
contextually-dependent entity can be described as the ‘objective-perceived risk 
dichotomy’.7
This distinction has long been a source of tension in the risk debate, although this 
simplistic polarization is often misconceived as proposing strictly alternative 
understandings of risk. This thesis is not intended as a complete dismissal of 
scientific approaches to risk assessment. Instead, it is designed to bring to attention 
the fact that, as a result of its inability to communicate the contextual dimensions of 
risk, purely scientific predictions should be construed in the light of their institutional 
premises and political-cultural underpinnings.8 This thesis does not deny that 
regulatory decision-making should be rooted in scientific findings. It is inevitable, 
and indeed desirable, that science informs decision-making.9 However, as this thesis 
argues, the normative interpretation of scientific calculations of risk must be 
accompanied by an appreciation for the broader values, preferences, attitudes and 
reasonings that inform definitions of risk.
6 Irwin, A. Sociology and the Environment (Polity Press; Cambridge; 2001) at page 159.
7 Lee, T. R. ‘Perceptions of Risk -  The Public’s Perception of Risk and the Question of Irrationality’, 
in The Royal Society Report, The Assessment and Perception of Risk, A Royal Society Discussion 
Group Held on 12 and 13 November 1980 (The Royal Society; London; 1981) 5-16, at pages 6-7, 
emphasis added; for a detailed discussion about the objective-subjective dichotomy, see Rosa, E. A. 
‘Metatheoretical Foundations for Post-Normal Risk’ (1998) 1(1) Journal of Risk Research 15-44, at 
page 17; Agassi, J. ‘The Cheapening of Science’ (1984) 27 Inquiry 167-172.
Luhmann, N. A Sociological Theory o f Risk (Aldine de Gruyter; Berlin; 1993) at page 2; Jaeger, C. C. 
et al, Risk, Uncertainty, and Rational Action (Earthscan; London; 2001) at page 107; see also Renn, O. 
‘The Role of Risk Communication and Public Dialogue for Improving Risk Management’ (1998) 3 
Risk Decision and Policy 5-30.
9 Beck notes that, since modem society presents uncertainty that is beyond our reckoning, and given 
that scientific systems continue to enjoy residual social authority, it is inevitable that decision-making 
is deemed to be impossible without being based on scientific reasoning (Beck, U. and Willms, J. 
Conversations with Ulrich Beck (Polity Press; Cambridge; 2003) at page 203).
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7.1 Social constructivism: two phases
In what is broadly described as the first phase of social constructivism, 
psychometricians recognised discrepancies between expert risk assessment and public 
perceptions of risk, and realised that they could be explained by factors other than 
empirical evidence. Accordingly, the cultural context within which risk was 
perceived was deemed a significant, although not overriding, factor in the expert-lay 
dichotomy. By contrast, the emergence of the second phase of social constructivism 
was marked by the claim that risk perception was solely dependent on cultural 
context. Unlike the psychometric paradigm, the second phase focuses primarily on 
collective, rather than individual, responses to risk. It is based on the assumption that, 
within any society, there exist a number of competing and conflicting cultural 
rationalities. Here, ‘rationality’ is used in the normative sense, describing values and 
beliefs about the way in which society ought to be. Those rationalities generate 
cultural ‘biases’ through which risk is defined and understood. Unsurprisingly, given 
its fixation with the impact of cultural context on perception, the second phase is 
typically referred to as the ‘cultural theory’ of risk.
Both phases draw to attention a number of themes -  the conflict between objectively 
observed and subjectively perceived risk, the expert-lay dichotomy, rationality versus 
irrationality, and quantitative as opposed to qualitative. Collectively, the 
psychometric and cultural theory paradigms highlight that social constructivism 
undermines the legitimacy of conventional risk assessment. The crux of the argument 
is that, if it can be demonstrated that the concept of risk necessarily possesses a 
psychological or social dimension, scientific risk assessment processes cannot uphold 
its claims to objectivity and authoritative accuracy. Subjectivity is so inherent in risk 
perception, it is impossible to achieve an understanding of risk that displays the 
objective and certain traits assured by scientific method. According to Adams, 
scientific uncertainty about the physical world and the inherent complexity of risk 
makes risk an inherently uncertain entity.10 Perceptions of risk are equivalent to risk
10 Adams, J. (1995) at page 25.
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itself.11 In the words of Slovic, “[h]uman beings have invented the concept of ‘risk’ 
... there is no such thing as ‘real risk’ or ‘objective risk’”.12 Subjectivity turns risk 
into a phenomenon of ‘multiple contingency’.13 Attempts to express subjectivities 
using a conventional assessment framework inevitably produce artificially conflated 
and incommensurable results.14 Thus, by virtue of its nature, risk does not lend itself 
to methods of quantification so traditionally associated with direct observation and 
risk assessment.15
Naturally, this has significant implications for the precautionary principle, not least 
because the risk assessment process upon which it depends is stripped of legitimacy. 
The failure of risk assessment procedures to convey social complexities undermines 
conventional assumptions of prediction-and-control and leads me to question the 
interpretation of narrowly-scientific definitions of risk as prescribing the appropriate 
mode of risk management. The following accounts challenge the institutional 
misrepresentation of a distinction between ‘science’ and ‘society’, and as a result, 
undermine the sentiment that risk assessment establishes purely factual, established 
truths “that no rational informed human could deny”.16
7.2 The contribution of cognitive psychology
Essentially, constructivist theories of risk emerged in response to the recognition that, 
given the risk statistics available, individual behaviour deviates significantly from that 
expected. Despite being presented with the same information, individuals had very 
different interpretations and understandings of risk. This field of inquiry was initially 
pursued by cognitive psychologists. In particular, one of the earliest studies -  How
11 Hilgartner, S. ‘The Social Construction of Risk Objects: Or, How to Pry Open Networks of Risk’, in 
Short Jr. J.F. and Clarke, L. (eds) Organizations, Uncertainties, and Risk (Westview Press; New York; 
1992) 39-53.
12 Slovic, P. ‘Perception of Risk: Reflections on the Psychometric Paradigm’ in Krimsky, S. and 
Golding, D. (eds) Social Theories of Risk (Praeger; New York; 1992) pages 117-152, at page 119.
13 Luhmann, N. Risk: A Sociological Theory (Aldine de Gruyter; Berlin; 1993) at page 16.
14 Stirling, A. On Science and Precaution in the Management of Technological Risk, ESRC Global 
Environmental Change Programme, Final Report, May 1999 (ESRC; London; 1999) at page 13.
15 Allen, F. W. ‘Towards a Holistic Appreciation of Risk: The Challenge for Communicators and 
Policymakers’, (1987) 12 Science, Technology, and Human Values 138-143; Vlek, C. A. ‘A Multi- 
Level, Multi-Stage and Multi-Attribute Perspective on Risk Assessment, Decision-Making, and Risk 
Control’ (1996) 1 Risk Decision and Policy 9-31.
16 Wynne, B. (2005) at page 70.
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Safe is Safe Enough? A Psychometric Study o f Attitudes Towards Technological 
Risks and Benefits -  was conducted in the late 1970s by Fischoff, Slovic and 
Lichtenstein.17 The participants in the study -  76 members of the Eugene, Oregon 
League of Women Voters -  were asked to evaluate 30 different activities with regard 
to their perceived benefit to society, their perceived risk, and the acceptability of the 
current level of risk posed by them. The ‘activities’ investigated included the 
consumption of alcoholic beverages, the use of contraceptives, fire fighting, hunting, 
mountain climbing, the application of pesticides, skiing, smoking, and surgery. 
Participants were also asked to assess the risk posed by such activities in terms of its 
voluntariness, immediacy, controllability, newness, the severity of its consequences, 
the dread associated with it, and the degree to which the risk is known to science and 
to those exposed.18
The results showed that, overall, perceived risk declined with overall benefit. There 
was an overwhelming relationship between perceived benefits and acceptable levels 
of risk -  acceptable levels increasing with the level of perceived benefit to society. 
Marking a departure from standard models of rational choice, the results suggested 
participants would be more willing to accept higher levels of voluntary rather than 
involuntary risk,19 and there was a positive correlation between the degree of 
perceived risk and the dread and the severity of consequences associated with it. 
Perhaps most significantly, the study drew an interesting comparison between expert 
and lay perceptions of risk. The findings suggested that experts used a much broader 
range of numerical values when assessing risk than lay participants, and that, 
unsurprisingly, expert perceptions of risk correlated with technical risk estimates. 
These findings were confirmed, and developed, in a subsequent study conducted by 
Slovic et al.20 Not only were there significant differences between expert and lay
17 Fischoff, B. et al ‘How Safe is Safe Enough? A Psychometric Study of Attitudes Towards 
Technological Risks and Benefits’ (1978) 9 Policy Sciences 127-152.
18 Ibid. at pages 139-141, see table 1.
19 See, also Starr, C. Benefit-Cost Studies in Sociotechnical Systems, in Perspectives on Benefit-Risk 
Decision Making (National Academy of Engineering; Washington; 1972), in particular pages 17-42; 
see page 30:- “[w]e are loath to let others do unto us what we happily do to ourselves.”
20 Slovic, P. et al, ‘Facts and Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk’, in Schwing, R. and Albers, W. 
(eds) Societal Risk Assessment: How Safe is Safe Enough? (Plenum Press; New York; 1980) at pages 
181-216. For a more recent study upholding these findings, see Allen, F. W. ‘Towards a Holistic 
Appreciation of Risk: The Challenge for Communicators and Policymakers’ (1987) 12 Science, 
Technology and Human Values 138-143 which outlines a study conducted by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency into the pattern of differences in risk estimates -  for full study see U.S.
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perceptions, but also amongst experts and the lay population. The most significant
question to emerge from both studies was -  how can these differences in risk
21perception be accounted for?
In an article attempting to address these issues, Kahneman and Tversky examined 
decision-making in the face of risk, and argued that differences in risk perception 
could be explained in terms of prospect theory -  which espouses that individuals tend 
to be risk prone when focusing on potential gains, and risk averse when focusing on 
potential losses.22 For many individuals, risk does not have a linear relationship with 
the probability and severity of consequences. Instead, the way in which individuals 
perceive the probability and severity of risk will depend upon a number of contextual 
circumstances. Those circumstances (or ‘persuasive effects’ ) were used to explain 
why choices made between risky prospects were inconsistent with expected utility 
theory. More specifically, Kanheman and Tversky claim that the ‘certainty effect’ 
and the ‘isolation effect’ lead to decisions that do not obey the rational model of 
economic behaviour. The certainty effect explains the tendency for individuals to 
underweight outcomes that are merely probable and overweight outcomes that are 
considered certain ?4 The isolation effect accounts for the tendency for individuals to 
disregard components that alternative options share, focusing only on those 
components that distinguish them, in order to simplify the choice between 
alternatives.25 Both the certainty and isolation effects may produce inconsistent 
preferences and decision-making. This is further illustrated by Kahneman and 
Tversky’s ‘weighting function’. Accordingly, probabilities are replaced by more 
general weights. Losses and gains are assigned a value. Rather than following a strict 
linear pattern, the value function is S-shaped -  it is generally concave for gains and 
convex for losses. Interestingly, the value function is steeper for a loss than it is for 
gains, suggesting that the distress suffered as a result of economic loss outweighs the 
pleasure associated with gaining the same amount.26 The value of each outcome is
Environmental Protection Agency, Unfinished Business: A Comparative Assessment of Environmental 
Problems (Washington DC; 1987).
21 Jaeger, C. C. et al (2001) at page 183.
22 Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis under Risk’ (1979) 47(2) 
Econometrica 263-292.
23 Ibid. at page 263.
24 Ibid. at pages 265-267.
25 Ibid. at pages 271-273.
26 Ibid. at page 279.
166
multiplied by a decision weight, further distorting the expected utility model. 
Decision weights measure the impact of events against the desirability of the 
outcome. On the whole, decision weights are generally lower than the corresponding 
probability, except in relation to low probabilities, which are usually overweighted.27
From this study alone, it could be concluded that decision-making is more complex 
than classic economic and insurance models would suggest. Highlighting the failure 
of expert-driven conventional risk assessment methods to reflect the intricacy of the 
concept of risk, Slovic claims that:-
“[m]ore generally, psychometric research demonstrates that, whereas 
experts define risk in a narrow, technical way, the public has a richer, 
more complex view that incorporates value-laden considerations such as 
equity, catastrophic potential, and controllability. The issue is not 
whether these are legitimate, rational considerations, but how to integrate 
them into risk analyses and policy decisions.”28
Also pointing to the shortcomings of technical analyses of risk, a more specific study 
on the perception of risk probabilities, conducted by Festinger, examined the way in 
which individual bias causes clear violations of rational decision-making.29 Festinger 
noted that there is often inconsistency, or ‘dissonance’, between the information an 
individual has and the way in which that individual responds to it. For the purposes 
of the study, dissonance was defined as “nonfitting relations among cognitions”,30 and 
was itself considered a motivating factor in decision-making. It is worth noting, 
however, that the individual decision-maker will rarely accept that dissonance plays a 
part in the process. Instead, the individual will rationalize dissonance as a way of 
nullifying its significance. For example, statistically speaking, smoking is bad for 
one’s health. Yet a smoker, despite being aware of the evidence, rationalises smoking 
on the grounds that first, it brings pleasure therefore it is worth taking the risk; 
secondly, the chances of smoking damaging health are over-exaggerated; thirdly, it is
27 Ibid. at page 263.
28 Slovic, P. (1992) at page 150.
29 Festinger, L. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford University Press; Palo Alto, California; 
1957).
30 Ibid. at page 3.
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impossible to avoid all dangers in life; and finally, to stop would encourage excessive 
eating and weight gain, thus creating a health risk of equal severity.31 In essence, 
dissonance explains decision-making that, prima facie, appears logically inconsistent. 
In reality, dissonance is inevitable. Festinger notes that few issues are clear cut -  
opinions are invariably contradictory and the production of new information creates 
dissonance, albeit momentary, with existing knowledge. The existence of dissonance 
allows for subjectivity to become the driving force behind decision-making.
For Covello, subjective bias is necessary to offset the complexity of risk decision­
making. In his article entitled The Perception o f Technological Risks: A Literature 
Review?2 he claims that “people do not cope well when confronted with risk 
problems.”33 Drawing upon the works of Sjoberg,34 Slovic et al,35 and Tversky and 
Kahneman, Covello claims that, as a result of intellectual limitations and the need to 
reduce anxiety, risk and uncertainty are often denied and complex risk problems
7^oversimplified. In order to simplify risk problems, inferential or judgmental rules, 
known as heuristics, become significant in the decision-making process, allowing 
people to reduce complex probabilistic assessment into a more digestible format. 
Four of the most significant heuristics are identified as:- i) information availability, 
which explains why past events that can be clearly and immediately recalled are 
perceived as being more probable than events that are less mentally available;38 ii) the 
anchoring effect of information, whereby probabilities are adjusted depending on the
• • • OQ • • •perceived significance of the data; iii) representativeness, or the tendency for people 
to assume that roughly similar events entail the same characteristics and risks;40 and 
iv) the avoidance o f dissonance, which compels people to downplay or ignore 
information challenging their existing beliefs.41
31 Ibid. at page 2.
32 Covello, V. T. ‘The Perception of Technological Risks: A Literature Review’ (1983) 23 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 285-287.
33 Ibid. at page 287.
34 Sjoberg, L. ‘Strength of Belief and Risk’ (1979) 2 Policy Sciences 39-52.
35 Slovic, P. et al (1980) at pages 181-216.
36 Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. ‘Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’ (1974) 185 
Science 1124-1131.
37 Covello, V. T. (1983) at 287.
38 Jaeger, C. C. et al (2001) at page 103; Covello, V. T. (1983) at page 287.
39 Jaeger, C. C. et al (2001) at page 103.
40 Jaeger, C. C. et al (2001) at page 103; Covello, V. T. (1983) at page 287.
41 Jaeger, C. C. et al (2001) at page 103.
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By focusing on the impact of factors beyond those represented in conventional risk 
calculations, the paradigm of cognitive psychology has been able to demonstrate the 
conceptualisation of risk as a subjective, rather than objective, expression. Individual 
risk estimation and evaluation are shaped by a number of variables. When faced with 
the task of interpreting risk probabilities, people come already primed with 
assumptions and weightings.42 As such, qualities ascribed to risk are not merely 
physical and objective -  they are constructed. From this perspective, the risk 
discourse is removed from realism and rooted in a much broader theory of 
socialisation.43 The basic tenet is that, although scientific knowledge contributes to 
risk analysis, risk is an aesthetic, political and moral construct, moulded by social 
frameworks of understanding. And in the words of Luhmann, “[o]nce dissolved into 
... social differentiations there is no return to the innocence of primary observation.”44
7.3 Cultural theory
Essentially, the second phase of social constructivism is based on the same notion that 
risk is a social rather than physical entity. However, whereas psychometric 
formulations of risk are dependent on an array of factors, ranging from the degree to 
which risk is assumed voluntarily to the immediacy of consequences, cultural theory 
considers the pivotal factor in the definition of risk to be cultural context.
Cultural theory has been described as the most comprehensive approach to risk,45 
tackling an impressive breadth of risk issues -  from the public perception and 
selection of risk, to scientific objectivity and rationality.46 Labelled “the most directly 
influential presentation of constructivism in the environmental and risk field”,47 
Douglas and Wildavsky’s Risk and Culture48 attacks the realist position, aiming to 
“dispose of the contention that selection of dangers could be determined by direct
42 Douglas, M. Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory (Routledge; London; 1992) at page 58.
43 Luhmann, N. (1993) at page 3.
44 Ibid. at page 17.
45 Rosa, E. A. (1998) at page 21.
46 Krimsky, S. and Golding, D. (1992) at page xv.
47 Strydom, P. Risk, Environment and Society (Open University Press; Buckingham; 2002) at page 50
48 Douglas, M. and Wildavsky, A. B. Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and 
Environmental Dangers (University of California Press; Berkeley; 1982).
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assessment of the physical evidence.”49 They begin their book with a question and an 
answer -  “Can we know the risks we face now and in the future? No, we cannot”.50 
Accordingly, there are no real risks in the ‘objective observation’ sense. Risk can 
only exist in the collective consciousness of cultures. It is an ‘extraordinarily’ 
constructed concept, and should be seen as the product of both knowledge and 
consent about future prospects.51 Notably, knowledge and consent about future 
prospects are determined by social structures within the cultural framework. Thus, 
risk can be said to be a cultural phenomenon, not a physical one. For Douglas and 
Wildavsky, this is the most significant problem with scientific risk analysis -  it 
removes risk from its cultural context. It is upon this plane that expert and non-expert 
approaches to risk can be compared. The critical difference between expert and non­
expert approaches to risk lies in the fact that non-expert approaches do not attempt to 
conceal the influence of cultural context. Of expert approaches, Douglas and 
Wildavsky claim that it is “a travesty of rational thought to pretend that it is best to 
take value-free decisions in matters of life and death.”
Recognising a pattern of responses to risk, Douglas and Wildavsky developed a 
typology to explain the correlation between risk perception and cultural background. 
Essentially, drawing on Douglas’ earlier works, they proposed that the variability of 
individual responses to risk can be explained in terms of two dimensions of sociality54 
- grid and group. The first dimension, the grid, reflects the extent to which an 
individual’s life is constrained by externally imposed conditions. The second 
dimension, the group, reflects the degree of social solidarity, or the extent to which an 
individual is involved in collective activities. The grid dimension is represented on a 
vertical axis, and the group dimension on a horizontal axis. At the top of the vertical 
axis, human behaviour is prescribed, and constrained by restrictions imposed by the 
social order. At the bottom, there are no externally prescribed constraints on choice. 
Running from left to right on the horizontal axis, human behaviour becomes less 
individualistic and more collectivist as the extent to which individuals are driven or 
restricted by their commitment to the social unit increases. At the point where the two
49 Ibid. at page 14.
50 Ibid. at page 1.
51 Ibid. at page 5.
52 Ibid. at page 73.
53 Ibid.
54 Thompson, M. et al, Cultural Theory (Westview Press; New York; 1990) at page 5.
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axes meet, human behaviour is divided into four segments symbolizing four different 
rationalities. Diagrammatically, the typology is represented in the following way:-
Group
High Egalitarian Bureaucratic
Grid
Individualistic Hierarchical
Low
Low High
Figure 1. Grid-group diagram created on the basis of the work of Douglas, M. and Wildavsky, A. 
(1982).
It is worth noting that Douglas and Wildavsky’s initial typology has since been 
developed and refined, although subsequent models have tended to replicate the four­
fold categorisation.55 Essentially, the four types of sociality represented present four 
difference cultural filters through which individuals perceive and understand the 
notion of risk. First, the low grid/high group egalitarian culture views the emergence 
of environmental hazards as punishment for ‘technocratic hubris’ and a failure to 
respect the forces of nature. It demonstrates a strong group loyalty, upholds 
democratic decision-making, and has little respect for externally imposed rules. As a 
result of its low grid position, there is little role differentiation amongst individuals in 
egalitarian society. Since relations between individuals are ambiguous, it is difficult 
to resolve internal conflict. Individuals tend only to be able to exert control over 
others when claiming to speak on behalf of the collective.56 Environmental pressure 
groups and religious sects commonly demonstrate egalitarian traits.
Low grid/low group individualists are ‘self-made’ people, free from the control of 
others, exerting control over their own environment. They maintain that the 
environment is robust enough to protect itself, however, in the face of uncertainty, the 
best course of action is to exercise power over nature by encouraging the use of man-
55 Schwarz, M. and Thompson, M. Divided We Stand: Re-defining Politics, Technology and Social 
Choice (University of Pennsylvania Press; Pennsylvania; 1990); and Thompson, M. et al (1990).
56 Thompson, M. et al (1990) at page 6.
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made science and technology to maximise human defences against the unpredictable 
future.
High grid/high group hierarchists believe that everything, including the state of 
nature, is subject to their control. Unsurprisingly, such cultures exhibit hierarchical 
social relationships, possess strong group boundaries and yield to externally imposed 
constraints. In stark contrast to the egalitarian position, hierarchy “has an armoury of 
different solutions to internal conflicts, [including] upgrading, shifting sideways, 
downgrading, resegregating, redefining.”57 This exercise of authority is justified on 
the ground that role differentiation promotes a harmonious lifestyle.
Finally, the high grid/low group fatalists have minimal control over their own lives 
and are resigned to fate, adopting a laissez-faire attitude; they “continue to read The
CO
Sun, watch videos, drink lager and buy lottery tickets; que sera sera” According to 
the fatalistic way of life, individuals are subject to external constraints, and are 
prevented from joining the group responsible for exerting control over them.59
Thus, individuals confront risk differently according to the cultural filters through 
which they perceive it. Perrow claims that this relativity is derived from differences 
in the underling cultural rationality.60 Cultural rationality is embedded in social and 
cultural values, forming the basis of decision-making without us even knowing about 
it.61 Crucially, cultural rationality is described as being pre-scientific.62 As a result, 
the significance of cultural context goes unrecognised in scientific risk assessment. 
As Jasanoff rightly points out, cultural biases penetrate so deeply into risk assessment
57 As cited in Thompson, M. et al (1990) at page 6.
58 Adams, J. ‘A Richter Scale for Risk?: Scientific Management of Uncertainty Versus Management of 
Scientific Uncertainty’ (1998) 23(2) Interdisciplinary Science Review 146-155, at page 148.
59 Douglas, M. Cultural Bias (Royal Anthropological Institute; London; 1978) at pages 202-3 and 207.
60 Perrow, C. Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (Basic Books; New York; 1984) 
at page 324.
61 Ibid. at pages 315-6.
62 See Kaprow, M. L. ‘Manufacturing Danger: Fear and Pollution in Industrial Society’ (1985) 87(2) 
American Anthropologist 342-356: see page 343 where it claims that cultural biases in modem society 
are as pre-scientific as those in tribal society.
172
that it is impossible to isolate any phase of the assessment process as purely 
scientific.63
7.4 The shortfalls of social constructivism
Unfortunately, despite offering compelling criticism of the conventional 
quantification of risk, constructivist insights often fail to recognise that the theory of 
relativism is unlikely to penetrate the scientific realm unless it goes further than 
simply highlighting the abstract notion of the diversity of risk perception. The 
fundamental flaw with relativity theory is that it endorses perceptions of risk “with 
much the same academic detachment that we appreciate divergent perceptions of 
beauty in museums of ethnic art.”64 Those advocating the theory of relativism appear 
content that they have successfully demystified the concept of risk.65 Apparently, it is 
enough simply to expose the part played by subjectivity in risk decision-making and 
to deny the ‘objectivists’ any legitimate claim to the truth. However, Rayner 
concedes that:-
“[w]e have had our fun exposing the smug pretensions of positivist 
science to privileged knowledge of the world, but unless we can do a 
better job the last laugh will rightly be on us.”66
Disappointingly, neither psychometric nor cultural theories of risk go any further than 
creating heightened awareness of the inability of scientific risk assessment to cope 
with the multi-dimensional nature of risk, its focus on subjectivity is equally 
problematic.67 As it stands, the rational quantitative approach to risk assessment
63 Jasanoff, S. ‘Cultural Aspects of Risk Assessment in Britain and the United States’, in Johnson, B. 
and Covello, V. T. (eds) The Social and Cultural Construction of Risk: Essays on Risk Selection and 
Perception (Reidel Publishing; Dordrecht; 1987) chapter 15, at page 392.
64 Rayner, S. (1987) at page 6.
65 See Latour, B. and Wolgar, S. Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts (Sage; 
Beverly Hills, California; 1979)
66 Rayner, S. (1987) at page 6.
67 See Wynne, B. ‘Public Perceptions of Risk’, in Aurrey, J. (ed) The Urban Transportation of 
Irradiated Fuel (Macmillan; London; 1984) at 246-259; Marris, C. et al ‘Exploring the Psychometric 
Paradigm: Comparisons Between Aggregate and Individual Analyses’ (1997) 17 Risk Analysis 303- 
312; Plough, A. and Krimsky, S. ‘The Emergence of Risk Communication Studies: Social and Political 
Context’ (1987) 12 Science, Technology, and Human Values 4-10.
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cannot be reconciled with the theory of ‘irrational’ risk perception. The antagonism 
between the two raises an interesting dilemma. On the one hand, full quantification of 
risk into a one-dimensional figure is fundamental in dealing with the practicalities of 
collective decision-making. In this sense, quantification is advantageous because it 
allows for the numerical comparison of alternative, seemingly dissimilar, hazards. 
Although quantification is crude and simplistic, it is a response to the administrative 
demand for more formal and regimented risk assessment, and it operates in a 
universally recognisable language.69 On the other hand, attempts to codify risk
70 •perception using an "artificially precise uni-dimensional scale” inevitably produce 
unrealistic and blinkered results. In other words, the narrowness of scientific risk 
assessment is its weakness as well as its strength. As Jaeger et al points out:-
“The broadness of the dimensions that people use to make judgments and 
the reliance on intuitive heuristics and anecdotal knowledge make it hard, 
if not impossible, to aggregate individual preferences and to find a
71common denominator for comparing individual risk perceptions.”
Klinke and Renn also observe that:-
“[t]o focus on the objectivist perspective only ignores the social 
processing of risk information; to rely only on the constructivist 
perspective may lead to more fatalities and other adverse effects than 
necessary under the condition that there are only limited societal resources 
available for risk reduction.”72
Thus, there is an underlying tension between the simultaneous need for, and the 
impossibility of, objective quantification of risk. Relativism cannot be ignored in the
68 The Royal Society, Risk Assessment: Report of a Royal Society Study Group (Royal Society; 
London; 1983) at page 111.
69 Covello, V. T. Risk Comparisons and Risk Communication: Issues and Problems in Comparing 
Health and Environmental Risks, in Kasperson, R. E. and Stallen, P. M. (eds) Communicating Risk to 
the Public (Kluwer; Dordrecht; 1991) 79-124.
70 Wynne, B. (1984) at page 249
71 Jaeger, C. C. et al (2001) at pages 106-7
72 Klinke, A. and Renn, O. A New Approach to Risk Evaluation and Management: Risk-Based, 
Precaution-Based, and Discourse-Based Strategies (2002) 22(6) Risk Analysis 1071-1094 at 1073; see 
also Shrader-Frechette, K. S. Risk and Rationality: Philosophical Foundations for Populist Reforms 
(University of California Press; Berkeley, Los Angeles; 1991).
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risk equation; however, the ultimate issue is to determine its proper place in risk 
analysis. It is clear, though, that it is impossible to pursue a wholly constructivist 
approach. In the words of Rosa:-
“if we presuppose an entirely constructed or culturally conditioned reality, 
we are also presupposing a reality independent of all social constructions 
that provides the raw material out of which the constructions are 
formed.”73
Socially constructed reality can only be bom of an ontologically objective reality. As 
Searle puts it, “socially constructed reality presupposes a nonsocially constructed 
reality.”74 In other words, socially constructed facts cannot exist without brute facts. 
Our constructed perceptions of risk are necessarily activated by an independent, 
external source.
On a more practical note, the ‘risk equals perceived risk’ argument is problematic 
because, in maintaining that risks must be perceived in order to exist, it discards the 
possibility that a potential hazard exists which is not considered to be a ‘risk’ because 
it has not yet been perceived. Thus, although it has been recognised that the linearity 
of a purely scientific understanding of risk cannot accommodate its true complexity, it 
has also been established that theories accounting for this complexity do not satisfy 
the demand for a practical means of decision making. The obvious tension between 
the two positions renders them difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile. It is arguable 
that the discourse of conventional risk assessment needs to be re-examined.75 The 
ultimate challenge, however, is finding a suitable model of decision analysis that does 
justice to both.
The precautionary principle can perhaps be seen as attempt to frame the future in 
socially-constructed entity, whilst maintaining the operation of conventionally- 
structured risk assessment procedures. Indeed, early advocates of precaution were 
confident that it offered a compromise between the rigidity of the formal discourse of
73 Rosa, E. A. (1998) at page 26.
74 Searle, J. R. The Construction of Social Reality (Free Press; New York; 1995) at page 191.
75 Short, J. F. ‘The Social Fabric at Risk: Toward the Social Transformation of Risk Analysis’ (1984) 
49 American Sociological Review 711-725, at page 722.
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science and the flexibility of social construction.76 For them, it presented an 
opportunity to combine aspects of both regimes, establishing a more accommodating 
dialogue with which the scale and occurrence of future hazards could be interpreted.
Yet, in spite of this optimism, the precautionary principle has remained firmly 
attached to science in the formal sense, having developed an intimate relationship 
with reductionist and selective means of articulating the environment. The procedural 
affiliation between the precautionary principle and the scientific discourse lends 
further support for the argument that “the origin of ‘real’ knowledge is laboratory 
scientific knowledge”,77 and that scientific construction of risk are innately sovereign 
over social understandings. Yet, as the following section shows, although discourses 
of risk beyond formal process of risk assessment criticised for their failure to 
objectively represent the magnitude and frequency of potential hazards, the scientific 
discourse itself suffers from the ‘unrecognised cultural syndrome’78 described above. 
Wynne observes that:-
“these tacit representations [of objectivity and rationality] protect 
scientific institutions from critical attention to the unrecognized cultural 
biases which they embody, project and reproduce in the name of 
rationality.”79
7.5 The social process of science: misplaced abstractions and absoluteness80
In reality, the notion of scientific observation is far broader than its traditional analogy
O I
with visual inspection suggests, and this is also true of risk assessment processes.
76 See, for example, Stirling, A. ‘Science and Precaution in the Appraisal of Electrivity Supply 
Options’ (2001) 86 Journal of Hazardous Materials 55-75. Stirling compares a ‘scientific’ and a 
‘precautionary’ approach to the regulation of risk, and concludes that the notion of precaution 
introduces a very different perspective that responds to the inadequacies of narrowly-reductionist 
scientific assessment, at page 56.
77 Wynne, B. (2005) at page 68.
78 Wynne, B. ‘Creating Public Alienation: Expert Cultures of Risk and Ethics on GMOs’ (2001) 10(4) 
Science as Culture 445-481, at page 473.
79 Wynne, B. ‘Creating Public Alienation: Expert Cultures of Risk and Ethics on GMOs’ (2001) 10(4) 
Science as Culture 445-481, at page 473.
80 This heading is inspired by the section in John Adams’ Risk entitled ‘Abstractions and the Fallacy of 
Misplaced Concreteness’ (Adams, J. Risk (UCL Press; London; 1995) chapter 11, at page 199).
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Stirling notes that a crucial problem that affects risk assessment approaches is the 
multiplicity of different ways of conceiving ‘magnitude’ and ‘frequency’82 based on 
observations of past events. Observation is contextually dependent. When scientists 
observe, they are implicitly making reference to what they do know, and also to what 
they do not know but want to find out. Otherwise, observation would be a relatively 
meaningless process. Information, derived through observation, is only created if 
there is a use for it. Necessarily, observation is performed within a particular 
framework of investigation, it is dependent on a variety of presuppositions and 
assumptions, and is theory-laden. Since it based not only upon the visual inspection 
but also theoretical understandings of the subject, it can be said that scientific 
observation is a social process that is contingent on predisposed insights.
In his book, Patterns o f Discovery,84 Hanson set out to demonstrate the importance of 
individual perception in scientific observation. Following an experimental study, he
O f
concluded that “observation of x is shaped by prior knowledge of x”. His study 
sought to determine whether different theoretical understandings of a subject would 
bring about different observations of the same object. On the basis of the scientific 
ideal of objective empiricism, one would, of course, expect the same observation to be 
recorded in the same way. However, Hanson’s study served to illustrate that the 
scientific ideal is infeasible. He posed the following question:- supposing Johannes 
Kepler and Tycho Brahe were to watch the sun rise, do Kepler and Brahe see the
O f
same thing in the east at dawn? Hanson stressed that he was not questioning 
whether they saw the same object. Rather, he was seeking to determine whether 
Kepler and Brahe had the same experience of the same object given that they had 
different theories about the sun and its movement. For Kepler, the sun was at the 
centre of the solar system, and the earth rotated round it annually. Brahe, on the other 
hand believed that the earth was at the centre of the solar system with, accordingly, 
the sun rotating round it. When asked what they saw at dawn, Kepler claimed that 
since it was the earth moving, movement of the sun was only apparent. 
Unsurprisingly, Brahe maintained that the sun actually moved across the sky. Thus,
81 Bames, B. et al, Scientific Knowledge -  A Sociological Analysis (Athlone; London; 1996) at page 2.
82 Ibid. at page 7.
83 Ibid.
84 Hanson, N. R. Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge; 1958).
85 Ibid. at page 19.
86 Ibid. at page 5.
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Hanson was able to conclude that observation, even in the narrow sense of the word, 
is shot through with individual perception. Theories and interpretations are “‘there’ in 
the seeing from the outset”, and thus produce qualitatively different experiences of 
the same thing.
Hanson has not been alone in his findings. Kuhn, for example, cites the works of 
Bruner and Postman88 to illustrate influence of prior knowledge on scientific
OQ • ■ • •observation. In this psychological experiment, subjects were given an ordinary pack 
of playing cards mixed with anomalous cards, such as a black four of diamonds. The 
subjects were tested on the accuracy with which they identified anomalous cards. The 
results showed that, initially, subjects saw what they expected to see, taking 
appreciably longer to recognise anomalies. Since expectations structured what the 
subjects saw, Bruner and Postman were able to conclude that pre-existing knowledge 
can cloud the observation of reality. Thus, the idealist notion of objective empiricism 
cannot always be sustained in reality. Kasper claims that:-
“[the] attraction of objective measures of risk is the apparent elimination 
of subjective elements in at least one part of the decision-making process. 
But the attraction is more apparent than real.”90
The root of the problem seems to lie in the tendency of scientists to perceive objective 
characterisations of risk as somehow more real or more valid than the concept of 
subjective interpretations. Despite the public image that science is a dispassionate 
seeker of the truth, subjective methods play a crucial role in the acquisition of
87 Ibid. at page 10.
88 Bruner, J. S. and Postman, L. ‘On the Perception of Incongruity: A Paradigm’ (1949) XVIII Journal 
of Personality 206-223.
89 See Kuhn, T. S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press; Chicago; 
1962).
90 Kasper, R G. ‘Perceptions of Risk and Their Effects on Decision Making’, in Schwing, R. C. and 
Albers, W.A. (eds) Societal Risk Assessment -  How Safe is Safe Enough? (Plenum Press; New York; 
1980) at page 74. Subjectivity in scientific method was also recognised by Holton who claims that 
value-judgements pervaded Millikan’s research into sub-electrons. See Holton, G. ‘Sub-Electrons, 
Presuppositions and the Millikan-Ehrenhaft Dispute’ (1978) 9 Historical Studies in the Physical 
Sciences 161. See also Wolpert, L. The Unnatural Nature of Science (Faber; London; 1992) at page 
95. The position is summarised in Gillispie, C. The Edge of Objectivity (Princeton University Press; 
Princeton, New Jersey; 1960) at page 150: “Science is created by the scientist”.
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knowledge. Lacey argues that values “pervade and must pervade”91 scientific inquiry. 
If science was purely objective, without contradiction and controversy, the call for 
research would diminish and scientific progress would “slow to a crawl.”92 More 
importantly, a lack of time and resources make it a logistically impossible task to 
objectively evaluate every new scientific claim -  thus, subjectivity is justifiable on 
grounds of expediency. Scientists must rely on subjectivities to determine which 
claims to pursue and which ones to discard. If all scientists were objective, then:-
“they would have no alternative but to refuse to hold any view on the 
correctness or otherwise of these new claims until they had first carried 
out their own extensive studies.”93
Subjectivity is not only necessary, it is unavoidable.94 In the absence of consensus 
and certainty, decisions are necessarily value-laden.95 Scientists do not respond 
blankly to uncertainty.96 Instead, they impose meaning upon uncertainty and 
rationalise decisions according to individual reason. I am not suggesting here that the 
substitution of value for fact is deliberate, but instead suggesting that subjectivity is so 
deeply entrenched in the scientific institution that reliance on value rather than fact is 
presented as objective truth.97
The realisation that science is influenced by complex, non-linear relationships 
between research and subjectivities is exacerbated by symptoms of contemporary 
‘risk society’98 society, which is characterised by pluralism and diversity.99 This has
91 Lacey, H. Is Science Value Free? Values and Scientific Understanding (Routledge; London; 1999) 
at page 259.
92 Matthews, R. A. J. ‘Facts Versus Factions: The Use and Abuse of Subjectivity in Scientific 
Research’, in Morris, J. (ed) Rethinking Risk and the Precautionary Principle (Butterworth- 
Heinemann; Oxford; 2000) chapter 12, at page 249.
93 Ibid.
94 Douglas, M. and Wildavsky, A. B. Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and 
Environmental Dangers (University of California Press; Berkeley; 1982)) at page 63; see also 
Lowrance, W. W. Of Acceptable Risk: Science and the Determination of Safety (Kaufinann; Los Altos, 
California; 1976) at page 7.
95 Waring, A. and Glendon, A. Managing Risk (International Thomson Business Press; London; 1998)
96 Adams, J. ‘A Richter Scale for Risk? Scientific Management of Uncertainty Versus Management of 
Scientific Uncertainty’ (1998) 23(2) Interdisciplinary Science Review 146-155.
97 Lacey, H. (1999) at page 256.
98 Reference is made here to Beck’s writings on reflexive modernisation and post-industrial risk society 
-  these concepts are discussed in further detail in the following chapter. Beck, U. Risk Society (Sage; 
London; 1992).
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inevitably resulted in an increase in the forms of knowledge production, leading to 
multiplicity of opinion, and a notable shift from ‘confident’ and ‘unproblematic’100 
technological determinism to a state of social ‘volatility’,101 complexity, and 
ultimately uncertainty.102 Whereas traditionally, science was seen as an impenetrable 
authority, the epistemological core in the reflexive modem phase has become “so 
crowded with different norms and practices that they cannot readily be reduced to
• • • i n igeneric methodologies or, more broadly, privileged cultures of scientific inquiry.” 
The resultant plethora of differing views undermines claims to objectivity and 
certainty. The upshot is that knowledge is incomplete, contested, subjective and 
uncertain.104
It is against this backdrop that scientific risk assessment has come under attack for its 
discursive practices. In addition to the relativity of scientific observation, the 
contextual-dependence of scientific analysis becomes apparent in the framing and 
testing of hypotheses.105 Wynne observes that policy discourses relating to risk and 
ethics embody “prior unacknowledged and thus unaccountable yet arbitrary human 
values and ethical commitments.”106 These subjectivities are culturally entrenched in 
the ‘constitutional framework of deliberate analytical thinking’107 rather than 
contingent human biases. Not only does this form an intricate part of scientific 
observation, but it is also central to the framing of scientific problems. In the words 
of Hattis and Smith:-
“[i]n designing analyses to produce a few simple numbers to summarize 
the complex reality of dose-response, how many people may be 
harmed/helped, and the uncertainties in the estimates provided, the analyst 
inevitably must convey the impression that these are the specific kinds of
99 Nowotny, H. et al, Re-Thinking Science -  Knowledge and the Public in an Age of Uncertainty 
(Polity Press; Cambridge; 2001) at page 21.
100 Ibid. at page 30.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid. at page 37.
103 Ibid. at page 199.
104 Institute of Science in Society (ISIS) ‘Submission to US Advisory Committee on International 
Economic Policy’, Biotechnology Working Group 13 July 2000, www.i-sis.org.uk/prec/php. accessed 
July 2003.
105 Wynne, B. (2001) at page 458.
106 Ibid. at page 472.
107 Ibid.
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numbers of interest for the purpose(s) that the analysis is supposed to 
serve. As with the famous modem art painting of a can of Campbell’s 
soup, the very act of selecting a particular object to put in the picture
makes a non-trivial statement that this specific object should be elevated
>*108to special status relative to the objects not so portrayed.”
Weber also notes that the recognition of the existence of a problem “coincides, 
personally, with the possession of specifically oriented motives and values.”109 
Furthermore, the use of specific types of data, analysis techniques and terminology 
conveys the message that these are the appropriate tools for the decision-making at 
hand. Judgements about the relative significance of different types of information and 
methodologies introduce an inescapable subjectivity to the process of risk analysis. It 
comes as no surprise, therefore, that the risk assessment process has been described as 
“primarily an ‘art’ with abundant opportunities for personal interpretation and 
bias.”110 Facts seldom speak for themselves; values shape facts.111
The argument that hazard identification reflects human commitments was highlighted 
by the amicus curiae brief submitted in relation to the ongoing WTO Dispute in 
relation to GM food and crops.112 It argues that principles of selection, emphasis and 
presentation are crucial in shaping theories about what exists, what happens, and what 
matters,113 stating that:-
“[fjraming is integrally related to the possibility of control. Problems that 
have been framed, with particular causal explanations, can also in 
principle be managed or solved by addressing the causes so identified. At 
the same time, framing, by its nature, is also an instrument of exclusion.
108 Hattis, D. and Smith, J. A. (1987) at page 92.
109 Weber, M. (Shils, E. and Finch, H. (eds)) The Methodology of the Social Sciences (Free Press; New 
York; 1949) at page 61.
110 Petts, J. et al, Risk Based Contaminated Land Investigation and Assessment (John Wiley & Sons; 
Chichester; 1997) at page 301.
111 Fischhoff, B. Acceptable Risk (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge; 1981).
112 European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 
WT/DS 291, 292 and 293.
113 Busch, L. et al, Amicus Curiae Brief Submitted to the Dispute Settlement Panel of the World Trade 
Organisation in the Case of ‘EC: Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products’, 30 April 2004, at page 16. Full text of amicus available at 
http://www.1ancs.ac.iik/fss/ieppp/WTOamicus. accessed August 2005.
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To bring some parts of an issue within a problem frame -  to render the 
issue comprehensible and interpretable -  other parts are invariably left out 
as irrelevant, incomprehensible or uncontrollable.”114
This argument that risk assessment encompasses value-laden understandings about 
appropriate forms and means of governance, institutional capabilities, and cultural 
aspects challenges the presumptions upon which conventional models of analysis are 
based. Subjectivity inevitably undermines the rationalist presumption of apodictic 
knowledge and certainty. Given that determining the likelihood and magnitude of 
risk involves a strong subjective element,115 scientific risk assessment claims to 
empirical accuracy are more idealistic rather than realistic. Subjective perception 
results in a ‘conflictual pluralization and multiplicity’116 of risk that is incompatible 
with the linearity of scientifically observed risk. The scientific principle -  ‘see no 
evil, hear no evil, smell no evil, know no evil’117 -  is fundamentally flawed because, 
as it has been shown above, the scientific representation of salient realities exclude 
more wide-ranging and multivalent questions that are nonetheless critical in the 
construction of the future.
The question then becomes, of course, how does this affect the operation of 
precaution? In what way does the exposure of subjectivity in risk assessment impact 
upon the application of the precautionary principle? In order to answer these 
questions, it is necessary to emphasise again that the relationship between risk 
assessment and the precautionary principle is governed by the normative 
interpretation of risk estimates. The practice of using risk measurements to determine 
behavioural responses to the future presumes that those statistics are simply objective 
predictions based on observations of the past. There are two problems here. The first 
is that risk statistics are the manifestation of more than objective information, and 
should be interpreted in the light of their context. The second problem, which is 
considered in the following chapter, is that the practice of projecting the past into the
114 Ibid. For a detailed account of the concept of scientific framing, see Wynne, B. ‘Creating Public 
Alienation: Expert Cultures of Risk and Ethics on GMOs’ (2001) 10(4) Science as Culture 445-481, at 
pages 458-463.
15 Jaeger, C. C. et al (2001) at page 118.
116 Beck, U. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (Sage; London; 1992) at page 31.
117 Ibid. at page 59.
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future as a means of prediction fails to acknowledge that the materialisation of 
hazards in contemporary society might bear little or no relation to hazards in the past.
The coexistence of complexity and reductionism, and the tension between the human- 
cultural political dimension of risk and institutional discourses reflected by scientific 
assessment forms the basis upon which theories linking modernity with risk are 
developed. Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, Niklas Luhmann, and Hans Jonas 
recognise that hazards in the modem era defy traditional models of uniformity,
I  I  Q
making it impossible to calculate risk with any degree of certainty. The 
conventional treatment of risk as an objective measurement breaks down with the 
advent of post-industrial society, exposing rational calculation to the criticism that the 
materialisation of risk in modem society rarely emulates previously recorded patterns. 
The next chapter examines this body of risk literature and comments on its relevance 
to the operation of precaution.
118 See Luhmann, N. Risk: A Sociological Theory (Walter de Gruyter; Berlin; 1993) at page 6.
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Chapter Eight 
Modernity and risk
8.0 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the second criticism of risk assessment cited in Chapter Seven 
-  that hazards in the modem era occur with such irregularity that neither their 
magnitude nor frequency can be predicted using observations of past events. It 
illustrates that the emergence of the precautionary principle induces a consideration of 
broader political issues such as the supremacy of scientific expertise and the 
relationship between science and responsibility. The aims here are two-fold. First, it 
provides historical context to the relationship between risk measurement and scientific 
discourse. Second, it rationalises the emergence of the precautionary principle. It 
shows that the notion of precaution can be directly associated with the erosion of the 
unity of scientific knowledge1 and the realisation that hazards in contemporary society 
can defy traditional models of prediction. The sociologists cited in this chapter give 
little, if any, consideration to the precautionary principle.2 This chapter remedies this 
deficiency. It should be noted that, although the structure of Beck’s thesis is used as 
its structure, this chapter has been informed by the works of a number of theorists 
who have been pivotal in developing a dialogue on risk and modernity.
An exploration of the themes arising from this literature provides a skeleton upon 
which my examination of the operation of precaution in preceding chapters can hang. 
In essence, sociological analyses of risk are used here to illustrate the way in which 
conditions of modernity have accentuated the limits of conventional models of risk 
assessment -  and, as a result, brought into sharp focus the problems with reliance on 
risk assessment as a normative decision-making tool. The impact of risk literature on 
the implementation of the precautionary principle is profound and often overlooked.
1 O’Riordan, T. ‘The Cognitive and Political Dimensions of Risk Analysis’ (1983) 3 Journal of 
Environmental Psychology 345-354, at page 347.
2 It should be noted that sociological commentators do make reference to anticipatory conduct: Beck, 
U. and Willms, J. Conversations with Ulrich Beck (Polity Press; Cambridge; 2003) refers to the notion 
of ‘current action’ at page 135; Luhmann, N. Risk: A Sociological Theory (Aldine de Gruyter; Berlin; 
1993) cites the ‘problem of prevention’ at page 29. They do not, however, explicitly refer to the 
precautionary principle.
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Whereas Chapters Six and Seven present the distinction between positivist and 
constructivist interpretations of risk by distinguishing between the realist scientific 
position and social constructivism, this chapter approaches the issue from perspective 
that draws on a temporal distinction between old ‘industrial’ and new ‘risk’ societies. 
This approach is critical in redeeming the process of risk assessment from the 
criticism that, from a constructivist stance, the operation of precaution falls at the first 
fence. The logical conclusion to draw from a wholly constructivist perspective is that, 
given that risk does not exist in any real sense, risk assessment is a futile exercise. 
Although this deduction is reflective of the argument that risk does not exits beyond 
its construction, it is neither practical nor realistic to assume that risk assessment is an 
entirely redundant process. The problem with risk assessment is not its use of 
estimates deriving from scientific observation. The problem is, in fact, its 
presentation of risk estimates as objective and, more importantly, the underlying 
supposition that the results of risk assessment are normative -  that is, that risk 
calculations convey the nature of response demanded in the face of a hazard. The 
lesson to learn from social constructivism is not necessarily that all forms of risk 
assessment are useless, but that, because risk quantities have little meaning without 
reference to their context, they should not be used as sole means of prescribing 
appropriate risk management. From this standpoint, the application of the 
precautionary principle ought to be determined by a consideration of risk estimates in 
their context. The upshot is that a precautionary response to hazards that have been 
statistically presented as ‘scientifically certain’ risks might still be suitable. With this 
in mind, it can be said that portrayals of the precautionary principle as a component of 
a decision-making algorithm in which precaution applies only in response to 
unquantifiable threats are unrealistic.
The aim of this chapter is to add substance to the argument that, given that the modem 
era presents hazards with such irregularity and novelty that they no longer fit with 
models of prediction, it is important that risk estimates deriving from assessment 
procedures are contemplated with reference to factors beyond their numerical 
expression. This is necessary, not simply because abandoning risk assessment 
procedures altogether is not an option, but also because it will promote a considered 
and holistic approach to precaution. As Santillo notes, the familiarity of the format of 
scientific risk assessment results in “widespread neglect of the inherent weaknesses
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and assumptions.”3 This chapter portrays risk assessment against a backdrop of 
literature that criticises the practice of projecting observations of the past into the 
future as a means of risk prediction. It highlights the limits of highly standardised 
procedures, and depicts the emergence of precaution as a response to uncertain and 
unknown hazards.
Central to this chapter is the operational relationship between the precautionary 
principle and scientific knowledge. In particular, this chapter draws attention to the 
unresolved debate as to whether the notion of ‘scientific uncertainty’ as contained in 
the definition of the precautionary principle is in/consistent with formal scientific 
discourse. This section departs from existing literature on the relationship between 
precaution and science. Instead of concentrating on the in/compatibility of ‘scientific 
uncertainty’ with scientific enterprise, it centres on the difference in the way the 
precautionary principle and the formal scientific discourse perceive the future. From 
this perspective, it becomes clear that there is a conceptual conflict between the 
precautionary principle and science. This discord is crucial in explaining why the 
ability of the precautionary principle to attribute responsibility for unknown, future 
impacts of decision-making is restricted by the hegemony of scientific knowledge.
The precautionary principle operates in the face of scientific uncertainty.4 By virtue 
of its relationship with scientific knowledge, there has been considerable debate as to 
whether the precautionary principle is either allied to, or antithetical to, science-based 
decision-making. For some, the very notion of ‘scientific uncertainty’ is seen as an 
implicit statement of the inability of scientific knowledge to foresee the future.5 
Conversely, other commentators argue that, since the notion of ‘scientific uncertainty’ 
represents a stage in the process of acquiring scientific knowledge, the precautionary 
principle -  as a regulatory tool for managing such uncertainty -  can be regarded as 
being entirely consistent with the scientific domain. Mee, for example, claims that the 
precautionary principle “does not negate the need for science, rather it poses a new 
challenge to scientists and calls upon them to play a key role in a broader conceptual
3 Santillo, D. et al ‘The Precautionary Principle: Protecting Against Failures of Scientific Method and 
Risk Assessment’ (1998) 36(12) Marine Pollution Bulletin 939-950, at page 945.
4 See UNCED Rio Declaration 1992, Principle 15.
5 Cameron, J. ‘The Precautionary Principle’, in Sampson, G. and Chambers, W. B. (eds) Trade, 
Environment and the Millennium (United Nations University Press; New York; 1999) at page 244.
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frame in which ethical considerations are of paramount importance.”6 Stirling 
considers that “key elements of a precautionary approach are entirely consistent with
• • 7sound scientific practice in responding to intractable problems in risk assessment”. 
Similarly, Harremoes et al assert that “[t]he precautionary principle has nothing to do 
with anti-science and everything to do with the rejection of reductionist, closed and 
arbitrarily narrow science in favour of sounder, more rigorous and more robust
•  >98science.
However, this chapter adopts a different approach. Although there are valid 
arguments for interpreting the precautionary principle as either compatible or 
incompatible with ‘scientific wwcertainty’, this chapter draws to attention to the way in 
which science and the precautionary principle differ in the way they comprehend 
threats to human health or the environment. Instead of focusing on determining 
whether or not the notion of scientific uncertainty is in/consistent with science,9 it 
examines the disparity between the way in which scientific and precautionary 
decision-making perceive hazards that have not yet materialised. Whereas the formal 
discourse of science regards the future as being a largely calculable controllable 
entity, the precautionary principle intrinsically recognises that the future cannot be 
controlled by ‘rational’ means of quantification. From this perspective, it can be 
argued that the precautionary principle is adverse to science. The implications of this 
position are critical to the functioning of the precautionary principle.
Central to the argument is the notion that science is a conceptually inappropriate tool 
for knowing the future implications of techno-scientific progress in the modem era. It 
is worth noting here that ‘science’ is used to describe formal scientific discourse. The
6 Mee, L. D. ‘Scientific Methods and the Precautionary Principle’, in Freestone, D. and Hay, E. (eds) 
The Precautionary Principle in International Law: The Challenge of Implementation (Kluwer Law 
International; The Hague; 1996) chapter 7, at page 109.
7 Stirling, A. ‘The Precautionary Principle in Science and Technology’, in O’Riordan, T. et al (eds) 
Reinterpreting the Precautionary Principle (Cameron May; London; 2001) chapter 3, at page 61.
8 Harremoes, P. et al (eds) The Precautionary Principle in the 20fh Century: Late Lessons from Early 
Warnings (Earthscan, European Environment Agency; London; 2002) at page 210.
9 Note that Cameron describes the ‘sound science versus precaution’ debate as ‘futile’, see Cameron, J. 
‘The Precautionary Principle in International Law’, in O’Riordan, T. et al (2001) at page 142. 
Furthermore, Stirling warns against being drawn into the ‘dichotomy trap’ of polarizing realms of 
science and precaution, see Stirling, A. (2001) at pages 61 and 66.
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‘formal scientific discourse’ is tied up with notions of ‘sound science’.10 Scientific 
knowledge is presented as upholding ideals of realism, objectivism, logical 
empiricism, and rationality. This is achieved through the statistical representation of 
the future.11
8.1 The emergence of the post-industrial condition
1 j
Undoubtedly, Beck’s Risikogesellschaft (Risk Society ) has been one of the most 
influential sociological analyses of modernity in the last century -  presenting “not 
only a visionary excursion into our present condition, but also a prophetic perspective 
on the future”.13 It traces the emergence of a new phase of modernity, and places the 
origins and consequences of environmental degradation at the heart of the theory of 
modem society.14 The study centres on a “break within modernity”,15 enabling 
society to free itself from the cast of classic industrial society and evolve into a new 
risk society.16 This transition is “not an option which could be chosen or rejected in
1 7the course of political debate,” but rather an inevitable symptom of scientific 
progress. Alongside this development, Beck notes a simultaneous proliferation of 
new and undesirable environmental risks, never before experienced. The emergence 
of such risks marks the beginning of modernity beyond its classical industrial 
design.18
10 See, for example, Edmond, G. and Mercer, D. ‘Experts and Expertise in Legal Regulatory Settings’ 
in Edmond, G. (ed) Expertise in Regulation and Law (Ashgate; Hampshire; 2004) chapter 1, at pages 
8-9.
11 Luhmann, for example, notes that statements that adhere to the scientific tradition of using statistical 
procedures appear to be ‘scientifically well founded’, Luhmann, N. Risk: A Sociological Theory 
(Walter de Gruyter; Berlin; 1993) at page 214. He goes on to note (at page 215) that the quantification 
of predictions emphasises their reliability.
12 Beck, U. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (Sage; London; 1992).
13 Adam, B. et al, The Risk Society and Beyond -  Critical Issues for Social Theory (Sage; London; 
2000) at page 1; see also Beck, U. (1992) at page 1.
14 Goldblatt, D. Social Theory and the Environment (Polity Press; Cambridge; 1996) at page 155.
15 Beck, U. (1992) at page 9.
16 Ibid
17 Beck, U. ‘Risk Society and the Provident State’ in Lash, S. et al (eds) Risk, Environmental and 
Modernity: Towards a New Ecology (Sage; London; 1996) 27-43 at page 31.
18 Beck, U. (1992) at page 10.
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Ulrich Beck’s vision of risk society, and the direct link between risk and modernity, is 
shared by Anthony Giddens,19 Niklas Luhmann,20 and Hans Jonas.21 Beck’s Risk 
Society operates on the assumption that there is a distinction between old and new 
risks. Essentially, Beck’s theory relies on a three-stage model of development -  from 
pre-industrial (pre-modernity), to industrial (modernity), to risk (reflexive modernity) 
society. Pre-industrial society, according to Beck, is characterised by the occurrence 
of natural hazards which occur independently of human control and as a result of
99  . .  ■ • •external forces, such as gods, demons or Mother Nature. The transition classic 
industrial society is marked by the emergence of dangers that are no longer solely 
attributable to external conditions, but are also the consequences of human 
behaviour.23 The birth of risk society, on the other hand, is evident in the emergence 
of hazards generated by human decision-making alone.
Central to Beck’s thesis is the argument that the distinction between industrial and 
risk society is based on calculability. Underlying the industrial-risk dichotomy is the 
contention that hazards in industrial society are calculable,24 whilst those in risk 
society are incalculable.25 Accordingly, hazards typical of risk society do not lend 
themselves to calculation by way of classic insurance theory. A new category of 
‘fundamentally ambivalent’ risk marks the onset of the post-rational era -  one which 
was “not at all perceived by Max Weber.” 27
19 Giddens, A. The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford University Press; Palo Alto, California; 1991) 
at page 4; Giddens, A. Modernity and Self Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modem Age (Polity 
Press; Cambridge; 1991a) at 122.
20 Luhmann, N. Risk: A Sociological Theory (Walter de Gruyter; Berlin; 1993) chapters 1 and 2, 
specifically pages 26-28.
2 Jonas, H. The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age 
(University of Chicago Press; Chicago; 1979) at page 6. It is worth noting that, despite the fact that 
Ulrich Beck is frequently hailed as the most significant theorist in risk literature, Hans Jonas identified 
that the modem condition presented a new ethical challenge to the traditional control of ecological 
hazards almost a- decade before the first publication of Beck’s Risk Society (original publication in 
German in 1986).
22 Beck, U. World Risk Society (Blackwell; Oxford; 1999) at page 50.
23 Goldblatt, D. (1996) at page 159.
24 Giddens, A. The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford University Press; Palo Alto, California; 1991) 
at page 2.
25 Beck, U. Ecological Politics in an Age o f Risk (Polity Press; Cambridge; 1995) at page 77. Incidents 
in industrial society, says Beck, occur unexpectedly but frequently enough to become substantially 
predictable, and thus insurable. See also, Beck, U. and Willms, J. Conversations with Ulrich Beck 
(Polity Press; Cambridge; 2003) at page 114.
26 Beck, U. ‘The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization’, in Beck, U. 
et al (eds) Reflexive Modernization, Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modem Social Order 
(Polity Press; Cambridge; 1994) chapter 1 at page 9.
27 Ibid.
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The transition to risk society emanates from heightened techno-scientific development
and the consequent generation of threats that are neither calculable no controllable.28
These ‘modernization risks’29 possess unprecedented characteristics, making them
distinct from industrial-type hazards. Whereas hazards in the industrial epoch are
described as individual, local, sporadic, perceptible, insurable and attributable,30
hazards in the new era are collective, global, systematically produced, uninsurable and 
11non-attributable.
This results in what Beck calls the ‘ecological crisis’.32 In contrast with classic 
models of industrial societies -  in which “blame or culpability for threats can be 
confidently asserted and their statistical likelihood calculated” -  risk society throws 
up risk problems to which there are no unambiguous solutions. Since modem threats 
do not fit the dimensions of quantitative calculability, the risk calculus collapses.34 
Hazards are, in effect, “statistically anonymized” and thus scientifically uncertain. 
Beck explains that:-
“[ujnfortunately, this [risk calculus] model loses its validity in a case like 
Chernobyl. Chernobyl is a paradigmatic counter-example that bursts 
through this model of clearly defined accidents in all three [spatial, 
temporal, and social] dimensions. The way its consequences overleapt 
geographical and political boundaries was of course spectacular and 
immediately obvious at the time. But it was just as true of temporal 
bounds. How does one define an affected population when some of those 
affected have not yet been bom, even today, fifteen years after the
28 Beck, U. (1999)-at page 53.
29 Beck, U. (1992) at page 21.
30 In industrial society, environmental hazards “assaulted the nose or the eyes and were thus susceptible 
to the senses”, Beck, as cited in Adams, J. Risk (University College Press; London; 1995) at page 179.
31 See Beck, U. (1995) at pages 76-7. See also, Beck, U. (1996) at page 31; Halfimann, J. ‘Risk
Avoidance and Sovereignty’ (1988) 8(1) Praxis International 14-25; Beck, U. ‘From Industrial Society 
to Risk Society: Questions of Survival, Social Structure and Ecological Environment’ (1992a) 9 
Theory, Culture and Society 97-123 at page 102; and Giddens, A. (1991) at pages 124-125. Jonas also 
acknowledges that the modem era presents technological hazards that defy the ‘nearness and 
contemporaneity’ of traditional society, Jonas, H. (1979) at page 7.
32 Beck, U. (1994) at page 8.
33 Goldblatt, D. (1996) at page 159.
34 Beck, U. (1992) at page 22.
35 Beck, U. (1995) at page 126.
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accident? This is why the question of ‘How many people died from the 
accident at Chernobyl?’ is still statistically undecidable in principle. The 
arguments that rage over it are like battles between phantom armies.”36
Our exposure to physically imperceptible and incalculable hazards makes them 
perceptible only through individual experience. Post-industrial risks only exist to the 
extent that they are perceived.37 Risk in the modem era, therefore, is a social 
construct. Unlike industrial hazards, which Beck claims can objectively exist 
independently of perception, the concept of socially constructed risk paves the way 
for diverse pluralism in expert opinion. As a result, experts cease to adopt a united 
front and are no longer seen as being in a position to determine what constitutes a 
risk. The concept of ‘expertise’ becomes more synonymous with w/icertainty than 
with certainty. Beck refers to the undercutting of expert authority in the aftermath of 
Chemobyl:-
“We felt like we were hanging from the marionette strings of these experts 
and institutions who continually contradicted each other. They kept 
saying they had everything well in hand, and it constantly turned out not 
to be true. To get answers to the most everyday questions, like ‘Can I let 
my kid play in the sandbox? Can I buy mushrooms? Are all the 
vegetables poison, or just those from specific regions?’ we were 
dependent on the minute to minute statements of experts who were simply 
blinding in their contradictions. And underneath it all was the horrifying 
thought that maybe food itself might now be poison.”39
By virtue of scientific and technological progress, local risks metamorphose into 
systematic risk.40 Endorsing Keynes’ argument that systematic risk is radically 
uncertain, Beck claims that the industrial model of quantification is rendered 
ineffective, and that society in the new era is confronted with insurmountable
36 Beck, U. and Willms, J. (2003) at page 115.
37 Beck, U. (1995) at page 12.
38 Giddens refers to this as the ‘grand narrative’ being replaced by heterogeneous claims to knowledge. 
Giddens, A. (1991) at page 2.
39 Beck, U. and Willms, J.(2003) at page 117.
40 Ibid. at page 127.
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threats.41 Yet despite the portrayed gravity of the risks threatening society, Beck 
maintains that risks in the post-industrial risk era are not taken seriously42 -  which is 
confirmed by the continuing tendency to equate risks with probabilities. He notes 
that:-
“[w]e still seem unable to accept the crucial difference between 
probability and radical uncertainty, and to come to terms with the fact that 
the latter now dominates, at least among the risks that occupy the public 
stage. This basic misunderstanding permeates even the mindset of the 
natural sciences.”43
This ignorance is reflected by the tendency of decision-making institutions to 
overlook the inherent uncertainty of risk44 by denying any danger that cannot be 
expressed and ‘controlled’ by way of statistics. Beck points out that:-
“[w]hen the affected and worried people take their case to the scientists, 
they find themselves talking to a group whose most identity-defining 
belief is that the canons of causal evidence and inference must always be 
strictly adhered to. When these criteria can’t be satisfied, scientists can be 
depended upon to explain away any new risk as mere fantasy without 
giving it further consideration.”45
Ironically, the smokescreen of controllability created by quantification only serves to 
heighten the paranoia and anxiety felt when a global risk crisis occurs and we realise 
that, despite our calculations, we are still oblivious to the nature of that risk and the 
way in which to deal with it.46 And furthermore, despite this institutional denial, 
incalculable risks still seep into those institutions and actively destabilise them. The
41 Keynes, J. M. A Treatise on Probability (Macmillan; London; 1921) in The Collected Writings of 
John Maynard Keynes: Volume. VIII (Macmillan; London; 1973). See Keykhah, M. ‘The Shape of 
Uncertainty: Implications for Decision Making’ (Economic Geography Research Group; University of 
Oxford; Oxford; 2002) Working Papers, WPG 02-03, at page 4.
42 Beck, U. and Willms, J.(2003) at page 116.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid. at page 117.
45 Ibid. at page 120.
46 Ibid. at page 116.
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goal is to be free from risk, however, risk aversion necessarily leads to risk 
procreation. Beck explains that:-
“[e]veryone tries to free themselves from risk, but it continues to multiply 
and permeate. It’s as if we’ve knocked over a honeypot, and in our efforts 
to rub it off, we succeed only in getting honey stuck to every part of the 
social body. It’s a self-negating process, in which everything society’s 
institutions do to free themselves only spreads the risk and helps to 
dissolve their legitimacy.”47
Underlying Beck’s ‘honeypot analogy’ is a process referred to as reflexive 
modernisation -  which is central to the transition from industrial to risk society. The 
following section introduces reflexive modernisation, and highlights that the 
emergence of new, global, systematic hazards specifically in risk society is by no 
means a coincidence. The proliferation of risk in post-industrial society is the direct 
result of the reflexive modernisation of social structures. The reflexive phase is 
distinguished by the dissolution of the ‘grand narrative’ model which confers upon 
social systems a definitive past and a predictable future 48
8.2 Reflexive modernisation
Modernisation in the post-industrial era manifests itself in technological and scientific 
progress which acts upon itself. It is self-destructive, dissolving the foundations upon 
which traditional society is based. The self-destruction of society is inextricably 
linked to a process known as reflexive modernisation.49 It is worth noting from the 
outset that reflexive modernisation is distinct from the process of modernisation. 
Beck explains that whilst simple modernisation involves the disembedding of 
traditional social structures and subsequent re-embedding of industrial social 
structures, reflexive modernisation entails the disembedding industrial social
47 Ibid. at page 122.
48 Giddens, A. (1991) at page 2.
49 Beck, U. (1994) at page 2. Jonas also makes a similar reference, describing the technological era as 
‘cumulatively self-propagating’, Jonas, H. (1979) at page 7.
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structures and subsequent re-embedding of a new stage of modernity.50 Simple 
modernization is characterised by a sense of utopic evolution, involving, for example, 
the development of means of production, structural differentiation or functional 
integration. Reflexive modernisation, however, marking the passage from industrial 
to risk society, is a much darker process.51 It describes a condition in which 
modernity confronts itself, forcing “a radicalization of modernity, which breaks up the 
premises and contours of industrial society and opens paths to another modernity.” 
Accordingly, modernization begins to take on itself as an object of reflection. 
Modernity begins to modernize its own foundations, destroying itself and creating a 
new social order. To that end, modernisation is its own gravedigger -  it has become 
“a theme and a problem for itself.”
Although reflexive modernisation has its roots fixed in the critique of scientific 
knowledge, it is applicable throughout society. For Beck, the term ‘risk society’ 
signifies a condition in which social, economic, political and cultural systems are 
confronted with self-generated uncertainty, which in turn plants increased complexity, 
contingency and disintegration at the heart of those systems. Following on from this, 
risk is defined as “a systematic way o f dealing with hazards and insecurities induced 
and introduced by modernization itself”5*
Crucially for Beck, reflexive modernisation changes the societal role assigned to 
science and knowledge, setting it apart from simple modernisation. Whereas in 
industrial society, science, rationality and expertise were looked upon as key 
determinants of the definition and management of risk, science in risk society has a 
dual role. On the one hand, scientific progress in the reflexive phase has generated a 
new-fangled set of risks and hazards, thus undermining ontological security. On the 
other, science is an indispensable tool for the comprehension and measurement of 
such risks. As Beck notes, “[sjcience is one o f the causes, the medium o f definition 
and the source o f solutions to risks” 55 This interplay between the functions of 
science in risk society has meant that scientific progress is a contradictory process.
50 Ibid.
51 Beck, U. (1995) at page 2.
52 Beck, U. (1994) at pages 8-9.
53 Ibid. at page 8.
54 Beck, U. (1992) at page 21.
55 Ibid. at page 155.
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The growth of scientific success has created negative by-products, in the form of 
risks, which themselves become subject to scientific analysis. By virtue of a system 
of checks and balances being placed within the process of modernization itself,56 
scientific knowledge is critically evaluated and reshaped. The medium of self­
confrontation is, unsurprisingly, an impetus for change. In other words:-
‘The expansion of science presupposes and conducts a critique of science 
and the existing practice of experts in a period when science concentrates 
on science, and therefore scientific civilization is subjecting itself to a 
publicly transmitted criticism that shakes its foundations and its own self­
conception.”57
The upshot of this paradoxical relationship between science and risk is an inherent 
public scepticism of science, and the demonopolization of scientific claims of its 
ability to solve the problems introduced by risk society. Beck calls this science’s 
“loss of function.”59 Jonas makes a similar observation that heightened technological 
progress creates a disparity between the scientific capacity to produce the future and 
the scientific capacity to know the future implications of scientific progress.60 This 
juxtaposition is described as:-
“[t]he gap between the ability to foretell and the power to act creates a 
novel moral problem.”61
Ironically, the negative effects of scientific progress, together with growing awareness 
of the limits of scientific foresight, has been offset by increasing demand for scientific 
assurances of safety.
56 Jaeger, C. C. et al, Risk, Uncertainty, and Rational Action (Earthscan; London; 2001) at page 210.
57 Beck, U. (1992) at page 156.
58 Ibid.
»IbUL
60 This argument appeared in a paper delivered by Professor Barbara Adam titled ‘Minding Futures: An 
Exploration of Responsibility for Long Term Futures’ at the ‘Sensing the Unsensed’ workshop, 
Lancaster University, October 2004. Paper posted on website:
http://www.cf.ac.uk/socsi/futures/mindingfutures.pdf. accessed December 2004.
61 Ibid. at page 8.
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“The further scientization proceeds and the more clearly risk situations 
and conflicts enter public conscience, the greater becomes the pressure to 
act, and the more techno-scientific society threatens to metamorphose into 
a scientifically produced ‘taboo society’.”62
This circular relationship means that the production of risk is the direct consequence 
of scientific efforts to minimise insecurity. This is what Beck is referring to when 
he uses the term ‘manufactured uncertainty.’64 Beck comments on the systematic 
generation of uncertainty:-
“What we are finding now is that the world isn’t quite as the 
Enlightenment thinkers assumed. Increasing our knowledge about the 
world ... create[s] new forms of risk for which we have little prior 
experience -  and which can’t be calculated on the basis of established 
time-series, for the data don’t exist ... What I call ‘manufactured 
uncertainty’ is bound up more with the advance of knowledge than with 
its limitations. The economist Frank Knight made the distinction between 
risk and uncertainty. He argued that risk concerns future probabilities 
which can be calculated, uncertainty, ones that cannot. But that 
distinction doesn’t hold water: there are too many fuzzy areas in the 
middle.”65'
Although here, Beck claims that manufactured uncertainty is related to knowledge 
rather than a lack of it, in later works he introduces the notion that manufactured 
uncertainty has a double reference.66 Manufactured uncertainty can be the product of 
knowledge and unawareness. They are interrelated. Scientific progress necessarily 
implies a greater accumulation of knowledge, which in turn provides new sources of 
uncertainty. New knowledge can turn normality into risk overnight. Beck 
comments that “[b]y opening more and more new spheres of action, science creates
62 Ibid. at page 157.
63 Beck, U. (1995) at page 12.
64 Beck, U. (1999) at pages 5, 6, 111-112, 140-142.
65 Giddens, A. and Pierson, C. Conversations with Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of Modernity 
(Cambridge; Polity Press; 1998) at pages 104-5.
66 Beck, U. (1999) at page 140.
67 Ibid. at page 58.
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new types of risk as well.”68 However, the opposite is also true. Scientific 
progression can also work to highlight unawareness and the inability to know. For 
Beck, the inability to know is related to the concept of ‘highly developed expert 
rationality’69 -  which is ultimately the product of scientific advancement. The 
reflexive phase marks a departure from linear forms of knowledge in which closed 
circles of experts act upon knowledge in a consensual manner. Instead, non-linear 
forms of knowledge develop as a result of hyper-complexity revealed by scientific 
development, producing a situation in which knowledge systems are no longer closed 
and consensual. By stark contrast, non-linear forms are open and pluralistic, inviting 
a mixture of rationales to the forum, and generating uncertainty and dissent. This 
pluralism undermines the ability of closed scientific system to unanimously act upon 
knowledge, and thus calls for the opening up of science to outside knowledge. The 
transition to the reflexive phase occurs when the inquiry into our inability to know 
induces a shift of focus towards external rationalities. This dissolves the foundations 
of mono-rationality underlying the structure of industrial society.
The association of uncertainty with non-linear forms of knowledge calls to attention 
the central theme to Beck’s concept of reflexive modernisation. The existence of 
uncertainty in relation to risk ultimately means that, in effect, no one is an expert and
7ftyet at the same time everyone is an expert. Thus, control over decision-making in 
the face of uncertainty should be wrested from scientific experts and granted all 
members of society. Determining the course of action in the face of uncertainty is no 
longer something that can be legitimately done by scientific experts, not only because 
science creates as much uncertainty as it dispels, but also because expert-systems 
cannot maintain public trust typically enjoyed in industrial society. Reflexivity, 
therefore, derives from the self-refutation and distrust of the rational-calculative 
model of scientific expertise.
It is interesting to draw comparison between Beck’s concept of reflexive 
modernisation and the theory of scientific displacement advocated by the likes of
68 Ibid. at page 140.
69 Ibid. at page 141.
70 Beck, U. (1994) at pages 5-13; Smith, R. J. ‘Sustainability and the Rationalisation of the 
Environment’ (1996) 5(1) Environmental Politics 25-47, and Cohen, M. J. (ed) Risk in the Modern 
Age: Social Theory, Science and Environmental Decision-Making (Macmillan; London; 1999).
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Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper. Models of scientific displacement serve to emphasise 
Beck’s contention that science generates uncertainty -  scientific problems are not 
conclusively solved, but are superseded by new and more pressing problems.71 As 
technology becomes more complex, so we are confronted with more risk, and the 
more technology autopoietically develops in order to control heightened risk, the 
more risk autopoietically procreates.72 Scientific advancement is necessary in order to 
avoid risk, but increased scientific inquiry generates further risk. In the words of 
Luhmann, “[scientific analysis does not serve to solve problems but to multiply 
them.”73 The very essence of scientific displacement is centred on the notion that 
scientific orthodoxies are pursued to such a degree that they “take a pratfall and have 
to be replaced.”74
8.3 Models of scientific displacement
Traditionally, scientific progress has been seen as a cumulative process of uncovering 
the truth. Underlying this notion is the theory of scientific realism -  that the objects 
of scientific knowledge exist independently of the knowledge of them; that the truth 
can be objectively observed; and that scientific discovery will form a permanent part 
of knowledge. However, the works of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn offer 
alternative models of scientific progress that dispel the notion that scientific 
knowledge develops in a cumulative and enduring manner. Instead, they propose 
models of scientific displacement. Accordingly, scientific progress is revolutionary. 
As knowledge is created, gaps of ignorance are filled. However, rather than
71 This point has been endorsed by Giddens: “[e]ven philosophers who most staunchly defend the 
claims of science to certitude, such as Karl Popper, acknowledge that, as he expresses it, ‘all science 
rests upon shifting sand.’ In science, nothing is certain, and nothing can be proved, even if scientific 
endeavour provides us with the most dependable information about the world to which we can aspire. 
In the heart of the world of hard science, modernity floats free.” Giddens, A. (1991) at page 39.
72 For a detailed analysis of the concept of autopoiesis, see Maturana, H. and Varela, F. Autopoiesis and 
Cognition: The Realization of the Living (Reidel Publishing; Dordecht, Holland; 1972); 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, A. ‘The Silence of the Sirens -  Environmental Risk and the 
Precautionary Principle’ (1999) 10(2) Law and Critique 175-197, at page 177; Nelken, D. ‘Changing 
Paradigms in the Sociology of Law’, in Teubner, G. (ed) Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law 
and Society (Walter de Gruyter; Berlin; 1988) 191-216, at pages 196 and 199, where the author 
describes autopoiesis as a system that displays characteristics of circularity, self-observation, awareness 
of its own autonomy, operation according to its own code, and a focus on its correspondence to itself.
73 Luhmann, N. Ecological Communication (Polity Press; Cambridge; 1989) at page 78.
74 Lowrance, W. W. ‘The Nature of Risk’, in Schwing, R. C. and Albers, W. A. (eds) Societal Risk 
Assessment -  How Safe is Safe Enough? (Plenum Press; New York; 1980) at page 7.
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advancing along the path to scientific truth, the generation of knowledge, as well as 
resolving one scientific quandary, simultaneously produces another knowledge gap. 
New scientific knowledge replaces old, and at the same time unearths a new set of 
questions. McMullin explains that as more scientific puzzles are solved, scientists are 
not led closer to the truth, because there is no scientific truth.75 Instead of reaching a 
new level of understanding, scientists reach a new illusion of understanding.
The works of Popper and Kuhn are renowned for questioning the traditional view of 
scientific history as a process by which scientists add new pieces to the ever- 
expanding scientific puzzle. Of the two, Popper’s analysis of scientific progress in 
Conjectures and Refutations -  The Growth o f Scientific Knowledge offers the more 
explicit model of scientific displacement. He argues that scientific process begins 
with a problem. Knowledge starts with a problem and ends with a problem. In order 
to solve a scientific problem, an ‘anticipation’,76 or hypothesis is proposed which is 
subsequently subjected to a four stage testing procedure exercising deductive logic 
first, its internal consistency is tested;77 secondly, its logical form is tested so as to
no
determine whether it has the character of scientific theory; thirdly, it is compared
7Qwith other theories so as to determine whether it will advance scientific knowledge;
OA
and finally, its conclusions are empirically applied and observed. Irrespective of the 
number of instances in which a hypothesis is confirmed, it only takes a single 
conflicting observation to falsify it. In the event of falsification, the hypothesis is 
refuted, and with the aid of ‘imaginative thinking’, a new conjecture if proposed. 
Popper concedes that “every discovery contains ‘an irrational element’, or ‘a creative 
intuition’.”81
The knowledge process works on the basis that science is about progressing from one 
problem to the next. The most lasting contribution to the advance of scientific
75 McMullin, E. ‘The Shaping of Scientific Rationality’, in McMullin, E. (ed) Construction and 
Constraint: The Shaping of Scientific Rationality (University of Notre Dame Press; Notre Dame; 1988) 
at page 38.
76 Popper, K. R. Conjectures and Refutations -  The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Routledge; 
London; 1963) at page 32.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid
79 Ibid at 33.
80 Ibid
81 Popper, K. R. The Logic of Discovery (Hutchinson; London; 1968) at page 32.
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knowledge that a theory can make, Popper argues, is the new problems it creates 
through the course of rigorous testing, falsification, refutation and discovery.82 In this 
way, science can help to progress towards the truth, but we will never be certain that 
we have the final explanation.
Kuhn rejects the notion that science grows steadily as observations accumulate. 
Instead explains the acquisition of knowledge in terms of periodic revolutions -  or 
changing ‘paradigms’. A paradigm is an accepted example of actual scientific 
practice providing a model of particular coherent traditions of scientific research. 
Scientific research necessarily takes place within a paradigm since the random 
exploration of the world would present a complex and mammoth task. Research is 
thus constrained by the scientific assumptions and methodology advocated by the 
dominating paradigm. The paradigm restricts the questions a scientist can 
legitimately ask, and it confines the answers to the product of approved scientific 
technique. During ‘normal science’, as Kuhn calls it, relatively esoteric problems 
present themselves forcing scientists to investigate the paradigmatic claims in 
‘unimaginable’ detail.84 This is what Beck is referring to when he states that:-
“[s]triding forth along the path of specialization, it does not, cannot stop at 
the deconsecration of its own foundations and products. Anyone who lets 
his doubts gnaw at his own fundamental principles can, if he does the job 
well, realize that he has none.”85
Beck goes on to note that:-
“[pjeople who inquire further, learn more, and also more about the 
fragility and limitations of their own fundamental principles and 
statements; and therefore they learn less.”86
82 Popper, K. R. (1963) at page 222.
83 Kuhn, T. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press; Chicago; 1962) at 
page 10.
4 Ibid. at page 24.
85 Beck, U. (1995) at page 68.
86 Ibid. at page 121.
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The inevitable discovery of some uncertainty or anomaly forces the scientist to adopt 
a different attitude to the paradigm, and undertake more meticulous research. Kuhn 
describes the increasing rigour with which scientific inquiry is conducted as a
07
transition from normal to extraordinary research. More comprehensive and 
thorough investigation draws to attention the weaknesses of a current paradigm and 
generates the momentum for change. Scientific revolutions “are inaugurated by a 
growing sense ... that an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the
00
exploration of an aspect of nature to which that paradigm itself had led the way.” In
response to this, scientists propose alternate paradigms, adopting new instruments and 
looking in new places for answers. Gradually, one of the alternate paradigms will 
triumph over competing paradigms. As the scientific community converts itself to the 
new paradigm, scientific research commences under a new set of basic assumptions 
and scientists reinterpret old data in new ways. Kuhn described the process of the 
evolution of a new paradigm:-
“At the start a new candidate for paradigm may have few supporters, and 
on occasions the supporters’ motives may be suspect. Nevertheless, if 
they are competent, they will improve it, explore its possibilities, and 
show what it would be like to belong to the community guided by it. And 
as that goes on, if the paradigm is one destined to win its fight, the number 
and strength of the persuasive arguments in its favour will increase. More 
scientists will then be converted, and the exploration of the new paradigm 
will go on. Gradually the number of experiments, instruments, articles, 
and books based upon the paradigm will multiply. Still more men, 
convinced of the new view’s fruitfulness, will adopt the new mode of 
practicing normal science, until at last only a few elderly hold-outs
OQremain.
Unlike the traditional view that scientific progress in cumulative, Kuhn’s model 
proposes that new knowledge replaces older, incompatible knowledge. From this
87 Kuhn, T. (1962) at page 91.
88 Ibid. at page 92.
89 Kuhn, T. (1962) at page 159.
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perspective, scientific progress is presented are being revolutionary, invoking 
fundamental changes in method and understanding, rather than cumulative.
Arguably, the works of Popper and Kuhn can be reconciled with Beck’s notion of 
reflexive modernity on the grounds that the transition to modernity has led to an 
acceleration of the process of scientific displacement. Whereas, conceivably, both 
Popper and Kuhn envisaged scientific displacement occurring over a relatively 
lengthy period, Beck’s notion of reflexive modernisation induces the process of 
scientific displacement over a much shorter timeframe. Eloquently demonstrating the 
position, Beck states that:-
“[o]n the one hand, technologists claim that their declarations about risks 
are strictly scientific, including the maximum permissible levels on which 
they depend. The observer rubs his eyes in disbelief at the miraculous 
power of the engineering sciences; these have now managed to overcome 
the gravity of the insight that no force in the universe, no matter how 
sparkling its formulae, can yield normative propositions concerning risk 
acceptance. Yet no sooner has one accustomed oneself to this feat of 
magic than one has to acknowledge that the technologists have done more, 
hanging the norms they claim to prescribe from the gallows of fluctuating 
maximum possible levels. Now the technologists’ claims to accuracy 
dangle, one beside another, from the ropes of the maximum permissible 
levels they have tied around their own necks.”90
8.4 Reflexive modernisation and individualisation
Directly relating to reflexive modernisation is the process of individualization.91 In 
fact, individualization is the driving force of a reflexively modem phase. It has been 
described as “socially most astonishing, most surprising and perhaps least understood
90 Beck, U. (1995) at page 114.
91 Lash, S. ‘Reflexivity and its Doubles: Structure. Aesthetics, Community’, in Beck, U. et al (1994) 
chapter 3 at page 114.
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Q9phenomenon of the last twenty years”, and involves an “unexpected renaissance of 
an ‘enormous subjectivity’ -  inside and outside institutions.” According to Lash, 
the process of individualisation is the motor of social change.94 Although Beck 
himself admits that Risk Society focused primarily on the risk thesis rather than 
individualisation,95 his later publications work to redress this imbalance.96 
Accordingly, individualisation underlies the dissolution of traditional social structures 
characteristic of industrial society. Thus, individualisation provides the means 
through which a reflexive state is achieved. It is perhaps surprising, therefore, that 
Beck initially played down its significance in his theory of modernity.
Nevertheless, it has since become obvious that the process of individualisation 
operates at a profound level in Beck’s account of the transition from industrial to risk 
society. Given its significance, it is fitting to go beyond paying it mere lip-service. 
The purpose of this section is to introduce Beck’s concept of individualisation, and to 
place it in the context of reflexive modernisation.
From the outset, Beck is keen to establish the proper meaning of individualisation. 
He states
“Let us be clear what ‘individualization’ means. It does not mean 
individualism. It does not mean individuation -  how to become a unique 
person. It is not Thatcherism, not market individualism, not
, , 9 7atomization.
In fact, it is quite the opposite. Whereas market individualism is founded on the 
notion of predictive economic rationality, individualism as it is envisaged by Beck is 
rooted in the politics of the free market. This is not a new concept. Individualisation 
has occurred throughout history in phases of revolution -  during, for example, the
92 Beck, U. (1999) at page 68.
93 Ibid.
94 Lash, S. (1994) at page 114.
95 Beck, U. and Beck-Gemsheim, E. Individualization (Sage; London; 2002) at page xxi; see also Lash, 
S. ‘Foreword: Individualization in a Non-Linear Mode’, in Beck, U. and Beck-Gemsheim, E. (2002) 
vii-xiii, at page vii where Lash notes that “[t]he individualization thesis, for its part, has passed 
virtually ignored.”
96 See, for example, Beck, U. and Beck-Gemsheim, E. (2002); Beck, U. and Willms, J. (2003).
97 Beck, U. (1999) at page 9.
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Renaissance; and the emancipation of peasants from feudal repression98 -  when 
individuals have been freed from traditionally prescribed roles. From this 
perspective, individualisation is a term coined by Beck to describe the liberation of 
individuals from constraints imposed by social institutions and the creation of new 
forms of social identity. This freedom from the collective forms the basis upon which 
Beck’s theory of modernity and the transition to risk society is established.
However, Beck is careful to highlight that individualisation in risk society differs in 
one crucial respect from individualisation in earlier historical phases. The difference, 
although subtle, is critical to an understanding of his thesis. In order to illustrate the 
position, it is worth noting Beck’s definition of individualisation in the reflexive 
phase. Before doing so, it is important to observe that Beck’s later works adopt the 
terminology ‘first/second modernity’ in place of ‘industrial/risk society’. Thus, in the 
following extract, the phrase ‘second modernity’ denotes ‘risk society’:-
“[W]hat individualization means in this constellation is disembedding 
without re-embedding. In the second modernity, the individual becomes, 
for the first time in history, the basic unit of social reproduction.”99
In other words, individualisation as a component of reflexive modernisation brings 
about the liberation of the individual from social structures (disembedding) without 
the formation of new social structures (re-embedding) through which the individual 
establishes his identity. By contrast, individualisation in previous phases is 
characterised by the disembedding and subsequent re-embedding of social control 
structures. Thus, until the second modernity (or risk society), individualisation has
always been offset by the re-empowerment of social structures. Conversely, the
process of individualisation leading to the second modernity destructs social 
structures and the individual assumes central place. According to Beck, this is 
evident in three ways.100 First, social classes based on status are dissolved. Secondly, 
women are freed from the traditional role of dependent house-wife. However, this 
‘detraditionalization’ does more than simply redress rigid gender roles -  Beck notes
98 Beck, U. and Beck-Gemsheim, E. (2002) at page 202.
99 Beck, U. and Willms, J. (2003) at page 63.
100 Beck, U. and Beck-Gemsheim, E. (2002) at pages 202-203.
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that “[t]he entire structure of family ties has come under pressure from 
individualization and a new negotiated provisional family composed of multiple 
relationships -  a ‘post-family’ -  is emerging.”101 Thirdly, the rigidity of old forms of 
work routine is being replaced by new flexible working hours and options to conduct 
business from the home.
Thus, rather than being a concept relating to the individual, individualisation is a 
structural concept, meaning the dissolution of, and disenchantment with, collective 
foundations of industrial society.102 Individuals are ‘released’ from industrial society
1 r ninto ‘the turbulence’ of risk society. Accordingly, individualisation undercuts 
structures of class, occupation, sex roles, the nuclear family, trade unions, and the 
welfare state leaving individuals to master the notion of risk without being able to 
make decisions on an established institutionalised basis.104 Thus, individualisation 
removes any sense of consensus, certainty and security, traditionally associated with 
the industrial phase.
The position can be summarised as follows. Individualisation is a process by which 
society’s institutions, and more specifically, the relationship of the individual to them, 
are transformed. Individual action must be seen as being independent of collective 
pressures,105 and individual nonconformity subverts social orthodoxy.106 The upshot 
is the establishment of a more indeterminate coexistence. Rigid, pre-determined 
‘biographies’107 are replaced by a ‘dialogic existence’.108 In other words, Beck claims 
that the resolution of conflict between individuals can no longer be achieved by 
reference to pre-given trajectories. Instead, he argues that “the pre-given 
intermeshing of role-sets is replaced by a much more fluid situation wherein nothing 
is pre-given and everything has to be negotiated.”109 The only way in which the 
extreme complexity and indeterminacy of risk society can be dealt with is through a
101 Ibid. at page 203.
102 Beck, U. (1999) at page 74.
103 Ibid. at page 75.
104 Beck, U. (1994) at page 8.
105 Beck, U. and Willms, J. (2003) at page 65.
106 Ibid. at page 68.
107 Beck, U. and Willms, J. (2003) at page 65.
108 Ibid. at page 69.
109 Ibid. at page 65.
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continuous process of translation between individuals. The collective no longer plays 
a meaningful part.110
In relation to risk, this process results in individuals being increasingly forced to bear 
unforeseeable consequences of the decisions they have made. The supremacy of the 
individual over the collective means that there is a distinct loss of the institutional 
underpinning of decision-making, and cultural definitions are “are set in a flux”.111 
This is particularly well demonstrated by the struggle over risk definitions, which in 
turn reinforces the argument that the hyper-complexity of the individualised phase 
dissolves the legitimacy of any claims to certainty. Douglas explains that:-
“[n]o one gives us certainty, even in science. When we lived in [an 
industrial] culture, we used to think that either a thing was known to be 
true or it was wrong; a fact was a fact, and as such it guaranteed 
deductions made from it. Now that we are committed to an individualist 
culture, the competition is on; knowledge has to be defended at every 
point; the open society guarantees nothing.”112
Thus, the process of individualisation is central to reflexive modernisation since it sets 
the scene for ambiguity and uncontrollability. The breakdown of societal institutions 
makes it possible for individual risks to escape the collective monitoring and 
protection facilities of industrial society. The failure of such institutions to exercise 
control of threats not only encourages self-criticism, but also increases the demand on 
institutions to define and manage those threats. This schizophrenia raises interesting 
questions in relation to the operation of precaution.
110 Ibid. at page 69.
111 Ibid. at page 128.
112 Douglas, M. ‘Risk as a Forensic Resource’, in Burger, E. J. (ed) Risk (University of Michigan Press; 
Michigan; 1993) pages 1-16, at page 11.
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8.5 Implications for precaution
Although sociological literature is frequently cited in analyses of risk, its implications 
for the precautionary principle are seldom explored.113 The overriding conclusion to 
draw is that the relationship between risk assessment and precaution is beset by 
fundamental issues arising in relation to the role of science in regulation. Despite the 
fact that this risk literature reflects the finding of social constructivism that risk is a 
‘multi-level game’ that cannot be reduced to a merely technical question,114 it brings 
to the forum profound questions about the relationship between precaution, scientific 
expertise, and risk assessment.
As Part One of this thesis has illustrated, a significant consequence of the definitional 
deficit of precaution is the ambiguity relating to its point of application. The question 
is: when do we enter into precautionary-territory? When does the precautionary 
principle, as opposed to the principle of prevention, apply? As Part One of this thesis 
illustrates, this issue has been the focus of a number of recent judgments passed down 
by the European Courts and the WTO Appellate Body. Part Three continues with this 
theme, demonstrating through a case-study of the BSE crisis that complete reliance on 
scientific risk assessment creates a tendency to overestimate control over potential 
hazards. The result is the constrained use of precaution.
Sociological risk literature is useful in that it provides substance to the argument that 
the operation of precaution induces a consideration of deep-rooted interactions 
between the formal discourse of science and the future. A consideration of these 
sociological theories leads to the abstract conclusion that “we simply cannot know the 
future (or it would not be the future)”.115 With this in mind, a precautionary response 
to suspected threats can be seen as a valid attempt to circumvent unwanted 
consequences. In the context of this sociological underpinning, the notion of 
precaution might be understood as embodying the realisation that “no one is in a
113 Jenny Steele published a book in 2004 called Risks and Legal Theory. Although she presents risk 
regulation in the context of sociological theory (see, for example, pages 44-5), she pays relatively little 
attention to its relationship with the precautionary principle (pages 196-9). Steele, J. Risks and Legal 
Theory (Hart; Oxford; 2004).
114 Beck, U. and Willms, J. (2003) at page 129.
115 Luhmann, N. (1993) at page 48.
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position to claim knowledge of the future or the capacity to change it.”116 This 
undermines the premise upon which risk assessment is based -  that, in order to
117measure risk, it is necessary to project the past into the future.
The underlying problem, it would appear, is that quantitative risk assessment does not 
distinguish between potential and actual risks.118 It assumes that the frequency and 
magnitude of future risks will reflect those that have already been observed.119 Thus, 
on a conceptual level there is a conflict between risk assessment and the precautionary 
principle -  primarily because the precautionary principle is only intended to deal with 
potential hazards. The definition of the precautionary principle contained in Principle 
15 of the Rio Declaration confines its application to situations in which there are 
‘threats of serious or irreversible damage’. It is essential to note the use of the word 
‘threat’, which implies that the operation of the precautionary principle is confined to 
prospective hazards.
As it stands, there exists a tension between the operation of precaution and the 
materialisation of the ‘trans-scientific’ state. A problem arises when the 
implementation of the precautionary principle is determined by scientific means. 
When scientific risk assessment is relied upon to clarify and communicate 
uncertainty, the results appear to be more certain, or less value-laden, than is
191 • •defensible. The scientific construction of potential hazards, therefore, can preclude 
a precautionary response when it is, in fact, appropriate. This has led Giddens to 
conclude that risk assessment has itself become ‘inherently risky’122 and of 
‘imponderable character’.123 Notions of predictability based upon extrapolations of
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid. at page 43.
118 Silbergeld, E. K. (1993) at page 75.
1,9 Keykhah, M. ‘The Shape of Uncertainty: Implications for Decision Making’ (Economic Geography 
Research Group; University of Oxford; Oxford; 2002) Working Papers, WPG 02-03, at page 4.
120 Weinberg, A. M. ‘Science and Trans-science’ (1972) 10 Minerva 209-222, at page 209. Weinberg 
describes questions “which can be asked by science and yet which cannot be answered by science.”
121 I would like to express thanks to Anne Ingeborg Myhr (Institute of Genomics, Tromso) for her 
valuable comments. Reference is made here to her thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of a Doctor 
Scientarium degree: Myhr, A. I. ‘Precaution, Context and Sustainability’ (2002) Department of 
Microbiology and Virology, Institute of Medical Biology, Tromso, Norway, at page 15.
122 Giddens, A. (1991a) at page 122.
123 Ibid. at page 124.
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the past have been undermined by their inability to secure a calculable future.124 
Consequently:-
“When we seek definitions of the concept of risk, we immediately find 
ourselves befogged, with an impression of being unable to see beyond our 
own front bumper.”125
This chapter ends, therefore, with the recognition that the notion of precaution is 
consistent with recognition of the complexity of ecological hazards, lack of scientific 
understanding, and high decision stakes. It challenges the authority of science in 
policy decision-making, and suggests that an alternative approach to the future is 
desirable. Yet, if this is juxtaposed with the fact that the operation of precaution is 
reliant on reductionist techniques of risk assessment, it is conceivable that its scope of 
application is jeopardised. The following chapter continues to draw on Beck’s thesis 
to illustrate that the assumption that reductionism eliminates uncertainty and
1 *yf% * •complexity conflicts with the broad notion of anticipatory conduct -  which, of 
course, encompasses precaution.
124 Adam, B. and Van Loon, J. (2000) at page 6.
125 Luhmann, N. (1993) at page 6.
126 Myhr, A. I. (2002) at page 12.
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Chapter Nine 
The relativity of risk and the ability of the precautionary principle to 
establish an ‘ethics for the future’: a critical analysis
9.0 Introduction
Chapter Seven provides a theoretical basis for this chapter. It introduced the 
supremacy of scientific expertise using a temporal distinction between industrial and 
post-industrial societies. It presented the philosophical rational for the combination of 
the limited ability of conventional risk assessment models to predict the future and 
increasing angst about exercising control over the unknown. This chapter considers 
the operation of precaution in Beck’s risk society, and, armed with an understanding 
that scientific parochialism does not always engender ontological security, it shows 
that the practice of resigning the application of precaution to a statistical interpretation 
of the future conceptually limits its application.
The phrase ‘ethics for the future’ is taken from Hans Jonas’ analysis of environmental 
hazards in contemporary society.1 In my opinion, Jonas’ work in this field is 
underrated. Risk literature tends to focus solely on the writings of Beck, Giddens and 
Luhmann, without citing Jonas’ thesis which captures the inadequacies of scientific 
dialogues with the future. This chapter seeks to remedy this oversight.
9.1 Beck’s thesis and the precautionary principle
Academics agfee that the emergence of the precautionary principle is a direct 
response to concern over new dangers threatening modernity. De Sadeleer, for 
example, notes that:-
1 Jonas, H. The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age 
(University of Chicago Press; Chicago; 1979).
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“[t]he emergence of the precautionary principle can be traced from 
disenchantment with classical scientific culture, which, convinced with 
the linear nature of the universe, as predictable as the path of a cannon 
ball, could find a remedy for any problem. Scientific predictability comes 
up against staggering limits in the field of the environment ... 
Contemporary science cannot deliver certainty; as at the end of the day, it 
throws up more questions than it solves.”
It is clear that the precautionary principle is a by-product of conditions specific to the 
modem risk era. Not only has it emerged out of exposure to environmental 
catastrophes, but also out of the realisation that our knowledge of the future is limited. 
It can be said that the precautionary principle has transpired as a result of a desire to 
have control over the uncontrollable future. It has spawned from a deeply-embedded 
confidence in the human ability to manage and manipulate impending dangers, which 
derives from traditionally-scientific approaches to prediction. Yet it also reflects an 
understanding of the limits of the ability of scientific method to determine and make 
safe potential hazards. I will call this ‘the paradox of precaution’.
It is useful here to recall Beck’s temporal distinction. Whereas traditional industrial 
society is underpinned by a compelling faith in science to predict and control future 
hazards, risk society is marked by a desire to extend control of the future coupled with 
an awareness of the inability of existing scientific knowledge to predict prospective 
dangers. Crucially, it is the fear of the unknown, which is notably absent in the 
industrial phase, that has prompted the development of the precautionary principle. 
Yet, according to Beck’s thesis, the conditions in which fear and anxiety are 
entrenched, whilst giving rise to the demand for anticipatory action, render unfeasible 
‘current action’ in the face of future hazards. The precautionary principle intended to 
apply before the materialisation of uncertain environmental hazards. It therefore falls
2 De Sadeleer, N. ‘The Effect of Uncertainty on the Threshold Levels to which the Precautionary 
Principle Appears to be Subject’, in Sheridan, M. and Lavrysen, L. (eds) Environmental Law Principles 
in Practice (Bruylant; Bruxelles; 2002) chapter 1, at page 17.
3 This turn of phrase stems from Luhmann’s thesis, in which he cites ‘the paradox of prevention’: 
Luhmann, N. Risk: A Sociological Theory (Walter de Gruyter; Berlin; 1993) at page 29. The paradox 
is that, although the very notion of anticipatory action is essentially an acknowledgment that the future 
is uncertain, we continue to “actively [seek] out confirmation of the assumption that the course of 
events will remain amenable to control” (at page 29). He concludes that risk-elimination remains a risk 
(at page 30).
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within Beck’s understanding of ‘current action’. However, Beck argues that uncertain 
risks “can only be dealt with retroactively”.4 On the basis of the Beck’s notion of 
current anticipatory action, therefore, the precautionary principle is inoperable. There 
is no basis for precautionary decision-making because there lacks specific knowledge 
in relation to the occurrence and magnitude of potential hazards.
Beck’s argument that hazards in industrial society are statistically predictable, whilst 
those in risk society are unpredictable, brings to light an interesting dilemma for the 
precautionary principle. His thesis works on the premise that, given that threats in the 
industrial can be quantified, future events, even though they have not yet occurred, 
can become the object of current action. Conversely, post-industrial risks that are 
incalculable and uncertain cannot become the object of current action. Beck 
considers that the inherent scientific ambiguity surrounding hazards of risk society 
makes it impossible to control their occurrence or minimise their impact prior to their 
materialisation. According to Beck, the uncertainty manufactured by reflexive 
modernisation creates a conflict with anticipatory action.5 From this perspective, 
therefore, the precautionary principle can only operate in response to calculable and 
scientifically certain threats that are associated with Beck’s industrial society. 
Conversely, the precautionary principle is unworkable in his post-industrial risk 
society.
This position is wholly incompatible not only with the ‘working definition’ of the 
precautionary principle, but also with its underlying objectives. Principle 15 of the 
Rio Declaration states that:-
“[wjhere there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack o f full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost- 
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”6
The application of the precautionary principle depends on there being a degree of 
scientific w/icertainty in relation to potential environmental hazards. Contrary to
4 Beck, U. and Willms, J. Conversations with Ulrich Beck (Polity Press; Cambridge; 2003) at page 135.
5 Beck, U. and Willms, J. (2003) at page 31.
6 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) Declaration, Rio de 
Janeiro, 1992, emphasis added.
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Beck’s argument, and as this definition demonstrates, the precautionary principle as 
an instrument of current action to manage future events, is intended to operate only in 
relation to scientifically wwcertain hazards -  such as those characteristic of Beck’s risk 
society.
This gives rise to an illogical state of affairs. The argument that current action can 
only be retroactive, not proactive, generates a situation in which either the 
precautionary principle is theoretically feasible but never invoked, or desirable but 
unworkable. Although he claims that current action is viable in industrial society 
because hazards are scientifically-certain, precautionary responses to hazards are 
futile by virtue of their statistical certainty and perceived controllability. Precaution 
in risk society, on the other hand, presents an appropriate approach to the unknown, 
although, according to Beck, is inoperable because global, imperceptible, and 
sporadic hazards cannot become the object of anticipatory decision-making.
This stance is not only pessimistic,7 but it is also inconsistent with the affiliation 
between precaution and diminished scientific authority. Although Beck’s modernity 
thesis is useful in explaining the emergence of a precautionary-mindset, his model of 
current action undermines its implementation. With this in mind, it is useful to 
consider the notion of precaution in terms of ‘responsibility’ -  first, because it 
provokes a broader scrutiny of precaution; and second, because it substantiates the 
argument that the d/s-embedding of scientific authority through the precautionary 
principle and the subsequent re-embedding of authority through reliance on risk 
assessment places a constraint on securing responsibility for the impact of decision­
making. The following section shows that the imposition of responsibility through 
the precautionary principle is limited by the institutional failure of science to 
articulate threats that do not fit conventional models of prediction.
Having benefited from an understanding of the relationship between science, risk 
definitions and theories of social constructivism, this section assesses the extent to 
which the precautionary principle can provide us with an ‘ethics for the future’. It 
focuses primarily on the seminal work of Hans Jonas, The Imperative o f
7 This pessimism is evident in Beck’s sentiment: “Yep, there’s no way out, we leave you, to your 
overcivilized fate”, Beck, U. and Willms, J. (2003) at page 204.
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Responsibility, and interposes Jonas’ theory of future-oriented ethics on the ideals of 
precaution. It finds that, despite the depiction of the precautionary principle as a 
manifestation of Jonas’ construction of responsibility for decisions made in the face of 
an unknown future, the ability of the precautionary principle to attribute responsibility 
in practice is offset by an embedded culture of formal scientific discourse and the 
judicial review of decision-making. The upshot is that, whilst the precautionary 
principle is an ostensible mechanism for furnishing decision-making with a 
cognisance for the unpredictable future, its implication is curbed by a continuing 
reliance by policy-makers on scientific fact, extrapolated from past experience.
In order to demonstrate the disparity between scientific and precautionary decision­
making, it is useful to draw upon the seminal work of Hans Jonas -  The Imperative o f  
Responsibility.8 Interestingly, despite the fact that Ulrich Beck’s is frequently hailed 
as the founding author in the fields of risk and modernity,9 Jonas had identified that 
the modem condition presented a new ethical challenge to the traditional control of 
ecological hazards almost a decade before the publication of Beck’s Risk Society.10 It 
is, thus, surprising to find that Jonas’ work tends to be overlooked in studies of 
technologically-generated hazards.
9.2 Conceptual inappropriateness
As Jonas observes:-
“the doer, deed, and effect are no longer the same as they were in the 
[individual] proximate sphere, and which by the enormity of its powers 
forces upon ethics a new dimension of responsibility never dreamed of 
before.”11
8 Jonas, H. (1979).
9 See, for example, McDonell, G. ‘Risk Management, Reality and the Precautionary Principle: Coping 
with Decisions’, in Harding, R. and Fisher, E. (eds) Perspectives on the Precautionary Principle 
(Federation Press; Sydney; 1999) chapter 10 at page 200.
10 Beck, U. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (Sage; London; 1992).
11 Jonas, H. (1979) at page 6.
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Broadly speaking, Jonas concludes that science is incapable of providing us with an
‘ethics of the future’. It has long been recognised that scientific prediction of the
occurrence and magnitude of future hazards is extrapolated from observed past
events. However, the practice of looking to the past to explain the future ignores the
fact that the accuracy with which the past can be extended into the future is wholly
dependent on the future mirroring that which has already occurred. And, as
experience has shown, much of the future transpires in a unique and detached manner,
independent of precedent. Jonas notes that “an extrapolation from presently available
data will always, in certainty and completeness of prediction, fall short of the causal
10 •pregnancy of our technological deeds.” The upshot is that scientific decision­
making is incapable of being mindful of potential and eventual long-term impacts.13 
This inevitably creates a ‘gap’ in responsibility. Given that science cannot 
meaningfully engage with the unknown, it is incapable of establishing responsibility 
for future hazards.14 Adam refers to this as the ‘structural irresponsibility’ of 
science.15
In order to illustrate his argument, Jonas reflected on the nature of ‘traditional’ ethics 
and their inability to ascribe responsibility for latent consequences of decision­
making. Ethics directly relate to human action -  “whether in the form of issuing 
direct enjoinders to do and not to do certain things, or in the form of defining 
principles for such enjoinders, or in the form of establishing the ground of obligation 
for obeying such principles”.16 Jonas observed that the nature of human action in the 
modem era has significantly altered.17 Naturally, this change should be accompanied 
by a change in ethics.18 Yet, the framework of traditional ethics still underpins the 
constmction of responsibility.
Jonas explained that this traditional framework treated tech n e  as an ethically neutral 
realm.19 Since technological enterprise did not interrupt the balance of nature, and
12 Ibid. at page x.
13 Adam, B. (2004) at page 5.
14 Ibid. at page 6.
15 Ibid. at page 4; Beck calls it the ‘non-responsibility of science’, see Beck, U. (1992) at page 214.
16 Jonas, H. (1979) at page 1.
17 Ibid. at page 6.
18 Ibid. at page 1.
19 Ibid. at page 4.
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given that there was no question of it causing permanent injury to the integrity of the
90nonhuman world, it was regarded as being ethically insignificant. In this sense, 
ethical significance was attributed only to activities that influenced humankind. For 
the most part, traditional ethics were anthropocentric, and this was evident in its
maxims -  such as ‘Love thy neighbour as thyself, and ‘Do unto others as you would
21wish them to do unto you’.
This anthropocentricity is explained with reference to the confines within which 
ethics traditionally operated. First, they were limited in space. That is, they 
functioned in a localised manner, in the ‘proximate sphere’22 between friends, 
neighbours, and so on, within the bounds of human interaction. Second, their 
operation was limited in time, confined to the foreseeable within the span of human 
life.23
These spatial and temporal constraints were reflected in the knowledge base required 
to ensure that human action was consistent with ethical maxims. Jonas claimed that, 
as a result of their localised and short-term bearing, ethics in the traditional 
framework needed to be buttressed by ‘ordinary’ intelligence (as opposed to 
expertise) -  that is, knowledge informed by, and accessible to, the general populace. 
However, Jonas detected that the modem age presented novel technological hazards -  
their occurrence and magnitude extending beyond the containment of ‘nearness and 
contemporaneity’.24 The inability of traditional ethics to cultivate control over global 
and long-term impacts reveals not only the vulnerability of nature, but also the 
phenomena that mankind is a causal agent in environmental degradation.25 This 
plight of nature creates new dimensions of responsibility.
In a similar vein to Beck’s theory of reflexive modernisation,26 Jonas describes the 
technological era as ‘cumulatively self-propagating’.27 Modernity generates hazards
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid. at page 5.
22 Ibid. at page 6.
23 Ibid. at page 5.
24 Jonas, H. (1979) at page 7.
25 Ibid. at page 6.
26 See, for example, Beck, U. and Beck-Gemsheim, E. Individualization (Sage; London; 2002) at page 
151.
27 Jonas, H. (1979) at page 7.
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of unprecedented nature, frequency and scale, making them impossible to predict and 
control using past observations. The uncertainty of the future elevates the import of 
knowledge, leading to increasing scientific specialisation and reliance on expertise. 
Paradoxically, however, this escalation in the value of scientific knowledge is 
juxtaposed against its increasing inability to know the future. Jonas remarks that 
science generates :-
“conjectural knowledge of the real and the probable in the realm of facts 
is thus interposed between the ideal knowledge of ethical principles and 
the practical knowledge of political application, which must operate with 
such hypothetical projections of what hope or fear have to expect -  what
9 o
to promote and what to prevent.”
He goes on to note that:-
“[a]s long as the danger is unknown, we do not know what to preserve and 
why. Knowledge of this comes, against all logic and method, from the 
perception of what to avoid. This is perceived first and teaches us, by the 
revulsion of feeling which acts ahead of knowledge, to apprehend the 
value whose antithesis so affects us. We know the thing at stake only
29when we know that it is at stake.”
Thus, until it has transpired, the future is unknowable. Inferring the future from past 
events requires “an exponentially higher degree of science than is already present in 
the technology from which it is to be extrapolated.” Therefore, knowledge of the 
implication of future hazards is forever ‘not yet available’.31 The inherent uncertainty 
of long-term predictions renders ineffectual responsibility for future implications of 
decision-making. In recognition of the futility of extrapolation, Jonas calls for a
'1 ' i
more ‘future-oriented’ framework of ethics as a means of attributing responsibility.
28 Ibid. at page 26.
29 Ibid. at page 27.
30 Ibid. at page 29.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid. at page 30.
33 Ibid. at page 12.
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9.3 Control and responsibility
Jonas identifies two different types of ‘responsibility’ -  first, responsibility in the 
‘formal’ sense of accountability; and second, responsibility in the ‘substantive’ sense 
that someone is a responsible person, i.e., that he or she honours his or her duties or 
responsibilities.34 Whereas the former type is backward-looking in that it is 
dependent on a degree of causal attribution between a decision and its consequences,
■ i t
the latter is “a forward determination of what is to be done”. This distinction is 
critical to Jonas’ thesis. For him, formal responsibility is an ‘empty’ concept because 
it constructs a leg a l, rather than m o ra l, form of accountability. By virtue of the 
principle of causal attribution, a formal responsibility to indemnify can exist 
independently of feelings of guilt. In other words:-
“The damage done must be made good even if the cause was no misdeed, 
and even if the consequence was neither foreseen nor intended. It suffices 
that I was the active cause -  but then again only in close causal connection 
of the consequence with the deed, so that the attribution is clear and the 
consequence does not lose itself in the unforeseeable.”
This formal type is incapable of manufacturing ‘responsibility for the future’ because 
reality has shown that the consequences of modernity transcend the spatial and 
temporal constraints of causal attribution.
Jonas comes to the following conclusion:-
“For it is the future of the whole existence, beyond the direct efficacy of 
the responsible agent and thus beyond his concrete calculation, which is 
the invisible co-object of such a responsibility in each of its single, 
defined occasions. These occasions, and the interventions they provoke, 
are each time about the proximate particular, and this lies more or less
34 Ibid. at page 98.
35 Ibid. at page 92.
36 Ibid. at pages 90-92.
37 Ibid. at page 91.
38 Ibid. at page 90.
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within the range of informed prescience. The totality that will absorb the 
long-range effect of the particular decision is beyond such prescience, not 
only because of the unknown number of unknowns in the equation of 
objective circumstances, but ultimately because of the spontaneity or 
freedom of the life in question -  the greatest of all unknowns, which yet 
must be included in the total responsibility.”
This leads Jonas to refer to futurity as ‘self-owned’,40 suggesting that the future is its 
own guardian of unpredictability. In other words, under the blinkered framework of 
traditional ethics, decisions are made without regard for their latent spatial and 
temporal impact. Naturally, it is irrational to suppose that responsibility can be 
attributed for consequences of which the decision-maker was neither aware, nor 
should have been aware.
It is against this backdrop of ‘structural irresponsibility’ that the continuing societal 
tendency to rely on scientific expertise in decision-making appears all the more 
conspicuous. It is interesting to observe the preservation of scientific dominance in an 
age when science has been proven to have been mistaken in its predictions of the 
future. A plausible explanation for the supremacy of scientific knowledge lies in the 
social desire to establish a legitimate basis for decision-making, which manifests itself 
in a ‘compensation culture’ and “erodes our faith and trust in each other and even 
ourselves.”41 Scientific knowledge has a crucial role in imparting legitimacy to 
publicly scrutinized decision-making, despite the fact that science is exposed to the 
criticism that “opinion is the only possible approach to the future”.42
The precautionary principle can be seen as an attempt to circumvent the structural 
irresponsibility of the formal discourse of science and create an ‘ethics of the future’, 
imposing responsibility for future long-term impacts. On an abstract level, 
subscription to the spirit of precaution is a way of assigning moral responsibility for 
consequences that were unknown at the time of decision-making, thus establishing a
39 Ibid. at page 107.
40 Ibid.
41 Durodie, B. ‘Trust Comes from Expertise’, in Gilland, T. et al, Debating Matters: Science: Can We 
Trust the Experts? (Hodder & Stoughton; London; 2002) Essay Two, at page 30.
42 Luhmann, N. Risk: A Sociological Theory (Walter de Gruyter; Berlin; 1993) at page 214.
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duty to show concern for future generations, in an unknown time and space.43 In 
essence, it is an implicit acknowledgement that techno-scientific progress surpasses 
traditional spatial and temporal confines that are conducive to scientific certainty in 
prediction. From this perspective, and in keeping with the aims of sustainable 
development, the notion of precaution allows us to extend ourselves beyond the 
present without having to rely on extrapolation. It perceives the future as unknowable 
and uncontrollable, and accepts that it is impossible to measure and comprehend 
future hazards unless, and until, they have materialised.
The precautionary principle is bom of the assumption is that “the damaging effects of 
human activities may become irreversible before the scientific community can agree 
the precise nature or scope of their impact”.44 In this sense, it introduces a process of 
artificial and premature closure to decision-making. Given the uncertainty with which 
a threat may present itself, precautionary action must be taken before its spatial and 
temporal impact can be ascertained. Von Moltke explains that:-
“[sjcience almost never provides clear proof of major environmental 
impacts because the environment is too complex to be comprehensively 
described in strictly scientific terms. For example, despite widespread 
acceptance of the firm hypothesis that greenhouse gases are capable of 
trapping heat exist, science remains almost incapable of answering critical 
questions concerning actual environmental responses to changes in their 
concentration in the atmosphere.”45
This forms the bedrock of Jonas’ argument. The limitations of science to produce 
sufficiently predictive knowledge -  described as a ‘disparity between power and 
competence’46 — places an ‘impossible strain’47 on securing responsibility for the 
ecological impact of action. Thus, rather than relying on scientific knowledge to be
43 See Jonas, H. (1979) at page 128.
44 Holder, J. ‘The Precautionary Principle Under UK Environmental Law’, in Holder, J. Impact of EC 
Environmental Law in the UK (Wiley; Chichester; 1997) at page 123.
45 von Moltke, K. ‘The Relationship between Policy, Science, Technology, Economics and Law in the 
Implementation of the Precautionary Principle’, in Freestone, D. and Hey, E. (1996) chapter 6, at page 
98, emphasis added.
46 Jonas, H. (1979) at page 93.
47 Ibid. at page 107.
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mindful of the future,48 Jonas proposes that morality is better equipped to establish 
responsibility than science. Accordingly, moral responsibility can extend farther than 
proximate consequences of decision-making, thus overcoming the problems of 
precognition. Jonas does note, however, that moral responsibility will only be 
effective if it surpasses the ‘critical point of moral theory’, meaning that there must be 
a shift in stimulus -  from willingness to obligation,49
Although Jonas fails to provide any further clarification of this transition, it is possible 
that his notion of ‘obligation’ might be construed in a legal sense. As Part One of this 
thesis has illustrated, despite the fact that the precautionary principle appears in the 
text of a number of legal provisions at international, EC and domestic levels, the 
nature and extent of the obligation it imposes remain unclear. On the basis of Jonas’ 
theory that the reliance on scientific foresight antagonises the ascertainment of formal 
responsibility, it can be said that the practice of using scientific risk assessment to 
determine the application of precaution limits the extent to which responsibility for 
impending hazards might be attributed.
This brings to attention the discord between the forward-looking nature of precaution 
and the backward-looking nature of scientific risk assessment. The precautionary 
principle is less able to secure responsibility for hazards whose quality and impact are 
unknown because risk assessment processes utilise observations of the past to predict 
the future. Despite the fact that the precautionary principle represents a prima facie 
ethical basis for responsibility of future impacts, its ability to achieve such implication 
is curtailed by the institutionally-embedded predicament of science. In other words, 
although the precautionary principle is portrayed as a being a tool to close the 
responsibility gap, its ability to do this is restricted because decision-making institutes 
remain bound by the narrow scope of scientific foresight.50
48 Adam, B. ‘Re-Vision: The Centrality of Time for an Ecological Social Science Perspective’, in Lash, 
S. et al (eds) Risk, Environment and Modernity -  Towards a New Ecology (Sage; London; 1996) 
chapter 3, at pages 98-99.
49 Jonas, H. (1979) at page 129.
50 Beck makes a similar argument, stating that:-
“[t]he promotion and protection of ‘scientific progress’ and of ‘the freedom of science’ 
become the greasy pole on which the primary responsibility for political arrangements 
slips from the democratic political system into the context of economic and techno-
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Although responsibility might formally be attributed to scientists or politicians who 
base their decisions of scientific knowledge of the future, it is of little practical 
consequence. Value-laden decisions can be defended on the ground that they relied 
on ‘sound science’. Any undesirable consequences of decision-making are accredited 
to knowledge that displayed scientific traits of rationality and certitude. The innate 
legitimacy, therefore, of scientific means of prediction is counteracted by its inability 
to know the future. Attaching responsibility through the precautionary principle is 
likely to be a futile exercise because its own capacity to ascertain the likely 
consequence of potential hazards is offset by its scientific basis of its application. The 
result is that, despite the fact that the precautionary principle is presented as a means 
of establishing a dialogue with the undesirable impacts of technological advance, the 
ability of precaution to develop a consciousness for the future is undercut by the 
scientific domination of risk decision-making.
In the face of risk-complexity -  the need for ‘decidability’ increases, but decisions are 
increasingly disabled.51 Decisions are disabled because risks are incalculable. 
Accordingly:-
“the catastrophic potential of an increasing number of our ... industrial 
activities has magnified beyond the comprehensible (e.g. Chernobyl, 
biochemical warfare, genetics). The established institutionalization of 
‘risk’ in terms of ‘insurance’ (coupling risk with money and the future) 
has collapsed because it has become clear that this catastrophic potential 
can no longer be grasped in the form of the commodity fetish to which 
money is related. The probability/magnitude nexus of this catastrophic 
potential thus becomes incalculable in so far as it has lost its ultimate 
point of reference. Hence, as the need for more complex and more precise
scientific non-politics, which is not democratically legitimated.” (Beck, U. (1992) at 
page 186).
51 Adam, B. and Van Loon, J. ‘Introduction: Repositioning Risk; the Challenge for Social Theory’, in 
Adam, B. et al (eds) (2000) at page 13; see also Adam, B. ‘Values in the Cultural Timescapes of 
Science’, in Lash, S. et al (eds) Time and Value (Blackwell; Oxford; 1998) pages 227-244.
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calculations rises with the increased complexity of risk, so does the
• C limpossibility to establish such calculations.”
The precautionary principle is presented as a means through which decisions can be 
made in the absence of certainty. It can be interpreted as encouraging decidability in 
the face of the unknown. Yet, in the light of the fact that the instigation of 
precautionary responses is traditionally governed by risk calculation, it can be argued 
that the operation of the precautionary principle is equally disabled.
Part Three of this thesis provides a detailed examination of the UK BSE epidemic. It 
illustrates that the utility of precaution in the face of threats posed by the bovine 
disease was undermined by an institutional focus on scientific knowns, as opposed to 
unknowns.
52 Adam, B. and Van Loon, J. (2000) at page 13.; see also Adam, B. (1998); and, Colbom, T. et al, 
Our Stolen Future (Plume; New York; 1996); Ratzan, S. C. The Mad Cow Crisis: Health and the 
Public Good (University College Press; London; 1998) at page 13.
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Part Three
Case study: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: scientific 
risk assessment risk regulation and the role of precaution
“For the majority of administrative lawyers ... expertise and science have been 
transplantable black boxes that can be slotted into any particular area of the 
law. These different boxes are rarely opened up and subjected to critical
analysis.”53
53 Fisher, E. ‘The Rise of the Risk Commonwealth and the Challenge for Administrative Law’ (2003) 
Public Law 455, at page 467.
Chapter Ten 
A case study: the BSE episode. Evidence of the institutional
marginalisation of uncertainty., the supremacy of scientific risk 
assessment, and the limited impact of precaution
10.0 Introduction
The Government’s handling of the BSE crisis from the mid 1980s onwards has 
generated fervent criticism of, and remorse for, the way in which the episode panned 
out. Millstone, for example, counts the saga as “the single biggest failure of UK 
public policy since the Suez debacle of 1956”.1 Jacob and Hellstrom describe it as 
“one of the most costly public policy crises of the decade”2 and “an institutionally 
predicated crisis of risk management.”3
There is little doubt amongst academic commentators, politicians, scientists, and the 
public at large, that the BSE crisis was indicative of the limits of human intervention 
in nature.4 It stands out in history as marking the point in contemporary society at 
which mistrust in scientific evidence was prevalent, bringing into sharp focus the 
fallibility of traditional images of the controllability and certitude of the future. 
Existing literature tends to frame it as a defining moment in the demise of the 
longstanding supremacy of scientific knowledge in risk analysis,5 depicting the 
episode as archetypal evidence of the constraints of conventional models of 
prediction.
1 Millstone, E. ‘When, Where and Why Does Evidence Matter to Policy-Makers?’, a transcript of a talk 
at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) 30 April 2003, see 
http://www.odi.org.uk/rapid/Meetings/Evidence/Presentation Millstone.html. accessed in November 
2004.
2 Jacob, M. and Hellstrom, T. ‘Policy Understanding of Science, Public Trust and the BSE-CJD Crisis’ 
(2000) 78 Journal of Hazardous Materials 303-317, at page 305.
3 Ibid. at page 306.
4 Vos, E. ‘EU Food Safety Regulation in the Aftermath of the BSE Crisis’ (2000) 23 Journal of 
Consumer Policy 227-255, at page 227.
5 Beck, U. and Willms, J. Conversations with Ulrich Beck (Polity Press; Cambridge; 2003) at pages 
121-128.
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The admission by the Government in March 1996 that there might be a link between 
BSE in cattle and new variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (‘CJD’) in humans prompted 
fierce debate over the relationship between science, risk, law, and precaution. Given 
that the Government chose legislation as the principal vehicle through which the 
disease could be controlled, an analysis of the interface between the legal response to 
BSE and notions of risk and scientific certitude is of utmost importance. In particular, 
the BSE episode draws attention to the inter-relationship between the legal regulation 
of uncertainty and science, highlighting that modernity has placed new demands on 
scientific prediction which have undermined the legitimacy of the dependence of law 
on notions of scientific certainty, reason, and rationality. One of the remarkable 
achievements of the modem risk society has been the reconstruction of the concepts 
of ‘sound science’ and ‘expertise’. This has led to the recognition that claims made 
by science to objectivity are severely destabilised by the relativist position, and that, 
contrary to traditional scientific thinking, the notion of expertise is both highly 
specific and at the same time is able to encompass an extraordinarily wide range of 
knowledge-holders. However, despite a full-frontal attack on the philosophical 
underpinnings of science, the fundamental principles of objectivity, rationality, 
certitude, and expertise continue to be prominent in the assessment of risk. That is to 
say, whilst there is some disciplinary acknowledgement of the contribution made by 
the social sciences in relation to the problems of indeterminacy, contradiction and 
uncertainty, the practice of risk analysis confirms that the formal discourse of physical 
science is authoritative in its understanding of the world.
The reliance of risk assessment on science is evident throughout the administration of 
the BSE epidemic. In particular, the analogy drawn between BSE in cattle and 
scrapie in sheep (the ‘scrapie analogy’) illustrated that scientific risk assessment was 
based on the notion that observations of past events could be projected into the future 
as a means of prediction. By applying the knowledge that scrapie was incapable of 
transmitting to humans, Government scientists were able to conclude that it was 
highly unlikely, if not implausible, that BSE would pose a risk to human health. Yet, 
as the following excerpt from Bernstein’s Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story o f  
Risk shows, calculating the magnitude and scale of future events on the basis of 
knowledge of the past is often a futile exercise. He states that:-
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“[w]e cannot enter data about the future into the computer because such 
data are inaccessible to us. So we pour in data from the past to fuel the 
decision-making mechanisms created by our models, be they linear or 
nonlinear. But therein lies the logician’s trap: past data from real life 
constitute a sequence of events rather than a set of independent 
observations, which is what the laws of probability demand. History 
provides us with only one sample of the economy and the capital markets, 
not with thousands of separate and randomly distributed numbers. Even 
though many economic and financial variables fall into distributions that 
approximate a bell curve, the picture is never perfect. Once again, 
resemblance to the truth is not the same as truth. It is in those outliers and 
imperfections that the wildness lurks.”6
The failure of the Government to recognise the fallibility of its predictions that the 
human consumption of BSE-infected meat was safe is central to the following study 
of the intersection between law and science. It is important to note that, in using the 
term ‘science’, there is a distinction between the individual scientist and science as an 
institution. Such as distinction is as inevitable as it is necessary, for it cannot be 
assumed that any activity undertaken by a scientist is to be automatically regarded as 
‘sound science’. Flaws in the scientific assessment of the risk of BSE are attributable 
to the institution of science, and criticism of the idealistic notions of objectivity and 
certitude are directed towards the formal discourse of science.7
6 Bernstein, P. L. Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk (John Wiley & Sons; New York; 
1996) at page 335.
7 Jones, B. D. identifies three aspects of formal scientific discourse in the policy-making: -
a. Isolating out one motive from a panoply of those that drive congressional behaviour;
b. Ignoring the fundamental role of uncertainty; and
c. Dismissing aspects of ‘organisational culture’.
These themes of precision and impartiality pervade conventional analyses of the formal discourse of 
science. See Jones, B. D. ‘Bounded Rationality and Political Science: Lessons from Public 
Administration and Public Policy’ (2003) 13(4) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 
395-412, at pages 405-406. This argument reflects Jasanoffs argument that “science is ordinarily seen 
as set apart from all other social activities by virtue of its institutionalized procedures for overcoming 
particularity and context dependence and its capacity for generating claims of universal validity.” See 
Jasanoff, S. Science at the Bar: Science and Technology in American Law (Harvard University Press; 
Harvard; 1997) at page 7.
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To a large extent, the problem of ascertaining the ‘proper’ role of science in risk 
decision-making remains unresolved. The aim here is not to propose an exhaustive 
model of a more pragmatic relationship between law, science, and risk. Instead, it 
uncovers some of the major themes arising from the regulation of BSE, with specific 
reference to the notion of scientific certainty and the precautionary principle. 
Furthermore, whilst this study exposes the weaknesses in the management of BSE and 
comments on the more abstract liaison of law with science, its focus does not stray too 
far from the sobering reality of the human impact of CJD. Even though issues 
relating to the legislative response to scientific uncertainty, definitions of risk, and the 
role of precaution form the substance of this examination, it is important that the 
gravity of the human health implications of BSE are not altogether overlooked.
The BSE episode was unique in that it brought about an unprecedented consumer 
backlash against official advice. The crisis in consumer confidence in the safety of 
beef8 played a key role in the Government’s repeated assertions that, as a matter of 
scientific fact, the BSE agent was incapable of jumping the species barrier from cattle 
to humans. Moreover, the epidemic effectively reduced the ostensible distance 
between the consumer and the agricultural industry, effectively shortening the supply 
chain. As a result of this newfound proximity, consumers suddenly became key 
players in the social construction of risk. As Chambers observes
“[t]he link between the bright red, clean meat which appears on white 
plastic trays wrapped in cling film on supermarket shelves and the animals 
-  stunned, killed, bled, eviscerated and sawn up on production lines in the 
slaughterhouse -  has not always been obvious to the public now for many 
years.
The BSE crisis had an enormous impact on the way in which consumers perceived 
bovine products, triggering deep-rooted public anxiety about the credibility of 
scientific evidence and the sincerity of Government assurances that BSE posed a 
minimal danger to consumers. Provoked by intense media interest, commentators
8 Donnelly, C. A. et al ‘A Review of the BSE Epidemic in British Cattle’ (1999) 5(3) Ecosystem Health 
164-173, at page 165.
9 Chambers, G. R. ‘The BSE Crisis and the European Parliament’ in Joerges, C. and Vos, E. (eds) EU 
Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics (Hart Publishing; Oxford; 1999) 95-106, at page 97.
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were quick to interpret the Government’s insistence on a firm scientific basis for 
action as a “barely concealed conspiracy”10 or “an easy way in which its own 
uncritical support for the agriculture and food industries could be justified.”11 
Without doubt, the strict reliance on arguments derived from scientific evidence raises 
contentious issues about the role of science in risk assessment and the formulation of 
legislation. The Government’s staunch adherence to scientific findings continued 
throughout the episode, in spite of the fact that there was evidence to suggest that the 
adoption of the precautionary principle would have better suited the political needs at 
that time.12
Although a narrative account of events is necessary in order to set the scene, this case 
study aims to avoid simply reproducing findings already documented in the Phillips 
Inquiry. It is hardly surprising that, given that the disease was first acknowledged 
almost twenty years ago, a vast amount of literature has been generated during that 
time. Retrospective studies of the spread and impact of the disease have tended to 
present a narrative of events, without exploring the finer details of the interplay 
between science, uncertainty, and the regulation of risk through legal provisions. This 
case study avoids reproducing previously documented findings, and examines how 
the framing of risk definitions had a critical bearing on the application of the 
precautionary principle and, more generally, on the regulation of the future via the 
law.
10.1 BSE and scientific supremacy
If nothing else, the BSE crisis is a textbook example of the exclusivity of risk 
definitions fostering scientific supremacy. In particular, this chapter explains that the 
authority bestowed upon scientific opinion throughout the entire episode was 
reflective of two major aspects of decision-making. First, the reductionist and 
deterministic characteristics of scientific discourse generate abstract and universal 
numerical expressions of chance, allowing risk governance to be based on specific
10 Winter, M. ‘Intersecting Departmental Responsibilities, Administrative Confusion and the Role of 
Science in Government: the Case of BSE’ (1996) 49(4) Parliamentary Affairs 550-565, at page 561.
11 Ibid.
12 ruu
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and seemingly uncontested knowledge. The conviction with which evidence was 
presented, particularly during the early years of the BSE crisis, was indicative of the 
underlying scientific assumptions of quantification and certitude. Indeed, prior to 
official acknowledgement that CJD might be associated with the consumption of 
infected bovine products, the official standpoint was founded on the notion that the 
threat of transmission was ascertainable, and was known to be low.
Second, uncertainty in respect of the transmission of BSE to humans itself heightened 
both expert and public consciousness of unpredictable consequences, triggering an 
increase in the demand for a secure future. Paradoxically, and notwithstanding the 
implicit recognition of the limits of scientific prognoses, the role of science in 
assessing the unknown was elevated above lay predictions as a means of recreating 
certainty through statistics. Political pressures to control public fear and to protect the 
commercial interests of agricultural export placed impossible demands on 
Government Ministers to suppress the communication of uncertainty, and construct a 
controllable and definable risk. To a large extent, the manufacturing of certainty is 
evident in the scientific analysis of the threat posed. Any gaps in knowledge of the 
cause, transmissibility, infectivity, and incubation period of the BSE agent were 
implicitly plugged by political and commercial objectives, meaning that the scientific 
definition of risk was surreptitiously shaped by the context of its construction.
The investigation begins with a study into the way in which the threat of the 
transmission of BSE from cattle to humans was represented. It shows that, despite the 
indisputable uncertainty of both the likelihood and impact of transmission, the 
possibility of BSE jumping the species barrier was presented as a known risk. Instead 
of acknowledging that the BSE agent posed a threat beyond the capacity of human 
knowledge, it was depicted as being an identifiable and definite risk. Statements 
about human susceptibility to the disease were made on the basis that there was a 
statistically-determined risk of infection between zero and one. This risk-based 
modelling of exposure to the human population, conducted before March 1996, led to 
affirmative conclusions that the risk of transmission was either non-existent, or 
negligible. Ministers and Government scientists made assertions within the 
parameters of the definition of risk -  claiming either that “BSE is most unlikely to
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have any implications for human health” (i.e. low risk), or that “we can say with 
confidence that beef can be eaten safely by everyone, both adults and children”14 (i.e. 
no risk).
The impact of this risk discourse was profound, proving to be a pivotal factor in the 
shaping of subsequent legislative provisions. In order to demonstrate the effect of 
what might be called ‘the bureaucracy of risk’, it is argued that the use of the term 
‘risk’ during the BSE episode secured, by virtue of its innate exclusivity, the 
supremacy of scientific opinion. Instead of acknowledging the uncertainty with 
which BSE manifested itself, the Government’s uncontested reliance on the findings 
of ‘establishment’ expertise was testimony not only to the underlying tenets of 
scientific prediction, but also to a political desire to exercise control over the 
unknown.
10.2 What are TSEs?
Winter is right to observe that the presence of TSEs in animals is not a new 
phenomenon -  they have been detected in a number if different species for some 
time,15 manifesting as scrapie in sheep and goats, Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) in 
wild deer in North America, and Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy (TME).16 
Human TSEs include Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD), Grestmann-Straussler 
Syndrome (GSS), kuru, and Fatal Familial Insomnia (FFI).17 TSEs are characterised 
by small vacuoles in the brain, leading to progressively severe psychomotor 
dysfunction.18 In 1982, Prusiner discovered that the infectious agents of TSEs were 
infectious proteins or ‘prions’ (proteinaceous infectious particles).19 He found that 
prions are transmissible particles composed exclusively of modified protein. Protein 
can exist in both toxic and non-toxic isoforms. Prusiner suggested that toxic isoforms
13 Cited in Consumers in Europe Group, BSE: Briefing and Recommendations from Consumers in 
Europe Group (Consumers in Europe Group; London; 1996) at page 4.
14 John Gummer (Minister of Agriculture, 1989-93) HC Debates 21 May 1990 at page 82.
15 Winter, M. (1996) at page 551.
16 Prusiner, S. B. ‘Prion Diseases and the BSE Crisis’ (1997) 278 Science 245-51, at page 245.
17 Ibid.
18 Donnelly, C. A. et al (1999) at page 165.
19 Prusiner, S. B. ‘Novel Proteinaceous Infectious Particles Cause Scrapie’ (1982) 216 Science 136- 
144.
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are capable of converting non-toxic counterparts, resulting in the self-propagation of 
infectious cells. Brain damage is thought to occur when abnormal prion protein enters 
into the brain causing normal protein to adopt a new, infectious, structure.20
It is possible that scrapie in sheep was identified as early as the eighteenth century,21 
although the first published commentary of the disease appeared in 1913.22 It is a 
globally endemic condition, except in Australia and New Zealand, and clinical
' j ' y
symptoms include nervousness, pruritis, and lack of coordination. Early studies 
claimed that scrapie was a hereditary condition. However, in 1936 Cuille and Chelle 
established that it could be transmitted by the exposure of sheep to affected sheep 
brain.24 Subsequent studies were successful in transmitting scrapie to goats,25 mice,26 
and hamsters27 through contact with infected tissue.
Approximately 200 years after the first clinical identification of scrapie, a TSE 
affecting humans was recognised by Creutzfeldt and Jakob. The disease later 
became known as ‘Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease’ (CJD). Although relatively little is 
known about CJD in comparison with other TSEs, it is thought to be a rare disease, on
on
a global scale affecting approximately one in a million people per year. There is a
20 Chesebro, B. ‘Enhanced: BSE and Prions: Uncertainties About the Agent’ (1998) 279(5347) Science 
42-3, at page 42.
21 Some commentators claim that scrapie was first identified in 1720 -  see, for example Donnelly, C. 
A. et al (1999) at page 165; and, Parry, H. B. ‘Scrapie: A Transmissible and Heredity Disease of 
Sheep’ (1962) 17 Heredity 75-105. The BSE Inquiry Report, on the other hand, claims that the first 
record of the disease was made in 1732: see The Inquiry into BSE and Variant CJD in the United 
Kingdom (HMSO; London; 2000) referred to as the ‘BSE Inquiry’ hereafter, in particular, Volume 2, 
Chapter 2, page 22, at section 2.10 .
22 Stockman, S. ‘Scrapie: An Obscure Disease of Sheep’ (1913) 26 Journal of Comparative Pathology 
317-327.
23 BSE Inquiry (2000): Volume 2, Chapter 2, page 21, at section 2.7.
24 See Cuille, J. and Chelle, P. L. ‘La maladie dite tremblante du mouton est-elle inoculable?’ (1936) 
203 Comptes Rendus Des Seances de TAcademie de Sciences 1552-1554.
25 Pattison, I. et al (1959) ‘Experimental Production of Scrapie in Goats’ (1959) 69 Journal of 
Comparative Pathology 300-312.
26 Chandler, R. (1961) ‘Encephalopathy in Mice Produced by Inoculation with Scrapie Brain Material’ 
(1961) 277(7191) The Lancet 1378-1379.
27 Marsh, R. and Kimberlin, R. (1975).
28 See Creutzfeldt, H. G. ‘Uber eine eigenartige herdformige Erkrankung des Zentralnervensystems’ 
(1921) 57 Zeitschriftfur die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie 1-18.
29 See Jakob, A. ‘liber eigenartige Erkrankung des Zentralnervensystems mit bemerkenswertem 
anatomischen Befunde: (spatische Pseudosklerose-Encephalomyelopathie mit disseminierten 
Degenerationsherden)’ (1921) 64 Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie 147-228; 
Jakob, A. ‘Uber eine der multiplen Sklerose klinishe nahestehende Erkrankung des 
Zentralnervensystems (spatische Pseudosklerose) mit bemerkenswertem anatomischen Befunde: 
Mitteilung eines vierten Falles’ (1921) 17 Medicine Klinik 372-376.
30 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 2, Chapter 2, page 24, at section 2.21.
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risk, however, that its prevalence is underestimated since its symptoms are consistent 
with Alzheimer’s Disease, Parkinson’s Disease and Huntington’s Disease.31 The
' I ' j
average age of the contraction of CJD is 65 years, and symptoms include memory 
loss and confusion, progressive dementia, loss of coordination, involuntary 
movements, blindness and loss of speech.33 Evidence shows that the CJD is fatal 
within six to 12 months of the onset of symptoms.34
10.3 Crossing the species barrier?
In 1959, recognising similarities between two progressive degenerative disorders of 
the central nervous system, Hadlow identified a connection between scrapie, affecting 
sheep, and a human TSE, kuru, affecting the Fore natives in the Eastern Highlands of 
Papua New Guinea.35 Kuru is a form of CJD which was first identified in 1957 when 
Zigas and Gajdusek recognised that the disease affected approximately ten per cent of
o r
the Papua New Guinean tribal population. Hadlow subsequently drew parallels 
between epizootiological, aetiological, clinical, and pathological characteristics of the 
two diseases,37 and he concluded that the overall resemblance between scrapie and 
kuru was “too impressive to be ignored.”38
A study conducted by Gajdusek and Gibbs in 1972 advanced the argument that, not 
only were there similarities between scrapie and human TSEs, but that scrapie could 
be transmitted to primates via oral and intracerebral exposure.39 An explicit link 
between scrapie and CJD was first made in five years later in October 1977 at an
31 Donnelly, C. A. et al (1999) at page 166; Sielder, H. and Malmund, N. ‘Creutzfeldt-Jakob’s Disease’ 
(1963) 22 Journal of Neuropathology and Experimental Neurology 381-402.
32 Donnelly, C.A. et al (1999) at page 166.
33 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 2, Chapter 2, pages 24-25, at section 2.21.
34 Ibid.
35 Hadlow, W. J. ‘Scrapie and Kuru’ (1959) 274(7097) The Lancet 289-290, at page 289.
36 See Zigas, V. and Gajdusek, D. ‘Kuru: Clinical Study of a New Syndrome Resembling Paralysis 
Agitans in Natives of the Eastern Highlands of Australian New Guinea’ (1957) 2 Medical Journal of 
Australia 745-54.
37 Hadlow, W. J. (1959) at page 290.
38 Ibid.
39 See Gajdusek, D. C. and Gibbs, C. ‘Transmission of Kuru from Man to Rhesus Monkey (Macaca 
Mulatta) Eight-and-a-Half Years after Inoculation’ (1972) 240 Nature 351; Gajdusek, D. C. et al 
‘Experimental Transmission of a Kura-like Syndrome to Chimpanzees’ (1966) 209 Nature 794-6.
233
Agricultural Research Council meeting, chaired by the Hon. J. J. Astor.40 The 
Council concluded that the epidemiology of scrapie could be related to man, raising 
the question of the safety of those working with sheep.41 Concerns were also raised 
about the public reaction to news of potential risk between infected sheep and a threat 
to human health. The British sheep export industry at the time was worth an 
estimated £100 million per annum, and there was consensus that disclosure of a 
potential risk could place the industry “in considerable jeopardy” 42
Results presented at a Medical Research Council meeting held in March 1978, chaired 
by Professor Walton, showed that there was no evidence that anyone working with 
scrapie diseased animals had developed CJD,43 and Council members concluded that 
existing mortality data was “likely to be inaccurate”.44 However, it is worth noting 
that the Council observed that the epidemiology of CJD was “poorly understood”45 
and that a connection between scrapie and CJD could not be ruled out entirely before 
there was concrete evidence that scrapie did not pose a threat to humans.46
10.4 MAFF and the regulation of animal disease in the late 1970s
It is unsurprising that, in the light of the heightened focus on the unknown impact of 
scrapie, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) became increasingly 
concerned about risks posed by the transmission of zoonoses through use of infected 
animal carcasses in animal feed. In 1978, the Labour administration introduced 
proposals for the drafting of secondary legislation, pursuant to the Disease of Animals 
Act 1950 to impose controls on rendering process to provide protection against food- 
borne diseases such as salmonella. The proposed Protein Processing Order required 
that domestic rendering plants were regulated by licensing system -  the granting of a 
license being subject to the rendering process being capable of destroying particular
40 Agricultural Research Council Report of Advisory Committee on Scrapie Research, Meeting of the 
Council 11 October 1977, YB77/10.11/1.1-1.4.
41 Ibid. at section 1.3.
42 Ibid. at section 1.4.
43 YB78/3.9/1.1-1.5, at 1.3.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid. at 1.4.
46 Ibid.
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disease organisms. A Joint Consultation Paper produced by MAFF, the Department 
of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland, and the Welsh Office Agriculture 
Department, explained that the Order was a necessary and long-awaited response to 
the growing concern about the increasing incidence of salmonella infection in 
livestock and poultry, and food poisoning in human beings caused by the 
contamination of animal protein. It claimed that there was ‘strong evidence’ to 
suggest that a ‘uniformly high standard of hygiene’ in the protein processing industry 
would significantly reduce the spread of infection.47
The 1978 licensing proposals were abandoned by the newly elected Conservative 
Government in favour of a far less radical approach48 of prescribing and enforcing 
observance of animal feed standards.49 According to the Phillips Inquiry, the 
rendering industry at that time was “virtually unregulated in terms of quality control 
and production methods”.50 The Diseases of Animals (Protein Processing) Order 
1981, pursuant to the Diseases of Animals Act 1950, was directed primarily at 
controlling salmonella and similar organisms in meat and bone meal. It was based on 
a regime of testing animal feed for salmonella as an indicator of the efficacy of the 
rendering process, giving an ‘authorised officer’ powers to enter any premises which 
he had reasonable grounds for believing were being used for the purpose of 
processing animal protein. In relation to eh implementation of the Order, the 
Secretary of State for Wales noted that:-
“[i]f you had a negative for salmonella, then the Ministry went away quite 
happily for six months”.51
It is often argued that these changes in rendering practice were symptomatic the 
deregulation principles of Thatcher’s administration. Winter suggests that the 
changes might be more suitably attributed to shifts in market patterns and health
47 Joint Consultation Paper by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the Department of 
Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland and the Welsh Office Agricultural Department April 1978 
‘Protein Processing’, YB 78/04.00/1.1-1.25 at 1.1-1.2.
48 MAFF Annual Report of the Agricultural Development and Advisory Service (MAFF, HMSO; 
London; 1980) at pages 9-10.
49 The Diseases of Animals (Protein Processing) Order 1981 SI 1981 No.676 (subsequently updated by 
SI 1989 No.661; Winter, M. (1996) at page 551.
50 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 13, paragraph 6.51.
51 Transcript number 19, at page 27.
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concerns.52 Although this thesis is not charged with determining the grounds for 
deregulation, it is interesting, from a legal perspective, to observe a pattern of 
deregulation immediately prior to the identification of BSE in contrast to a phase of 
re-regulation in response to the bovine disease.
It is now widely accepted that the relaxation of rendering controls is the most likely 
explanation for the transmission of BSE to humans.53 The rendering process relies on 
the use of solvents to remove fat, followed by heat treatment to remove solvents. 
During the 1970s, the market for fat products declined, and concerns were raised 
about the carcinogenic properties of residual solvents and that the health risks created 
by the heat treatment processes. In response, the temperature at which rendering 
occurred was significantly reduced in the early 1980s. It is argued that infective 
agents associated with scrapie and BSE are able to survive heat processing, leading to 
the introduction of infected animal proteins used in animal feed.
10.5 The marginalisation of uncertainty: defining the potential implications of 
BSE using the rhetoric of risk
Without doubt, one of the most interesting aspects of the BSE episode is the way in 
which scientific uncertainty in respect of the transmissibility of BSE to humans was 
marginalised at an institutional level. The term ‘institutional’ is used here in two 
different senses -  first, to describe institution of science, encompassing its 
conventional methods of inquiry and analysis, and furthermore, its precepts of 
rationality, certitude and, objectivity; and second, in relation to the institution of 
Government, its Departments and Ministries, and the system of Government 
administration within which Ministers and their civil servants operate. Although the 
political administration of the epidemic and the scientific analyses underpinning the 
response were necessarily interrelated components in the collective response to BSE, 
and to that end ought to be dealt with as being tantamount to each other, the 
distinction is useful because it allows for an unprecedented consideration of the way
52 Winter, M. (1996) at page 551.
53 Ibid.
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in which notions of uncertainty and risk were dealt with in specific political and 
scientific contexts.
The following section draws upon two theories emerging from the BSE crisis -  the 
first portrays the marginalisation of scientific uncertainty; and the second exposes the 
construction of an ascertained risk notwithstanding pervasive uncertainty -  although it 
is important to recognise that both theories are two sides of the same coin. The 
practice of marginalising scientific uncertainty necessarily implies that greater value 
is ascribed to the prospect of being able to define the future as an unambiguous 
expression of risk than to acknowledging that the future is an unknowable and 
uncontrollable entity. Conversely, the process by which prospective hazards are 
defined as fixed and foreseeable risks is a manifestation of the argument that all 
eventualities can be articulated in quantitatively certain terms, and, more importantly, 
that the notion of scientific uncertainty can be circumvented by specific measures of 
risk. To the extent that scientific risk assessment is able to calculate the likelihood 
and potential magnitude of forthcoming hazards, the notion of uncertainty is marginal.
Using as a framework the institutional distinction between the political and the 
scientific handling of BSE, outlined above, this chapter draws attention to both 
aspects of uncertainty and risk. It is split into two parts. The first examines scientific 
assessments undertaken in relation to the threat of BSE. It observes that, in 
accordance with the consensus of the scientific community, it was widely accepted 
that BSE was a strain of bovine scrapie. With reference to Kuhn’s notion of the 
‘scientific paradigm’, it shows that science-based risk assessments reflected a 
consensus amongst Government scientists that both the likelihood of the transmission 
of BSE to humans, and the subsequent threat of adverse consequences, were 
negligible. From this perspective, and applying Kuhn’s thesis of scientific revolution, 
it can be said that the findings of scientific risk assessment mirrored the ‘paradigmatic 
consensus’. However, the validity of this paradigmatic consensus depended entirely 
on the legitimacy of the comparison drawn between BSE in cattle and scrapie in 
sheep. It is clear that assessments of the risk posed to human health by BSE were 
based firmly on the position that BSE and scrapie were analogous diseases. Yet, as 
this chapter illustrates, the knowledge upon which risk assessments in relation to BSE 
were based lacked both in applicability and comprehensiveness. Even though
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information about the nature of the BSE agent was deficient -  making it impossible to 
come to any definite conclusions about its capacity to infect humans -  the threat of 
human transmission was nonetheless constructed in definite terms as a risk, as 
opposed to uncertainty. The root of the problem is explained through a more general 
critique of conventional risk assessment. The fundamental issue here is the 
dependence of risk assessment procedures on existing evidence obtained from 
observations of a broadly similar event. Under the heading ‘Asking the Wrong 
Questions ’, this section illustrates that the backward-looking nature of risk assessment 
models is profoundly incompatible with the forward-looking character of anticipatory 
regulation. Whilst declarations that there was no evidence of human susceptibility to 
BSE were factually accurate, they were improperly used as a means of bestowing 
scientific legitimacy upon predictions that the risk of transmission was either 
nonexistent, or low. Thus, whilst the scrapie analogy was an effective vehicle 
allowing for definite expressions of risk on the ground that there was no evidence of 
human infection, it was nonetheless meaningless as a way of predicting the unknown 
impact of BSE.
The second part of this chapter focuses on the marginalisation of uncertainty and 
construction of risk in the political administration of the BSE episode. In doing so, it 
points to the communication of risk, both within Government departments and 
between the Government and the public. Under the heading ‘Reassurances o f Safety \ 
it is shown that Government officials were improperly selective in their interpretation 
of scientific advice. This section presents a sample of internal and external dialogue 
regarding the threat of BSE to illustrate that, in spite of that fact that scientific studies 
often conceded that it might take a number of years until the real impact of BSE could 
be measured, the Government maintained its dogmatic stance that British beef was 
safe to eat. Irrespective of growing concern expressed by independent scientists and 
the media that models assessing the human implications of BSE should be taken as 
having wide margins of confidence, the Government continued to have uttermost faith 
in scientific analyses, placing scientifically-certain evidence at the core of its policy 
and legislative initiatives. Two explanations are presented in an attempt to account 
for this political marginalisation of uncertainty. First, relating specifically to the 
functions of MAFF, it is argued that the Government acted so as to protect the 
commercial interests of the agricultural export industry. Second, and on a more
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general note, the prospect of decisions being subject to judicial review is manifestly 
incompatible with the notion of ‘scientific Mwcertainty’ -  thus cultivating the practice 
of demanding scientific certainty before decisions are made.
This combination of the scientific and political understanding of BSE resulted in the 
threat of transmissibility to humans being presented as a known risk, albeit a remote 
one. In effect, both scientific and political interpretations of the potential implications 
of BSE were framed in such a way that scientific uncertainty became a peripheral 
matter. This chapter refers to the tangential treatment of uncertainty as ‘the 
marginalisation of uncertainty’.
10.6 The marginalisation of uncertainty in scientific assessment: the ‘scrapie 
origin theory’
In scientific analyses of the transmissibility of the BSE agent, models used to predict 
patterns of infectivity, susceptibility, and transmission routes were based wholly on 
retrospective studies of scrapie. From the outset, a pathological analogy was drawn 
between BSE and scrapie. The BSE Inquiry explained that, “[a]s scrapie in sheep and 
goats was the only TSE known to affect farm animals in the UK, it was the main 
candidate for the source of the epidemic in cattle.”54 The results of an initial 
epidemiological investigation, published in the Veterinary Record in December 1988, 
concluded that it was most likely that BSE derived from existing strains of scrapie.55 
It found that, although there was no evidence to suggest that direct transmission 
occurred between sheep and cattle, exposure to the scrapie agent through sheep offal 
in cattle feedstuffs was the probable cause of infection. Furthermore, it recognised 
that, given that cattle had only become infected with BSE after changes in the 
rendering process, rendering had failed to inactivate scrapie. The conclusion was 
drawn that cattle had always been susceptible to the scrapie agent, although in the
54 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 2, Chapter 3, at paragraph 3.16.
55 Wilesmith, J. et al ‘Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: Epidemiological Studies’ (1988) 123 
Veterinary Record 638-44.
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past, their exposure to it had been insufficient to cause any noticeable incidence of 
disease.56
The views expressed by experts in the late 1980s and early 1990s were steadfast in 
their commitment to the theory that scrapie and BSE were essentially the same strain 
of TSE. The prevailing opinion was that BSE was simply ‘scrapie in cows’,57 or 
‘bovine scrapie’58 and that, given their similarities, “BSE and scrapie should be 
treated as one and the same for safety purposes.”59 Indeed, the analogy dominated 
analyses of the potential threat posed to human health by the BSE agent. The process 
of determining both the likelihood that humans were susceptible to BSE, and the 
magnitude with which human transmission was likely to occur, were based on risk 
models assessing the infectivity of scrapie. A minute sent to the Director of the 
Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) by the Head of the CVL Pathology Department 
is perhaps the most concrete indication that scrapie patterns were pivotal in the 
forming of early insights into the behaviour of BSE (see figure 2, below).
John Wilesmith, Head of Epidemiology at the CVL, suggested that a number of 
factors contributed to the outbreak of BSE epidemic, collectively pointing to scrapie 
as the most likely cause of BSE.60 These included the dramatic increase in the sheep 
population in Great Britain; a probable, but unproven, increase in the prevalence of 
scrapie-infected flocks; a greater inclusion of sheep heads and of casualty sheep in 
material for rendering; the introduction of continuous rendering processes during the 
1970s and 1980s; and, the decline in the practice of using solvent extraction of tallow 
in rendering since the mid-1970s. According to Wilesmith, the pivotal factor in the 
development of BSE was the establishment of continuous rendering processes that 
might have led to the rendering of animal material at lower temperatures or for shorter 
periods, resulting in the failure to destroy the scrapie agent.61
56 Wilesmith, J. et al ‘Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy: Epidemiological Studies on the Origin’
(1991) 128 Veterinary Record 199-203.
57 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 1, at paragraph 711; for further descriptions of analogy between BSE 
and scrapie, see YB87/6.10/4.1 and YB87.6.04/1.1.
58 YB86/12.19/1.1.
59 YB88/12.07/7.2.
60 Wilesmith, J. et al (1988); see also BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 2, paragraph 3.22.
61 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 2, at paragraph 3.23.
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Figure 2. YB88/12.8/3.1.
The rendering industry processed waste from the carcasses of cattle, crushing the raw 
material and indirectly applying heat. The evaporation of moisture separated the fat, 
known as ‘tallow’, from the high-protein solids, known as ‘greaves’. The greaves 
were pressed, centrifuged, or subjected to solvent extraction to get rid of more tallow, 
before being ground into meat and bone meal (MBM). Although tallow was the 
primary product of rendering, both tallow and MBM had good commercial value in 
the 1980s.62 Depending on its quality, tallow was used for direct human consumption, 
or the manufacture of soap or industrial lubricant, and MBM was used largely in 
animal feed.
Wilesmith suggested that compound animal feed containing infective MBM was the 
principal means by which BSE developed and spread throughout the UK. He 
concluded that changes in the rendering process probably brought about the 
emergence of the bovine disease. The continuous rendering method was introduced
62 Ibid. Volume 13, at paragraph6.1.
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in the 1960s, replacing the less efficient ‘batch processing’ (see figure 2).63 Most 
rendering plants had previously used ‘dry rendering’, or ‘atmospheric’ batch 
processing systems.64 Before being cooked, raw material was fed into a crusher, 
breaking up the fatty and gut tissue before transferring the mass into a cooker. The 
cooker was heated at a normal atmospheric pressure to approximately 100°C so that 
moisture was removed in the form of steam through vents. The temperature was then 
increased to 140°C or more, causing the cell structure of the residue to break down, 
releasing the fat as tallow. The tallow was then removed into a separate vessel and 
the remaining solids emptied from the cooker.
Continuous systems used heating, separation, and cooling on a continuous flow basis. 
Raw material was fed in at one end of the cooker, and the product emitted at the other. 
The treatment was similar to that used in dry rendering batch systems, although it was 
more automated allowing more accurate control over the crushing process, the 
temperature and the time of rendering.65 Greater automation led to increased 
flexibility, allowing for a wider range of time and temperature combinations in the 
cooking of raw material. Whereas some continuous systems operated between 104 to 
145°C for a period of between fifteen minutes and two and half hours,66 others only 
heated material for three to seven minutes at about 95°.67
Yoar
Figure 3. Proportion of MBM produced by plants using a continuous rendering process, 1971-88.68
63 Ibid. at paragraph 6.6.
64 Ibid. Volume 13, Annex B, at paragraph 6.80.
65 Ibid. Volume 13, at paragraph 6.82.
66 For example, ‘Stork Duke’, ‘Stord Bartz’, and ‘Carver-Greenfield’ continuous rendering systems. 
See BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 13, at paragraph 6.92.
67 For example, ‘Protec’ rendering systems. See BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 13, at paragraph 6.92.
68 Wilesmith, W. J. et al (1991) at page 201.
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A Senior Scientific Officer from the Veterinary Investigation Centre at Preston, 
observed that the cooking times and temperatures were poorly recorded, inaccurate, 
and failed to reach the degree necessary to destroy the scrapie agent which was known 
to survive temperatures of 136°C for 18 minutes.69 In a draft report on the ‘Rendering 
Industry and BSE’ produced in April 1988,70 he concluded that:-
“[t]he rendering industry operates with processes which with few 
exceptions are inadequate to destroy scrapie agent. This together with 
increasing amounts of sheep material consisting of whole carcasses and 
heads which undoubtedly contain increasing numbers of scrapie cases 
may have resulted in contaminated tallow and meat and bone meal 
reaching the animal feed compound industry.
Scrapie contaminated material has probably always entered and survived 
the rendering process but only in small amounts prior to 1980. With the 
change to continuous rendering large volumes of contaminated products 
have been introduced to the food chain.”71
The finding that the infectious scrapie agent had been introduced via commercial 
cattle feedstuffs stemmed from the absence of any direct epidemiological evidence of 
other sources of the agent, together with the fact that BSE was a common source 
epidemic. This theory that BSE had a scrapie origin was critical in prompting claims 
that BSE and scrapie were directly comparable. Commenting on the findings of the 
Southwood Working Party Report, Sir Richard Southwood concluded that “[t]here 
were good grounds for assuming that the likelihood that BSE was like scrapie was 
high.”72 Following the initial identification of BSE, it was accepted that it was 
pathologically comparable with scrapie. In a minute recording the identification of 
neuronal vacuolation in a bovine brain, the head of the Pathology Department noted 
that “the lesions observed have similarities to spongiform encephalopathies of other
*?73species and in particular scrapie of sheep.”
69 S45 Smith, at paragraph 2.
70 YB88/4.27/5.1-5.6.
71 YB88/4.27/5.3.
72 Witness statement 483, at paragraph E l6.
73 YB86/12.19/1.1.
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fLikewise, following the initial pathological examination of Cow 142, a senior 
pathologist at the CVL, Carol Richardson, claimed that although she had never seen 
the combination of neuronal and neuropil vacuolation before in a cow, she had 
frequently observed it in scrapie-infected sheep.74 Despite the fact that pathological 
observations made in December 1986 only lent themselves to a provisional diagnosis, 
Richardson recalled that, at the time, she was certain that the bovine brain samples 
confirmed the existence of scrapie-associated fibrils cattle.75 By August 1987, Dr 
Wells, head of the Consultant Pathology Unit at the CVL, was adamant that “[n]ow 
with even more confidence than formerly we can draw similarities with scrapie of 
sheep and I feel that scientifically this cannot be avoided.”76
The overriding view was that, because BSE bore such close similarities to scrapie, 
and because scrapie had existed for centuries prior to the identification of BSE and 
had not been known to pose any threat to human health, it was similarly unlikely that 
BSE would cause any ill health to humans. A study, published in 1987, observed that 
scrapie had never infected humans in spite of opportunities to do so during the 250 
years in which the disease had contaminated sheep meat products entering the human 
food chain.77
Yet, despite the prevailing opinion, a small number of experts were deeply sceptical 
from the outset of the appropriateness of the scrapie analogy. Adopting a stance 
critical of the comparison drawn between scrapie and its suspected counterpart in 
cows, Professor Richard Lacey78 and Stephen Dealler79 claimed that evidence 
confirming the scrapie-BSE analogy was ‘nonexistent’, and as a result felt they could 
not assert, with any degree of confidence, that the BSE agent from bo vines would not 
be infectious for man.80 By the same token, John Suich,81 in his correspondence with 
the British Embassy in The Hague, wrote that “there is no evidence that BSE is
74 S69 Richardson, at paragraph 12.
75 Ibid.
76 YB87/8.4/2.1.
77 Brown, P. et al ‘The Epidemiology of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease: Conclusion of a 15-Year- 
Investigation in France and Review of the World Literature’ (1987) 37 Neurology 895-904.
78 Emeritus Professor of Clinical Microbiology, University of Leeds.
79 Public Health Laboratory Service.
80 IBD1 tab 7 at page 19-20.
81 MAFF, Animal Health Division.
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attributable to the same cause as scrapie and it is important to distinguish between the
O'}
two conditions”.
Indeed, the discord amongst experts in relation to the utility of the scrapie analogy 
might be described as an illustration of the Kuhnian model of paradigmatic 
revolution. It is clear that, for the most part of the BSE episode, scientific forecasts of 
the potential health threats posed by BSE reflected the paradigmatic consensus that 
BSE and scrapie were directly comparable.83 That is, until the early 1990s when there 
was a paradigmatic shift brought about mounting recognition that scrapie and BSE 
were dissimilar diseases. However, prior to this disciplinary recognition of their 
distinct pathological and epidemiological properties, assessment procedures used as a 
means of determining the risk o f the transmission of BSE to humans depended 
entirely on existing epidemiological knowledge about the scrapie agent. Given the 
novelty with which BSE presented itself, information about its infectivity, routes of 
exposure, and the effect of the species barrier was clearly incomplete. Consequently, 
models tracing the behaviour of the scrapie agent based on previously conducted 
investigations were projected into the future so as to predict patterns of the 
transmissibility of BSE. The scientific assessment upon which assurances of the 
safety of BSE-infected material reflected quantitative data on the pathogenic 
characteristics of the scrapie agent. The risk of transmission of BSE to humans was 
understood as being contingent on the dose of infected material required to bring 
about the onset of BSE -  otherwise known as the ‘effective dose’84 -  which was itself 
considered to be a function of three factors -  the infectivity titre of the contaminated
• 85material; the route of exposure; and, the species bamer effect.
82 YB87/10.30/1.1.
83 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 2, at paragraph 3.61.
84 See BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 2, at paragraphs 3.126, 3.163, and 3.180.
85 Annex A to Witness Statement 147C, Mr Colin Maclean.
245
! '
10.7 Effective dose assessments
■ 10.7.1 Infectivity titre
Determining the infectivity titre of BSE was crucial to the introduction of the SBO 
ban on 13 November 1989.86 In the absence of an infectivity test for BSE, and before 
results of infectivity tests were available for BSE, the process of ascertaining which 
cattle tissues carried the BSE agent was governed by studies undertaken in relation to 
scrapie. In a written statement, Professor Southwood confirmed that:-
“[t]here was no, or virtually no scientific knowledge concerning BSE 
available at this time. We worked on the basis that scrapie was the most 
likely cause of the BSE epidemic; we had to base our advice on the
science relating to scrapie at that time”.87
Investigations into the nature o f scrapie conducted by Hadlow et al in 198088 and
OA
1982 found that the greatest concentration of disease occurred in the brain and 
spinal cord of sheep (see figure 3, below). Given the absence of data relating to the 
infectivity of BSE to humans, the decision by MAFF to prohibit the use in human 
food of types of offal most likely to have a high infectivity titre of BSE was 
scientifically underpinned by the outcome of the Hadlow investigations. Announced 
on 13 June 1989, and brought into force five months later, the human SBO ban was 
established pursuant to the Food Act 1984, and made use of mechanisms already in 
place under the Meat (Sterilisation and Staining) Regulations 1982 designed to deal 
with unfit meat. Reflecting the categorisation of scrapie infectivity, the SBO measure 
applied only to the use of ‘high risk’ tissues -  such as the brain, spinal cord, spleen 
and tonsils.90 It is important to note that it did not prohibit the use of tripe and rennet, 
both extracted from the abomasum; mesenteric fat, taken from the intestine; offal
from calves aged less than six months; and, mechanically recovered meat deriving
86 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 2, at paragraph 3.60.
87 S483 Southwood, at paragraph 42.
88 Hadlow, W. J. et al ‘Virologic and Neurohistologic Findings in Dairy Goats Affected with Natural 
Scrapie’ (1980) 17 Veterinary Pathology 187-189.
89 Hadlow, W. J. et al ‘Natural Infection of Suffolk Sheep with Scrapie Virus’ (1982) 146 Journal of 
Infectious Disease 657-664.
90 The Bovine Offal (Prohibition) Order 1989, section 2.
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from the spinal column. It was widely accepted that preventing only tissues with the 
highest concentration of infectivity was itself a ‘measure of extreme prudence’,91 and 
that the combination of low infectivity, together with ineffective routes of exposure 
and the species barrier rendered any further precautions relating to other bovine 
tissues wholly unnecessary.
■ 10.7.2 Routes of exposure and the species barrier
Knowledge about potential routes of exposure and the effectiveness of the species 
barrier was also limited to data drawn from parallel investigations analysing the 
behaviour of either scrapie, or BSE in infected mice. Studies into routes of exposure 
found that oral or intragastric infection of scrapie was between 50,000 to 100,000 
times less efficient than the intracerebral route of infection. Large oral doses of high 
titre scrapie-infected tissue led to the assumption that the oral route of transmission of 
scrapie was very inefficient. Furthermore, models assessing the effectiveness of the 
species barrier in limiting the transmission of BSE suggested that the species barrier 
between cattle and mice would reduce effective exposure by 1,000 fold.94 Despite the 
fact that evidence in relation to both likely routes of exposure and the significance of 
the species barrier in humans was absent, it was assumed that patterns of cattle to 
human transmission would mirror these findings. On this basis, experts advising 
MAFF concluded that it was extremely unlikely that the human consumption of BSE- 
infected offal would present any threat to human health because effective exposure 
was inhibited not only by the inefficiency of the oral route of infection, but also by the 
species barrier resisting the transmission of BSE from cattle to humans.
91 YB89/2.21/2.4
92 Kimberlin, R. and Walker, C. ‘Pathogenesis of Scrapie in Mice after Intragastric Infection’ (1989) 12 
Virus Research 213-220; Diringer, H. et al ‘The Nature of the Scrapie Agent: The Virus Theory’ 
(1994) 724 Annals of the New York Academy of Science 246-258.
93 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 2, at paragraph3.191.
94 Bmce, M. et al ‘Transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Scrapie to Mice - Strain 
Variation and the Species Barrier’ (1994) 343 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B 405-411.
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Category Titre {Iog10/30mg) Tissues
i 3 .9 -4 .1 Brain, spinal cord.
jj 1.1-12 Lymph nodes, Peyer's patches, spleen, tonsil, proximal colon.
iii 0 .8—1.6 Pituitary, sciatic nerve, adrenal, distal colon.
iv <0.8 Blood, bone marrow, CSF, heart, kidney, lung, gonads, mammary gland, 
thymus, thyroid, uterus, salivary gland, muscle, milk, serum, faeces, saliva.
Figure 4. Categorisation o f the relative infectivity o f sheep and goat tissue based on data derived from 
Hadlow et al 1980 and 1982.
10.8 Deficiencies in risk assessment
The BSE Inquiry acknowledged that almost every decision regarding BSE had to be 
made when uncertainty about its capacity to affect human health was endemic,95 
noting that “[d]oing nothing until firm information was available was itself risky, 
because answers to such questions might not [have] become available for years.”96 
The potential latency of human implications meant that decision-making was not only 
urgent, but had to be based on information available at the time, albeit incomplete. 
The pressing need for immediate decisions about the inclusion of infected cattle in the 
human food chain meant that the risk assessment process became a key tool in the 
formulating of BSE policy. The feeling amongst experts was that a formal risk 
assessment procedure was the only logical basis for introducing control measures.97
Q O
In particular, Richard Kimberlin was of the opinion that, irrespective of the fact that 
comparisons drawn between scrapie and BSE were only tentative, it was crucial that 
decision-making was founded on some scientific measurement. Commenting on the 
question of human transmissibility, he claimed that “these issues can only be 
understood in the context of risk assessment, which I regard as an essential tool for 
making rational decisions.”99
Yet, whilst disciplinary support for conventional models of risk assessment was 
construed as evidence of the accuracy of their predictions, the categorical acceptance 
of findings of ‘remote risk’ failed to take into account the fact that the results bore no
95 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 15, Chapter 5, at paragraph5.3.
96 Ibid.
97 Witness Statement 179, at paragraph 112.
98 TSE research scientist at the Neuropathogenesis Unit, Edinburgh.
99 Witness Statement 95C, at paragraph 21.
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meaning in relation to BSE. Their significance was restricted to reflecting preceding 
observations of either the nature of scrapie or the epidemiological patterns of BSE in 
infected mice. And, in that sense, their usefulness was limited to providing an 
account of the past, as opposed to the future.
The fundamental problem in any risk assessment for BSE was that there was no firm 
information on the nature of the disease. Having observed the significance explicitly 
attributed to formal processes of risk assessment during the BSE episode, it is 
interesting to consider the disparity between deficiencies in knowledge about BSE 
and the tradition of risk assessment to extrapolate future predictions from evidence of 
past events. To some extent, the predicament was encapsulated by Jack Done of the 
CVL when he stated that “[i]t is, of course, fallacious to maintain that modelling can 
only be of any use when it uses ‘robust’ assumptions.”100 Without any concrete 
understanding of the epidemiology of BSE, and given that, typically, risk assessment 
models are inherently evidence-based decision-making tools, it was inevitable that the 
paucity of available information would be compensated for by forecasts reflecting 
pre-existing knowledge about the nature and behaviour of scrapie in sheep. In other 
words, whilst it was impossible to formulate an assessment of risk based on direct 
observations of the human consumption of BSE-infected tissue, predictions were 
nonetheless perceived as being relevant because of the theory that cases of BSE were 
index cases of cattle infected with scrapie.
Of course, the utility of this practice of projecting the past into the future is contingent 
on the factual similarity between the past and the future. As will be seen, this 
similarity was more idealistic than realistic -  the upshot being that ensuing risk 
assessments could not accurately apply to the BSE problem. This section exposes the 
critical problem that, although the scrapie analogy was pivotal in the regulation of 
BSE, it subsequently proved to be fallacious. From as early as 1988, there was 
evidence to suggest that BSE and scrapie were markedly different in three senses -  in 
terms of their host range, transmission properties, and pathogenesis101 -  although this 
was not recognised by mainstream scientific opinion until it had been established that 
BSE was the most likely cause of human CJD.
i°° YB91/4.06/1.1.
101 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 2, Chapter 3, at paragraph 3.49.
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10,8.1 Host range
A substantial body of evidence shows that the range of species (the ‘host range’) 
susceptible to BSE is markedly different to the range susceptible to scrapie. In 1987 
and 1988, experimental studies found that BSE could not be transmitted to hamsters 
intracerebrally inoculated with BSE-infected material,102 despite the fact that studies 
had already confirmed that hamsters were readily susceptible to the scrapie disease. 
Conversely, investigations established that BSE could be transmitted to a wide range 
of hosts which had not been shown to be receptive to scrapie. Examples include the 
successful experimental transmission of BSE through intracerebral, intravenous, 
intraperitoneal, or oral means to pigs;103 mink;104 several exotic ungulates, including 
nyala,105 gemsbok,106 Arabian oryx,107 greater kudu,108 eland,109 moufflon,110 and 
scimitar homed oryx;111 and exotic carnivores, such as puma,112 cheetah,113 and 
ocelot.114 The appearance of BSE in domestic and wild cats was a crucial 
development in the comparison drawn between BSE and scrapie.115 It illustrated that 
it was no longer plausible to claim that BSE was merely scrapie in cows with the
102 See YB87/6.9/1.3 and YB88/3.00/1.6.
103 M40 tab 4.1.
104 Robinson, M. et al ‘Experimental Infection of Mink with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(1994) 75 Journal of General Virology 2151-5, as cited in the BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 2, Chapter 
3, at paragraph 3.51.
105 Jeffrey, M. and Wells, G. ‘Spongiform Encephalopathy in Nyala (Tragelaphus Angasi)’ (1988) 25 
Veterinary Pathology 398-9, as cited in the BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 2, Chapter 3, at paragraph 
3.52.
106 Kirkwood, J. and Cunningham, A. ‘Epidemiological Observations on Spongiform Encephalopathies 
in Captive Wild Animals in the British Isles’ (1994) 135 Veterinary Record 296-303, as cited in BSE 
Inquiry (2000) ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 Bradley, R. ‘Animal Prion Diseases’, in Collinge, J. and Palmer, M. S. (eds) Prion Diseases (Oxford 
University Press; Oxford; 1997) at page 89, as cited in the BSE Inquiry (2000) ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Willoughby, K. et al ‘Spongiform Encephalopathy in a Captive Puma (Felis Concolor)’ (1992) 131 
Veterinary Record 431-4, as cited in the BSE Inquiry (2000) ibid.
113 Peet, R. and Curran, J. ‘Spongiform Encephalopathy in an Imported Cheetah (Acinox Jubatus)’
(1992) 69 Australian Veterinary Record 171, as cited in BSE Inquiry (2000) ibid.
114 Johnson, R. and Gibbs, C. ‘Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease and Related Transmissible Spongiform 
Encephalopathies’ (1998) 339 New England Journal of Medicine 1944-2004, as cited in the BSE 
Inquiry (2000) ibid.
115 Wyatt, J. et al ‘Spongiform Encephalopathy in a Cat’ (1990) 126 Veterinary Record 513, as cited in 
BSE Inquiry (2000) ibid.; see also YB98/0.0/1.1; and, Arnyx, H. et al ‘Experimental Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
Disease in Cats’, in Court, L.A. and Cathala, F. (eds) Unconventional Viruses and the Central Nervous 
System (Masson; Paris; 1983) 358 -  a study failing to experimentally transmit two different strains of 
scrapie to cats -  cited in the BSE Inquiry (2000) ibid.
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same properties, and that the BSE agent possessed very different biological properties 
to scrapie, manifesting themselves in the extended host range of affected species.116
■ 10.8.2 Transmissibilitv
In addition to models tracing the respective host ranges of BSE and scrapie, studies 
into the transmissibility properties of both agents found that their incubation periods 
differed to such an extent that the diseases could not be compared.117 Experiments 
confirmed that both mice and marmosets incubated BSE for a longer period than 
scrapie.118 After having been experimentally inoculated in February 1988, marmosets 
succumbed to scrapie between two to eight months earlier than those animals 
inoculated with BSE. A summary of an informal SEAC meeting recorded that the 
separation between incubation periods was ‘striking’.119
The transmission properties of BSE and scrapie also differed in the pattern of disease 
recorded in the brains of experimental animals. Whereas mice inoculated with 
scrapie-infected material from geographically and temporally distinct sources had 
variable brain lesions, mice inoculated in the same way with BSE-infected material 
displayed very similar patterns of disease. Not only did the studies show that the 
lesion profile produced by BSE was different to that produced by scrapie, but also 
that, unlike scrapie, only one strain of BSE was present in inocula derived from 
geographically and temporally distinct sources.120
This distinction merely confirmed the outcome of a previously conducted 
investigation that BSE and scrapie did not develop from the same source. Although 
an experiment to determine whether the two diseases were derivatives of the same
116 Transcript number 94, at pages 75-6.
117 S65 Wells, at paragraph 47.
118 YB92/2.27/3.1-3.5.
1,9 Ibid.
120 Bruce, M. et al ‘Transmissions to Mice Indicate that “New Variant” CJD is Caused by the BSE 
Agent’ (1997) 389 Nature 498-501, as cited in BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 2, Chapter 3, at paragraph 
3.56.
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agent was never undertaken in the UK, a study performed in the USA in 1979 showed 
that cattle inoculated with the scrapie agent developed a TSE quite unlike BSE.121
■ 10.8.3 Pathogenesis
Similar pathogenesis studies designed to observe the manner in which both BSE and 
scrapie developed also revealed that, although BSE is a ‘scrapie-like’ disease, its 
characteristics were very different once it emerged in cattle.122 The Phillips Inquiry 
concluded that, although the “pathological similarity to scrapie was a fact”,123 it was 
not proof that BSE was merely a strain of scrapie in cows. Dr Kimberlin supported 
this viewpoint, stating that:-
“[tjhere definitely was some good scientific data that said that sometimes, 
when you cross a species barrier, you create a situation in which the agent 
will change. You actually exercise or impose a selective pressure, the 
consequence of which is that the agent can change. So the ethos of scrapie 
not being transmissible to man that we knew about, and BSE probably 
having a scrapie origin, did give grounds for optimism, but by itself, it 
really was not enough to say that there would be no problem from 
BSE.”124
Yet, in spite of the fact that it was clear that BSE and scrapie were not directly 
comparable, the scrapie analogy continued to govern the regulation of BSE 
throughout the episode until MAFF acknowledged in 1996 that the BSE agent might 
be transmittable to humans.
121 See Clark, W. et al ‘Encephalopathy in Cattle Experimentally Infected with the Scrapie Agent’
(1995) 56 American Journal of Veterinary Research 606-612, as cited in BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 
2, Chapter 3, at paragraph 3.57.
122 BSE Inquiry, Volume 2, at paragraph3.61.
123 Ibid. at paragraph 2.188, emphasis added.
124 Transcript number 6, at page 50.
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w10.9 Too many variables
This section points to the shortcomings of conventional risk assessment in the BSE 
crisis, illustrating that the process was unfeasibly idealistic in its reliance on the 
linearity and regularity of circumstance, and that this rigidity generated inaccurate and 
unrealistic calculations of risk. It shows that, regardless of the fact that the scrapie 
analogy proved to be factually inapplicable, predictions deriving from scientific risk 
assessment were always going to be limited by the inability of such a model to 
account for the unforeseen. In other words, the fallibility of the scrapie analogy, and 
the resultant irrelevance of scrapie models in determining the potential nature of BSE, 
presented only part of the problem with traditional risk assessment. The other 
problem lay in its intransigence. Its incapacity to engage with conditions beyond 
those already taken into consideration for the purpose of prediction limited its utility 
as a means of meaningful prediction. This inadequacy was particularly well 
demonstrated by the failure of the risk assessment conducted by the Southwood 
Working Party to anticipate that the mechanical recovery of meat in practice might 
not reflect the process envisaged by on paper. This discord between reality as it 
transpired, and the construction of reality prior to its materialisation, inevitably led to 
the misleading application of risk predictions. That is not to say, however, that the 
problem of the social construction of reality can ever be resolved. Risk assessment 
procedures undertaken in anticipation of potential happenings necessarily rely current 
understandings of the future, thus making the potential inaccuracy of current 
projections an inescapable weakness of any risk assessment. The argument here 
focuses not on the precision of risk forecasts -  which, by virtue of the nature of any 
attempted insight into the future, are tarnished by the inability to know or define 
forthcoming events -  but instead on the unyielding rhetoric of risk assessment and its 
resultant incapacity to acknowledge that its predictions are unconditionally dependent 
on reality emulating projected constructions of reality.
Naturally, the effectiveness of risk assessment will depend entirely on the information 
available. Any assessment relying on too many variables is unlikely to ever be a 
useful tool for action.125 This problem arose in relation to the SBO ban and
125 Witness statement 78A, at paragraph 11.
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mechanically recovered meat (MRM). Once the bulk of meat had been removed from 
the carcass, a mechanical recovery process applied high pressure to bones to separate 
any remaining meat for use in a range of meat products for human consumption. The 
advice of MAFF scientists, which was accepted by the Department of Health, was that 
it was ‘most unlikely’ that any BSE agent would be present in MRM.126 In a minute 
recording a meeting to discuss the proposed ban on specified offal, John Maslin of the 
Animal Health Division recalled the decision that no action should be taken in respect 
of MRM because it did not present ‘a significant risk’.127 The Chief Veterinary 
Officer at the Department of Agriculture, Northern Ireland,128 who was present at that 
meeting, commented that:-
“[w]hat we were trying to do here was try to put what we thought at the 
time was a fairly small risk and put it into context and draw a line 
somewhere, do a risk analysis on it and draw a line. And I think the 
conclusion of the meeting as recorded there was that this was such a small 
risk it was completely negligible, was the conclusion that the time.”129
The argument that MRM posed only a minimal risk to human health was contingent 
on the successful removal of spinal cord from the carcass, pursuant to the SBO ban. 
Furthermore, the legitimacy of the contention that there was an insignificant chance of 
MRM containing BSE was acutely dependent on knowledge of the process of carcass- 
splitting and removal of spinal cord; knowledge of the process of MRM extraction; 
knowledge of standards of the operation, inspection, and monitoring of abattoirs; as 
well as an understanding of what was known, and what was not known, about 
infective dose in relation to TSEs.130 It transpired that this knowledge was in short 
supply -  the upshot being that the application of the SBO ban in relation to bovine 
spinal cord did not correspond with predictions drawn from risk assessment 
procedures, resulting in infectious spinal cord tissue entering MRM.
126 Witness Statement 75C, at paragraph92.
127 YB89/9.29/6.1.
128 Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer, Northern Ireland.
129 Transcript number 80, at page 131, emphasis added.
130 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 1, at paragraph 604.
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Spinal cord, together with brain tissue, had been identified as having the highest titre
l ^ i
of BSE infection. It was a major source of bovine MRM, and, once it was 
prescribed as an SBO, was prohibited from entering human food under the Bovine 
Offal (Prohibition) Regulations 1989.132 The Phillips Inquiry noted that “[t]here was 
never any apprehension that, once removed, SBO would find its way into the human 
food chain.”133 However, practical problems in relation to the implementation of the 
ban developed -  largely from incomplete knowledge on the part of regulators about 
the mechanical meat recovery process. Essentially, the removal of SBO involved 
cutting the carcass in half along the backbone, and exposing and removing the spinal 
cord. The process required meticulous skill and care, and Meat Inspectors had to be 
vigilant in ensuring that carcasses would only receive a health stamp if it did not 
contain any remnants of spinal cord. It was inevitable that sometimes parts of spinal 
cord were damaged, remaining trapped or hidden within the vertebrae. As a result, 
infected tissue would pass undetected into human food chain via MRM.
At the time, the Director of the Environmental Health (Scotland) Unit recognised that 
the practice of extracting MRM, as anticipated in risk assessment models, was not 
translated in practice. He claimed that in the aftermath of the implementation of the 
SBO ban it was not possible to guarantee that parts of the central nervous system of 
cattle would not enter products intended for human consumption.134 He went on to 
note that “whether or not the practice of producing mechanically recovered meat can 
be considered safe is very much open to doubt.”135
10.10 No formal risk assessment
A second criticism of risk analysis during the BSE crisis draws attention to its
inherently haphazard structure. Although, by 1988, MAFF had a “well-ordered
1system for food chemical risk assessment”, policy-makers considering the
131 Hadlow, W. J. ^  a /(1982).
132 SI No.2061. See Explanatory Note, which states that the Regulations apply to “the brain, spinal 
cord, spleen, thymus, tonsils and intestines of bovine animals slaughtered in the United Kingdom.”
133 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 1, at paragraph 615.
134 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 9, at paragraph 11.36.
135 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 1, at paragraph 628
136 Witness statement 435, at paragraph 19.
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implications of BSE had very little guidance in the prediction of its impact on human 
health.137 Traditionally, assessing the likelihood and magnitude of threats posed by 
chemicals in food made use of an established framework. Mr Dickinson138 noted that 
in the mid-1980s, there were routine methods for assessing the toxicological risks 
created by food additives, contaminants, and residues. He observed that the broad 
thrust was to prevent any unnecessary risk in food using decision-making tools such 
as No Observed Effect Levels, Acceptable or Tolerable Daily Intakes, and Maximum 
Residue Limits.139 However, in spite of the fact that coherent models of risk 
assessment were well developed by the late 1980s, MAFF officials dealing with the 
risk of BSE transmission to humans appear to have adopted a rather more arbitrary 
approach to risk prediction. In the words of Donald Peacock:-
“There is little evidence, however, that a thorough risk assessment was 
made and too heavy a reliance was placed on known scientific proof when 
all along we realised that there was a great deal that was (and I still 
believe is) still unknown.”140
Likewise, Danny Matthews,141 in his witness statement remarked that:-
“there was no structural process of risk assessment in place with respect to 
BSE before this, or indeed until 1996, although ... this did not preclude ad 
hoc assessments from being made.”142
And, Thomas Murray143 claimed that:-
“I cannot point to any specific documents where (to my knowledge) risk 
assessment was discussed in the context of BSE. At the time that I was
137 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 15, Chapter 5, at paragraph 5.19i.
138 Director of the Neuropathogenesis Unit, Edinburgh, 1981-1987.
139 Witness statement 97B, at paragraph 11.
140 Witness Statement 443, at paragraph 9. Statement on behalf of the Masters of Bassett Hounds 
Association.
141 MAFF Senior Veterinary Officer, Tolworth, 1988-1996.
142 Witness Statement 94A, at paragraph 27, emphasis added.
143 Department of Health Head of Section, Environmental Health and Food Safety Division, 1990- 
1995; Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee Secretariat, 1990-193.
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dealing with the matter we did not have the sort of data that we knew we 
needed.”144
It transpires that this view was shared by a number of scientists advising the 
government. According to Alistair Cruickshank,145 risk assessment procedures were 
not employed in determining means of regulating the threat of BSE. He told the 
Phillips Inquiry that, although the notion of risk assessment has since become well- 
established is regulatory decision-making, between 1986 and 1989 it was neither 
properly understood nor used.146 He noted that instead of making use of any formal 
assessment:-
“I think we tended to use another couple of legal concepts ... [I]n dealing 
with any risk, one would apply the concept of reasonableness ... [I]n 
some cases it was explicitly stated in legislation. In other cases the advice 
we got from our own lawyers was that anything we did had to be 
reasonable. That tended to mean it had to be based on scientific advice. If 
we were purporting to ban something, or restrict its use, we had to have 
pretty good scientific advice to suggest it should be banned or restricted, 
or whatever”.147
Thus, in the absence of any formal risk assessment process, risk predictions were 
bolstered by the innate authority of scientific discourse as a means of attaining any 
legitimacy. Consequently, explicit statements that the risk of human transmission was 
‘remote’ were accepted simply because they had scientific backing. Despite the fact 
that, at the height of regulatory decision-making in relation to BSE it had been 
recognised that there were likely to be unknown unknowns, as well as known 
unknowns, the risk of transmission to humans through the consumption of infected 
tissue was still portrayed as a definable and foreseeable risk. The scientific nature of 
prediction was crucial in the identification of human transmission as a risk, as 
opposed to an uncertainty. As illustrated above, the reliance of science-based 
foresight on evidence of past occurrences resulted in unequivocal assurances that
144 Witness Statement 120B, paragraph 5.
145 MAFF Under Secretary, Animal Health Group.
146 Transcript number 32, at page 61.
147 Ibid. at page 62.
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patterns of BSE would mirror the findings of previously conducted experiments -  that 
is to say, the dependence of scientific risk analysis on evidence of preceding events 
effectively marginalised uncertainty in respect of the future. Although MAFF 
scientists acknowledged, notably on a number of occasions, that where protection of 
public health was concerned, the range of uncertainty in relation to BSE was great,148 
they continued to utilise knowledge of the past as a means of securing a degree of 
certainty in respect of the future in their calculations that there was a remote 
likelihood that BSE would transmit to humans. In doing so, the future hazards were 
expressed in fixed, rather than uncertain, terms.
This tendency to define the future using the rhetoric of risk is not only the product of 
the backward-looking basis of scientific prediction, but it is also a result of the 
political dimensions of decision-making. Admittedly, it is difficult to draw any 
logical distinction between the scientific and political elements of risk decision­
making, particularly given that both the definition of risk and the process of risk 
assessment are governed by their social, and thus political, context. However, for the 
purpose of this section, the construction of risk in the BSE episode is presented as 
having distinct scientific and political aspects. The following part focuses on the 
political administration of BSE. It begins with an account of the reassurance offered 
by government officials that BSE posed no, or little, risk to human health. It goes on 
to illustrate that, although those reassurances of safety were both naive and 
unfounded, they were accurate in that they echoed the reality that there was no 
evidence that BSE was a risk to humans. Under the heading ‘Asking the Wrong 
Questions’, it shows that politicians and MAFF officials were mistaken in their 
excessive attention to past events. Accordingly, whilst they correctly asserted that 
there was no evidence that BSE could be transmitted to humans, they were erroneous 
in their inference that the absence of evidence of risk in the past meant that there was 
no possible risk in the future. In particular, it draws attention to the unwavering 
reliance of government officials and policy-makers on scientific evidence, illustrating 
that decision-making centred on the notion that “the scientific advice must be that 
there is evidence that such and such occurs before the Government can act to stop
148 See, for example, witness Statement 103C, at paragraph 12.
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it” 149 The following section shows that the marginalisation of uncertainty in the 
official administration of the BSE crisis was bom of a combination of over-reliance of 
scientific opinion and evidence-based knowledge. As a MAFF official noted, the 
importance of taking outside views into account in policy-making had not been fully 
understood.150
149 Transcript number 32, at page 70, emphasis added.
150 Witness statement 307, at paragraphic
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Chapter Eleven 
The bureaucracy of risk; evidence of reason, rationality and
positivist hubris
11.0 Introduction
The significance of the BSE crisis lies not only in its warnings of the limits of 
scientific knowledge, but also of the centrality of science in the Government’s 
response to dealing with the unknown. As the Dainton Report of 1971 emphasised:-
“For many years past it has been evident that Government departments 
need scientific knowledge ... and in some cases large scientific 
establishments to enable them to carry out their functions ... It is essential 
that the advice and information from this source be free from 
considerations of administrative and political convenience; but it does not 
mean that policies for strategic and basic science should be devised 
without proper regard for public policy.”1
John Gummer, MAFF Minister of State from September 1985 to July 1988, reflected 
the findings of the Dainton Report, commenting that:-
“[pjolicy must ... be based on reason. We were to do everything that the 
scientists thought necessary, including the research they advised ... Once 
expert advice was obtained, we had to be wary of taking decisions that 
were not supported by the scientists as that would undermine the 
credibility of our actions and make the whole policy subjective”.2
It is unsurprising that, in the light of the political dependence on scientific knowledge, 
decision-making in relation to BSE was rooted in a culture of expertise. As a notable
1 The Future of the Research Council System, Report of a Council for Scientific Policy (CSP) Working 
Group under the chairmanship of Sir Frederick Dainton, published as an appendix to Government 
Green Paper (November 1971) Cm 4814, A Framework for Government Research and Development 
(HMSO; London; 1971) page 12, at paragraph 35.
2 Witness statement 311, at paragraph 13.
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consequence of the explicit reliance on specialist analysis, definitions of ‘risk’ were 
narrowly constructed and founded solely on scientific evidence. Departing from the 
BSE episode for a brief moment, the following extract illustrates the blinkered nature 
of scientific definitions of risk. In July 2001, during a public meeting, the Chair of 
the UK scientific Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment of GMOs 
(ACRE), and Robin Grove-White, a member of the Agriculture and Environment 
Biotechnology Commission (AEBC) advisory body, entered into a discussion of 
potential environmental impact of GM crops. The discussion not only reveals that 
scientific interpretations of risk are only capable of accommodating observations of 
past events, but also that the scientific discourse is incapable of recognising that the 
future is essentially unknown:-
[AEBC]:
[ACRE]:
[AEBC]:
[ACRE]:
[AEBC]:
“Do you think people are reasonable to 
have concerns about possible ‘unknown 
unknowns’ where GM plants are 
concerned?
Which unknowns?
That’s precisely the point. They aren’t 
possible to specify in advance. Possibly 
they could be surprises arising from 
unforeseen synergistic effects, or from 
unanticipated social interventions. All 
people have to go on is analogous 
experience with other technologies...
I’m afraid it’s impossible for me to respond 
unless you can give me a clear indication of 
the unknowns you are speaking about.
In that case don’t you think you should add 
health warnings to the advice you’re giving 
to ministers, indicating that there may be 
‘unknown unknowns’ which you can’t 
address?
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[ACRE]: No, as scientists, we have to be specific.
We can’t proceed on the basis of 
imaginings from some fevered brow...”
It is clear that scientific discourse is, conceptually at least, incompatible with the 
notions of anticipatory action and precaution. Whereas scientific discourse focuses on 
what is known, the concept of precaution is based on the notion that the future is 
essentially unknown. In relation to the BSE episode, the affiliation between scientific 
interpretations of the future and evidential certainty created a situation in which 
reassurances of the safety of beef were necessarily reliant on the fact that there was no 
prior evidence of human transmission. The following section focuses on the framing 
of the threat of human health implications, highlighting that the manner in which the 
‘BSE problem’ was presented was fundamental to the way in which legitimacy was 
ascribed to reassurances of safety.
11.1 Asking the wrong questions
It is unsurprising that scientific analyses of the potential risk posed by BSE were 
framed by political demands of certainty. Perhaps one of the most prominent forces 
in the quest for scientifically-certain knowledge was the prospect of the judicial 
review of decision-making. So as to avoid the criticism that a particular decision was 
unfounded, the Government was keen to ensure that its actions could be corroborated 
by scientific evidence. John MacGregor, Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
between 1987 and 1989, observed that:-
“[the BSE crisis] could have great significance for the industry and 
therefore I had to be sure of my ground ... We had to have a view of those 
who could give us the best advice in relation to human health. If we had 
not taken that, then I think we would have been at risk of challenge, not
3 Taken from a paper delivered at ‘Sensing the Unsensed’ Workshop at Lancaster University, October 
2004: Wynne, B. ‘Reflexing Complexity: Post-Genomics Knowledge and Reductionist Returns in 
Public Science’ in which the dialogue is attributed to Grove-White, R. ‘personal communication as the 
AEBC member involved’ (Institute for Environment, Philosophy and Public Policy; Lancaster 
University; 2001).
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just judicial review. I could have been challenged in the House of 
Commons or by the industry.”4
This pressure to achieve scientific certainty resulted in a rigid and specific framing of 
the ‘BSE problem’. Driven by a need to acquire scientific proof upon which to base 
its policy and legislation, Government Ministers and officials posed very direct 
questions about the nature of BSE. Instead of referring to the inadequacy of scientific 
knowledge or the unknown likelihood that BSE might present a future threat to 
human health, the Government position was continually framed in terms of the 
evidence available in relation to human transmission. For example, on 15 October 
1987, John Suich of the MAFF Animal Health Division conducted a BSE ‘Question 
and Answer’ briefing for the media. He was asked:- “Can it be transmitted to 
humans?”. Rather than replying that the threat of human transmission was 
scientifically uncertain, he answered:- “There is no evidence that it is transmissible to 
humans.”5 Strictly speaking, Suich was correct -  there was no evidence to suggest 
that BSE could jump the species barrier and affect human health. Yet, despite the 
technical validity of such statements, they provided a tenuous basis upon which to 
construct assurances of the safety of BSE-infected meat. Nonetheless, declarations 
that there was no proof that BSE would transmit to humans continued to be seen as 
affirmation that human transmission was, under any circumstances, impossible. 
Prime Minister Major insisted that, given that there was “no scientific evidence that 
BSE can be transmitted to humans or that eating beef caused CJD”6 beef was a “safe
7 ftand wholesome product.” Furthermore, the Chief Veterinary Officer, in a note 
addressed to the Parliamentary Secretary, maintained that the lacking evidence of any 
human health implications demonstrated that cattle was a dead-end host to the 
disease.9
4 The Inquiry into BSE and Variant CJD in the United Kingdom (HMSO; London; 2000) Volume 15, at 
paragraph 4.65.
5 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 3, at paragraph 5.27; YB87/10.15/1.3.
6 As cited in Dealler, S. F. Lethal Legacy (Bloomsbury Publishing; London; 1996) at page 242.
7 Ibid.
8 William Rees, August 1980-May 1988.
9 YB87/6.5/1.1.
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11.2 Absolute K/icertaintv
On 25 October 1995, the Chief Medical Officer at the Scottish Office remarked that, 
in relation to BSE “[t]he issue remains, however, that the uncertainty has increased, 
rather than decreased.”10 In written statement, Sir Richard Southwood,11 Sir Anthony 
Epstein,12 William Martin,13 and Lord Walton of Detchant14 observed that when the 
Southwood Working Party published its report, “no one could quantify the risk at that 
time”15 Although the Government did not explicitly acknowledge the danger of 
transmissibility until March 1996, the potential threat of BSE to human health was 
acknowledged as being a principal concern from the very outset, almost a decade 
earlier. On 19 December 1986, approximately a month after BSE was first identified 
by the Central Veterinary Laboratory, Ray Bradley, Head of the Pathology 
Department, sent a minute to his colleagues warning that if it transpired that the 
disease was a strain similar to scrapie, there would be “severe repercussions to the 
export trade and possibly also for humans if, for example, it was discovered that 
humans with spongiform encephalopathies had close association with the cattle.”16 
During the course of giving oral evidence, he subsequently observed that, despite 
there being uncertainty as to whether the disease was a human pathogen, it was 
reasonable, at that time, to suggest that it posed a possible risk if infected bovine
• 17entered the human food chain. Although there was no evidence to suggest that other 
animal spongiform encephalopathies could be transmitted to humans, the Chief 
Veterinary Officer considered that the possibility that BSE was capable of crossing 
the species barrier should not be ruled out.18 Similarly, in his written evidence, 
Alistair Cruickshank of the Animal Health Group, MAFF, described the similarity 
between bovine encephalopathy and kuru, a human prion disease, as ‘worrying’.19 Of 
equal significance, when asked if BSE presented any real threat of transmissibility,
10 YB95/10.25/16.1-16.2.
11 Chairman, Working Party on BSE, 1988-89.
12 Member of the Southwood Working Party.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Witness statement 483, at paragraph C5.
16 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 3, at paragraph 5.4; see YB86/12.19/1.1, emphasis added.
17 Transcript number 29, at page 93.
18 Transcript number 98, at page 66.
19 Witness statement 75, at paragraph 2.2.
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the Director of the Central Veterinary Laboratory20 admitted that he was unable to
91provide a categorical answer.
On an examination of the BSE Inquiry and the archived evidence, it becomes apparent 
that these expressions of incertitude and fear for potential human consequences were 
endemic in communications between Members of Parliament, government scientists, 
and policy-makers throughout the episode. It is remarkable, then, that despite the 
acknowledged uncertainty of the likelihood and implications of the transmission of 
BSE to humans, the threat of transmission was repeatedly presented as a definable and 
low risk. Taking as a case study the ten year-period leading up to the official 
recognition in 1996 of the possible link between CJD and BSE, it is interesting to 
juxtapose the congenital uncertainty of the threat of transmission with the modelling 
of risk based on retrospective studies of scrapie.
Concerns that reassurances of safety might not have an accurate basis in scientific 
evidence were clearly echoed in a letter written by Lord Montagu of Beaulieu to the
99Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food:-
“My concern in writing to you, and indeed the concern of my tenant, is 
that in present legislation there is nothing which prevents veterinary 
officers from certifying the carcass of an animal infected with this disease 
as fit for human consumption. Indeed, it is my understanding that many 
such cattle many already be sold through abattoirs for this purpose.
At the present time I understand little or no research has been done on 
whether this disease can be transmitted to humans through consumption 
o f beef from infected animals, and, until this is known, it seems quite 
wrong to me that it is possible to sell infected carcasses for this purpose.
As you will appreciate, there is a substantial financial incentive on farmers 
to sell a carcass for human consumption, as I understand it is worth 
approximately £300, as against a price of £50 if sold for pet food. Perhaps
20 William Watson.
21 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 3, at paragraph 5.20.
22 June 1987-July 1989.
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this is an area where the Ministry should make the disease notifiable and 
pay compensation at the full value for animals infected?
I wonder if this is something which should be taken up urgently through 
your Ministry, at least until a clearance is placed on any possibility of risk 
arising from the consumption of carcasses affected with this disease.”
The following year, Alistair Cruickshank, in a minute sent to the Deputy Secretary for 
Land and Resources24 and copied to officials in MAFF and the Scottish, Welsh and 
Northern Ireland Offices provided one of the most compelling accounts of the 
uncertainty of transmissibility: -
“We do not know where this disease came from, we do not know how it is 
spread and we do not know whether it can be passed to humans. The last 
point seems to me to be the most worrying aspect of the problem. There 
is no evidence that people can be infected but we cannot say that there is 
no risk ... If we believe the risk to human health was so remote as to be 
negligible we might advise Ministers to ride out the criticism. I would 
however be reluctant to say the risk is negligible. One theory is that BSE 
may have originated from sheep affected with scrapie .. .If this theory is 
correct -  and I emphasise that this is only one of a number of possible 
explanations -  we have to face up to the possibility that the disease could 
cross another species gap”.25
In a minute to the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, the Permanent 
Secretary at MAFF26 advised that:-
“[i]f you took no action now and worrying positive results were to emerge 
from these studies, you would have laid yourself open to criticism for not 
acting to reduce the risks to public health. I do not see how you could
23 YB87/12.4/1.1-1.2; emphasis added.
24 Edward Smith.
25 YB88/2.16/1.1 at paragraphs 2-3.
26 Derek Andrews, October 1987-February 1993.
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defend taking no action now unless you had the support of the Chief 
Medical Officer.”27
In his written statement to the Inquiry, the Permanent Secretary recalled that:-
“my overriding concern at the time [February 1988] was the possible risk 
to human health. I felt that the correct way forward on the basis of the 
information we had was to introduce a slaughter and compensation policy
*yo
as soon as possible.”
Expressions of concern that BSE might be more dangerous than scientific studies 
suggested have been documented throughout the episode. During an
9Qinterdepartmental meeting attended by Sir Donald Acheson, Department of Health 
Officials, Alistair Cruickshank,30 William Watson,31 Joan Davies,32 and Dr 
Galbraith,33 it was accepted that there was probably no risk in drinking milk or eating 
meat of infected cattle, although the position was far less clear about consumption of 
brains, spleen and other organs.34 The Chief Medical Officer concluded that, 
although he suspected that there was no risk posed to humans, it could take 30-40 
years to establish this with any degree of certainty. In an article published in 
Farming News, Tony Andrews of the Royal Veterinary College, when asked whether 
BSE could affect humans, answered “we simply don’t know”. Furthermore, Alistair 
Cruickshank noted that “[t]he problem is that we cannot say there is no risk -  indeed, 
I do not think we can even say the risk is insignificant.” Yet, the official position 
continued to reflect the argument that there was no risk to human health.
27 YB88/2.24/2.1.
28 Witness statement 281, at paragraph 35.
29 Chief Medical Officer, Department of Health.
30 Under Secretary, Animal Health Group, MAFF.
31 Director of the Central Veterinary Laboratory.
32 Public Health Laboratory Service.
33 Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre.
34 YB88/3.17/7.1.
35 Ibid.
36 YB88/4.22/6.1.
37 YB88/2.26/4.1.
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11.3 Reassurances of safety
In the ten years prior to 1996, dialogue between scientists, government officials, and 
politicians assured, with exuberant confidence, the safety of British beef. This was 
true not only of government-authorised communications of the risk of human 
infection, but also of confidential exchanges that the Phillips Inquiry has since 
disclosed. Indeed, the Inquiry concluded that repeated assertions of the safety of beef 
conveyed the message not only that consumption posed no human threat, but also that 
the BSE agent was, in epidemiological terms, incapable of jumping the species 
barrier.38 This ‘risk-free’ rhetoric came to dominate expert findings at a remarkably 
early stage of the episode, and, notwithstanding deficient knowledge, disputed values, 
high stakes, and urgency of action, definite statements of Tow-risk’ or ‘no risk’ 
continued to dictate decision-making until it became clear that predictions made on 
the basis of ‘sound science’ were entirely unsound. Whilst these risk-based 
judgments drew legitimacy from the innate authority of scientific discourse and the 
‘privilege of experience’,39 it transpired that findings of the ‘establishment’ expertise 
were intrinsically flawed in two different senses. Not only were forecasts about the 
transmissibility of BSE incorrect, but the mechanism, deriving from orthodox 
scientific assessment, and used to project observations of the scrapie-protein into the 
future as a means of predicting the epistemological behaviour of BSE, failed to 
appreciate the capricious autonomy with which the future materialises.
In order to fully illustrate the discrepancy between, on the one hand, reassurances of 
safety, and on the other, the inability of scientific risk assessment to predict the 
nature, occurrence, and magnitude of potential hazards, this section begins with an 
analysis of the communication of the implications of BSE to human health. It draws 
on a sample of exchanges between those within the organisational structure of 
Government. Although initial communication about BSE within MAFF went largely 
undocumented,40 it is still possible to identify the prevailing belief that, since 
scientific studies failed to turn out evidence of previous human transmissibility, the 
logic of deduction prescribed that there was no risk of transmissibility in the future. It
38 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 1, page xxi, at paragraph 5.
39 Williams, G. and Popay, J. ‘Lay Knowledge and the Privilege of Experience’, in Gabe, J. et al (eds) 
Challenging Medicine (Routledge; London; 1994) pages 118-139.
40 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 3, at paragraph 1.37.
268
is therefore especially interesting to note that, despite having been presented as a 
matter of scientific certainty, repeated reassurances of safety were, in fact, based 
merely on provisional opinion. Whereas the credibility of claims of ‘no-risk’ is 
traditionally seen as being contingent on its scientifically-verified underpinning, it 
transpires that assurances of safety had no basis in conventional risk assessment.
This section adopts a distinct perspective on the marginalisation of uncertainty, 
capturing the incongruity between scientific assessment, with its ostensible mastery of 
risk and disciplinary purity, and the capacity of scientific risk discourse to conceal not 
only the socially-negotiated process of definition, but also its inability to engage with 
the future in any meaningful sense. Naturally, this raises serious questions about the 
utility of scientific risk assessment as a tool for decision-making in relation to 
prospective contingencies. But, before turning to examine the broader themes 
emerging from the BSE episode, it is necessary to briefly recall some explicit 
statements of the safety of the human consumption of beef in order to add substance 
to the argument that reassurances were a key feature in the administration of the 
disease.
Early in 1987, the Head of the CVL Pathology Department, commenting on the nature 
of BSE, insisted that it was essential that MAFF kept “an open mind”41 regarding the 
potential human health implications of BSE. Unfortunately, this pursuit for open 
mindedness was lost to scientific and political demands of certitude in prediction, 
resulting in premature and idealistic testimonies of safety. Four months on, in a note 
addressed to the Parliamentary Secretary, the Chief Veterinary Officer made a pivotal 
statement on the subject of transmissibility. He claimed that there was no evidence 
that the bovine disorder was transmissible to humans, and, in the absence of such 
evidence, it was inappropriate to impose any restrictions on affected farms or the sale 
of produce from affected cattle herds.42 Accordingly, any ‘irresponsible or ‘ill- 
informed’ publicity would induce “hysterical demands for immediate, draconian 
government measures”,43 and that, given the lack of epidemiological records pointing 
to its origin, infectivity, potential transmission routes, and animal susceptibility, the
41 YB87/2.4/2.1.
42 YB87/6.5/1.1.
43 Ibid.
269
possibility of human health implications was so remote that the implementation of 
anticipatory measures was indefensible, both in terms of cost-effectiveness and 
feasibility.
The essence of this statement came to be a central theme of the official response to 
BSE, dominating the approach taken in dealing with the threat of cross-species 
transmission. In December 1987, in an article published in Farmers Weekly, the CVL 
declared that, given that there was no evidence that cattle, nor any other species, had 
become diseased as a result of contact with other species, BSE did not present any 
danger to humans.44 Yet, curiously, notwithstanding the fact that it was alleged that 
humans were insusceptible to the disease, MAFF subsequently established a scientific 
advisory committee, under the chairmanship of Sir Richard Southwood (‘the 
Southwood Working Party’), to examine any potential human and animal health 
implications of BSE.
A month later, and contrary to suggestions of its safety, Holt and Phillips published an 
article in the British Medical Journal claiming that the BSE agent posed a very real 
threat to public health.45 They argued that there was no way of telling which cattle 
were infected until symptoms developed, and, if transmission to man had already 
occurred it might be some years before affected individuals displayed signs of 
infection 46 Furthermore, they suggested that it was possible, although at that stage 
unproven, that asymptomatic cattle could be as infective as symptomatic animals.47 
Similar concerns about the latent effects of BSE were raised by a number of other 
scientists and physicians outside government.48 Presenting evidence to the 
Agriculture Select Committee, a Professor Emeritus of Clinical Microbiology 
submitted that “we do not know if [beef] is safe”,49 adding that it “could well contain
44 YB87/12.11/2.1.
45 Holt, T. A. and Phillips, P. J. ‘Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy’ (1988) 296(6636) British 
Medical Journal 1581-1582.
46 Ibid. at page 1582.
47 Ibid.
48 See, for example, evidence given by Professor Richard Lacey and Dr Helen Grant, House of 
Commons Agriculture Select Committee Fifth Report, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (HMSO; 
London; 1989) Minutes of Evidence at pages 43-45.
49 Ibid. at page 43.
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three components that could make it dangerous”50 -  nerves; lymphatics and lymph 
nodes; and, infected material from the opening up of the brain and spinal cord.
In an attempt to allay these fears, the Southwood Working Party reported that the 
threat of transmission to humans was ‘remote’,51 and that it was ‘most unlikely’ that 
BSE would have any implications for human health.52 On the back of these findings, 
Ministers and officials made explicit statements that there was “no risk, or indeed any 
proof or such a risk”53 to public health.
It is important to draw a clear distinction between the actual findings of the 
Southwood Report, and the way in which they were subsequently interpreted. Whilst 
it is true that it concluded that it was ‘most unlikely’ that BSE would have any 
implications for human health, it also warned that the validity of those findings was 
limited to the extent that knowledge about the disease was incomplete. Regardless of 
its position that the risk posed by BSE was minimal, the Report considered that it 
would be ‘extremely serious’ if the assessment of the likelihood of human 
transmission was incorrect,54 noting that its long incubation period might lead to it 
being “a decade or more before complete reassurance can be given”.55 Yet, 
notwithstanding these caveats, the Southwood Report was repeatedly upheld as 
illustrating that, by way of robust scientific inquiry, the risk of human transmission 
was either nonexistent, or negligible.
In written statement, the Working Party claimed that their findings were founded on a 
conventional analysis of risk, defining ‘risk’ as a combination of both the likelihood, 
and the scale of danger, of an impending hazard.56 However, a careful reading of the 
Southwood Report reveals that, contrary to its claim that it based its findings on 
scientific risk assessment, the conclusion that the risk of transmissibility was ‘remote’
50 Ibid.
51 The Department of Health, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Report of the 
Working Party on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (HMSO; London; 1989) at paragraph 5.3.5.
52 YB89/2.17/1.3.
53 Keith Meldrum, Chief Veterinary Officer at MAFF, statement to the EU’s Standing Veterinary 
Committee, cited in European Parliament, Report on Alleged Contraventions or Maladministration in 
the Implementation of Community Law in Relation to BSE, Without Prejudice to the Jurisdiction of the 
Community and National Courts, A4-0020-/97 (European Parliament; February 1997) at page 9.
54 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 4, at paragraph 10.40
55 DoH and MAFF (1989) at paragraph 5.3.1.
56 Witness statement 483, at paragraph 6.
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was, at most, a product of inference rather than scientifically-verified foresight. Not 
only did the Report fail to make clear the grounds upon which the professed risk 
assessment had been made,57 but it also used the terms ‘most unlikely’ and ‘remote’ 
to describe the risk to human health without any explanation of their meaning.58 
Thus, whilst the Report is portrayed as imparting a scientifically-assessed calculation 
of risk, its predictions were essentially a matter of “judgement in the face of 
uncertainties”,59 devoid of any footing in risk assessment. Acknowledging the 
absence of any explicit analysis of the risk posed, the Phillips Inquiry found that the 
conclusion that humans were unlikely to be susceptible to the BSE agent “was not 
founded on a scientific understanding of the factors governing the transmission of 
TSEs in general”,60 and described it simply as a product of uneducated guesswork.61
At this stage, two issues come to mind. First, the findings of the Southwood Report 
were selectively interpreted; and second, its outwardly-scientific nature was perceived 
as a means of ensuring authoritative definitions of risk. What is intriguing about the 
way in which the Southwood Report was understood by Ministers and government 
officials was that, despite the fact that it lacked any formal risk assessment to 
substantiate its claims, it was consistently construed as credible evidence of a ‘very 
remote risk’.62 To argue, as many did, that the Report was a clear indication that it 
was highly improbably that the threat of cross species transmission would materialise 
is a misguided exaggeration of the esteemed position occupied by science. Such an 
outlook laid undue emphasis on unambiguous statements deriving from scientific 
evidence, whilst at the same time disproportionately overlooking more tenuous 
statements based on opinion, rather than fact.
This tendency to regard the Report’s findings as having an infallible quality was 
captured in a statement made by Prime Minister Thatcher in February 1989. 
Responding to a question posed by an MP sitting on the Opposition benches regarding 
the validity of the Southwood Report, Thatcher was adamant that its findings were
57 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 4, at paragraph 10.36.
58 Ibid. at paragraphl0.21.
59 Ibid. at paragraph 10.31.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 MAFF News Release 27 February 1989, IBD1, table 3, at page 3, emphasis added.
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valid, irrespective of the fact that they were both uncorroborated and tentative. She 
argued that:-
“[w]e set up a committee of experts under Professor Southwood. We 
published the report in full. We referred it to the Chief Medical Officer of 
Health and we accepted the recommendation of both, precisely. There is 
no point whatsoever in setting up a committee of experts, in having a 
Chief Medical Officer of Health, in receiving their advice and then not 
accepting it. We would rather accept their advice than that of the hon. 
Gentleman.”
Echoing Thatcher’s sentiments, scientific expertise continued to provide a pivotal 
force in the administration of the BSE crisis. Further, in-keeping with the rationalist 
tradition, decision-making maintained the distinction between scientific and non- 
scientific knowledge. As a result of the import attributed to scientific analysis 
throughout the BSE, decisions founded on scientific knowledge were perceived as 
being more credible than those without a scientific basis.
It is particularly interesting to note that a position of ‘minimal risk’ to humans was 
adopted, despite that fact that studies conducted subsequent to the Southwood Report 
confirmed that the BSE agent had been successfully transmitted to a number of 
different species during controlled scientific experiments. This finding undoubtedly 
conflicted with the Report’s conclusion that cattle was a dead-end host to the disease. 
Crucially, the range of species becoming infected with BSE was notably wider than 
that observed with scrapie,63 leading the BSE Inquiry to conclude that these findings 
were entirely “consistent with the possibility that BSE was transmissible to 
humans.”64 However, at the time, Government officials were adamant that the 
laboratory conditions in which cross-species transmission had occurred were not 
reflective of nature, and that there was no scientific evidence to suggest that the 
human consumption of beef posed any health risk. In a press release, MAFF claimed 
that, given that similar results had been previously obtained in experimental studies of 
the transmission of scrapie to mice, the oral transmission of BSE to another species
63 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 6, at paragraph644.
64 Ibid.
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merely confirmed that transmission to humans was improbable -  stating that the 
results provided “further evidence that BSE behaves like scrapie, a disease which has 
been in the sheep population for over two centuries without any evidence whatsoever 
of being a risk to humans.”65 Reinforcing the claim that British beef posed little 
danger to consumers, the Chairman of the Meat and Livestock Commission, after 
having consulted MAFF, stated that:-
“[t]op British and European vets and scientists advising the European 
Community have studied the disease very carefully. They are agreed that 
everything necessary to protect public health is being done and they do 
not consider there is any danger to public health.”66
The question of safety came into sharp focus through the media, which, 
unsurprisingly, became a key conduit through which such reassurances could be 
challenged. In the months following the revelation of cross-species transmission, 
television, radio, and newspaper reports were saturated with stories of the ‘Mad Cow 
Threat to Humans and claims that '"Mad Cow Meat May Still Reach Dinner 
Table\ 68 An article in The Independent quoted scientists at the Neuropathogenesis 
Unit as accepting that there was a ‘remote possibility’ that the BSE agent was capable 
of passing from infected cows to humans.69 A press report published in The Sun 
warned that BSE could present the biggest threat to human health since the bubonic 
plague.70 In two separate interviews, Professor Richard Lacey71 claimed that “in the 
years to come our hospitals will be filled with thousands of people going slowly and 
painfully mad before dying,”72 and described BSE as “the greatest of all the food- 
borne dangers and may kill five per cent of the population within a generation.”73 In 
the same year, Dr Helen Grant was quoted in four national newspapers as admitting
65 YB90/2.01/10.1.
66 YB90/1.22/4.3-4.4.
67 YB90/2.02/5.1.
68 Ibid.
69 North, R. ‘Cattle with Cow Disease “On Sale for Slaughter’” (4 January 1990) The Independent, as
cited in BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 1, Chapter 6, at paragraph 645.
70 Coleman, V. ’10 Reasons Why We Should Treat Mad Cow Like Black Death’ (12 May 1990) The
Sun, as cited in BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 1, at paragraph 653.
71 Emeritus Professor of Clinical Microbiology.
72 YB90/3.01/14.1.
73 YB89/10.00/1.1-1.4.
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that “some genetically susceptible people may have become infected with material by 
eating meat products.”74
The fraught relationship between the media, on the one hand, issuing alarming claims 
that the Government had taken too lightly the threat of human transmission, and red 
tape announcements, on the other, that British beef was safe to eat, was a recurring 
theme throughout the episode. Understandably, MAFF and other advisory bodies 
were concerned that the disclosure of information likely to deter the public from 
eating beef be avoided. There has already been widespread recognition that the 
ability of MAFF to properly regulate the potential threat of BSE was hindered by 
divided loyalty between the protection of public health and the safeguarding of the 
agricultural economy. A number of academic commentators have observed that, on 
balance, the protection of commercial interests surpassed the protection of human 
health.75 It is therefore unnecessary to pursue this point in much detail. At this stage, 
it is suffice to note that there existed a tension between MAFF’s two principal 
focuses.
In-keeping with the Government’s long-standing position, the Technical Director of 
the Meat and Livestock Commission declared that “[a]ll the scientific evidence -  as 
opposed to rumour, conjecture and guess -  provided by the leading veterinary 
surgeons and scientists in the UK and the rest of the EEC has indicated that UK beef 
is perfectly safe to eat.”76 In the same month, and after having described the risk of 
human transmission as ‘remote and theoretical’, the MAFF Food Safety Directorate 
issued a public statement maintaining that British beef was “not a public health risk
77and can be eaten with complete confidence.” Reaffirming this position, the Chief 
Medical Officer, Sir Donald Acheson, in a television interview, stated that “there is no 
risk associated with eating British beef’. Laying emphasis on the implausibility of 
transmission, and the undisputed validity of scientific advice, he claimed that:-
74 YB90/2.02/5.1.
75 See, for example, Little, G. ‘BSE and the Regulation of Risk’ (2001) 64 MLR 730-756, at pages 742- 
744.
76 YB90/5.14/3.1.
77 YB90/5.15/15.1.
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“I have taken advice from the leading scientific and medical experts in 
this field. I have checked with them again today. They have consistently 
advised me in the past that there is no scientific justification for not eating 
British beef and this continues to be their advice. I therefore have no 
hesitation in saying that beef can be eaten safely by everyone, both adults 
and children, including patients in hospital.”78
In order to bolster claims of safety, and following the recommendation of the 
Southwood Report that an expert committee be established,79 the Government 
announced the setting up of the Consultative Committee on Research into Spongiform 
Encephalopathies to advise MAFF on work already proposed or in progress on 
transmissible spongiform encephalopathies and priorities for future research. The 
Committee was chaired by David Tyrrell, a microbiologist who was Director of the 
Medical Research Council Common Cold Unit, and it subsequently came to be 
referred to as the ‘Tyrrell Committee’. Other Committee members included William 
Watson, Director of the CVL; Professor John Bourne, Director of the Institute for 
Animal Health; Robert Will, Consultant Neurologist at the Western General Hospital 
in Edinburgh; and Richard Kimberlin, ex-Acting Director of the Neuropathogenesis 
Unit, who had retired and founded an independent consultancy advising on TSEs.80
From the outset, the Tyrrell Committee recognised the potential implications of BSE, 
observing that there would be very serious consequences should the findings of the 
Southwood Working Party turn out to be incorrect. In stressing the importance of 
more rigorous investigations into the epidemiology of the BSE agent, the Committee 
noted that:-
“[t]his concern about BSE not being a dead-end infection, that it might 
possibly become a naturally endemic infection in cattle, not only had 
tremendous implications to animal health, the future of the epidemic, but 
it had implications to public health, because if the disease was not going 
to go away, then it would obviously present much more of a public health
78 YB93/3.11/1.1.
79 DoH and MAFF (1989) at paragraph 8.5.
80 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 1, at paragraph 286.
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problem than if it were to go away in due course. So the two things are 
extremely important, and I think were of major significance to us in 
focusing on quite a lot of the research programme, to anticipate that.”81
In particular, David Tyrrell expressed concerns about the way in which Southwood 
Report had dealt with the human health issue, noting that in hindsight, he would 
have:-
“given more emphasis to the probable large numbers of [subclinically] 
infected cattle which would be by now around, and what we were going to 
do about them, and something ought to be done, because that is where 
risks for the human population would mainly arise.”82
In response to the Committee’s recommendations that a thorough examination of the 
disease be undertaken, the Government established a new expert standing committee 
-  the Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) -  to review BSE 
research and to provide policy advice “on almost every decision that the Government
0 - 7
was faced with in handling BSE.” SEAC was chaired by David Tyrrell, and, 
although its membership changed and enlarged over time, its inaugural members were 
Robert Will, William Watson, and Richard Kimberlin of the former Tyrrell 
Committee, and virologist, former Deputy Director of the Animal Virus Research 
Institute, and former member of the Agricultural Research Council Committee on 
Scrapie, Professor Fred Brown.84
In a letter to the Chief Medical Officer,85 SEAC was unyielding in its conclusion that 
the threat posed by BSE to human health was insignificant. It stated that:-
“[i]n our judgement any risk as a result of eating beef or beef products is 
minute. Thus we believe that there is no scientific justification for not 
eating British beef and that it can be eaten by everyone.”86
81 Transcript number 6, at page 42; see also BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 11, at paragraph 2.36.
82 Transcript number 6, at page 36.
83 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 1, at paragraph 294.
84 Ibid. Volume 11, at paragraph 4.18.
85 YB90/7.24/3.1-3.12.
277
The Committee went on to note that “any theoretical ’BSE risk' in British beef is so 
remote that for practical purposes it can be ignored”*1 SEAC’s unequivocal stances 
that British beef could be eaten safely by everyone remained the cornerstone of the 
Government’s policy throughout the episode.88 Even after the death of two dairy 
farmers in 1993, Robert Will,89 in an article published in The Lancet, claimed that “a 
causal link with BSE is at most conjectural”. In relation to the death of the second 
farmer, the National CJD Surveillance Unit -  established in May 1990 at the Western 
General Hospital in Edinburgh to assess the epidemiological characteristics of CJD 
and to determine whether its occurrence was linked to BSE90 -  concluded that there 
was no evidence to suggest that it was anything other than a case of sporadic CJD.91 
Subsequent reports that a teenager, Vicky Rimmer, suffered from an unidentified 
neurodegenerative disease gave rise to widespread speculation that she had been 
infected as a result of eating BSE-contaminated meat. During a period of intense 
media coverage, Professor Richard Lacey was cited by the Daily Mirror as saying 
that:-
“I am convinced CJD can be caused by eating meat from cows infected by 
Mad Cow Disease. The only explanation for this 16-year-old girl’s
M
condition is that it came from contaminated beef.”
In a further article, published in The Times, Professor Lacey insisted that:-
“We know the most likely food is processed food, the burgers and 
sausages. We have to assume it was these products, from cows, that 
caused the disease and we think this is the first certain case of BSE
93infecting a member of the human race by this method.”
86 YB90/7.24/3.2, at paragraph 7.
87 YB90/7.24/3.3, at paragraphl.3.
88 Witness statement 251, at paragraph90.
89 Director of the CJD Surveillance Unit.
90 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 8, at paragraphs 3.2-3.5.
91 YB93/7.12/1.1.
92 YB94/1.26/20.1.
93 YB94/1.26/16.1, emphasis added.
278
In response to these claims, which were perceived by the Government as unwarranted 
attempts at scare-mongering, Sir Kenneth Caiman, Chief Medical Officer at the 
Scottish Office, issued a statement confirming that there was no evidence that BSE 
caused CJD and, similarly, no evidence that eating beef caused CJD. He noted that:-
“[m]y position as the Government’s Chief Medical Officer means that I 
must provide the best advice to the public, whatever the consequences. If 
there was any evidence that suggested a link, then I would regard it as my 
responsibility to bring it to public attention.”94
This presumption that lacking evidence of human transmission was definitive proof 
that future human infection was unlikely became central to the political administration 
of the BSE crisis. Against a background of public anxiety about the safety of bovine 
meat and products, Ministers and officials became all the more wary of taking 
decisions that were not supported by scientific evidence for fear that it would 
undermine the credibility of their actions and expose policy to the criticism of 
subjectivity. The Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, for example, testified 
that “there is no evidence whatsoever that BSE causes CJD and, similarly, not the 
slightest evidence that eating beef or hamburgers causes CJD.”95 This outlook was 
endorsed by the Chief Medical Officer for Scotland, who, on learning that schools and 
caterers were removing beef from the menu, pointed out that:-
“[t]he Government’s independent scientific advisors are saying 
consistently that there is no evidence at all that eating beef or other foods 
derived from beef is dangerous. My general advice to people is therefore 
to carry on eating what you want to eat as you were before. We have no 
evidence of any connection between BSE and CJD.”96
On countless occasions, government officials were unwavering in their attempts to 
restore public confidence in British beef. In a press release issued by the Department 
of Health in October 1995, Sir Kenneth Caiman avowed that there was no evidence of
94 YB94/1.26/3.1.
95 Cited in Consumers in Europe Group, BSE: Briefing and Recommendations from Consumers in 
Europe Group (Consumers in Europe Group; London; 1996) at page 1.
96 YB95/12.07/12.1.
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a link between meat eating and the onset of CJD and that beef was perfectly safe to 
eat.97 Similarly, in February 1996, a Meat and Livestock Commission briefing paper 
stated, categorically, that British beef posed no risk to human health, and that “[t]he 
existence of BSE in cattle and the similar disease in humans, CJD (Creutzfeldt Jakob 
Disease) does not imply any link between the two”.98
These explicit statements, suggesting in absolute terms that beef infected with the 
BSE agent would not harm consumers, held considerable sway over the political 
response to the epidemic. An exercise in comparing the political interpretation that 
lacking evidence of human transmission implied that BSE was unlikely to pose any 
risk to human health in the future, and the reality that origin, nature, and behaviour of 
the BSE agent were scientifically uncertain, is perhaps proof that the disparity derived 
from semantic inconsistency rather than any deliberate attempt to mislead the public. 
In giving evidence to the Phillips Inquiry, Sir Donald Acheson testified that “[i]t was 
several years after the events that I became aware that for some people the word ‘safe’ 
without qualification means zero risk.”99 In fact, it was not until September 1996 -  
some six months after the Government acknowledged that the most likely cause of 
CJD was BSE -  that the Chief Medical Officer first conceded that such definite and 
unconditional reassurances of ‘no risk’ or ‘negligible risk’ were inappropriately 
applied, in the circumstances.100
11.4 Controlling the agenda
It can be said that MAFF’s reticent approach -  its initial denial followed by a 
reluctant admission of minimal risk -  mirrored its response to previous health scares. 
The sharp increase in Listeria-related disease in the 1970s and 1980s provoked 
MAFF’s Central Public Health Laboratory to prohibit the release of any information
97 YB95/10.05/7.2.
98 YB96/1.3/4.1-4.2.
99 Witness statement 251, at paragraph92.
100 As cited in Bartlett, D. M. C. ‘Mad Cows and Democratic Governance: BSE and the Construction of 
a “Free Market” in the UK’ (1999) 30 Crime Law & Social Change 237-257, at page 244.
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about food and food poisoning. At first, MAFF announced that not only did Listeria 
not cause disease, but it was not even associated with food.101
An information embargo during the BSE crisis occurred on two levels. There was a 
distinct failure, on the part of MAFF, to disclose full and accurate information about 
BSE, first, to other Government departments, and second, to the public.102 This 
section focuses on the restricted communication between MAFF and the Department 
of Health prior to March 1988. It illustrates that the interplay between the two 
departments was central to the premise that there was no risk, or that there was a 
negligible risk, of human transmission. Restrictions imposed by MAFF on 
communication to the Department of Health were pivotal in shaping the finding that 
the risk of repercussions to human health was remote.
A MAFF scientist recalled that “in December 1986 when recognition of the disease 
began to crystallise, we were at the Central Veterinary Laboratory placed under strict 
confidentiality as to discussing it with outside people”.103 The Phillips Inquiry also 
acknowledged that, during the first half of 1987 “there was a policy of restricting, 
even within the State Veterinary Service, the dissemination of any information about 
the new disease.”104
The allocation of administrative responsibilities was such that MAFF was accountable 
for consumer protection as well as matters falling within veterinary expertise, whilst 
the Department of Health was charged solely with human health surveillance.105 
However, as this section illustrates, this division was not sustained in reality. In fact, 
by deliberately restricting communication with the Department of Health, MAFF 
initially retained control over the administration of the potential impact on human 
health. The resulting imbalance in the distribution of responsibility between MAFF 
and the Department of Health was pivotal in the construction of risk. It is shown that, 
although MAFF controlled the development of measures designed to deal with the
101 Dealler, S. F. (1996) see pages 31-3 and 165-6.
102 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 3, at paragraph 2.6.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid. at paragraph 2.137.
105 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 1, at paragraph 1225.
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potential impact of BSE on human the health, it lacked expertise, not only in relation 
to TSEs in general, but also in respect of strains known to infect humans.
Alistair Cruickshank explained that the restricted distribution of information had its 
roots in the belief within MAFF that it was highly unlikely that BSE was capable of 
jumping the species barrier, rendering unnecessary any interaction with the 
Department of Health. The following extract makes it clear that the decision to 
sidestep consultations with the Department of Health was a consequence of a 
preceding assumption of the improbability of human transmission. Cruickshank was 
of the opinion that:-
“the implications of BSE for public health were considered as soon as the 
similarities with other diseases emerged. For many months the 
information available was too scanty to permit any conclusions to be 
drawn. In any case although there did appear to be similarities to certain 
very rare human diseases, there was also a similarity with the very 
common sheep disease, scrapie, which had no known implications for 
human health. The latter point was seen as more significant than the 
former. Throughout this period my understanding was that DHSS [i.e. the 
Department of Health] were taking the same view as MAFF, namely that 
any decisions on action would have to await further information. This 
seemed entirely reasonable at the time.”
In a written statement, the Chief Veterinary Officer confirmed that the decision to 
curtail the transfer of information to the Department of Health merely reflected the 
fact that MAFF was already confident that the impact of BSE was confined to cattle. 
He made his position clear, stating that:-
“[a]lthough the number of cases of BSE increased in the latter half of 
1987, there were no developments that caused me to change my opinion 
that there was no reason to believe that BSE might present a danger to 
humans. . .
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It is worth noting that if (a) I had reason to believe between December 
1986 and March 1988 that BSE might present a danger to humans (even 
though other spongiform encephalopathies, indeed TSEs, were not 
recognised as a potential danger); and (b) a minimum amount of scientific 
information about BSE had been collated, I would formally have informed 
the DHSS, who would have primary responsibility for producing any 
reasoned examination of possible implications for humans. However, the 
factors set out at (a) and (b) above were not in my opinion fulfilled.”106
It is crucial that, in addition to indicating that it had already been established that the 
risk of human transmission was negligible, the lack of interaction between MAFF and 
the Department of Health was fundamental in ascribing credence to the claim that it 
was most unlikely that BSE would affect humans. In other words, the failure to 
disclose information to the Department of Health was the product, as well as the 
source, of the construction of risk during the BSE crisis. Not only did it expose that 
MAFF had interpreted the threat of transmission as ‘nonexistent’ or ‘remote’, but it 
also engendered a perception that the BSE agent was only capable of infecting 
animals. Thus, not only did the information embargo emulate an accepted 
construction of risk, it simultaneously gave rise to the impression that the risk was 
minimal. The fact that MAFF prohibited the release of information was itself a 
seminal factor in shaping the expression of risk.
In June 1990, Hilary Pickles of the Department of Health remarked that:-
“[t]he most serious delay was in informing DH in the first place. The 
CVL were aware of a new disease in January 1987, they informed their 
Ministers in June 1987, but wrote to us . . . only on 3 March 1988, by 
which time they had 500 cases.”107
106 Witness Statement 3, at paragraphs 38-9.
107 YB90/6.1/3.1.
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She went on to note that:-
“[a]t a day to day working level there appear no problems, and direct 
requests for information known to exist have not been refused. The 
difficulty is with information that is not being volunteered in the way we 
would expect with full trust and cooperation. If we not know about it, we 
do not know to ask for it.”108
It is significant that, although it was documented that several MAFF scientists had 
expressed concern regarding their limited expertise in relation to human TSEs and 
inability to predict the behaviour of BSE, MAFF continued to control the handling of 
the potential threat posed by BSE to human health. Despite the fact that, in a meeting 
on the 22 July 1987, both the MAFF Permanent Secretary Sir Michael Franklin and 
Parliamentary Secretary Donald Thompson stressed the importance of a specialist 
investigation into all possible consequences of human infection, responsibility for 
human health remained with MAFF -  primarily because of its failure notify the 
Department of Health of the its endeavours. In a landmark statement, the Head of the 
CVL’s Pathology Department commented that:-
“[the] CVL did not have any medically trained staff and was not in a 
position to make a detailed assessment of the possible risk that BSE could 
transmit to man. Neither was the necessary expertise to make this type of 
assessment available elsewhere in MAFF. Assessment of the possible risk 
to man was a matter for the Department of Health, who had the necessary 
medical expertise to consider these matters. Initially CVL, and MAFF 
generally, set about gathering together as much information as possible 
about the new disease in cattle to allow MAFF to assess the risk to animal 
health and allow others to assess the risk to human health.”109
Hence, given that MAFF was incapable of conducting a thorough assessment of the 
human health risks stemming from BSE, it can be said that its interpretation of risk 
more accurately reflected its commitment to protecting the commercial interests of the
108 YB90/6.01/3.1.
109 Witness statement 7ID, at paragraph 15.
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vagricultural export industry. From this perspective, it is clear that the definition of 
risk propounded by MAFF was contextually dependent on scientific prognoses that 
took into account political and commercial dynamics of the threat of BSE. In the 
words of Winter:-
“So here we have a situation where the politicians could claim, on 
scientific grounds, that a ban was not necessary whereas the scientists 
only came to this conclusion because of their perceptions of the political 
unacceptability of a ban.”110
Whilst it is clear that scientific findings underpinned the political administration of the 
disease, it must also be borne in mind that the definitions of risk emanating from 
scientific assessment were shaped by the political and commercial climate. To some 
extent, the notion of risk running through the BSE episode confirms the inescapability 
of a subjective construction of the future. And, given that it is a socially constructed 
concept, there is no obvious reason why risk cannot be defined in a more inclusive 
manner. The real constraint throughout was an indisputable lack of knowledge. With 
a disease with such a long incubation period, and without any tests for infection, it 
was obvious that a better understanding of BSE would not be achieved for some 
time.111 Nevertheless, the practice of disguising political decision-making with 
seemingly objective and certain scientific evidence continued to govern the handling 
and control of BSE. This relationship between science and managing the unknown 
was particularly evident in the legislative response to the disease.
110 Winter, M. ‘Intersecting Departmental Responsibilities, Administrative Confusion and the Role of 
Science in Government: the Case of BSE’, [1996] Parliamentary Affairs 550, at page 563.
1,1 Witness statement 1, at paragraph 30.
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Chapter Twelve 
Legislative response to scientific uncertainty
12.0 Introduction
A study of the legislative response to BSE is useful in that it reveals the capacity of 
law to act in the face of scientific uncertainty. Here it is shown that the credence 
attributed to scientific analyses that construed the risk of BSE transmission to humans 
as ‘low’ or ‘negligible’ precluded legislation from providing an anticipatory recourse 
to the disease. Although MAFF officials were adamant that the legislative framework 
was founded on the precautionary principle, reliance on the notion of precaution was, 
in fact, merely superficial. An examination of legal measures adopted in the face of 
BSE illustrates that undue prominence was ascribed to the notion of scientific 
certainty, rendering ostensible the practical implication of precaution.
This section introduces the major pieces of legislation enacted in response to the 
human health risk posed by the BSE agent. In doing so, it illustrates that the approach 
adopted by the Government in managing the threat of BSE was preventive, rather than 
precautionary. This preventive/precaution distinction is central to the argument that 
scientific means of risk analysis are incompatible with the application of 
precautionary measures. It is important to keep in mind that whilst the working 
definition of the precautionary principle requires that, in the face of scientifically- 
w/zknown risks, steps are taken to avoid potential harm, preventive measures are only 
implemented as a means of dealing with scientifically-Arzoww risks. The process of 
risk assessment, which is traditionally underpinned by the tenets of scientific 
discourse, reflects the assumption that the ideals of scientific certainty are realised 
through definite statistical expressions of reality. Conventional practice dictates that 
articulating the unknown is best achieved by projecting the past into the future. The 
extent to which the past has been observed and quantified inevitably determines 
whether the future can be predicted with scientific certitude. Thus, being able to 
distinguish between scientific uncertainty and scientific certainty is fundamental to 
the task of determining whether precautionary or preventive action is taken. Because
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scientific risk assessment is inherently dependent on certain and absolute expressions 
of the future, legislation emanating from that assessment can be specifically directed 
towards governing known threats, and can thus be described as preventive action. 
Accordingly, legislative responses to scientifically-determined risk can be designed so 
as to manage the precise nature and scope of its expected impact. Measures adopted 
in line with the precautionary principle, however, operate to curb the effects of an 
uncertain and undefined threat before scientific assessment has established, by 
statistical means, its frequency and magnitude.
Having shown that the significance of the division between scientific uncertainty and 
scientific certainty in risk assessment lies in its capacity to determine whether 
precautionary or preventive action is taken, it can be said that scientific means of risk 
analysis are inherently incompatible with the ethos of precaution. At the crux of the 
matter is the degree to which the formal discourse of science and the notion of 
precaution consider the unknown to be captured by scientific prediction. The conflict 
between the precautionary principle, on the one hand, and scientific risk assessment, 
on the other, is the product of their conflicting perceptions of the future. Whereas the 
precautionary principle is founded on the understanding that science is not always 
capable of articulating the future, scientific risk assessment is a procedural 
manifestation of the notion that it is always possible to express the future in certain 
terms, provided that similar events in the past can be used to aid prediction. In other 
words, the distinction lies in the extent to which they accept that the future is 
foreseeable. Here it is worth bearing in mind Beck’s in/calculability distinction and 
Jonas’ theory of responsibility referred to in Chapters Eight and Nine.
12.1 Habermasian model of legitimacy
The interface between scientific certainty and anticipatory methods of controlling the 
future was particularly evident in the legislative response to risk during the BSE 
crisis. Measures aimed at abating the spread of disease reflected the notion that law 
derives legitimacy from science. Here, reference is made to Habermas’ schema of the 
rational society in which a pre-scientific stage of communication is a precursor to the
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‘scientization’ of what are essentially political decisions.1 Using Habermas’ theory as 
its starting point, this section shows that early legal responses to BSE in the UK were 
based on ‘post-scientized’ knowledge of the disease, and as a result were 
predominantly reactive in nature. From this perspective, it can be said that legislation 
designed to control the potential threat of human transmission was preventive, rather 
than precautionary. In order to acquire legitimacy, the legislative response to human 
health implications necessarily mirrored scientized conclusions -  that is, evidence 
obtained by scientifically-authoritative means -  about BSE.
Habermas explains that the traditional dependence of the expert on the politician has 
reversed itself. Accordingly, the politician becomes “the mere agent of a scientific 
intelligentsia”,3 creating a situation in which the politician is left with nothing but a 
‘fictitious’ decision-making power.4 He claims that the principles of modem society 
are structured in such a way that they serve as conceptual instruments for the 
domination of nature, and, citing Marcuse, he argues that this domination:-
“perpetuates and extends itself not only through technology but as 
technology, and the latter provides that great legitimation of the 
expanding political power, which absorbs all spheres of culture.”5
By demonstrating the impossibility of the autonomy of human life, technology 
provides “the great rationalization of the ww freedom of man”.6 The submission of 
human life to technology that increases productivity of labour and improves the 
standard of living is perceived neither as irrational nor as political. Rather, the fusion 
of technology and domination protects and promotes the legitimacy of scientific 
supremacy.
1 Habermas, J. Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science and Politics (Heinemaim 
Educational; London; 1971) Chapter 5, see in particular pages 62-63.
2 Ibid. at page 63.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Marcuse, H. One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Beacon 
Press; Boston; 1964) as cited by Habermas, J. (1971) at page 84.
6 Ibid., emphasis added.
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It follows that an understanding of Habermas’ theory of scientization is imperative in 
the study of legislation during the BSE crisis. By examining the Government’s 
legislative response to the epidemic, it becomes apparent that the legal measures 
adopted are symbolic of pas£-scientized, or scientifically certain, knowledge. 
Consequently, legislation can be described as preventive -  despite the fact that the 
emergence of BSE was the ultimate test-bed for the precautionary principle. 
However, because the threat of the transmissibility of BSE to humans was framed as a 
scientifically certain risk, legislation was directed as specific and known danger. 
Essentially, the application of the precautionary principle was circumvented by the 
marginalisation of uncertainty.
A significant feature of the legal response of the UK Government to BSE is that it 
starkly contrasts with the approach adopted by the EC. Whereas legislation in the UK 
was largely reactive, the EC engaged in precautionary and pre-scientific risk 
management. By juxtaposing UK and EC tactics in the handling of BSE, it becomes 
clear that the operation of the precautionary principle is wholly dependent on its 
relationship with science and scientific risk assessment. As this section shows, UK 
legislation during the BSE crisis fell outside the working definition of the 
precautionary principle solely because it was formulated to offset a scientifically- 
known risk. Conversely, legislation implemented at EC level was indicative of the 
view that the mere possibility that BSE could transmit to humans rendered legal 
intervention necessary before scientific assessment could quantifiably define the 
likely impact of the disease. To that end, EC institutions utilised the precautionary 
principle as a medium through which concerns about the safety of British beef could 
be validly expressed.
12.2 Chronological summary: assessing the relationship between legislation 
and precaution/prevention
The following chronological account begins in 1988, marking the passing of the first 
piece of UK legislation dealing with potential human health implications of BSE. 
This section goes on to introduce and summarise the main programme of legislation 
introduced in the UK between 1988 and 1996 designed to protect the public from any
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possible risk of exposure to BSE, pending its eradication. The legislation referred to 
here tended only to apply in England, Wales, and Scotland. Separate legislation was 
introduced in Northern Ireland, and in most cases it was identical to provisions 
implemented in the rest of the UK. Measures in England, Wales, and Scotland were 
adopted by means of secondary legislation under the Animal Health Act 1981, the 
Food Safety Act 1990, the Agriculture Act 1970, and the European Communities Act 
1972. In Northern Ireland, secondary legislation was established pursuant to the 
Diseases of Animals (Northern Ireland) Order 1981, the Food Safety (Northern 
Ireland) Order 1991, the Food Order (Northern Ireland) 1989, and the Agriculture Act 
1970.
The Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Order 19887 was introduced on 21 June 
1988, with the exception of article 7, which came into force almost a month later. Its 
primary aim was to protect animal health, and this was evident in its provisions
o
requiring the classification of BSE as a notifiable disease and the isolation of BSE 
suspects when calving.9
In relation to the possible human health implications of BSE, the most significant 
provision in the 1988 Order was article 7 which prohibited the sale, supply, and use of 
ruminant feedstuffs that is known to, or believed to, contain ruminant-derived protein. 
The ban (also known at the ‘ruminant feed ban’) took effect from 18 July, and was to 
apply until the end of December 1988 while a review of rendering processes was 
undertaken. It was introduced, as soon as the ‘feed-borne’ hypothesis had been 
established, to prevent further transmission of BSE via human consumption. During a 
meeting held in May 1988, the MAFF Parliamentary Secretary to the Commons 
confirmed that “the aim of the proposed order was to suspend the use of animal 
products in meat and bonemeal used in cattle feed, as this appeared to be the source of 
BSE.”10 In a submission to the Minister, Mr Rees acknowledged that there was 
evidence to reinforce the validity of the feed hypothesis, stating that:-
7S.I. 1988 No.1039.
8 Article 4.
9 Article 6.
10 YB88/6.2/3.1.
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“[t]he Chief Veterinary Officer is satisfied from the information produced 
by the investigating teams that the source of the transmissible agent which 
has caused BSE is through meat and bone meal derived from sheep 
material in which the rendering process has failed to inactivate the scrapie 
agent. Affected sheep material is continuing to be processed and it must 
be assumed therefore that cattle continue to be exposed to infection.”11
The issue here is the timing of the introduction of the 1988 Order. Despite the fact 
that MAFF officials were aware of BSE in November 1986, it took a further 19 
months for the Government to take legislative action. This alone suggests that 
Government failed to endorse the precautionary principle in its legislation. Indeed, 
the lapse between the initial identification of the disease and the decision to 
implement legal measures to control the spread of disease and reduce the chances of 
human transmission is itself indicative of risk prevention rather than precaution. It 
seems that the general view between 1986 and 1988 was that BSE posed a 
hypothetical risk that was so unlikely to materialise that anticipatory precaution was 
unnecessary. The administration of disease control was structured in such a way 
that scientific certainty was deemed to be a prerequisite to decision-making and the 
formation of policy and legislation. And, given that the benchmark of certainty was 
regarded as being fundamental to the management of BSE, the existence of a mere 
hypothetical risk was not enough to instigate any form of legislative response. In his 
witness statement, Dr Richard Kimberlin noted that:-
“[i]n 1988 and early 1989 we were faced with a number of uncertainties.
It is understandable that it should be suggested that in such circumstances 
it would be better to ‘err on the side of safety’ and I accept that point of 
view as a general principle. But to be governed solely by that approach, 
without due consideration, creates the danger that ill-conceived protective 
measures will be advanced, which would in my view by unacceptable.
Any recommendation must be based on science and logic.”13
11 YB88/5.6/3.3.
12 The Inquiry into BSE and Variant CJD in the United Kingdom (HMSO; London; 2000) Volume 6, at 
paragraph 8.201.
13 Witness statement 95C, at paragraph 20.
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X:
In other words, without any evidence that there was a real risk that BSE would infect 
humans, the Government was of the opinion that precautionary measures were 
superfluous. The full thrust of this anti-precautionary stance arose from fear that such 
measures would unduly increase public consciousness of risk and cause unwarranted 
injury to the agricultural industry. It is interesting that, despite the fact that MAFF 
was responsible, in part, for the public health implications of animal disease, the 
Ministry placed its duty to defend commercial interests at the forefront of its agenda. 
It is true that the implications on the cattle industry of a precautionary legislative 
response to BSE were potentially colossal.
This combination of post-scientized decision-making and MAFF’s commitment to 
safeguarding of trade in British beef entirely removed the option of precautionary 
responses from decision-making. Mr Stephen Crampton of the Consumers in Europe 
Group observed that “[t]he term ‘precautionary principle’ was not to the best of our 
recollection one that was used in 1990.”14
Yet, in spite of the envisaged repercussions of precautionary measures, the course of 
events up until 1996 is testimony to the argument that the BSE legislation lacked the 
critical foresight necessary to avoid the full scale of the disease’s eventual impact.15 
The Phillips Inquiry states that, had it not been for the Government’s failure to 
implement anticipatory provisions, “later chapters of the BSE story would have made 
much happier reading.”16 Naturally, with hindsight, it is easy to make accusations 
that the Government should have taken action before it did. However, the argument 
here is that, in view of the fact that scientific uncertainty was acknowledged almost 
immediately after pathological analyses had discovered BSE, the precautionary 
principle should have come into play and anticipatory measures adopted long before 
June 1988. There can be little doubt that, from the outset, the Government failed to 
frame the ‘BSE problem’ in terms of uncertainty, instead opting to impose the 
archetype of scientific certainty and requirements of proof. Rather than accepting that 
the cause and nature of BSE were unknown, simple statements of ‘risk’ were made, 
masking factors such as the incomplete knowledge and understanding of the dynamics
14 Witness statement 244, at paragraph 15.
15 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 3, at paragraph 4.3.
16 Ibid. at paragraph 4.2.
292
of the disease, inadequate consideration of underlying assumptions and uncertainty, 
and the failure to account for individual perceptions and values in the decision­
making process. This disregard for uncertainty can be described as a consequence of 
the entrenchment of scientific ideology in law.
The following legislative provisions demonstrate the centrality of science in the legal 
handling of BSE. The introduction of legislation was prompted by scientific 
evidence, and the scope of legislative provisions was determined by scientific 
knowledge. The upshot was a range of legislative initiatives, aimed at ascertained 
risk and dealing in absolutes. Legislation evolved from an ethos of reason and 
rationality, instigating the scientization of what was, essentially, political and value­
laden decision-making. This obvious tension between the scientific underpinnings of 
legislation and the inability of scientific assessment to calculate a definite risk with 
confidence runs to the core of the BSE episode. As a result of the inability of science 
to produce any credible quantitative risk assessment of the transmissibility of BSE, 
the Government embarked upon a legislative campaign, explicitly subscribing to 
notions of ‘sound science’, which created a false appearance of accuracy, control, and 
expertise.
As a result, legislation came to be perceived by MAFF as a major tool in bolstering 
consumer confidence and reassuring the public that all plausible eventualities were 
known and regulated. Conversely, precautionary measures were rejected for fear that 
they would give rise to the disclosure of scientific uncertainty, which would in turn 
generate a hostile consumer response and, more generally, public distrust of the 
Government’s management of BSE. The significance attributed to the maintenance of 
consumer confidence, as well as the vigour of the beef export industry, led to the 
fallacious translation of uncertainty into the language of ‘risk’, ‘scientific expertise’, 
and ‘legitimacy’. Although it was institutionally recognised within MAFF that, in 
areas where the magnitude and scale of risks are unknown, the precautionary principle 
should apply before exposing the public to unknown hazards that may be beyond its 
control,17 the Government took the line that the authority of scientific knowledge 
made it applicable to realms beyond realisation. The legitimacy assumed by formal
17 Witness statement 554, at page 6.
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discourses of science became an invaluable asset to the Government’s programme of 
reassurance.
The passing of the Zoonosis Order18 and the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
Order (No.2)19 in December 1988 illustrate the excesses of ‘scientism’ and the 
operation of the rhetoric of risk. It is fundamental that both provisions were founded 
on the belief that scientific evidence had established that the risk of human 
transmission to humans was remote.20 Article 3(1) of the Zoonosis Order identified 
that BSE was a ‘risk’ within the meaning of section 29 of the Animal Health Act 
1981.21
The Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Order (No.2) revoked and re-enacted the 
provisions of the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Order 1988 (the ‘principal 
Order’), and its aims were two-fold. First, it was directed at protecting animal health 
by prolonging the ruminant feed ban, and second, it endeavoured to safeguard public 
health by prohibiting the use of milk from suspected BSE-infected cattle for any 
purposes other than feeding to the cow’s own calf. Indeed, the only substantial 
change to the principal Order was the article 9 the inclusion of prohibitions on (i) the 
sale and supply for human consumption or for feeding to animals or birds of any milk 
from a bovine animal which is affected or suspected of being affected with the 
disease; (ii) the use of any such milk in the manufacture of any product for sale or 
supply for human consumption or for feeding to animals or birds;23 and (iii) the 
feeding (subject to certain exemptions) of any such milk to animals or birds.24
It is interesting that, despite the fact that the Government made repeated claims that 
the 1988 provisions exhibited an unnecessarily high level of prudence and precaution, 
they were only introduced after it had been scientifically established that particular 
action was required. The milk prohibitions contained in article 9, for example, were
18 S.I. 1988 No.2264.
19 S.I. 1988 No.2299.
20 See, for example, Hansard 1988 H.C. Oral Answers Col. 864 (1 December 1988).
21 Section 29 of the Anim al Health Act 1981 confers powers upon Ministers to make an order 
designating any such disease which, in their opinion, poses a risk to human health.
22 Article 9(l)(a).
23 Article 9(l)(b).
24 Article 9(2), subject to article 9(3).
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only introduced when there was evidence to suggest that there was a “greater 
possibility for infectivity to pass into milk”.25 Similarly, the Bovine Offal 
(Prohibition) Regulations 198926 came into force once there was scientific evidence 
that certain parts of bovine tissue were likely to pose a threat if they entered the 
human food chain. The Regulations prohibited the use of certain specified bovine 
offals (SBO) in human food following “clear scientific advice”27 that the ban on the 
use of the brain, spinal cord, the spleen, the thymus, the tonsils, and the intestines of 
bovine animals aged six months or older was necessary.
In response to scientific evidence that the host range of BSE was wider than initially 
anticipated, the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (No.2) Amendment Order 199028 
was introduced to extend the ban on the use of SBO to cover all animal feed. It is 
significant that, on the basis of SEAC’s recommendations, the remit of the Order was 
limited to the protection of animal health. SEAC had concluded that the experimental 
transmission of BSE to a pig did not provide evidence that the disease was capable of 
infecting humans. In its report, SEAC categorically stated that “[t]here were no new 
implications for human health in the fact that a pig had shown itself susceptible under
>JQ
laboratory conditions.” It went on to note that:-
“[s]ince this result shows that pigs can get spongiform encephalopathy, 
even though there is no evidence that they have done so in the field, we 
believe that pigs should no longer be fed with protein derived from bovine 
tissues which might contain the BSE agent, i.e. those ‘specified’ bovine 
offals that are already excluded from human consumption. It would make 
sense to extend this prohibition to feed for all species, including 
household pets, as other species have now developed spongiform 
encephalopathies.”30
This post-scientific approach to legislative action highlights the reactive, as opposed 
to proactive, nature of the provision.
25 YB88/3.10/2.1.
26 S.I. 1989 No.2061.
27 89/11.1/1.1.
28 SI 1990 No. 1930.
29 YB90/9.07/1.4.
30 YB90/9.20/10/2.
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The Bovine Offal (Prohibition) (Amendment) Regulations 1994 extended the ban on 
the use of SBO in human food to include the intestines and thymus of calves under six 
months of age. When the SBO Regulations were initially drafted between June and 
November 1989, there was no scientific evidence to suggest that the offal from calves 
aged under six months posed any risk to human health. However, in June 1994, a 
MAFF-funded pathogenesis experiment detected BSE in the intestines of calves that 
had been fed infected tissue at the age of four months.31 This development in the 
knowledge and understanding of BSE instigated an immediate response, and the 
Regulations, as amended, broadened the definition of ‘SBO’ to include the intestines 
of an animal, aged six months or under, which had died or been slaughtered in the 
UK.32
Likewise, the Specified Bovine Offal Order 199533 was a response to evidence of an 
increase in the host range for BSE34 and advances in the scientific understanding 
about the amount of infectious material sufficient to cause infection.35 The Order 
established tighter controls in relation to the handling of SBO, prohibiting the removal 
of brains and eyes, stipulating that the whole skull had to be disposed of as SBO, and 
prohibiting the removal of spinal cord from vertebral column. In contrast to the 
notion of precaution, legislation pertaining to the threat of BSE repeatedly trailed 
behind the scientific analyses that legitimised its existence, introducing safety 
measures to prevent a scientifically-ascertained risk. Even eight years after the first 
piece of BSE-related legislation was introduced, provisions continued to be 
formulated on the back of scientific evidence. Despite the fact that, as soon as BSE 
had been identified, neither its nature nor its potential impact were scientifically 
certain, it took the Government until 20 March 1996 to introduce emergency control 
measures prohibiting that sale of any meat from bovine animals for human 
consumption,36 pending a more targeted approach to the protection of human health.
31 YB94/6.17/1.1.
32 Regulation 3(b) of the Bovine Offal (Prohibition) (Amendment) Regulations 1994.
33 S.I. 1995 No. 1928.
34 BSE Inquiry (2000) Volume 6, at paragraphs 5.250-5.262.
35 Ibid. at paras 5.263-5.264.
36 Beef (Emergency Control) Order 1996 S.I. 1996 No.961.
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12.3 Tracing the relationship between law and science
Although by the time BSE was first identified in 1986, the precautionary principle 
was well-established concept of environmental and health protection in UK law and 
policy, the legislative responses to the disease can be described as preventive rather 
than precautionary.37 It is therefore surprising that the adoption of legislation 
designed to control the risk of BSE was postponed until it had scientific backing. 
However, although the working definition of the precautionary principle stipulates 
that action should be taken before scientific certainty is available, a brief exercise in 
uncovering the rationale behind the inter-relationship between scientific knowledge 
and the law sheds some light on the scientific underpinnings of BSE-related 
legislation.
According to McEldowney, the affiliation between science and law stems from an 
unparalleled combination of circumstances during the development of English law. 
Central to his theory is the argument that the emergence of statistical studies in the 
seventeenth century bridged the gap between law reform, social science, and science 
in the formal sense of the word. Furthermore, he traces the evolution of the common 
law, noting that its rule-bound fashion and heavy reliance on analytical methods of 
problem-solving resulted in a display of characteristics more often associated with the
• I Qprinciples of mathematics, and was formed using a deductive system of reasoning. 
To a large extent, these attributes are portrayed by Blackstone’s legacy that English 
law is “a science which distinguished the criteria of right and wrong”.40 It is this early 
association of the law with empiricism that underpins the association between law and 
standards of scientific proof. The development of case law reflected attempts at 
systematising legal responses to comparable social problems -  evident from the
37 See policy documents explicitly citing the ‘precautionary principle’: The 12th Report of the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution: Best Practicable Environmental Option (HMSO; London; 
1988) page 11, at paragraph2.30; HSE Discussion Document, Generic Terms and Concepts in the 
Assessment and Regulation of Industrial Risks, 30 June 1995 (HMSO; London; 1995) page 31, at 
paragraphs 66-67; Interdepartmental Liaison Group on Risk Assessment, Use of Risk Assessment 
Within Government Departments (HMSO; London; 1996) page 5, at paragraph9.
38 Petty, W. and Graunt, J. (Kelley, A. M. (ed)) Natural and Political Observations on the Bills of 
Mortality (Fairfield; New Jersey; 1986).
39 McEldowney, J. ‘The Environment, Science, and Law’ (1998) 1 Current Legal Issues 109-127, at 
page 112.
40 Blackstone, W. Commentaries on the Laws of England Vol. X (University of Chicago Press; 
Chicago; 1979) at pages 5-6.
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notion of stare decisis and the doctrine of precedent which are founded on the 
application of judicial reasoning by analogy with similar facts. McEldowney notes 
that “[technical and formal rules, applied in an analytical and scientific way, rooted 
the common law to the empiricist tradition and the logic of the judges.”41
Although it is true that modernity has placed new demands on environmental law to 
develop means of taking anticipatory action, the dependence of the law on scientific 
evidence continues to determine both the nature of legislative initiatives, and the point 
in time at which they take effect. McEldowney remarks that:-
“[w]ell-publicized problems such as acid rain, global warming, depletion 
of the ozone layer, and loss of biodiversity are examples of scientific 
research explaining the nature and scope of anthropologic impacts on the 
environment. Scientific data and analysis provide us with an 
understanding of the environment. In fact, only rarely do environmental 
problems not depend on some scientific explanation.”42
Yet, whilst it is important that science plays an important part in defining the 
environment and environmental threats, it is equally important to recognise that, for as 
long as the formal discourse of science continues to dominate analyses of potential 
risks, the precautionary principle is inoperable. The crux of the matter is the degree to 
which the scientific discourse presides over methods of prediction. As the following 
section illustrates, legislative initiatives adopted by the EC during the BSE crisis were 
more precautionary than preventive — not because risk analysis in the EC was anti- 
scientific in its approach, but because risk assessment reflected the notion that 
definitions of risk were inclusive and relative.
12.4 The EC dimension
Unsurprisingly, given its commitment to achieving the internal market, early legal 
responses introduced by the EC focused primarily on establishing procedures for trade
41 McEldowney, J. (1998) at page 112.
42 Ibid. at page 109.
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in animals and animal products. Directive 89/662/EEC,43 for example, required that 
veterinary checks be conducted by the ‘state of dispatch’ to assess the health of live 
animals transported between Member States, replacing veterinary checks at the 
Community’s internal frontiers. An amending act, Council Directive 92/118/EEC,44 
set out rules for the treatment, storage, and documentation of animal products. 
Moreover, it introduced the concept of the ‘real risk’ of the spread of transmissible 
diseases -  which was later relied upon by the Commission to justify its export ban on 
British cattle and beef. According to article 10(4) of the Directive:-
“[t]he decisions ... [governing trade and imports] must be taken on the 
basis of evaluation and, if appropriate, the opinion of the Scientific 
Veterinary Committee, of the real risk of the spread of serious 
transmissible diseases or of diseases transmissible to man which could 
result from movement of the product, not only for the species from which 
the product originates but also for other species which could carry the 
disease or become a focus of disease or a risk to public health.”45
This extract is particularly useful because it suggests that the Directive conceived risk 
assessment as more than just a technocratic exercise.
Commission Decision 94/474/EEC46 prohibited the export from UK to other Member 
States live cattle aged more than six months and offspring of cows which might have 
been infected with BSE. These trade rules were supplemented by more detailed 
measures concerning the preparation of meat and cattle-feed, such as the trimming of 
meat from BSE-infected herds to remove tissue that might contain diseased protein, 
prohibiting the export of offal, and specifying that protein from cattle is not to be 
included in cattle-feed.
43 Directive 89/662/EEC concerning veterinary and zootechnical checks applicable in intra-Community 
trade in certain live animals and produce with a view to the completion of the internal market [1990] 
OJ L224/29, 18 August 1990.
44 Directive 92/118/EEC laying down animal health and public health requirements governing trade in 
and imports into the Community of products etc. [1992] OJ L62/49, 15 March 1993.
45 Directive 92/118/EEC Article 10(4), emphasis added.
46 Commission Decision concerning certain protection measures relating to bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy and repealing Decisions 89/469/EEC and 90/200/EEC [1994] OJ LI94/96, 29 July 
1991, as amended by Commission Decision 95/287/EC [1995] OJ L181/40, 18 July 1995.
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A week after the UK Government enacted the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
(Amendment) Order 1996, and following the release by SEAC of new scientific 
evidence of a causal link between BSE and CJD, the European Commission adopted 
Decision 96/239/EC,47 banning the export of British cattle, beef, and beef products, 
such as gelatine, semen, and tallow. The risk of contracting CJD from BSE-infected 
meat was assessed by the Scientific Veterinary Committee of the European Union,48 
and, although the Committee concluded that it was not possible to prove that BSE was 
transmissible to humans, there was a ‘real risk’ that there may be human health 
implications. The fifth recital of the preamble to Decision 96/239/EC provided that:-
“[wjhereas, under current circumstances, a definitive stance on the 
transmissibility of BSE to humans is not possible; whereas a risk of 
transmission cannot be excluded; whereas the resulting uncertainty has 
created serious concern among consumers; whereas, under the 
circumstances and as an emergency measure, the transport of all bovine 
animals and all beef and veal or derived products from the United 
Kingdom to the other Member States should be temporarily banned; 
whereas the same prohibitions should also apply to exports to non- 
Member countries so as to prevent deflections of trade.”49
There can be not doubt that the approach adopted by the Community is profoundly 
different reaction to BSE. Evidence shows that, not only did the EC consider that 
precautionary action was vital in minimising its impact, but it also reveals a deep- 
rooted recognition that the notion of ‘risk’ is as much about values as it is probability. 
In contrast to the traditionally-held view that no evidence of risk amounted to ‘no 
risk’, EC provisions reflect the notion that science should inform, but not make, 
precautionary decisions. Furthermore, they suggest that EC policy focused primarily 
on solutions rather than diagnosis. Instead of having the risk analysis of existing 
knowledge as its principal focus, EC measures are indicative of a far more flexible,
47 Commission Decision 96/239/EC on emergency measures to protect against bovine spongiform
encephalopathy [1996] OJ L78/47, 27 March 1996; Article 1, as amended by Commission Decision
96/362/EC [1996] OJ L139/17, 12 June 1996 which lifted the ban on bovine gelatine, semen, and 
tallow because scientific evidence suggested that they were safe.
48 as required by Directive 92/118/EC [1992] OJ L62/49, 15 March 1993.
49 Commission Decision 96/239/EC on emergency measures to protect against bovine spongiform
encephalopathy [1996] OJ L78/47, 27 March 1996, fifth recital.
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holistic, and forward-looking approach to uncertainty. They were explicit about the 
uncertainty with which BSE presented itself, and placed a greater premium on acting 
in response to credible early warnings as opposed to achieving scientifically-certain 
information before intervening.
12.5 Determining whether Habermas’ model might be applied to the EC 
response to BSE
It is interesting that the UK and EC responses to BSE should be so different. Given 
that Habermas’ model of scientization has been presented as an explanation for the 
overt reliance of UK legislation on scientific expertise, it is perhaps surprising that 
this model does not obviously apply to the EC approach. There are two possible 
explanations for this: either the process of scientization did occur in the EC, but 
Directives were based on fundamentally different science to UK provisions thus 
resulting in incompatible conclusions about the risk of BSE; or, scientization did not 
apply in the formation of the EC legislation in question. An examination of case law 
in the European Courts is useful in determining the most likely rationale for such 
strikingly different legislative responses to BSE.
In July 1996, the ECJ observed that Commission Decision 96/239 EC on emergency 
measures to protect against BSE was based unequivocally on the scientific advice of 
independent bodies such as SEAC and the Scientific Veterinary Committee of the 
European Union. In particular, the Court noted that in the light of the Veterinary 
Committee conclusion that, on the basis of available information, it was not possible 
to prove that BSE was transmissible to humans,50 Decision 96/239 EC was both a 
proportionate and legitimate measure.51 The mere fact that human transmissibility 
posed a potential, albeit inconclusive, danger justified protective measures taken in 
pursuit of the protection of public health. And, despite having been framed as a
50 Case C-180/96 R, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Commission of the 
European Communities, European Court Reports 1996 page 1-03903, at paragraph 17; see Report from 
the Scientific Veterinary Committee on the Potential Risk of Transmission of BSE to Humans and 
Animals from Bovine Colostrum, Milk and Milk Products, VT/8197/96 Version J (Final), at page 28.
51 C-157/96, The Queen v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Commissioners of Customs & 
Excise, ex parte National Farmers’ Union, European Court Reports 1998, page 1-02211, at paragraph 
73.
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response to the lacking definitive stance on the transmissibility of BSE,52 it is clear 
both from the ECJ judgment and the Commission Decision contents that the measure 
was founded on scientific findings.53
Following from the recognition that EC measures were fundamentally rooted in 
science, it is useful to turn the legal basis of legislation at UK and EC levels. A 
comparison of the provisions conferring powers upon the UK Government and the EC 
Commission to adopt respective protective measures illustrates that the disparity in 
the interpretation of scientific findings can perhaps be explained by differences in the 
legal basis of UK and EC legislation. Underpinning measures taken in the UK, 
section 29 of the Animal Health Act 1981 provides that:-
“the Ministers may by order designate any such disease or organism 
which in their opinion constitutes such a risk”
Whereas section 29 of the Animal Health Act 1981 is explicit in its mention of risk, 
the legal basis of measures taken by the EC are more broadly formulated in terms of 
the protection of human health. Decision 96/239 EC, for example, was introduced 
using powers deriving from Articles 3(o), 129, and 174 of the EC Treaty. Article 3(o) 
provides that Community objectives include the ‘contribution to a high level of health 
protection’. Article 129 requires that the Community ensures that a high level of 
protection is maintained,54 and that health protection forms a constituent part of other 
EC policies.55 Furthermore, Article 174 demands that Community policy pursues the 
objective inter alia of protecting human health56 and is based on the principles of
cn t
preventive action, precaution, and polluter-pays. In short, a distinction is made here 
between the narrow risk-based approach of section 29 and the wider scope of EC 
health protection requirements. Whereas under Animal Health Act 1981 the general 
powers of Ministers to make orders and authorise regulations is limited to situations 
in which there is a clear risk to human health, provisions of the EC Treaty are framed
52 Preamble to Decision 96/239 EC, fifth, sixth and seventh recitals.
53 See minutes of Council meeting held on 1-3 April 1996, Luxembourg, in which it was held that EC 
measures were based on ‘the best available scientific evidence’ (at paragraph 1).
54 Article 129(1) EC Treaty.
55 Article 129(3) EC Treaty.
56 Article 174(1) EC Treaty.
57 Article 174(2) EC Treaty.
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in such as way that powers are conferred for the adoption of measures in pursuit of the 
protection of human health, irrespective of whether a risk is said to exist. Although 
this semantic distinction might on the face of it appear to be insignificant, it is at least 
evidence that the framing of UK and EU legislation was inevitably going to differ as a 
result of their noticeably distinct origins. Reference to the term ‘risk’ by the Animal 
Health Act, in conjunction with the proviso that only those hazards that are deemed 
by Ministers to pose a risk fall within the scope of section 29, reinforces the notion 
that expert constructions of risk rank above all others. The practical implication of 
this sentiment is that the ‘objective’ findings of scientific analysis defeat subjective 
interpretations of risk.
By virtue of this specific phrasing of section 29, it was perhaps unavoidable that 
legislative measures in the UK relied so heavily on allegedly scientifically-certain 
predictions. By contrast, Article 174 of the EC Treaty is broader in its approach to the 
protection of human health, and the absence of the requirement that a risk must exist 
before action can be taken lends itself to a more explicit dialogue of scientific 
incertitude. In this respect, the EC Treaty provisions underlying legislative responses 
to BSE can be described as enabling the operation of precaution. Conversely, section 
29 of the Animal Health Act 1981 can be understood as being the antithesis of a 
precautionary approach by virtue of its restriction to situations which are deemed by 
Ministers to constitute a risk.
Aside from the linguistic distinction between the legal basis to UK and EC legislation, 
their divergent approaches to BSE might also be explained as a symptom of the 
different administrative role adopted by the UK Government and EC institutions.
co
Whereas a model of ‘European governance’ ensures the fair treatment of Member 
States, providing a means of arbitration between different interests and securing the 
fulfilment of Treaty provisions, the exercise of powers at UK level is, as expected, 
directed at protecting domestic welfare. EC institutions during the BSE crisis, 
therefore, were concerned with safeguarding consumer interests at an inter-State level, 
whilst the principal focus of the UK Government was confined to the national export
58 Wincott, D. ‘Looking Forward or Harking Back? The Commission and Reform of Governance in 
the European Union’ (2001) 39(5) Journal of Common Market Studies 897-911 at page 898; see also 
Commission of the European Communities, European Governance: A White Paper, COM (2001) 428 
Final (EC Commission; Brussels; 25 July 2001) at page 8.
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industry and the health impact on UK citizens. Thus, cost-benefit analyses 
undertaken at EC level necessarily demanded a consideration of a wider range of 
diverging perceptions of risk than those conducted in the UK.
It follows from a comparison of the scope of section 29 and Article 174 EC Treaty 
that the EC legislative approach to BSE did reflect the Habermasian model of 
scientization -  although it adopted a broader interpretation of scientific ‘risk’ than the 
UK during the administration of BSE. The EC response was clearly mindful of the 
state of scientific knowledge in relation to the potential threats of BSE to human 
health, although, unlike the UK approach to risk assessment, it was rather more 
explicit about uncertain information, contradictory advice, and gaps in knowledge. It 
can be said that whilst the EC scheme of legislation was undoubtedly based on 
scientific interpretations of the risk posed by BSE -  thus conforming with the theory 
of scientization -  it also paid heed to the broader socially-informed claims that 
scientific claims of ‘low’ or ‘remote’ risks were essentially unsubstantiated. By 
acknowledging that scientific knowledge was incomplete, EC institutions were able to 
adopt legislation in a manner that was more consistent with the ideals of the 
precautionary principle. This brings to attention an critical aspect of precaution in 
relation to BSE. It suggests that taking ‘precautionary action’ is not simply a matter 
of taking earlier action than prevention; it is also a matter of creating a dialogue that 
allows for an unreserved expression of scientific uncertainty.
The following section supports the contention that in situations in which neither the 
nature not scale of an impending hazard is known, decision-making would be better 
served by focusing on the unknowns rather than constructions of the future based on 
very loosely similar pasts. This section offers a theoretical argument as evidence that, 
although the rhetoric of risk was critical to the marginalisation of uncertainty and 
maintaining scientific supremacy, the application of formal risk assessment to BSE 
was a futile exercise.
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12.6 The bureaucracy of risk
“Uncertainty is present in the decision-making process, not so much 
because there is a future as that there is, and will be, a p a s t ... We are 
prisoners o f the future because we will be ensnared by our past”59
Indeed, the handling of the risk posed by BSE exposes the limitations of traditional 
forms of risk modeling. In order to demonstrate the shortcomings of conventional 
assessment, this section conceptualizes events during the BSE episode in a theory 
called ‘the bureaucracy of risk’. In doing so, it draws heavily on the works of 
Bernstein, Knight, Keynes, and Hacking.
In his comprehensive study of the notion of ‘risk’, Bernstein captures the fundamental 
problem of prediction, stating that:-
“The information you have is not the information you want.
The information you want is not the information you need.
The information you need is not the information you can obtain.
The information you can obtain costs more than you want to pay.”60
In recognizing that risk assessment procedures are continually faced with incomplete 
knowledge from which to extrapolate an understanding of the future, he notes that 
uncertainty is an inescapable reality of the process of prediction. Central to 
Bernstein’s theory is the notion that risk assessment is a means of “putting the future 
at the service of the present.”61 And, given that the future is incomprehensible until it 
has manifested itself as the present, the only way in which they determine the future is 
by consulting the past. For him, the issue boils down to the extent to which the past 
can determine the future. He notes that:-
59 Dixon, R. ‘Uncertainty, Unobstructedness, and Power’ (1986) 8(4) Journal of Post Keynesian 
Economics 585-590 at page 587.
60 Bernstein, P. L. Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk (John Wiley & Sons; New York; 
1996) at page 202.
61 Ibid. at page 1.
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“We cannot quantify the future, because it is an unknown, but we have 
learned how to use numbers to scrutinize what happened in the past. But 
to what degree should we rely on the patterns of the past to tell us what 
the future will be like? Which matters more when facing a risk, the facts 
as we see them or our subjective belief in what lies hidden in the void of 
time?”62
The practice of projecting the past into the future takes on a deeper significance in 
modernity because hazards are known to present themselves with increased frequency 
and scale. The gravity of the potential implications of BSE to human health was 
clearly a motivating factor in the utilization of previously observed scrapie patterns. 
The mere possibility that BSE might jump the species barrier resulted in an increased 
incentive to define the unknown future with discernible certitude.
Yet, in spite of the perceived benefits of certitude in the expression of prediction, past 
performance is “a frail guide to the future.” Simply because similar events have 
been observed repeatedly in the past “is a poor excuse for believing that they will 
probably occur in the future.”64 The incidence of surprise in reality leads Knight to 
describe the unknowable future as a symptom of ‘the uncertainty problem’65 He 
claims that a priori reasoning does not remove indeterminacy from the future,66 and 
that at the root of the uncertainty problem, in economics at least, is the forward- 
looking nature of the economic process itself.67 Indeterminacy prevails because it is 
impossible to encapsulate the novelty with which the future presents itself using 
backward-looking models. Knight argues that:-
“[Any given] ‘instance’ ... is so entirely unique that there are no others or 
not a sufficient number to make it possible to tabulate enough like it to
62 Ibid. at page 6.
63 Ibid. at page 298.
64 Ibid. at page 226; see also Keynes, J. M. A Treatise on Probability: Exploration of the Meaning and 
Application o f Probability (Macmillan; London; 1921) at page 407.
Knight, F. H. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (Century Press; New York; 1921) at page 237.
66 Bernstein, P. L. (1996) at page 220.
67 Knight, F.H. (1921) at page 237.
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form a basis for any inference of value about any real probability in the 
case we are interested in.”68
This sentiment was also reflected by Chesterton, in his book Orthodoxy, when he 
acknowledged that the pervasiveness of uncertainty cannot be overcome by the desire 
to define the future in precise terms. He noted that:-
“[t]he real trouble with this world of ours is not that it is an unreasonable 
world, nor even that it is a reasonable one. The commonest kind of 
trouble is that it is nearly reasonable, but not quite. Life is not an 
illogicality; yet it is a trap for logicians. It looks just a little more 
mathematical and regular than it is; its exactitude is obvious, but its 
inexactitude is hidden; its wildness lies in wait.”69
It is evident that this ‘uncertainty problem’ was central to the construction of risk 
during the BSE crisis. Juxtaposing the forward-looking nature of risk assessment 
with the backward-looking character of the scrapie analogy, it becomes apparent that 
the identification of the risk of human transmission as ‘remote’ was a matter of social 
construction rather than scientifically corroborated fact. This construction lies at the 
heart of the theory of the ‘bureaucracy of risk’. From this perspective, the tradition of 
numerically characterizing the future forms part of the ‘great bureaucratic 
machinery’70 of risk. The appeal of defining future threats using the rhetoric of risk is 
that it implies a superficial neutrality in the perception of impending events.71 Their 
existence is presented in absolute, as opposed to relative, terms. This led Hacking to 
conclude that “the taming of chance by statistics does not introduce a new liberty.”72 
By employing the concept of ‘risk’ to define future events, the freedom to perceive 
the future as an unknown entity is effectively restricted. In this sense, risk is 
prescriptive in design, and, to that end, it is limited in its understanding of potential 
hazards. In fact, this is a detail that is commonly overlooked by conventional models
68 Ibid. at page 226.
69 Chesterton, G. K. Orthodoxy (Lane Press; New York; 1909) at pages 149-50.
70 Hacking, I. ‘How Should We Do the History of Statistics?’ in Burchell, G. et al. (eds) The Foucault 
Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Univerisity of Chicago Press; Chicago; 1991) Chapter 9, at page 
181.
71 Ibid. at page 184.
72 Ibid. at page 194.
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of risk assessment is that the concept of ‘risk’ is a matter of choice rather than of 
fate.73 Bernstein claims that the word ‘risk’ can be traced to the Italian ‘risicare’, 
which means ‘to dare’.74 And yet, traditionally, risk assessment is founded on the 
notion that the future imitates the past.
Keynes, in particular, is skeptical of claims that the utility of prediction derives from 
observations of the frequency and magnitude of past events. He claims that:-
“[t]here is little likelihood of our discovering a method of recognizing 
particular probabilities, without any assistance whatever from our 
intuition or direct judgment ... A proposition is not probable because we 
think it so.”75
Of course, this relativist position lies in stark contrast to the process of scientific risk 
assessment which claims to have an unshakable basis in norms such as objectivity, 
rationality, impartiality and certitude. In relation to BSE, it is argued that the 
uncertainty with which the disease presented itself was offset by the implementation 
of the formal discourse of science as a means of constructing a certain and defined 
risk. By employing the ‘bureaucracy of risk’, uncertainty came to be portrayed as an 
identifiable and known entity. During a House of Commons debate about the 
Government’s reassurances that BSE posed no risk to human health, Professor Lang 
pointed out that the restrictive nature of scientific risk definitions excluded due 
consideration of its subjective and contextual elements:-
“Even if MAFF and Mr Hogg, repeating what Mr Gummer and Mr 
Dorrell said back in 1989 when he was Junior Minister of Health, say that 
beef is .100 per cent safe, I do not think that the public now believes that 
view. This is why I quoted earlier an opinion poll of only two weeks ago.
You are essentially having promises o f certainty put into a situation o f 
uncertainty as far as the consumer is concerned ... The issue now is the
73 Bernstein, P. L. (1996) at page 8.
74 Ibid.
75 Keynes, J. M. (1921) at pages 3-4.
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psychology of risk. There is a burgeoning literature by academics that I 
would recommend the Committee spend some time looking at.”76
These promises of certainty were, of course, impossible to maintain. Yet, in spite of 
their emptiness, they were crucial in ascribing authority to scientific knowledge and 
upholding the concept of expertise. In this respect, the BSE case study provides an 
unparalleled example of hyperbolic statements of scientific certainty against a 
backdrop of indeterminate information and human ignorance. And, as Tickner 
recently argued at a conference on Ecological Risks and Precaution in the Nordic 
Countries, ‘the way we do science inhibits the operation of precaution.’77 By relying 
on the projection of the past into the future, scientific assessment places undue 
emphasis on applying what is known to what is unknown. Furthermore, in its framing 
of BSE as purely a scientific problem, risk assessment simply reinforced the notion 
that the articulation of the future is a matter solely for expert surveillance. In his 
address the House of Commons in May 1990, Martyn Jones MP expressed concern 
over the unwarranted reliance of policy on so-called scientific expertise, stating that:-
“I do not profess to be an expert on this subject. We have had a definition 
of ‘expert’ as ‘ex’ being the unknown factor and ‘spurt’ being a little drip 
under pressure, and we are bandying the word about rather too much.”78
12.7 What difference would the precautionary principle have made?
The pertaining question at the end of this case study is: what difference, if any, could 
the precautionary principle have made? Any answer will of course require a degree of 
imagination, and suggestions made in the following section are in no way intended to 
provide a definitive retrospective solution to the BSE problem. It is not my intention 
to make propose an infallible model of precaution to counter the dangers posed by 
BSE to humans. Instead, this section makes tentative statements about the way in
76 House of Commons Agriculture and Health Committees’ Joint Report: BSE and CJD: Recent 
Developments HC-331 (HMSO; London; 1996) at page 127, emphasis added.
77 Tickner, J. ‘Scientific and Political Setting: Key Concepts of Precaution and Risk Assessment’ at the 
Conference on Ecological Risks and Precaution in Nordic Countries, University of Oslo, 26-27 May 
2005.
78 Martyn Jones, MP, Clywd, South-West, Hansard 1990 H.C. Col. 1012 (17 May 1990).
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which precautionary conduct might have fitted into the complex sequence of events 
between 1986 and 1996.
The significance of the BSE case study lies in its illustration of the argument that 
problems with the precautionary principle extend beyond it definitional deficit. It has 
shown that the operation of a precautionary mindset is limited not only by the lacking 
consensus in relation to the meaning and scope of precaution, but more importantly, 
by the deeply-rooted institutional reliance of risk assessment on notions of ‘sound 
science’. To some extent, it is reasonable to suggest that an overhaul in the 
relationship between Government decision-making and scientific knowledge -  
including a broadening of what is meant by ‘knowledge’ and ‘expertise’ -  might 
induce a more precautionary approach to the future. Although this is a desirable end, 
it is neither a realistic nor attainable result in a political climate confronted with the 
judicial review of decision-making. That is to say, whilst scientific supremacy in the 
analysis of impending hazards presents a serious challenge to the workability of the 
precautionary principle, the dominance of science in risk assessment should perhaps 
be expected in view of the judicial review of decision-making.
The issue here is to determine when the precautionary principle might have come into 
effect. The critical period in which initial precautionary measures might have been 
called for is between November 1986 when the Central Veterinary Laboratory first 
identified BSE and June 1988 when the BSE Order 1988 came into effect. The 
following chronological account refers to the main events occurring between these 
two dates. It illustrates that, in the 19 months preceding the adoption of the BSE 
Order 1988, there was ample opportunity to implement measures consistent with the 
ideals of precaution. Working on the basis that the precautionary principle is 
triggered by scientifically uncertain threats, precautionary territory was entered into as 
soon as it was recognised that BSE might pose a threat, albeit uncertain, to human 
health. On the evidence, it appears that a potential link between BSE and human 
spongiform encephalopathies was first made by Raymond Bradley, Head of the 
Pathology Department at the CVL, in December 1986. Certainly, by June 1987 it was 
widely recognised within the scientific community that there were considerable 
deficiencies in knowledge about the nature and scope of BSE. It is therefore 
reasonable to suggest that a strict precautionary approach could have ensued late in
310
1986; or by mid-1987 at the latest. That is not to say that an outright ban on the 
human consumption of infected meat should have been adopted as an immediate 
response to counter the scientifically uncertain threat of transmission. Instead, a 
discourse of precaution, recognising not only that information about BSE was 
inconclusive and contradictory, but also that the scope of incertitude was unknown, 
could have been employed almost from the outset of the crisis. The outcome would 
have been potentially twofold. First, the legislative control of the human consumption 
of infected meat -  which in fact began with the introduction of the Bovine Offal 
(Prohibition) Regulations 1989, followed by the Bovine Offal (Amendment) 
Regulations in 1992 and the Specified Bovine Offal (Amendment) Order in 1995 -  
might have been imposed at the very early stages of the episode. Second, it is likely 
that a dialogue between MAFF and the public that was explicit about its limited 
understanding of BSE would have curbed the backlash of distrust in scientific 
expertise.
Brief chronology of events: November 1986 -  March 1996
November 1986 BSE identified by CVL
19 December 1986 Head of the Pathology Department, CVL, 
observed that:-
“[i]f the disease turned out to 
be bovine scrapie it would 
have severe repercussions to 
the export trade and possibly 
also for humans if for example 
it was discovered that humans 
with spongiform 
encephalopathies had close 
association with the cattle.”79
5 June 1987 Chief Veterinary Officer warned that the 
disclosure of information to the public 
might lead to:-
“hysterical demands for 
immediate draconian 
government measures”80
BSE identified as a 
potential threat to 
human health although 
pathological and 
epidemiological 
characteristics were 
unknown. Arguably 
this is ‘precautionary 
territory’.
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Furthermore, he noted that:-
“[i]n view of our very 
uncertain knowledge on the 
disorder it does not seem h b  
appropriate at this stage for 
MAFF to issue general 
information”81
15 October 1987 John Suich, MAFF Animal Health 
Division, comments that:-
“[t]here is no evidence that it 
[BSE] is transmissible to 
humans.”82
6 November 1987 32 cases of BSE confirmed on 29 farms83
10 November 1987 128 confirmed or suspected cases of BSE 
reported84
13 November 1987 181 cases of BSE confirmed85
20 November 1987 225 cases of BSE on 138 farms 
confirmed86
4 December 1987 Lord Montagu of Beaulieu expresses 
concern about the potential human health 
implications of BSE:-
“At the present time I 
understand little or no 
research has been done on 
whether this disease can be 
transmitted to humans through 
the consumption of beef from 
infected animals, and, until 
this is known, it seems quite 
wrong to me that it is possible 
to sell infected carcasses for
on
this purpose.”
15 January 1988 414 cases of BSE confirmed88
Acknowledgement 
of the limited 
understanding of 
BSE. The threshold 
of precaution has 
been satisfied.
Recognition of 
inherent uncertainty, 
although concerns 
about limited 
information on BSE 
were not incorporated 
into formal assessment 
procedures.
Scientific reliance 
on past evidence. 
Forming the basis of 
a preventative, 
rather than 
precautionary, 
approach.
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18 July 1988 Article 7 of the BSE Order 1988 came 
into effect imposing ruminant feed ban mm
13 November 1989 Bovine Offal (Prohibition) Regulations 
1989 came into force banning the use of 
certain specified offals for human 
consumption
12 March 1992 Bovine Offal Prohibition (Amendment) 
Regulations 1992 prohibited the use of the 
bovine head after the skull is opened in 
any food intended for human consumption
15 December 1995 Specified Bovine Offal (Amendment) 
Order 1995 prohibited the use of the 
bovine vertebral column in the 
manufacture of all MRM and other 
products for human consumption
29 March 1996 A targeted approach to the protection of 
human health: the Beef (Emergency 
Control) Order 1996 prohibited the sale 
for human consumption of any meat from 
bovine animals showing more than two 
permanent incisors
Imposition of legislation, 
but only after it had been 
established as a matter of 
‘scientific certainty’ that 
feedstuff was the most 
probable cause of 
infection.
The conclusion to draw here is that, had there been a more explicit dialogue about the 
uncertainty with which BSE presented itself, precautionary measures might have been 
adopted far sooner than the first legislative provision applying in relation to human 
transmissibility in July 1988. The implementation of legislation must be seen here as 
not only a measured response to scientifically-determined information about BSE, but 
also as an attempt, intentional or not, to reinforce scientific findings that BSE posed a 
negligible risk to human health. Here it is fitting to acknowledge that the decision to 
impose (or not impose, as the evidence suggests) precautionary measures must be 
considered in view of the fact that pressures from the cattle industry presented an 
enormous challenge to the Government -  the task of balancing potentially 
catastrophic and irreversible dangers to human health against potentially disastrous 
implications for the agricultural sector. Of course, determining whether and when
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precaution might come into play was never going to be a decision to be taken lightly. 
Furthermore, given the historical patterns of the scrapie agent, it was perhaps 
inevitable that, when presented with a broadly similar disease in cattle, MAFF was 
bound to draw a comparison and conclude that British beef was safe to eat. Yet, as 
the arguments in this thesis have shown that the application of precaution was 
certainly limited by the exclusive reliance on scientific assessment. If nothing else, an 
approach acknowledging the inadequacy of information about BSE would encourage 
earlier communication of scientific uncertainty and the potential implications of 
wwsound science.
The role of legislation in upholding the supremacy of scientific assessment during the 
BSE crisis is crucial. The interaction between legislation and scientific discourse is 
essentially a two-way process. Not only does scientific discourse confer legitimacy 
upon legislation, but legislation is itself a means of conferring legitimacy upon action 
taken in response to risk. The practice of imposing legal provisions to control the 
threat of transmission can be described as having a legitimating function. The 
argument that law is a significant tool in the legitimation of decision-making allows 
for a study of the BSE episode from a distinct legal perspective.
12.8 Legislation as a means of enforcing the bureaucracy of risk
It has already been established that the application of legislation in the regulation of 
the human impact of BSE is important because it reveals the intrinsic relationship 
between law and science. The dependence of legal regulation on wholly scientific 
constructions of risk is problematic because it precludes a truly anticipatory approach 
to the future. Luhmann comments on the typical concern of a normative orientation 
to be able to know now what the future entails:-
“We can ... hardly expect that risk problems ... can be solved within the 
framework of suitable legal forms. For in the case of risks we are not 
dealing with a future for which we can in our present determine how 
others are to behave in future situations. A risk cannot be violated. If the 
law can be expected to assume risks, this can only occur be
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detemporalizing the assessment of what is right and wrong. In other 
words, symbols such as legal force or legal validity have to be deployed 
with ‘binding’ effect regardless of whether the future proves a decision 
right or wrong.”89
Aside from the problem of the limited capacity of scientific assessment to predict 
future hazards, the imposition of legislation during the BSE crisis calls to mind the 
relationship between the law and its role in restoring public confidence in British beef. 
In addition to the function of scientific discourse in creating and legitimating specific 
perceptions of risk, a separate process of legitimation through the law was critical to 
the political reassurance that the spread of BSE was under control. The issue is the 
division between policy and law. There is a distinction -  not least in implication -  
between a rule promulgated, adopted or ratified by a Government and a rule that has 
been adopted as legally-enforceable. The passing of legislation in relation to BSE 
was a significant in that it conferred ‘unconstrained normative validity’90 on findings 
that the risk of human transmission was negligible. Drawing on the decisionistic 
model of legal theory expounded by Carl Schmitt, the process of enacting legal 
provisions to control the impact of BSE can be seen as creating legitimation in 
relation to the legislative content, but also, by extension, to the scientific opinion upon 
which the legislation was based. In his explanation of Schmitt’s theory, Luhmann 
notes that:-
“[t]he positivization of law means that legitimate legal validity 
[Rechtsgeltung] can be obtained for any given contents, and that this is 
accomplished through a decision which confers validity upon the law”.91
Habermas ’ Legitimation Crisis also reflects the view that formal rules of procedure 
provide a sufficient basis for the legitimation of a decision.92 He describes the notion 
of legitimacy as:-
“the abstract imperative validity [Sollgeltung] of norms that can do 
without a material justification beyond the following of correct procedure
99  93in origin and application”.
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Furthermore, Habermas goes on to note legal process is itself capable of establishing 
abstract validity, stating that:-
“legality can create legitimation when, and only when, grounds can be 
provided to show that certain formal procedures fulfil material claims to 
justice under certain institutional boundary conditions.”94
In accordance with this theory of legitimation, it is reasonable to suggest that, by 
virtue of strict adherence to legislative procedure, legal provisions adopted during the 
BSE episode had a specific legitimating function. The use of the term ‘legitimation’ 
is subtly different to the Habermasian notion. Whereas Habermas refers to legitimacy 
in relation to the degree to which the creation and implementation of law conforms 
with accepted procedure, it is used here in a broader manner to show that, by virtue of 
the observance of legal procedure, the content of legislation can also be regarded as 
‘legitimate’ in the sense that it is commonly accepted and normatively valid. The 
point here is that, as a result of their status as formal law, measures adopted in 
response to BSE were effective tools in enforcing the authority of scientific evidence 
that the disease posed little risk to human health. In this respect, the passing of 
legislation represented a nexus between law and science. On the one hand (as 
discussed above), scientific consensus legitimizes legal measures; whilst on the other 
hand, the forming of legislation legitimizes the scientific arguments reflected in its 
provisions. Legitimation in this context, therefore, is essentially a two-way process.
Yet, whilst this understanding of the legitimating relationship between law and 
science is useful in that it offers an insight into the role of legislation and scientific 
knowledge in underpinning claims that threats to the agricultural industry far 
outweighed those to human health, it overlooks the fact that science is a fallible 
process. Scientific authority is constructed, not out of its reputation for accuracy, but 
out of a social hierarchy of knowledge-production in which the scientific profession 
lies at the top of the order. At the root of scientific supremacy is the propensity of 
scientific method to pledge objectivity, certainty and numerical precision in its 
findings. However, as Kaiser points out, the failure of science to acknowledge its 
limitations opens up a space for irresponsibility in decision-making. He argues, and 
rightly so, that:-
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“[w]hen science is not self-conscious about its own potential pitfalls and 
shortcomings, when science assigns to itself a better track record than is 
justified by history, when science forgets the many idealizations and 
abstractions that are prerequisites for its model-building and testing 
procedures, and finally, when science portrays itself as unaffected by large 
commercial or political interests, it stands in grave danger of becoming 
socially irresponsible.”
The precautionary principle has traditionally been presented as a retort to the growing 
recognition that science might not be capable of perceiving, let alone expressing, 
future hazards. In spite of this interpretation, the operation of precaution continues to 
be determined by scientific constructions of the future. The problem, therefore, with 
the portrayal of science and precaution as alternatives is that the application of the 
precautionary principle is still ultimately governed by scientific understandings of the 
future. And, as this thesis has shown, science, and in particular the scientific expertise 
that informs policy-making in environmental protection, is far more divided, 
pluralistic, value-based, and uncertainty than formal scientific discourse suggests.
It is fitting here to end with an optimistic vision of an effective marriage between 
science and precaution:-
“A truly precautionary science does not refrain from entering discussions 
and arenas where values and ethics are at stake, but contributes to these in 
a balanced and self-reflective manner. The new objectivity in science is 
not an attempt to stick to “hard facts” alone. It is the “hard decisions and 
soft facts” that pose the challenge of our times. Thus, the new objectivity 
of precautionary science amounts to new modes of organizing and 
managing research, including new forms of quality control, with the aim 
of providing relevant information for policy-making that only scientific 
method can reveal, and that can effectively contribute to a balanced 
picture of the various options that society has to consider. Present-day 
science does not in general fit this picture, but luckily it contains all the
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intellectual resources necessary to become precautionary science to the 
benefit of society and nature.”95
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Conclusion
The precautionary principle is a fascinating concept, both in its own right, and in the 
contexts within which it has been presented. There is little doubt that it has marked 
the onset of a new era in environmental protection, and has generated considerable 
debate - amongst both academics and practitioners -  about the way in which the 
future is articulated and managed. Whilst the precautionary principle has been hailed 
as representing the most significant development in securing responsibility for 
potentially long-term impacts of decision-making, it has also been widely criticised 
for its empty definition and its paradoxical relationship with scientific risk 
assessment. This thesis presents the precautionary principle with particular reference 
to its definitional deficit, and its overt reliance on scientific means of constructing the 
unknown. It shows that the incongruity of its definition is reflective of its lacking 
normative content, which gives rise to an inescapably fluid concept whose meaning 
and application varies so considerably that it is impossible to isolate a single version 
of ‘the’ precautionary principle. The consequence of its inherent relativity is two­
fold. First, the precautionary principle is frequently the subject of litigation, meaning 
that judicial interpretations are often relied upon to flesh out the meaning of 
precaution. Second, subjective constructions of the implications of the precautionary 
principle generate a conceptual inconsistency with the scientific processes of risk 
analysis upon which its application is based.
Determining whether the precautionary principle applies in any given situation is a 
matter for scientific assessment. There is clear evidence of the affiliation between the 
operation of precaution and risk assessment at international, EC, and domestic levels. 
The implementation of risk assessment in this context is contingent upon there being a 
distinction between risk and uncertainty. It operates on the basis that risk can be 
quantified, but uncertainty cannot. Conventional models of risk assessment reflect the 
notion that, given that risk can be numerically articulated, risk predictions are certain. 
The specificity with which risk is expressed makes it an unambiguous construction of 
the future, and, to that end, it can be described as preserving the ideals of scientific 
certitude. Uncertainty, on the other hand, is hostile to specific numerical delineation.
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Taking Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration as its ‘working definition’, it is clear 
that the precautionary principle applies to hazards that are scientifically uncertain. On 
the strength of the risk/uncertainty dichotomy, risk assessment procedures are used to 
establish whether it is possible to assign numerical values to impending threats. If, on 
reflection of past events, a future hazard is expected to transpire in a similar manner, 
existing knowledge is used to quantify its materialisation. The quantification of the 
future precludes the application of the precautionary principle because it is perceived 
as having been predicted with scientific certainty.
The reliance of the precautionary principle on scientific assessment raises an 
interesting paradox. On the one hand, the application of precautionary measures is 
seen as a statement that scientific knowledge is incapable of calculating the 
occurrence of future hazards in any meaningful sense. On the other, determining the 
implementation of precautionary measures is exclusively scientific in its approach. 
The fundamental problem here is that the ideology upon which scientific foresight is 
based is deeply flawed. Subscribing to the central tenets of the philosophy of science, 
risk assessment models endorse the notions of scientific objectivity, rationality and 
certitude. The legitimacy of risk predictions is secured by the procedural dependence 
of risk assessment on the precepts that scientific knowledge is derived independently 
of context and individual prejudice, and that scientific findings possess universal 
meaning. As a result of its deeply-embedded roots in scientific dogma, risk 
assessment functions on the understanding that risk is an objective concept, and that 
risk predictions are obtained without recourse to their social backdrop.
As this thesis has illustrated, positivist approaches to risk have been criticised for their 
failure to acknowledge that the concept of risk encompasses factors other than its 
likely magnitude and occurrence. Social constructivist theorists point out that the 
impact of context on risk perceptions undermines claims made by risk assessment to 
objectivity and certitude. In essence, science is a social process.96 To that effect, risk 
is a socially-constructed concept. Whereas conventional forms of risk assessment 
reflect the notion that risk is an objective, linear and statistically-certain phenomenon, 
they overlook its incommensurability. Risk is an inherently subjective concept that 
can be perceived, but does not exist per se. Traditionally-deterministic approaches to 
risk assessment neglect the fact that it is impossible to reduce its multidimensional
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nature into universally intelligible quantities without reference to its complex, value­
laden, and non-linear aspects.
This thesis does not argue that conventional reductionist models of risk assessment 
have no place in policy-making relating to human health and the environment. 
Rather, it submits that recognition of the relativity of risk is evidence that risk 
estimates do not lend themselves to normative interpretation. Predictions deriving 
from scientific risk assessment do not convey deficiencies in its knowledge base, such 
as incomplete or disputed information. Consequently, risk calculations should not be 
construed as values that prescribe a particular course of action. By doing so, the 
precautionary principle is deemed to be inapplicable to hazards that have been 
quantified, despite the fact that their occurrence and impact are essentially unknown.
The works of social theorists such as Beck, Giddens, Luhmann and Jonas are crucial 
to the argument that risk in the modem era presents challenges for precaution. They 
focus on the part played by risk in modernity, and they make a temporal distinction 
between environmental hazards arising in the past and those in post-industrial society. 
Accordingly, hazards generated in the post-industrial modem era are essentially 
incalculable and uncontrollable. The uncertainty with which hazards in contemporary 
society present themselves makes them statistically unpredictable and uncontrollable 
by conventional means. Precautionary measures, therefore, become more desirable 
than reactive responses to risk.
The proliferation of uncertain risks in modernity is indicative of a process referred to 
by Beck as ‘reflexive modernisation’, which describes a situation in which 
technological and scientific progress acts upon itself and self-destructs. Modernity 
confronts itself as an object for reflection and undercuts its orthodox foundations. 
Consequently, there is a shift in the societal role of science. Whereas scientific 
knowledge had traditionally been looked upon as a source of rationality and expertise, 
reflexive modernisation has forced it to take on a new dual role. Scientific enterprise 
is not only a means of achieving knowledge, but it is also a channel through which 
existing knowledge is scrutinised. Although modernity has brought with it scientific 
progression, it has also drawn attention to the negative repercussions of technological 
advance. Despite the fact that science has traditionally been relied upon as a means of
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controlling future uncertainty, it has developed the capacity to generate as much 
uncertainty as it eliminates.
Models of scientific displacement are useful in illustrating the theory that science is 
incapable of producing absolute results. They serve to highlight that scientific inquiry 
is a dynamic process, and that scientific knowledge is continually superseded by new 
and more pressing problems. With particular reference to Kuhn’s model of scientific 
revolution, it is shown that uncertainty in scientific investigation is a universal 
predicament. The process of specialisation stimulates the constant evaluation of 
existing knowledge, generating new knowledge to replace old. This displacement 
indicates that the validity of scientific findings is contingent upon context, and that 
both the accuracy and legitimacy of findings are revised with time. The natural 
conclusion to draw is that, since it is always subject to displacement, science is 
incapable of framing the future in absolute terms.
In conjunction with theories of reflexive modernisation and scientific displacement, 
the process of individualisation is critical to constructions of risk in the modem era. 
The emergence of a pluralistic society, with increased emphasis on the individual 
rather than the collective, has brought about the liberalisation of the individual from 
rigid social structures without the formation of new social structures. This demise of 
social control structures removes any sense of consensus, certainty and security that 
were traditionally associated with the industrial phase. Furthermore, and as a result of 
the breakdown of collective risk monitoring and control, individuals are forced to bear 
the unforeseen consequences of decision-making. This institutional failure to be in 
command of unknown future not only increases the demand for the collective 
identification and management of hazards, but it also fosters processes of self- 
criticism, reflexive modernisation and ontological insecurity.
By virtue of the incalculability of future hazards, the perpetual creation by scientific 
investigation of scientific uncertainty, and the disembedding of social structures 
traditionally used to define and extend control over risk, it is possible to conclude that 
risk is scientifically uncertain, in the sense that it is adverse to objective calculation. 
Social constructivism is useful in that it recognises the inadequacies of conventional 
forms of risk assessment, and provides evidence to suggest that risk is indeed a
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subjectively-constructed concept. Unlike the positivist tradition, which champions 
principles such as realism, objectivism and rationality, the constructivist paradigm 
illustrates that risk is a social, rather than physical, problem. Social constructivist 
theorists claim that definitions of risk reflect factors beyond those represented in 
scientific assessment, and that the conceptualisation of risk is a subjective process that 
reflects social differentiations.
Yet, in spite of the shortfalls of conventional modes of risk prediction, scientific 
discourse continues to provide the principal means of engaging with the future. 
Although there are obvious practical benefits of reducing the unknown into digestible 
quantities, deterministic models of risk assessment are undoubtedly incapable of 
establishing a useful dialogue regarding the future. The BSE episode during the 
1980s and 1990s provides an excellent example of the failure of scientific assessment 
to identify and define future hazards. Focusing on the institutional marginalisation of 
uncertainty, this case study shows that the rhetoric of risk and the supremacy of 
scientific means of prediction created what might be referred to as the 
‘bureaucratisation of risk’. The institutional marginalisation of uncertainty operated 
on two fundamental levels -  first, in relation to the scientific investigation into the 
human health implications of BSE; and second, in relation to the political 
administration of the epidemic. On both counts, the threat of the transmission of BSE 
to humans was presented as a known and calculable risk, when in fact, there existed 
considerable uncertainty as to the source, nature and transmissibility of the disease.
Given that BSE was a novel disease, there was little by way of scientific information 
about its pathology and epidemiology. Instead of acknowledging that almost nothing 
was known about BSE, MAFF used models tracing the behaviour of the scrapie agent 
in sheep, claiming that the findings of scrapie observations could be applied to BSE 
because the diseases were analogous. This practice of projecting the past into the 
future in order to predict a course of events is crucial to scientific foresight. The 
argument is that, provided that past events and anticipated future events are broadly 
similar, the future will reflect the past. Scientists during the BSE crisis were adamant 
that, given that scrapie had existed in British sheep for hundreds of years and had not 
been known to transmit to humans, it could be said with confidence that BSE would 
not adversely affect human health.
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In relation to the political administration of the epidemic, the official stance was that 
BSE-infected meat was safe to eat. Repeated reassurances of safety were issued in 
the ten years after BSE was first identified in 1986 until the Government recognised 
that BSE was linked to CJD in 1996. Statements that BSE posed no, or low, risk to 
humans were based solely on scientific conclusions that the disease would mirror 
scrapie patterns. These scientific findings were accepted by the Government as 
categorical evidence that BSE was incapable of jumping the species barrier. 
Consequently, policy adopted in response to BSE reflected the belief that BSE was 
confined certain species, not including humans.
A study of the legislation implemented to control the impact of the draws attention to 
the relationship between the law and scientific certainty. Although legal measures 
during the BSE episode were often dressed up as upholding the concept of precaution, 
their reliance on scientifically-certain findings rendered them preventive, as opposed 
to precautionary. UK legislation was entirely reactive in nature, upholding 
Habermas’ theory that law derives legitimacy from science and illustrating post- 
scientized, or backward-looking, decision-making. EC provisions, on the other hand, 
were largely proactive in its approach, exhibiting a forward-looking, anticipatory 
approach.
This distinction between backward-looking and forward-looking approaches to 
decision-making introduces an interesting dilemma for the precautionary principle. 
Whilst the notion of precaution essentially requires a proactive response to impending 
hazards, and is an attempt at least to engage with the unknown future, scientific risk 
assessment looks to the past for answers, and is contingent on the establishment of 
scientific certainty before action is taken. The distinction, although subtle, marks the 
point at which the precautionary principle and scientific knowledge depart. Given 
that the operation of the precautionary principle is fundamentally tied to scientific 
analysis, it can be said that the disparity between the backward-looking nature of 
science and the forward-looking nature of precaution create an inconsistency that 
ultimately curtails the implication of the precautionary principle.
This thesis has brought together substantial literatures relating to sociological, legal, 
and scientific interpretations of risk. It has shown that, despite the fact that the notion
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of precaution is well recognised in the protection of human health and the 
environment, there is remarkably little consensus about its operation. A fundamental 
consequence of the definitional deficit of the precautionary principle, in my opinion, 
is ambiguity in relation to its point of application. This thesis has shown that, 
although there is some disagreement about the role of formal risk assessment in 
determining the operation of precaution, in practice, the application of the 
precautionary principle is traditionally ascertained by scientific means. This finding 
is evident in a case study of the BSE epidemic.
On the basis of this argument, broad conclusions can be drawn. The first is that the 
imposition of legal measures in the regulation of risk is heavily reliant on 
scientifically-verified evidence. The second is that scientific risk assessment is 
conceptually inconsistent with the aspirations of precaution. The third is that absolute 
reliance on risk assessment can limit the operation of precaution. The BSE crisis 
provides an excellent example of a scientific risk discourse inhibiting a more 
precautionary response to expected threats.
Whilst it is recognised that debate surrounding the precautionary principle will not 
end here, this thesis has taken steps to unite literature that is commonly presented in 
distinct categories. It acknowledges that the precautionary principle will continue to 
play an integral part in the protection of human health and the environment, but it is 
also mindful of its practical limitations. It endorses the precautionary principle as a 
central component of policy-making, but it serves as a warning that questions relating 
to its workability call for a consideration of far deeper issues concerning the dialogue 
between science and regulation.
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